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THE SECRET TEAM 

The CIA 

and Its Allies 

in Control of the United 

States and the World 



L. FLETCHER PROUTY 
Col., U.S. Air Force (Ret.) 



Copyright © 1973, 1992, 1997 by L. Fletcher Prouty 
All Rights Reserved 



March 1997: 

This 1997 edition of the book is 
available in its entirety on Len Osanic's 



rip-roaring 1997 CD-ROM, The 

Collected Works of Col. L. Fletcher Prouty along with -600MB of 70+ 
articles, 100 images, 30 topics and 6 hours of audio material. Read all 
about it and how to order your own copy by going to: 
http://www.prouty.org/ 

Here on ratical we will be hooking up the rest of the book in HTML and 
ASCII formats over the next 7 months. Each month will see the following 
chapters come online: 

May: Chapters 3-6 
June: Chapters 7-10 
July: Chapters 11-15 
August: Chapters 16-19 
September: Chapters 20-23 
October: Appendices l-lll 

The online copy of this book was made possible by the efforts and 
generosity of Len Osanic. We thank him for his support. Be sure to check 
out the details on the complete CD if you are interested in this book. There 
is a great deal to recommend it for anyone who wants to study the 
writings, interviews and perceptions of Colonel Prouty. The significance 
of Prouty's level and depth of first-hand experience of World War II and 
direct participation in the ensuing birth and rise of the National Security 
State is provided in great detail on The Collected Works CD. 



CONTENTS 

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Author's Note 
Preface 

Preface to the Second Edition 
Preface: "THE SECRET TEAM II" 1997 

PART I THE SECRET TEAM 
Chapter 1 The "Secret Team" — the Real Power Structure 



Chapter 2 



The Nature of Secret Team Activity: A Cuban Case Study 



PART II THE CIA: HOW IT RUNS 

Chapter 3 An Overview of the CIA 

Section I. Intelligence versus Secret Operations 

Section II. Origins of the Agency and 

the Seeds of Secret Operations 

Section III. A Simple Coup d'Etat to a Global Mechanism 

Chapter 4 From the Word of the Law to the Interpretation: 

President Kennedy Attempts to Put the CIA Under Control 

Chapter 5 "Defense" as a National Military Philosophy, 

the Natural Prey of the Intelligence Community 

Chapter 6 "It Shall Be the Duty of the Agency: To Advise, to Coordinate, 
to Correlate and Evaluate and Disseminate 
and to Perform Services of Common Concern ..." 

Coordination of Intelligence — the 
Major Assigned Role of the CIA 

Correlation, Evaluation and Dissemination of 
Intelligence: Heart of the Profession 

Services of Common Concern: An Attempt at Efficiency 

Chapter 7 From the Pines of Maine to the Birches of Russia: 
The Nature of Clandestine Operations 

Chapter 8 CIA: "The Cover Story" Intelligence Agency 
and the Real-Life Clandestine Operator 

Chapter 9 The Coincidence of Crises 

Chapter 10 The Dulles-Iackson-Correa Report in Action 

PART III THE CIA: HOW IT IS ORGANIZED 

Chapter 1 1 The Dulles Era Begins 

Chapter 12 Personnel: The Chameleon Game 



Chapter 13 Communications: The Web of the World 
Chapter 14 Transportation: Anywhere in the World — Now 
Chapter 15 Logistics by Miracle 

PART IV THE CIA: SOME EXAMPLES 
THROUGHOUT THE WORLD 

Chapter 16 Cold War: The Pyrrhic Gambit 

Chapter 17 Mission Astray, Soviet Gamesmanship 

Chapter 18 Defense, Containment, and Anti-Communism 

Chapter 19 The New Doctrine: Special Forces and 

the Penetration of the Mutual Security Program 

Chapter 20 Khrushchev's Challenge: The U-2 Dilemma 

Chapter 21 A Time of Covert Action: U-2 to Kennedy Inaugural 

Chapter 22 Camelot: From the Bay of Pigs to Dallas, Texas 

Chapter 23 Five Presidents: "Nightmares We Inherited" 

APPENDICES: 

I. Definition of Special Operations 

II. Powers and Duties of the CIA 

III. Training Under the Mutual Security Program 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 

INDEX 



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Acknowledgments 



... to Len Qsanic and all at Bandit Productions for bringing all my work 
back to life. 

. . . to Patrick Fourmy, Dave Ratcliffe and Tom Davis , old friends who 
have insisted I revise and re- write this old "classic". 

. . . to Bill Mullan, Charlie Czapar, Bill Peters, and Dave Fleming, who 
worked with me in the Pentagon during the fifties, for those fascinating 
years with "Team B" in Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. 

... to Charles Peters of The Washington Monthly for publishing the first 
"Secret Team" article, and Derek Shearer for breathing the whole concept 
into life. 

. . . to General Graves B. (the big "E") Erskine and General Victor H. 
("Brute") Krulak, both of the U. S. Marine Corps, my immediate "bosses" 
and good friends, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the 
Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for close personal relationships that 
shaped the course of these events. 

. . . and to the hundreds of men with whom I shared these experiences and 
who must remain nameless and silent because that is the "code" of their 
chosen profession. 



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Preface 1972 



From President to Ambassador, Cabinet Officer to Commanding 
General, and from Senator to executive assistant-all these men have their 
sources of information and guidance. Most of this information and 
guidance is the result of carefully laid schemes and ploys of pressure 
groups. In this influential coterie one of the most interesting and effective 
roles is that played by the behind the scenes, faceless, nameless, 
ubiquitous briefing officer. 

He is the man who sees the President, the Secretary, the Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff almost daily, and who carries with him the 
most skillfully detailed information. He is trained by years of experience 
in the precise way to present that information to assure its effectiveness. 
He comes away day after day knowing more and more about the man he 
has been briefing and about what it is that the truly influential pressure 
groups at the center of power and authority are really trying to tell these 
key decision makers. In Washington, where such decisions shape and 
shake the world, the role of the regular briefing officer is critical. 

Leaders of government and of the great power centers regularly leak 
information of all kinds to columnists, television and radio commentators, 
and to other media masters with the hope that the material will surface and 
thus influence the President, the Secretary, the Congress, and the public. 
Those other inside pressure groups with their own briefing officers have 
direct access to the top men; they do not have to rely upon the media, 
although they make great use of it. They are safe and assured in the 
knowledge that they can get to the decision maker directly. They need no 
middleman other than the briefing officer. Such departments as Defense, 
State, and the CIA use this technique most effectively. 

For nine consecutive, long years during those crucial days from 
1955 through January 1, 1964, I was one of those briefing officers. I had 
the unique assignment of being the "Focal Point" officer for contacts 
between the CIA and the Department of Defense on matters pertaining to 
the military support of the Special OperationsJH of that Agency. In that 
capacity I worked with Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles, several 
Secretaries of Defense, and Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well 
as many others in key governmental places. My work took me to more 
than sixty countries and to CIA offices and covert activities all over the 
world— from such hot spots as Saigon and to such remote places as the 



South Pole. Yes, there have been secret operations in Antarctica. 

It was my job not only to brief these men, but to brief them from the 
point of view of the CIA so that I might win approval of the projects 
presented and of the accompanying requests for support from the military 
in terms of money, manpower, facilities, and materials. I was, during this 
time, perhaps the best informed "Focal Point" officer among the few who 
operated in this very special area. The role of the briefing officer is quiet, 
effective, and most influential; and, in the CIA, specialized in the high art 
of top level indoctrination. 

It cannot be expected that a John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, a 
Richard Nixon, or a following President will have experienced and learned 
all the things that may arise to confront him during his busy official life in 
the White House. It cannot be expected that a Robert McNamara or a 
Melvin Laird, a Dean Rusk or a William Rogers, etc. comes fully 
equipped to high office, aware of all matters pertaining to what they will 
encounter in their relationship with the Congo or Cuba, Vietnam or 
Pakistan, and China or Russia and the emerging new nations. These men 
learn about these places and the many things that face them from day to 
day from an endless and unceasing procession of briefing officers. 

Henry Kissinger was a briefing officer. General John Vogt was one 
of the best. Desmond Fitzgerald, Tracy Barnes, Ed Lansdale, and "Brute" 
Krulak, in their own specialties, were top-flight briefing officers on 
subjects that until the publication of the "Pentagon Papers," few people 
had ever seen in print or had ever even contemplated. 

(You can imagine my surprise when I read the June 13, 1971, issue 
of the Sunday New York Times and saw there among the "Pentagon 
Papers" a number of basic information papers that had been in my own 
files in the Joint Chiefs of Staff area of the Pentagon. Most of the papers 
of that period had been source documents from which I had prepared 
dozens — even hundreds — of briefings, for all kinds of projects, to be 
given to top Pentagon officers. Not only had many of those papers been in 
my files, but I had either written many of them myself or had written 
certain of the source documents used by the men who did.) 

The briefing officer, with the staff officer, writes the basic papers. 
He researches the papers. He has been selected because he has the 
required knowledge and experience. He has been to the countries and to 
the places involved. He may know the principals in the case well. He is 
supposed to be the best man available for that special job. In my own case, 
I had been on many special assignments dating back to the Cairo and 
Teheran conferences of late 1943 that first brought together the "Big Four" 
of the Allied nations of WW II: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, 
Chiang Kai-shek and Joseph Stalin. 

The briefing officer reads all of the messages, regardless of 
classification. He talks to a number of other highly qualified men. He may 
even have staff specialists spread out all over the world upon whom he 



may call at any time for information. Working in support of the "Focal 
Point" office, which I headed, there were hundreds of experts and agents 
concealed in military commands throughout the world who were part of a 
network I had been directed to establish in 1955-1956 as a stipulation of 
National Security Council directive 5412, March 1954. 

In government official writing, the man who really writes the paper- 
-or more properly, the men whose original work and words are put 
together to become the final paper— are rarely, if ever, the men whose 
names appear on that paper. A paper attributed to Maxwell Taylor, Robert 
McNamara or Dean Rusk, of the Kennedy era, would not, in almost all 
instances, have been written by them; but more than likely would have 
been assembled from information gathered from the Departments of 
Defense and State and from CIA sources and put into final language by 
such a man as General Victor H. Krulak, who was among the best of that 
breed of official writers. 

From 1955 through 1963, if some official wanted a briefing on a 
highly classified subject involving the CIA, I would be one of those called 
upon to prepare the material and to make the briefing. At the same time, if 
the CIA wanted support from the Air Force for some covert operation, I 
was the officer who had been officially designated to provide this special 
operational support to the CIA. 

If I was contacted by the CIA to provide support for an operation 
which I believed the Secretary of Defense had not been previously 
informed of, I would see to it that he got the necessary briefing from the 
CIA or from my office and that any other Chief of Staff who might be 
involved would get a similar briefing. In this unusual business I found 
rather frequently that the CIA would be well on its way into some 
operation that would later require military support before the Secretary 
and the Chiefs had been informed. 

During preparations for one of the most important of these 
operations, covered in some detail in this book, I recall briefing the 
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, on the 
subject of the largest clandestine special operation that the CIA had ever 
mounted up to that time: and then hearing him say to the other Chiefs, "I 
just can't believe it. I never knew that." 

Here was the nation's highest ranking military officer, the man who 
would be held responsible for the operation should it fail or become 
compromised, and he had not been told enough about it to know just how 
it was being handled. Such is the nature of the game as played by the 
"Secret Team." 

I have written for several magazines on this subject, among them the 
Armed Forces Journal, The New Republic, the Empire Magazine of the 
Denver Sunday Post, and The Washington Monthly. It was for this latter 
publication that I wrote "The Secret Team", an article that appeared in the 
May 1970 issue and that led to the development of this book. 



With the publication of the "Pentagon Papers" on June 13,1971, 
interest in this subject area was heightened and served to underscore my 
conviction that the scope of that article must be broadened into a book. 

Within days of The New York Times publication of those "Pentagon 
Papers," certain editorial personnel with the BBC-TV program, "Twenty- 
Four Hours", recalling my "Secret Team" article, invited me to appear on a 
series on TV with, among others, Daniel Ellsberg. They felt that my 
experience with the Secret Team would provide material for an excellent 
companion piece to the newly released "Pentagon Papers," which were to 
be the primary topic of the discussions. I flew to London and made a 
number of programs for BBC-TV and Radio. Legal problems and the 
possible consequences of his departure from the country at that time 
precluded the simultaneous appearance of Daniel Ellsberg. The programs 
got wide reception and served to underscore how important the subject of 
the "Pentagon Papers" is throughout the world. 

I have not chosen to reveal and to expose "unreleased" classified 
documents; but I do believe that those that have been revealed, both in the 
"Pentagon Papers" and elsewhere, need to be interpreted and fully 
explained. I am interested in setting forth and explaining what "secrecy" 
and the "cult of containment" really mean and what they have done to our 
way of life and to our country. Furthermore, I want to correct any 
disinformation that may have been given by those who have tried to write 
on these subjects in other related histories. 

I have lived this type of work; I know what happened and how it 
happened. I have known countless men who participated in one way or 
another in these unusual events of Twentieth Century history. Many of 
these men have been and still are members of the Secret Team. It also 
explains why much of it has been pure propaganda and close to 
nationwide "brainwashing" of the American public. I intend to interpret 
and clarify these events by analyzing information already in the public 
domain. There is plenty. 

Few concepts during this half century have been as important, as 
controversial, as misunderstood, and as misinterpreted as secrecy in 
Government. No idea during this period has had a greater impact upon 
Americans and upon the American way of life than that of the containment 
of Communism. Both are inseparably intertwined and have nurtured each 
other in a blind Pavlovian way. Understanding their relationship is a 
matter of fundamental importance. 

Much has been written on these subjects and on their vast 
supporting infrastructure, generally known as the "intelligence 
community." Some of this historical writing has suffered from a serious 
lack of inside knowledge and experience. Most of this writing has been 
done by men who know something about the subject, by men who have 
researched and learned something about the subject, and in a few cases by 
men who had some experience with the subject. Rarely is there enough 
factual experience on the part of the writer. On the other hand, the 



Government and other special interests have paid writers huge amounts to 
write about this subject as they want it done, not truthfully. Thus our 
history is seriously warped and biased by such work. 

Many people have been so concerned about what has been 
happening to our Government that they have dedicated themselves to 
investigating and exposing its evils. Unfortunately, a number of these 
writers have been dupes of those cleverer than they or with sinister reasons 
for concealing knowledge. They have written what they thought was the 
truth, only to find out (if they ever did find out) that they had been fed a 
lot of contrived cover stories and just plain hogwash. In this book I have 
taken extracts from some of this writing and, line by line, have shown how 
it has been manipulated to give a semblance of truth while at the same 
time being contrived and false. 

Nevertheless, there have been some excellent books in this broad 
area. But many of these books suffer from various effects of the dread 
disease of secrecy and from its equally severe corollary illness called 
"cover" (the CIA's official euphemism for not telling the truth). 

The man who has not lived in the secrecy and intelligence 
environment— really lived in it and fully experienced it— cannot write 
accurately about it. There is no substitute for the day to day living of a life 
in which he tells his best friends and acquaintances, his family and his 
everyday contacts one story while he lives another. The man who must 
depend upon research and investigation inevitably falls victim to the many 
pitfalls of the secret world and of the "cover story" world with its lies and 
counter- lies. 

A good example of this is the work of Les Gelb and his Pentagon 
associates on the official version of the purloined "Pentagon Papers." That 
very title is the biggest cover story (no pun intended) of them all; so very 
few of those papers were really of Pentagon origin. The fact that I had 
many of them in my office of Special Operations in Joint Staff area, and 
that most of them had been in the files of the office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs did not validate the 
locale of their origin. They were "working copies" and not originals. 
Notice how few were signed by true military officers. 

It is significant to note that the historical record that has been called 
the "Pentagon Papers" was actually a formal government-funded "study of 
the history of United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II to 
the present" i.e. 1945 to 1968. On June 17, 1967 the Secretary of Defense, 
Robert S. McNamara directed that work. A task force consisting of "six 
times six professionals" under the direction of Leslie H. Gelb produced 
"37 studies and 15 collections of documents in 43 volumes" that were 
presented on January 15, 1969 to the then-Secretary of Defense, Clark M. 
Clifford by Mr. Gelb with the words from Herman Melville's Moby Dick: 

"This is a world of chance, free will, and necessity-all 
interweavingly working together as one: chance by turn rules either and 



had the last featuring blow at events." 

As you may recall, this treasure trove of TOP SECRET papers was 
delivered to the New York Times, and other newspapers in mid-June, 1971, 
by a then-unknown "Hippie" of that period. His name was Daniel 
Ellsberg. What few people have learned since that time is the fact that both 
Daniel Ellsberg, who pirated these highly classified papers, and Leslie 
Gelb the Director of that Task Force, had worked in that same office of 
International Security Affairs (ISA). 

The "misappropriation" of those documents was not the work of 
some "true patriots" as Noam Chomsky wrote in 1972. Rather it was an 
inside job. That ISA office had been the home of many of the "big names" 
of the Vietnam War period, among them Paul H. Nitze, John T. 
McNaughton, Paul C. Warnke and William Bundy, among others. The 
fact that I had many of them in my office, that I had worked with them, 
and that I had written parts of some of them proves that they were not 
genuine Pentagon papers, because my work at that time was devoted to 
support of the CIA. The same is true of General Krulak, William Bundy, 
and to a degree, Maxwell Taylor among others. 

To look at this matter in another way, the man who has lived and 
experienced this unnatural existence becomes even more a victim of its 
unreality. He becomes enmeshed beyond all control upon the horns of a 
cruel dilemma. On the one hand, his whole working life has been 
dedicated to the cause of secrecy and to its protection by means of cover 
stories (lies). In this pursuit he has given of himself time after time to 
pledges, briefings, oaths, and deep personal conviction regarding the 
significance of that work. Even if he would talk and write, his life has 
been so interwoven into the fabric of the real and the unreal, the actual and 
the cover story, that he would be least likely to present the absolutely 
correct data. 

On the other hand, as a professional he would have been subjected 
to such cellurization and compartmentalization each time he became 
involved in any real "deep" operation that he would not have known the 
whole story anyhow. This compartalization is very real. I have worked on 
projects with many CIA men so unaware of the entire operation that they 
had no realization and awareness of the roles of other CIA men working 
on the same project. 

I would know of this because inevitably somewhere along the line 
both groups would come to the Department of Defense for hardware 
support. I actually designed a special office in the Pentagon with but one 
door off the corridor. Inside, it had a single room with one secretary. 
However, off her office there was one more door that led to two more 
offices with a third doorway leading to yet another office, which was 
concealed by the door from the secretary's room. I had to do this because 
at times we had CIA groups with us who were now allowed to meet each 
other, and who most certainly would not have been there had they known 
that the others were there. (For the record, the office was 4D 1000— it may 



have been changed by now; but it had remained that way for many years.) 

Another group of writers, about the world of secrecy, are the 
"masters"— men like Allen W. Dulles, Lyman Kirkpatrick, Peer de Silva 
and Chester Cooper. My own choice of the best of these are Peer de Silva 
and Lyman Kirkpatrick. These are thoroughly professional intelligence 
officers who have chosen a career of high-level intelligence operations. 
Their writing is correct and informative-to a degree beyond that which 
most readers will be able to translate and comprehend at first reading; yet 
they are properly circumspect and guarded and very cleverly protective of 
their profession. 

There is another category of writer and self -proclaimed authority on 
the subjects of secrecy, intelligence, and containment. This man is the 
suave, professional parasite who gains a reputation as a real reporter by 
disseminating the scraps and "Golden Apples" thrown to him by the great 
men who use him. This writer seldom knows and rarely cares that many of 
the scraps from which he draws his material have been planted, that they 
are controlled leaks, and that he is being used, and glorified as he is being 
used, by the inside secret intelligence community. 

Allen Dulles had a penchant for cultivating a number of such writers 
with big names and inviting them to his table for a medieval style 
luncheon in that great room across the hall from his own offices in the old 
CIA headquarters on the hill overlooking Foggy Bottom. Here, he would 
discuss openly and all too freely the same subjects that only hours before 
had been carefully discussed in the secret inner chambers of the 
operational side of that quiet Agency. In the hands of Allen Dulles, 
"secrecy" was simply a chameleon device to be used as he saw fit and to 
be applied to lesser men according to his schemes. It is quite fantastic to 
find people like Daniel Ellsberg being charged with leaking official secrets 
simply because the label on the piece of paper said "TOP SECRET," when 
the substance of many of the words written on those same papers was 
patently untrue and no more than a cover story. Except for the fact that 
they were official "lies", these papers had no basis in fact, and therefore no 
basis to be graded TOP SECRET or any other degree of classification. 
Allen Dulles would tell similar cover stories to his coterie of writers, and 
not long thereafter they would appear in print in some of the most 
prestigious papers and magazines in the country, totally unclassified, and 
of course, cleverly untrue. 

Lastly there is the writer from outside this country who has gained 
his inside information from sources in another country. These sources are 
no doubt reliable; they know exactly what has taken place — as in 
Guatemala during the Bay of Pigs era — and they can speak with some 
freedom. In other cases, the best of these sources have been from behind 
the Iron Curtain. 

In every case, the chance for complete information is very small, 
and the hope that in time researchers, students, and historians will be able 
to ferret out truth from untruth, real from unreal, and story from cover 



story is at best a very slim one. Certainly, history teaches us that one truth 
will add to and enhance another; but let us not forget that one lie added to 
another lie will demolish everything. This is the important point. 

Consider the past half century. How many major events— really 
major events— have there been that simply do not ring true? How many 
times has the entire world been shaken by alarms of major significance, 
only to find that the events either did not happen at all, or if they did, that 
they had happened in a manner quite unlike the original story? The war in 
Vietnam is undoubtedly the best example of this. Why is it that after more 
than thirty years of clandestine and overt involvement in Indochina, no 
one had been able to make a logical case for what we had been doing there 
and to explain adequately why we had become involved; and what our real 
and valid objectives in that part of the world were? 

The mystery behind all of this lies in the area we know as 
"Clandestine activity", "intelligence operations", "secrecy", and "cover 
stories", used on a national and international scale. It is the object of this 
book to bring reality and understanding into this vast unknown area. 

L. FLETCHER PROUTY 
Colonel, U.S. Air Force (Ret'd) 



1. Special Operations is a name given in most cases, but not always, to any clandestine, covert, undercover, or 
secret operations by the government or by someone, U.S. citizen or a foreign national . . . even in special cases a 
stateless professional, or U.S. or foreign activity or organization. It is usually secret and highly classified. It is to 
be differentiated from Secret intelligence and in a very parochial sense from Secret or Special Intelligence 
Operations. 



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Preface To The Second Edition 



Like it or not, we now live in a new age of "One World." This is the 
age of global companies, of global communications and transport, of 
global food supply and finance and... just around the corner... global 
accommodation of political systems. In this sense, there are no home 
markets, no isolated markets and no markets outside the global network. It 
is time to face the fact that true national sovereignty no longer exists. We 
live in a world of big business, big lawyers, big bankers, even bigger 
moneymen and big politicians. It is the world of "The Secret Team." 

In such a world, the Secret Team is a dominant power. It is neither 
military nor police. It is covert, and the best (or worst) of both. It gets the 
job done whether it has political authorization and direction, or not. It is 
independent. It is lawless. 

This book is about the real CIA and its allies around the world. It is 
based upon personal experience generally derived from work in the 
Pentagon from 1955 to 1964. At retirement, I was Chief of Special 
Operations (clandestine activities) with the U.S. loint Chiefs of Staff. 
These duties involved the military support of the clandestine activities of 
the CIA and were performed under the provisions of National Security 
Council Directive No. 5412/2. 

Since this book was first published in 1973, we have witnessed the 
unauthorized release of the "Pentagon Papers," "Watergate" and the 
resignation of President Nixon, the run-away activities of the "Vietnam 
War", the "Arab Oil Embargo" that led to the greatest financial heist in 
history, and the blatantly unlawful "Iran-Contra" affair. All of these were 
brought about and master-minded by a renegade "Secret Team" that 
operated secretly, without Presidential direction; without National 
Security Council approval — so they say; and, generally, without 
Congressional knowledge. This trend increases. Its scope expands... even 
today. 

I was the first author to point out that the CIA's most important 
"Cover Story is that of an "Intelligence" agency. Of course the CIA does 
make use of "intelligence" and "intelligence gathering", but that is largely 
a front for its primary interest, "Fun and Games." The CIA is the center of 
a vast mechanism that specializes in Covert Operations... or as Allen 
Dulles used to call it, "Peacetime Operations". In this sense, the CIA is the 



willing tool of a higher level Secret Team, or High Cabal, that usually 
includes representatives of the CIA and other instrumentalities of the 
government, certain cells of the business and professional world and, 
almost always, foreign participation. It is this Secret Team, its allies, and 
its method of operation that are the principal subjects of this book. 

It must be made clear that at the heart of Covert Operations is the 
denial by the "operator," i.e. the U.S. Government, of the existence of 
national sovereignty. The Covert operator can, and does, make the world 
his play ground... including the U.S.A. 

Today, early 1990, the most important events of this century are 
taking place with the ending of the "Cold War" era, and the beginning of 
the new age of "One World" under the control of businessmen and their 
lawyers, rather than the threat of military power. This scenario for change 
has been brought about by a series of Secret Team operations skillfully 
orchestrated while the contrived hostilities of the Cold War were at their 
zenith. 

Chief among these, yet quite unnoticed, President Nixon and his 
Secretary of the Treasury, George Schultz, established a 
Russian/American organization called the "USA-USSR Trade and 
Economic Council," in 1972. Its objective was to bring about a union of 
the Fortune 500 Chief Executive Officers of this country, among others, 
such as the hierarchy of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, with their 
counterparts in the Soviet Union. This important relationship, sponsored 
by David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank and his associates, 
continued through the Carter years. The bilateral activity increased 
significantly during the Reagan/Shultz years of the Eighties despite such 
"Evil Empire" tantrums as the Korean Airlines Boeing 747 Flight 007 
"shootdown" in 1983. 

It is this "US-TEC" organization, with its counterpart bilateral 
agreements among other nations and the USSR, that has brought about the 
massive Communist world changes. 

The Cold War has been the most expensive war in history. R. 
Buckminister Fuller has written in Crunch of Giants: 

We can very properly call World War I the million dollar war and 
World War II the billion dollar war and World War III (Cold War) the 
trillion dollar war. 

The power structure that kept the Cold War at that level of intensity 
has been driven by the Secret Team and its multinational covert 
operations, to wit: 

This is the fundamental game of the Secret Team. They have this 
power because they control secrecy and secret intelligence and because 
they have the ability to take advantage of the most modern 
communications system in the world, of global transportation systems, of 
quantities of weapons of all kinds, of a world-wide U.S. military 



supporting base structure. They can use the finest intelligence system in 
the world, and most importantly, they are able to operate under the canopy 
of an ever-present "enemy" called "Communism". And then, to top all of 
this, there is the fact that the CIA has assumed the right to generate and 
direct secret operations. 

— L. Fletcher Prouty 
Alexandria, VA 1990 



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Preface: 'The Secret Team IT 1997 



Like it or not, we now live in the age of "One World". This is the 
age of global companies, of global communications and transport, of 
global food supply and finance and ... just around the corner ... global 
accommodation of political systems. In this sense, there are no home 
markets, no isolated markets and no markets outside the global network. 

It is time to face the fact that true national sovereignty no longer 
exists. We live in a world of big business, big lawyers, big bankers, even 
bigger money-men and big politicians. It is the world of "The Secret 
Team" and its masters. We are now, despite common mythology to the 
contrary, the most dependent society that has ever lived, and the future of 
the viability of that infrastructure of that society is unpredictable. It is 
crumbling. 

As one of the greatest historians of all time, Ibn Khaldun, wrote in 
his unequaled historical work The Muqaddimah of the 14th Century: 

God created and fashioned man in a form that can live and subsist only 
with the help of food ... Through cooperation, the needs of a number of 
persons, many times greater than their own number, can be satisfied. 

As this One World infrastructure emerges it increases the 
percentage of our total dependence upon remote food production capacity 
to the mass production capability and transport means of enormous 
companies operating under the global policy guidance of such 
organizations as the Chartered Institute of Transport in London, and the 
international banking community. As individuals, few of us would have 
any idea where to get a loaf of bread or yard of fabric other than in some 
supermarket and department store ... and we are all dependent upon some 
form of efficient transport, electric power, gasoline at the pump, and 
boundless manufacturing capacity and versatility. Let that system collapse, 
at any point, and all of us will be helpless. A cooperating, working system 
is essential to survival; yet over-all it is a system without leadership and 
guidance. 

At the same time the traditional family farm, and even community 
farms and industries, have all but vanished from the scene. This has 
created, at least in what we label, the advanced nations, a dearth of farmers 
and of people who have that basic experience along with that required in 
the food and home products industries. Furthermore, as this trend is 



amplified, the transport of farm produce has become increasingly assigned 
to the trucking industry, which has its over-land limits ... mostly as applied 
to the tonnage limits of rural bridges, and the economical availability of 
petroleum. 

As a result, something as simple as a trucking industry strike that 
keeps trucks out of any city for seventy- two hours or more, will lead to 
starvation and food riots. None of us know where to get food, if it is not in 
the nearby supermarket; and if we do have a stored supply of food locked 
in the cellar, we shall simply be the targets of those who do not. Food is 
the ultimate driving force. Under such predictable conditions, there will be 
waves of slaughter and eventually cannibalism. Man must eat, and the 
only way he can obtain adequate food supplies is through cooperation and 
the means to transport and distribute food and other basic necessities. This 
essential role is being diminished beyond the borderline. The lack of food 
supplies has already resulted in a form of covert genocide in many 
countries. Other essential shortages unavoidably follow. 

As Rudyard Kipling has said: "Transport is Civilization." The 
opposite is equally true, "Without reliable transport we are reduced to the 
state of barbarism." 

These are fundamental statements of fact. In such a world, the 
Secret Team is the functional element of the dominant power. It is the 
point of the spear and is neither military nor police. It is covert: and the 
best (or worst) of both. It gets the job done whether it has political 
authorization and direction, or not. In this capacity, it acts independently. 
It is lawless. It operates everywhere with the best of all supporting 
facilities from special weaponry and advanced communications, with the 
assurance that its members will never be prosecuted. It is subservient to 
the Power Elite and protected by them. The Power Elite or High Cabal 
need not be Royalty in these days. They are their equals or better. 

Note with care, it is labeled a "Team". This is because as with any 
highly professional team it has its managers, its front office and its 
owners. These are the "Power Elite" to whom it is beholden. They are 
always anonymous, and their network is ancient and world-wide. Let us 
draw an example from recent history. 

During the Senate Hearings of 1975 on "Alleged Assassination 
Ploys Involving Foreign Leaders," Senator Charles C. Mathias' thoughts 
went back to November 22, 1963 and to the coup d'etat brought about by 
the surgical precision of the death of President John F. Kennedy, when he 
said: 

Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas Becket (Saint 
Thomas Becket, 1118-1170) was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro; 
the King said "Who will rid me of this man?" He didn't say to somebody, 
go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go 
at that. (As you will recall, Thomas Becket's threat was not against the 
King, it was against the way the King wanted to run the government.) 



With no explicit orders, and with no more authority than that, four 
of King Henry's knights, found and killed "this man", Saint Thomas 
Becket inside of his church. That simple statement ... no more than a wish 
floating in air ... proved to be all the orders needed. 

Then, with that great historical event in mind, Senator Mathias went 
on to say: 

... that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be 
taken by the Director of Central Intelligence or by anybody else, as 
Presidential authorization to go forward ... you felt that some spark had 
been transmitted ... 

To this Senator Jesse Helms added: 

Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been 
unhappy. 

There's the point! Because the structure, a "Power Elite", "High 
Cabal" or similar ultimate ruling organization, exists and the 
psychological atmosphere has been prepared, nothing more has to be said 
than that which ignites that "spark" of an assumed "authorization to go 
forward." Very often, this is the way in which the Secret Team gets its 
orders ... they are no more than "a wish floating in air." 

This book is about a major element of this real power structure of 
the world and of its impact upon the CIA and its allies around the world. It 
is based upon much personal experience generally derived from my 
military service from mid-1941 to 1964: U.S. Army Cavalry, U.S. Army 
Armored Force, U.S. Army Air Corps and Army Air Force, and finally the 
U. S. Air Force; and more specifically from my special assignments in the 
Pentagon from 1955 to 1964. At retirement, I was the first Chief of 
Special Operations with the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. All of these duties, 
during those Pentagon years, were structured to provide "the military 
support of the world-wide clandestine activities of the CIA." They were 
performed in accordance with the provisions of an Eisenhower era, 
National Security Council Directive No. 5412/2, March 15, 1954. 

Since this book was first published in 1973, we have witnessed the 
unauthorized release of the Defense Department's official " history of 
United States involvement in Vietnam from World War II to 1969" 
popularly known as the "Pentagon Papers," "Watergate" and the 
resignation of President Nixon, the run away activities of the "Vietnam 
War," the "Arab Oil Embargo" that led to the greatest financial heist in 
history, the blatantly unlawful "Iran Contra" affair, and the run-away 
banking scandals of the eighties. Many of these were brought about and 
master minded by renegade "Secret Team" members who operated, 
without Presidential direction; without National Security Council approval 
so they say; and, generally, without official Congressional knowledge. 
This trend increases. Its scope expands ... even today. 

I pointed out, years ago in public pronouncements, that the CIA's 



most important "Cover Story" is that of an "intelligence" agency. Of 
course the CIA does make use of "intelligence" and its assumed role of 
"intelligence gathering," but that is largely a front for its primary interest, 
"Fun and Games" ... as the "Old Boys" or "Jedburgh's" of the WW II 
period Office of Strategic Services (OSS) called it. 

The CIA is the center of a vast, and amorphous mechanism that 
specializes in Covert Operations ... or as Allen Dulles always called 
it, "Peacetime Operations." In this sense, the CIA is the willing tool of a 
higher level High Cabal, that may include representatives and highly 
skilled agents of the CIA and other instrumentality's of the government, 
certain cells of the business and professional world and, almost always, 
foreign participation. It is this ultimate Secret Team, its allies, and its 
method of operation that are the principal subject of this book. 

It must be made clear that at the heart of Covert Operations is the 
denial by the "operator," i.e. the U.S. Government, of the existence of 
national sovereignty. The covert operator can, and does, make the world 
his playground ... including the U.S.A. 

Today, in the mid-1990's, the most important events of this century 
are taking place with the ending of the "Cold War" era, and the beginning 
of the new age of "One World" under the control of businessmen and their 
lawyers, rather than under the threat of military power and ideological 
differences. This scenario for change has been brought about by a series of 
Secret Team operations skillfully orchestrated while the contrived 
hostilities of the Cold War were at their zenith. 

Two important events of that period have been little noted. First, on 
Feb. 7, 1972 Maurice Stans, Nixon's Secretary of Commerce opened a 
"White House Conference on the Industrial World Ahead, A Look at 
Business in 1990." This three-day meeting of more than fifteen hundred of 
the country's leading businessmen, scholars, and the like were concluded 
with this memorable summary statement by Roy L. Ash, president of 
Litton Industries: 

... state capitalism may well be a form for world business in the world 
ahead; that the western countries are trending toward a more unified and 
controlled economy, having a greater effect on all business; and the 
communist nations are moving more and more toward a free market 
system. The question posed during this conference on which a number of 
divergent opinions arose, was whether 'East and West' would meet some 
place toward the middle about 1990. 

That was an astounding forecast as we consider events of the 
seventies and eighties and discover that his forecast, if it ever was a 
forecast and not a pre-planned arrangement, was right on the nose. 

This amazing forecast had its antecedent pronouncements, among 
which was another "One World" speech by this same Roy Ash during the 
Proceedings of the American Bankers Association National Automation 
Conference in New York City, May 8,9,10, 1967. 



The affairs of the world are becoming inextricably interlinked ... 
governments, notably, cannot effectively perform the task of creating and 
distributing food and other essential products and services ... economic 
development is the special capability and function of business and 
industrial organizations ... business organizations are the most efficient 
converters of the original resources of the world into useable goods and 
services. 

The flash of genius, the new ideas, always comes from the 
marvelous workings of the individual brain, not from the committee 
sessions. Organizations are to implement ideas, not to have them. 

As a Charter Member of the American Bankers Association's 
Committee on Automation Planning and Technology I was a panelist at 
that same convention as we worked to convert the 14,000 banks of this 
country to automation and the ubiquitous Credit Card. All of these 
subjects were signs of the times leading toward the demise of the Soviet 
Union in favor of an evolutionary process toward One World. 

In addition to the 1972 White House Conference on the Industrial 
World Ahead a most significant yet quite unnoticed action took place 
during that same year when President Nixon and his then- Secretary of the 
Treasury, George Shultz, established a Russian/American organization 
called the "USA USSR Trade and Economic Council." Its objective was to 
bring about a union of the Fortune 500 Chief Executive Officers of this 
country, among others, such as the hierarchy of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, with their counterparts in the Soviet Union. This important 
relationship, sponsored by David Rockefeller of Chase Manhattan Bank 
and his associates, continues into the "One World" years. 

This bilateral activity increased during the Reagan/Shultz years of 
the Eighties despite such "Evil Empire" staged tantrums as the Korean 
Airlines Boeing 747 Flight 007 "shootdown" in 1983. 

It is this "US-TEC" organization, with its counterpart bilateral 
agreements among other nations and the USSR, that has brought about the 
massive changes of the former Communist world. These did not go 
unnoticed. During a speech delivered in 1991, Giovanni Agnelli, chief 
executive officer of the Fiat Company and one of the most powerful men 
in Europe, if not the world, remarked: 

The fall of the Soviet Union is one of the very few instances in 
history in which a world power has been defeated on the battlefield of 
ideas. 

Now, is this what Nixon, Stans, Shultz, Ash, Rockefeller and others 
had in mind during those important decades of the sixties, seventies and 
eighties. For one thing, it may be said quiet accurately, that these 
momentous events marked the end of the Cold War and have all but 
shredded the canopy of the nuclear umbrella over mankind. 

The Cold War was the most expensive war in history. R. 
Buckminister Fuller wrote in Crunch of Giants: 



We can very properly call World War I the million dollar war and 
World War II the billion dollar war and World War III (Cold War) the 
trillion dollar war. 



The power structure that kept the Cold War at that level of cost and 
intensity had been spearheaded by the Secret Team and its multinational 
covert operations, to wit: 



This is the fundamental game of the Secret Team. They have this 
power because they control secrecy and secret intelligence and because 
they have the ability to take advantage of the most modern 
communications system in the world, of global transportation systems, of 
quantities of weapons of all kinds, and when needed, the full support of a 
world-wide U.S. military supporting base structure. They can use the 
finest intelligence system in the world, and most importantly, they have 
been able to operate under the canopy of an assumed, ever-present enemy 
called "Communism." It will be interesting to see what "enemy" develops 
in the years ahead. It appears that "UFO's and Aliens" are being primed to 
fulfill that role for the future. To top all of this, there is the fact that the 
CIA, itself, has assumed the right to generate and direct secret operations. 



— L. Fletcher Prouty 
Alexandria, VA 1997 



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PARTI 
The Secret Team 

Chapter 1 The "Secret Team" — 

The Real Power Structure 



The most remarkable development in the management of America's 
relations with other countries during the quarter-century since the end of 
World War II has been the assumption of more and more control over 
military, financial and diplomatic operations at home and abroad by men 
whose activities are secret, whose budget is secret, whose very identities 
as often as not are secret — in short, by a Secret Team whose actions only 
those implicated in them are in a position to monitor and to understand. 

For the purposes of this historical study, the choice of the word 
"Team" is most significant. It is well known that the members of a team, 
as in baseball or football, are skilled professionals under the direct control 
of someone higher up. They do not create their own game plan. They work 
for their coach and their owner. There is always some group that manages 
them and "calls the plays". Team members are like lawyers and agents, 
they work for someone. They generally do not plan their work. They do 
what their client tells them to do. For example: this is true of agents in the 
Central Intelligence Agency. It is an "Agency" and not a "Department" 
and its employees are highly skilled professionals who perform the 
functions their craft demands of them. Thus, the members of the highest 
level "Secret Team" work for their masters despite the fact that their own 
high office may make it appear to others that they, themselves are not only 
the Team but the Power Elite. This recalls a story related by the Rt. Hon. 
Lord Denning, Master of the Rolls, of Great Britain, during WW II. 

Winston Churchill had left the Admiralty to become Prime Minister. 
Frequently he would come down to the Admiralty basement on his way 
from #10 Downing Street, to his underground, bomb-proof bedroom. He 
made it his practice to visit the Officer in Charge for up-to-date 



Intelligence and then stroll into the Duty Captain's room where there was a 
small bar from which he sometimes indulged in a night-cap, along with his 
ever-present cigar. 

On this particular night there had been a heavy raid on Rotterdam. 
He sat there, meditating, and then, as if to himself, he said, "Unrestricted 
submarine warfare, unrestricted air bombing ~ this is total war." He 
continued sitting there, gazing at a large map, and then said, "Time and the 
Ocean and some guiding star and High Cabal have made us what we are." 

This was a most memorable scene and a revelation of reality that is 
infrequent, at best. If for the great Winston Churchill, there is a "High 
Cabal" that has made us what we are, our definition is complete. Who 
could know better than Churchill himself during the darkest days of World 
War EE, that there exists, beyond doubt, an international High Cabal? This 
was true then. It is true today, especially in these times of the One World 
Order. This all-powerful group has remained superior because it had 
learned the value of anonymity. For them, the Secret Team and its 
professionals operate. 

We may wish to note that in a book "Gentleman Spy, the Life of 
Allen Dulles" the author, Peter Grose cites Allen Dulles response to an 
invitation to the luncheon table from Hoover's Secretary of State, Henry L. 
Stimson. Allen Dulles assured his partners in the Sullivan & Cromwell 
law firm, "Let it be known quietly that I am a lawyer and not a diplomat." 
He could not have made a more characteristic and truthful statement about 
himself. He always made it clear that he did not "plan" his work, he was 
always the "lawyer" who carried out the orders of his client whether the 
President of the United States, or the President of the local bank. 

The Secret Team (ST) being described herein consists of security- 
cleared individuals in and out of government who receive secret 
intelligence data gathered by the CIA and the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and who react to those data, when it seems appropriate to them, 
with paramilitary plans and activities, e.g. training and "advising" — a not 
exactly impenetrable euphemism for such things as leading into battle and 
actual combat — Laotian tribal troops, Tibetan rebel horsemen, or 
Jordanian elite Palace Guards. 

Membership on the Team, granted on a "need-to-know" basis, 
varies with the nature and location of the problems that come to its 
attention, and its origins derive from that sometimes elite band of men 
who served with the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) 
under the father of them all, General "Wild Bill" William J. Donovan, and 
in the old CIA. 

The power of the Team derives from its vast intragovernmental 
undercover infrastructure and its direct relationship with great private 
industries, mutual funds and investment houses, universities, and the news 
media, including foreign and domestic publishing houses. The Secret 
Team has very close affiliations with elements of power in more than 



three-score foreign countries and is able when it chooses to topple 
governments, to create governments, and to influence governments almost 
anywhere in the world. 

Whether or not the Secret Team had anything whatsoever to do with 
the deaths of Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem, Ngo Dinh Nhu, Dag 
Hammerskjold, John F. Kennedy, Robert F. Kennedy, Martin Luther 
King, and others may never be revealed, but what is known is that the 
power of the Team is enhanced by the "cult of the gun" and by its 
sometimes brutal and always arbitrary anti-Communist flag waving, even 
when real Communism had nothing to do with the matter at hand. 

The Secret Team does not like criticism, investigation, or history 
and is always prone to see the world as divided into but two camps — 
"Them" and "Us". Sometimes the distinction may be as little as one dot, as 
in "So. Viets" and "Soviets," the So. Viets being our friends in Indochina, 
and the Soviets being the enemy of that period. To be a member, you don't 
question, you don't ask; it's "Get on the Team" or else. One of its most 
powerful weapons in the most political and powerful capitals of the world 
is that of exclusion. To be denied the "need to know" status, like being a 
member of the Team, even though one may have all the necessary 
clearances, is to be totally blackballed and eliminated from further 
participation. Politically, if you are cut from the Team and from its 
insider's knowledge, you are dead. In many ways and by many criteria the 
Secret Team is the inner sanctum of a new religious order. 

At the heart of the Team, of course, are a handful of top executives 
of the CIA and of the National Security Council (NSC), most notably the 
chief White House adviser to the President on foreign policy affairs. 
Around them revolves a sort of inner ring of Presidential officials, 
civilians, and military men from the Pentagon, and career professionals of 
the intelligence community. It is often quite difficult to tell exactly who 
many of these men really are, because some may wear a uniform and the 
rank of general and really be with the CIA and others may be as 
inconspicuous as the executive assistant to some Cabinet officer's chief 
deputy. Out beyond this ring is an extensive and intricate network of 
government officials with responsibility for, or expertise in, some specific 
field that touches on national security or foreign affairs: "Think Tank" 
analysts, businessmen who travel a lot or whose businesses (e.g. import- 
export or cargo airline operations) are useful, academic experts in this or 
that technical subject or geographic region, and quite importantly, alumni 
of the intelligence community — a service from which there are no 
unconditional resignations. All true members of the Team remain in the 
power center whether in office with the incumbent administration or out of 
office with the hard-core set. They simply rotate to and from official jobs 
and the business world or the pleasant haven of academe. 

Thus, the Secret Team is not a clandestine super-planning-board or 
super-general-staff. But even more damaging to the coherent conduct of 
foreign and military affairs, it is a bewildering collection of semi- 
permanent or temporarily assembled action committees and networks that 



respond pretty much ad hoc to specific troubles and to flash-intelligence 
data inputs from various parts of the world, sometimes in ways that 
duplicate the activities of regular American missions, sometimes in ways 
that undermine those activities, and very often in ways that interfere with 
and muddle them. At no time did the powerful and deft hand of the Secret 
Team evidence more catalytic influence than in the events of those final 
ninety days of 1963, which the "Pentagon Papers" were supposed to have 
exposed. 

The New York Times shocked the world on Sunday, June 13, 1971, 
with the publication of the first elements of the Pentagon Papers. JH The 
first document the Times selected to print was a trip report on the situation 
in Saigon, credited to the Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, and 
dated December 21, 1963. This was the first such report on the situation in 
Indochina to be submitted to President Lyndon B. Johnson. It came less 
than thirty days after the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and 
less than sixty days after the assassinations of President Ngo Dinh Diem 
of South Vietnam and his brother and counselor Ngo Dinh Nhu. 

Whether from some inner wisdom or real prescience or merely 
simple random selection, the Times chose to publish first from among the 
three thousand pages of analysis and four thousand pages of official 
documents that had come into its hands that report which may stand out in 
history as one of the key documents affecting national policy in the past 
quarter-century — not so much for what it said as for what it signified. 
This report is a prime example of how the Secret Team, which has gained 
so much control over the vital foreign and political activities of this 
government, functions. 

Most observers might have expected that the inner group of men 
who had worked so closely with President Kennedy for three years would 
have lost heart in those days following his tragic death. On the contrary, 
they burst forth, as though from strong bonds and fetters and created this 
entirely new report, thus shaping the future of the Indochina conflict. 
Their energy and their new sense of direction seemed almost to rise from 
the flame of Kennedy's tomb in Arlington. 

During those hectic months of late summer in 1963 when the 
Kennedy Administration appeared to be frustrated and disenchanted with 
the ten-year regime of Ngo Dinh Diem in Saigon, it approved the plans for 
the military coup d'etat that would overthrow President Diem and get rid 
of his brother Nhu. The Kennedy Administration gave its support to a 
cabal of Vietnamese generals who were determined to remove the Ngos 
from power. Having gone so far as to withdraw its support of the Diem 
government and to all but openly support the coup, the Administration 
became impatient with delays and uncertainties from the generals in 
Saigon, and by late September dispatched General Maxwell D. Taylor, 
then Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Secretary of Defense 
McNamara to Saigon. 

Upon their return, following a brief trip, they submitted a report to 



President Kennedy, which in proper chronology was the one immediately 
preceding the remarkable one of December 21, 1963. This earlier report 
said, among other things "There is no solid evidence of the possibility of a 
successful coup, although assassination of Diem and Nhu is always a 
possibility." The latter part of this sentence contained the substantive 
information. A coup d'etat, or assassination is never certain from the point 
of view of the planners; but whenever United States support of the 
government in power is withdrawn and a possible coup d'etat or 
assassination is not adamantly opposed, it will happen. Only three days 
after this report, on October 5, 1963, the White House cabled Ambassador 
Lodge in Saigon: "There should be... urgent covert effort ... to identify 
and build contact with possible alternate leadership." Knowledge of a 
statement such as this one made by the ostensible defenders and 
supporters of the Diem regime was all those coup planners needed to 
know. In less than one month Diem was dead, along with his brother.m 

Thus, what was considered to be a first prerequisite for a more 
favorable climate in Vietnam was fulfilled. With the Ngo family out of the 
way, President Kennedy felt that he had the option to bring the war to a 
close on his own terms or to continue pressure with covert activities such 
as had been under way for many years. Because the real authors were well 
aware of his desires, there was another most important statement in the 
McNamara-Taylor report of October 2, 1963: "It should be possible to 
withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time...." [the end of 1965] 
This statement came at a key point in time. 

Like the others, it was written by Secret Team insiders who knew 
the President's mind and how far they could go in setting forth ideas which 
he would accept and yet be acceptable to their own plans. Reports such as 
the October 2, 1963, document were not written in Saigon and they were 
not written by the men whose names appeared on them. 

This pivotal report was written in Washington by members of the 
ST. Although it contained a lot of updated material from Saigon (some of 
which had been transmitted to Saigon verbatim for the express purpose of 
having to then re-transmitted back to Washington for inclusion in the 
report — with the all-important Saigon dateline), one may be certain that 
this report contained a skillful mixture of what the President wanted to 
hear and what its authors in Washington wanted the President to read. 
Therefore, when it included the blunt and unequivocal statement that "it 
should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U.S. personnel by that time", 
the authors, cover and undercover, were in tune with the times. They knew 
the President was favorably considering means to extricate the United 
States from Vietnam. 

The ST had had its day with Kennedy on the beaches of the Cuban 
Bay of Pigs. Kennedy had minutely reviewed that debacle, and from that 
time on he was ever alert for the slightest sign of any undercover operation 
that might expand and get so out of hand as to involve this country in any 
more such disasters. The Team had come a long way since that dismal 
period in April 1961, and had learned well how to use and thrive with Jack 



Kennedy, in spite of his caution. One way to do this was to be certain to 
spell things correctly — meaning hewing close to his line while retaining 
ST initiative. It is a safe bet to say that this forecast of personnel 
withdrawal by the end of 1965 was the maneuvering time they wanted and 
what Kennedy would accept, in their language, so that he too would have 
time to get re-elected and then carry out his own decisions as he had 
related them to Senator Mansfield. It appears that Kennedy felt that with 
the obstacle of the Diem regime out of the way, he would have the 
opportunity to disengage this nation from the war that he had so far been 
able to keep from becoming a runaway overt action. Up to the end of 
1963, all U.S. Army troops in South Vietnam, with the exception of a 
small number in the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) 
and a few other such positions, were there under the operational control of 
the CIA. This was flimsy cover and it was a poor device to maintain that 
the United States was not overtly involved in military activity in 
Indochina; but the device did achieve its purpose of keeping the level of 
the war to a minimum. 

Within thirty days of the Taylor-McNamara report, Diem and his 
brother were dead. The Government of South Vietnam was in the hands of 
the popular and powerful General Duong Van "Big" Minh. Minh was a 
strong enough man to have made Vietnamization work. But within another 
thirty days President Kennedy was dead, and the Government of the 
United States was in the hands of Lyndon B. Johnson. "Big" Minh may 
have been the man Kennedy wanted in Saigon, but he did not last long 
with the new Johnson Administration. Four days after Kennedy's death, on 
November 26, 1963, President Johnson issued an order reaffirming United 
States policy in South Vietnam and at the same time referring to the new 
Government of General Minh as a "provisional government", presaging 
and assuring the inevitability of another change in the near future. 
President Johnson's advisers wanted a "benevolent" military regime in 
Saigon, and they wanted one which would be more suitable than Minh's. 
Kennedy would have had Minh rally around him a popular and strongly 
independent Vietnamese administration. After Kennedy's death, U.S. 
policy called for leadership in Saigon which would accept continuing 
United States participation in the internal affairs of that Government. 

Less than fifteen days after the death of Kennedy, Secretary of 
Defense McNamara was on his way back to Saigon to assess the situation 
under General Minh and to report to the new President of the United 
States. This time, the McNamara report was, to quote The New York 
Times, "Laden with gloom". His assessment laid the groundwork for the 
long haul and included decisions to step up the covert war against North 
Vietnam in early 1964 and to increase American aid to South Vietnam. 
Within ninety days the Government of "Big" Minh was eased out of office 
and replaced by the more tractable General Nguyen Khanh. 

There are those who say that because he had approved certain covert 
operations in Indochina, President Kennedy was planning to expand the 
war. It is true that accelerating cover operations is like stoking the fire; but 
we should weigh Kennedy's actions against the fact that the United States 



had been actively involved in clandestine operations in Indochina since 
1945 as well as in other areas of the world for many years, and that these 
activities did not signify that the administration concerned had embarked 
upon a course leading to open warfare. 

The paramount condition underlying any approval for clandestine 
operations is absolute control at the top. The ST will come up with 
operational schemes all the time and will seek approval for as many as it 
believes it can get away with. The only way to cope with this is for the 
President to make it clear that there will be no covert operations without 
proper approval and that he will always be in a position to cancel or 
disapprove of any and all operations as he sees fit. Truman and 
Eisenhower knew this and practiced it. Kennedy learned it at the Bay of 
Pigs. Eisenhower had terminated major operations in Tibet, Laos, and 
Indonesia without escalating them into open war. Until his death Kennedy 
had held the line at the limited level of covert activities in Indochina, and 
American participation there was restricted to an advisory capacity. (Of 
course, we all recognize that this advisory role was, in many cases, pure 
combat.) 

Clandestine operations that are small and strictly controlled with a 
fixed and time-limited objective can be terminated at any time, whether 
they succeed or fail. However, clandestine operations that become large, 
that are permitted to continue and to be repeated, that become known or 
compromised — and yet still continue, as in Laos — are very dangerous and 
can lead to open hostilities and even war. Thus, when the ST proposed a 
vastly escalated covert campaign against North Vietnam in December 
1963, they were laying positive plans for the major military action that 
followed in 1965 .[31 Within thirty days after Kennedy's death all of this 
changed drastically. In his report of December 21, 1963, McNamara 
stated: "Viet Cong progress had been great during the period since the 
coup. We also need to have major increases in both military and USOM 
(United States Operations Mission) staffs." 

Later, he added, "Our first need would be immediate U-2 mapping 
of the whole Laos and Cambodian border, and this we are preparing to do 
on an urgent basis." And then, "One other step we can take is to expand 
the existing limited but remarkably effective operations on the Laos side, 
the so-called Operation HARDNOSE... Plans to expand this will be 
prepared and presented for your approval in about two weeks." And 
further, "As to the waterways, the military plans presented in Saigon were 
unsatisfactory, and a special Naval team is being sent a once from 
Honolulu to determine what more can be done." 

Then he noted: "Plans for covert action into North Vietnam were 
prepared as we had requested and were an excellent job. . .General Krulak 
of the JCS is chairing a group that will lay out a program in the next ten 
days for your consideration." All of these statements were evidence of 
typical, thorough ST groundwork. 

McNamara closed out this report — which was so vastly different 



from the earlier October 2 one that he and Maxwell Taylor had submitted 
to President Kennedy — by saying: "We should watch the situation very 
carefully, running scared, and hoping for the best, but preparing for more 
forceful moves if the situation does not show early signs of improvement." 

This was not the report of a group that was planing to wind down 
the war. It was a report that delineated various avenues of endeavor and 
that looked well into the future. This was the first such report made to 
President Johnson, and it was not designed to be reassuring. On the same 
day that the McNamara report was being handed to President Johnson, a 
former President was writing a totally different statement for the 
readership of the general pubic. President Harry S. Truman, observing the 
turn of events since the death of President Kennedy, and pondering 
developments since his Administration, wrote for the Washington Post a 
column also datelined December 21, 1963: 

For some time I have been disturbed by the way the CIA has been 
diverted from its original assignment. It has become an operational and at 
times a policy-making arm of the government... I never had any thought 
that when I set up the CIA that it would be injected into peacetime cloak- 
and-dagger operations. Some of the complications and embarrassment that 
I think we have experienced are in part attributable to the fact that this 
quiet intelligence arm of the President has been so removed from its 
intended role that it is being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and 
mysterious foreign intrigue and a subject for cold war enemy propaganda. 

Truman was disturbed by the events of the past ninety days, those 
ominous days of October, November, and December 1963. Men all over 
the world were disturbed by those events. Few men, however could have 
judged them with more wisdom and experience than Harry S. Truman, for 
it was he who, in late 1947, had signed unto law the National Security Act. 
This Act, in addition to establishing the Department of Defense (DOD) 
with a single Secretary at its head and with three equal and independent 
services ~ the Army, Navy, and Air Force — also provided for a National 
Security Council and the Central Intelligence Agency. And during those 
historic and sometimes tragic sixteen years since the Act had become law, 
he had witnessed changes that disturbed him, as he saw that the CIA "had 
been diverted" from the original assignment that he and the legislators 
who drafted the Act had so carefully planned. Although even in his time 
he had seen the beginning of the move of the CIA into covert activities, 
there can be little doubt that the "diversion" to which he made reference 
was not one that he would have attributed to himself or to any other 
President. Rather, the fact that the CIA had gone into clandestine 
operations and had been "injected into peacetime cloak-and-dagger 
operations", and "has been so much removed from its intended role" was 
more properly attributable to the growing and secret pressures of some 
other power source. As he said, the CIA had become "a symbol of sinister 
and mysterious foreign intrigue". 

There can be no question that the events just prior to this statement 
heavily influenced his arriving at these disturbing conclusions. It is 
possible, but quite improbable, that Harry Truman knew about the 



McNamara report of the same date. But the coincidence between the 
appearance of Truman's commentary and of McNamara's report is 
compelling, especially since McNamara's report was the first selected by 
The New York Times for publication in its expose of the Pentagon Papers. 

Now that the McNamara report has been published and has emerged 
from the depths of security, it can be added that this pivotal report was not 
written by McNamara; it was not even written in Saigon. This report, like 
the one dated October 2, was actually written by a group of ST and near- 
ST members and was drafted by them solely to impress upon the new 
President their idea of the increasing gravity and frightful responsibility of 
the war in Indochina. It was not for nothing that the Times noted that this 
report was "laden with gloom" and that it offered nowhere any easy or 
quick panacea for early victory in Indochina. It was not untended to do so. 
In fact, it did just the opposite. It left no room for any course of action 
other than eventual escalation of the war. This report and the ones that 
followed close upon it were carefully and skillfully written to instill into 
the new President an indelible belief that the war in Vietnam was the 
greatest issue facing the Free World. They hammered home the fanciful 
belief that if South Vietnam fell before the onslaught of Communism, the 
whole world would be engulfed. 

As was common with reports such as this one, the first time 
McNamara saw it was during a few days stopover in Honolulu on his 
return trip from Saigon. It had been put together from many sources and 
drafts, primarily from the CIA and other secret-operations related areas, by 
the office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special 
Activities (SACSA) in the Joint Staff under the skilled and dedicated 
direction of Major General Victor H. Krulak. General Krulak was the 
same man who was designated in the body of the report to chair "a group 
that will lay out a program of covert action in North Vietnam in the next 
ten days". 

In Pentagonese for highly classified matters, General Krulak's office 
in the Joint Staff was described as being responsible for serving as the JCS 
point of contact, in his field of interest, with related activities in the 
Military Departments, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), and 
other agencies of the government. This was the unclassified way of saying 
that his office was the point of contact within the DOD for the CIA. His 
contacts in this select circle in the OSD were such men as Major General 
Edward G. Lansdale, who was McNamara's special assistant for all 
matters involving the CIA and special operations; William Bundy, who 
appears throughout the Pentagon Papers as one of the key men of the ST 
and was at that time a recent alumni of the CIA, with ten years in that 
Agency behind him; John T. McNaughton, another member of the ST and 
a McNamara favorite; Joseph Califano, who moved from OSD to the 
White House; General Richard G. Stilwell of the White House Special 
Committee (details to follow), and others. 

The preparations for and the writing of such influential reports as 
this one attributed to McNamara was a work of skill, perseverance, and 



high art. Whenever it was decided that McNamara would go to Saigon, 
select members of the ST sent special messages to Saigon on the ultra- 
secure CIA communications network, laying out a full scenario for his 
trip. The Secretary of Defense and his party would be shown "combat 
devastated villages" that had paths and ruts that had been caused by the 
hard work and repeated rehearsals — not battles — that had taken place in 
them between "natives", "Vietnamese soldiers", and Americans. 
McNamara would be taken on an itinerary planned in Washington, he 
would see "close-in combat" designed in Washington, and he would 
receive field data and statistics prepared for him in Washington. All during 
his visit he would be in the custody of skilled briefers who knew what he 
should see, whom he should see, and whom he should not see. 

In many cases even the messages relayed from Saigon, ostensibly 
written by and for McNamara while he was there, had been sent to Saigon 
from Washington before he had arrived there. When a total 
communications system such as that available to the ST exists all over the 
world and is concealed by secrecy, it is not difficult to yield to the urge to 
"play God" and make everything come out as desired. 

While McNamara was on his trip, the Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities and his staff, augmented by CIA 
and others, were working around the clock on the report. There were times 
when General Krulak himself stayed at his desk for thirty-six hours or 
more to keep a full staff going while secretaries and typists were shuttled 
to and from their homes for rest periods to get the massive report done in 
time. 

While all of the writing was under way, cartographers and artists 
were working on illustrative material for the final report and for the big 
briefing charts that became a part of McNamara's personal style. The final 
report, perhaps two inches thick, was printed and bound in a legal-size, 
black goatskin cover, with the name of the President engraved in gold on 
it. 

The finished report was rushed by helicopter to Andrews Air Force 
Base, about twenty miles from the Pentagon, and placed aboard a military 
jet fighter for a nonstop, midair-refueled flight to Honolulu, where it was 
handed to Mr. McNamara and his staff. He familiarized himself with the 
report while his jet flew him to Washington, where he disembarked at 
Andrews Air Force Base, trotted (with the report tucked under his arm) to 
the waiting Presidential helicopter and was whisked to the White House 
lawn to be greeted by the President. As soon as he got into the White 
House, an aide distributed the closely guarded and controlled copies of the 
report to those who had the need to know, and discussions began. 

This recapitulation is worth setting forth in detail because it 
underscores not only the resourcefulness of the ST but its ability to 
perform super- miracles in an age when mere miracles are commonplace. 
The ST always fights for the minds, the time, and the attention of the top- 
echelon men. It moves fastest and most adroitly when others are off guard. 



This report of December 21, 1963, was absolutely crucial to the interests 
of the ST. Twenty-five years of driving, devoted work by ST members 
through a whole generation of critical events culminated in the Vietnam 
war. Never before in all the long history of civilization was a country to 
devote so much of its resources, its men and their lives, its money, and its 
very prestige in so strange an event as that which is called "The War In 
Vietnam". It made the coups d'etat in Guatemala and Iran, the rebellion in 
Indonesia, the escape of the Dalai Lama and the underground war in Tibet, 
the Bay of Pigs, and the wasting war in Laos all pale before its magnitude. 

President Johnson, for all his experience and native ability, had not 
yet been singed by the fire of experience as had Jack Kennedy in Cuba or 
Eisenhower by the U-2. Johnson was a natural "wheeler dealer", with 
courage and a flair for getting things done; but he had not yet learned how 
to say "No" and make it stick, rather, he had the inclination to defer the 
issue to a later day. This was the ideal formula for the ST, and they struck 
while the iron was hot. 

There is another important factor to weigh in considering the agility 
and cunning of the ST. In bureaucratic Washington, few things are worth 
more than prior information. If a subordinate knows now what his boss is 
going to know tomorrow, he is in the same position that the gambler 
would like to be in if he knew which horse was going to win in a future 
race. The ST has set itself up through the use and control of intelligence 
data, both real and manufactured, to know now what its bosses are going 
to know later. This applies most significantly in such events as the 
McNamara report. 

As anyone who has perceived the full significance of the routine 
described earlier will realize, the ST knows what the report of the 
Secretary of Defense is going to be even before he does, and therefore, 
before all the rest of official Washington does. This twenty-four to forty- 
eight hour lead-time of critical and most influential knowledge is a most 
valuable commodity. Many staffs who have no real responsibilities in the 
covert activities of this nation break their backs for a glimpse of what the 
ST is doing, and for this special privilege they pay one way or another. 

At other times the Team will extract from a report such as has been 
described a few paragraphs that will be skillfully leaked to the press and to 
selected businessmen. Background briefings are held, most frequently in 
some quiet conference room in the New State Building or perhaps in the 
big executive dining room Allen Dulles had in the old "E" Street 
headquarters of the CIA; and there a sub-staff of the ST will pour over the 
language of a brief item designed especially for "Periscope" in Newsweek, 
or perhaps for its old favorite, Joe Alsop. 

In any event, advance top-level information is a most valuable and 
saleable commodity. But nowhere is it more valuable than in the White 
House itself and in the offices of the Secretary of Defense and of the 
Director of Central Intelligence. McGeorge Bundy, Mike Forrestal, Joe 
Califano, Maxwell Taylor, and the others always looked good when they 



could sit down, calm and composed, with the President and with Rusk and 
McNamara, already knowing what was in the reports these men were 
pouring over page by page. McNamara would give one of his classic 
"fully charted" briefings of his trip, utilizing for his purpose the originals 
of the artwork in his report, and have the President and other Cabinet 
officers hanging on his every word — words he had been learning and 
rehearsing while he sped by jet from Honolulu. At the same time, the ST 
members were secure in their knowledge that they already knew every 
word that McNamara was going to say and that they had staff studies and 
Presidential messages already drafted to send to the Ambassador and the 
commanders in Indochina. 

It may seem strange to readers of the Pentagon Papers to note how 
often a report from the chairman of the JCS to the Secretary of Defense 
would be followed the next day by one from the Secretary of Defense to 
the President — and then almost on the same day, by a lengthy message to 
the ambassador in Saigon. What may seem even more strange is that the 
reply from the ambassador would follow, with all of its detail, within 
twenty-four hours. This was not a miracle. This was preplanning by the 
ST. The whole thing was done at the same time, and even the reply from 
the ambassador had been anticipated by a closely guarded message via 
CIA channels to a CIA man on the embassy staff in Saigon, giving him the 
language to use for the ambassadors reply almost as soon as the 
President's wire arrived. The ST seldom left anything to chance, and since 
they had the means of the "Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court", 
they made it a way of life to use it. 

The Pentagon Papers reveal in the total listing of names of the 
principal writers of those papers a good compilation of key members of 
the ST at that time. However, it would be very misleading to accept this 
list as complete and meaningful for anything more than this one area of 
activity. Furthermore, some of the most influential members of the Team 
are not even mentioned in those pages. There were and are many men who 
are not in government who are prime movers of Secret Team activity. 

Only one month after McNamara's report, General Maxwell D. 
Taylor, then Chairman of the JCS, kept the ball rolling with a report to 
Secretary McNamara, dated January 22, 1964. It is important to keep in 
mind that Maxwell Taylor was on the same trip to Saigon with McNamara 
that resulted in the October 2, 1963, report, the one that contained the 
"home by end of 1965" theme. Now, less than four months later, he was 
saying: "It would be unrealistic to believe that a complete suppression of 
the insurgency can take place in one or even two years." And further, "The 
United States must make plain to the enemy our determination to see the 
Vietnam campaign through to a favorable conclusion. To do this, we must 
prepare for whatever level of activity may be required and, being 
prepared, must then proceed to take actions as necessary to achieve our 
purposes surely and promptly." 

"The JCS believe that our position in Cambodia, our attitude toward 
Laos, our actions in Thailand and our great effort in South Vietnam do not 



comprise a compatible and integrated policy for Southeast Asia. U.S. 
objectives in Southeast Asia cannot be achieved by either economic, 
political or military measures alone. All three fields must be integrated 
into a single, broad U.S. program for Southeast Asia." 

Later, we shall deal in more detail with this new "military" line, 
which Taylor was here expounding. But while we are weighing these 
words, we should note that the U.S. military — more precisely, that part 
that was closely affiliated with the CIA (and by 1964, General Taylor 
must be considered to be among them) — was underscoring here in the 
United States as well as overseas the new political-social-economic role of 
the Army. This subject is only inferentially introduced in Taylor's report; 
but as we shall see later, it had become a dominant theme in the 
peacetime-operations Army procedure of this period. 

At the same time it should be noted that Taylor, operating most 
certainly under the provisions set forth by President Kennedy in his 
National Security Action Memorandum #55 of June, 1961141, is strongly 
announcing his support of covert actions against North Vietnam. This 
would have been quite uncharacteristic and unthinkable in the Army 
before this time. It became Secret-Team-type doctrine, because the Team 
knew all too well that covert operations of sufficient size and volume 
could be exploited. 

Like the carbon rods in a nuclear reactor, to raise or lower the level 
of "radioactivity" or to heat up a latent insurgency situation to the level 
desired, this has been done in Laos for fifteen or more years. The policies 
that have been used in Indochina create and generate more combat than 
they quench. It has been said that the Vietnamese war is one of "re- 
counter", the idea being that if you hit someone — even little, starving, 
terrorized, and homeless natives — long enough, they will eventually fight 
back with whatever bits of remaining strength they have. Thus, Taylor's 
following words take on certain special significance: 

It is our [JCS] conviction that if support of the insurgency from 
outside South Vietnamin terms of operational direction, personnel and 
material were stopped completely, the character of the war in South 
Vietnam would be substantially and favorably altered. Because of this 
conviction, we are wholly in favor of executing the covert actions against 
North Vietnam which you have recently proposed to the President. [These 
were the covert actions which the group chaired by General Krulak had 
developed.] We believe, however, that it would be idle to conclude that 
these efforts will have a decisive effect on the Communist determination 
to support the insurgency; and it is our view that we must therefore be 
prepared fully to undertake a much higher level of activity, not only for its 
beneficial tactical effect, but to make plain our resolution, both to our 
friends and to our enemies. 

Following this statement, which like others was written by his 
special staff and by his CIA associates, General Taylor listed ten activities 
which he said the United States must make ready to conduct in Southeast 
Asia. One of these was to "... commit U.S. forces as necessary in support 
of the combat action within South Vietnam." He added, "The past few 



months have disclosed that considerably higher levels of effort are 
demanded of us if U.S. objectives are to be attained." 

In the inner chambers of the Government, where secret operations 
are cloaked in sufficient cover-story language to keep even the experts and 
top echelon leaders in a state of unreality, nothing ever more closely 
approached the "emperor's new clothes" syndrome than did the ST's work 
on Johnson, Rusk, McCone, and McNamara. 

Townsend Hoopes, who spent years in the Pentagon in this 
awesome environment, wrote in the Washington Post of August 17, 1971, 
"The altered alignments in the Communist world were much clearer in 
1964 than in 1960, making it, again in theory, easier for Johnson to take a 
fresh look. But the abrupt and tragic way in which he had come to the 
White House, the compulsions of the 1964 presidential campaign, and his 
own lack of a steady compass in foreign affairs (not to mention the 
powerful and nearly unanimous views of his inherited advisers) effectively 
ruled out a basic reappraisal of our national interests in Vietnam. Like 
each predecessor, Johnson decided, as one analyst put it, "that it would be 
inconvenient for him to lose South Vietnam this year". 

There is a fine point to add to Mr. Hoopes' perceptions. Johnson not 
only did not make "a basic reappraisal of our national interests in 
Vietnam", but he did not check out the compass to assure himself that the 
Ship of State was on the same course that it had been sailing before he 
took the helm of office. He never took the time nor made the effort to 
check out the ST. He just took it for granted that it was on the same course 
after Kennedy's death as before. This was his first big oversight. 

The point is subtle, and the change was at each turn slight; but the 
long-range course was being altered dynamically. Each report he received 
gave the semblance of normalcy, and each report was a reasonable part of 
the pattern with which he was somewhat familiar. No one would deny that 
Lyndon Johnson was not an intimate of Jack Kennedy's and that, 
especially in matters pertaining to Vietnam, he really did not know the 
Presidents mind. The fact that he had been to Vietnam may actually have 
been more of a cover story and a handicap for him than a view of reality. 

Brainwashing was the business of the ST in South Vietnam. No less 
than Robert McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Vice-President Johnson, and 
John McCone were thoroughly indoctrinated on South Vietnam by 
hardheaded experts who thought nothing of sharpening the scenarios 
skillfully drawn for consumption by top-level officials. Allen W. Dulles 
meant it when he called his book The Craft of Intelligence. To him and his 
inner ring of confidants and paramilitary experts, big-time intelligence was 
craftily managed. As a result, these carefully drawn reports told the 
President that things were getting much worse in Southeast Asia and that 
there was a strong possibility of a Communist take-over of all of South 
Asia if South Vietnam and Laos and then Cambodia succumbed to the 
insurgency which, the Team said, was running rampant there. 



After the reports and briefings of December 1963 and January 1964, 
it became evident that Johnson was giving way before the pressures of the 
CIA and the "military" who were working with the Agency. 

It is essential that the term "military" be clarified for use throughout 
this book. Many military men are regularly assigned to the CIA, in their 
primary roles as intelligence experts, for their own experience and training 
and to flesh out areas where the Agency can use them. These are 
legitimate military assignments, and such men are openly identified with 
the CIA. There is another group of military men who are fully assigned to 
the Agency, meaning their pay and allowances are reimbursed to the 
parent service by the CIA, but they appear to be with regular military units 
or other normal assignments so that their assignment to the CIA will not 
be revealed to those unwitting of their real task. 

These men are on cover assignments. Some of them are completely 
detached from the service for the period of their assignment although they 
will get promotions and other benefits similar to those of their 
contemporaries. Then there are other military personnel working with the 
CIA who are really Agency employees but who are permitted to wear the 
uniform and rank or grade of their Reserve or National Guard status. And 
lastly, there are other CIA personnel who for special reasons are permitted 
to assume the uniform or at least the identity of one of the military 
services, with rank as is necessary, even though they have no real service 
connection. 

There are few of these latter individuals; but they do exist. It is also 
true that for certain practical purposes nearly all CIA personnel carry the 
identification of the Department of Defense or some other government 
agency in order that they will have simple cover for such things as credit 
cards and banking accounts so they will not have to reveal their 
employment with the CIA. This category is simply a technical expedient 
and is not intended in the first instance to be used for clandestine 
purposes. 

This strong military bias of the Agency plays a very important part 
in the operations of the ST and will be discussed more fully in later 
chapters. It probably played an impressive role in the winning of President 
Johnson's mind soon after be took office. He no doubt, as did most others, 
looked to such men as General Maxwell Taylor, General Victor Krulak, 
General William Rosson, General Edward Lansdale, General William 
Peers, General Richard C. Stilwell, General William Dupuy, and many 
many others as straight- line military officers. Although without question 
they all were military men, they all also had assignments of various types 
that made them effective CIA operators. By the very nature of their work, 
they worked with, for, and in support of the CIA. It was their first 
allegiance. Those mentioned above form but a brief list of the great 
number of senior officers in this category. 

After these first reports of December 1963 and early 1964, the next 
round of Secret Team maneuvers was planned as they worked to up-grade 



the war. It became time for McNamara to bring things up to date with the 
White House. On March 16, 1964, he made a report to the President, "On 
Steps to Change the Trend of the War". This report was long and 
discursive. It even included the line, "Substantial reductions in the 
numbers of U.S. military training personnel should occur before the end of 
1965." Notice how the words were put! This report had the ring of the old 
"home by the end of 1965" report of October 2, 1963, but with a 
significant difference. In October, Taylor and McNamara had said to 
Kennedy that it should be possible to withdraw the bulk of U S. personnel. 
The key word is "personnel", as opposed to the March 16 "military 
training personnel". 

The Vietnam war has always been a most unusual one from the 
standpoint of its being a non-typical war. A very large number of U.S. 
personnel in this war were not military. There were thousands from other 
government agencies. There were tens of thousands of civilian workers of 
all kinds. The helicopter maintenance support alone required fantastic 
numbers of civilian maintenance personnel and contract workers. Kennedy 
knew this, and when he was told that "U.S. personnel" would be coming 
home, he knew that meant a comprehensive and meaningful number. 
However, when McNamara told Johnson that "substantial reductions in. . . 
military training personnel" would take place, he was talking about a small 
slice of the pie. 

Even if all of the training personnel came home, there would still be 
a lot of U.S. manpower there. The distinction was meaningful. It was 
brainwashing and misleading, and intentionally so. Lines such as this were 
added simply for flavoring. The ST writers would not expect the President 
to notice the difference. He would hear the words "reductions" and 
"personnel" only. 

Meanwhile, the ST had a safety valve in their report in the event 
they had to account for this report at a later date, something they always 
planned for, but seldom, if ever, had to do. After all of the words, recent 
history of Indochina involvement, and some philosophizing continued in 
this lengthy McNamara report, the final paragraph held the meat of the 
proposition: 

12. To prepare immediately to be in position on 72 hours notice to 
initiate the full range of Laotian and Cambodian "Border Control" actions 
beyond those authorized in Paragraph 11 above and the "Retaliatory 
Actions" against North Vietnam, and to be in a position on 30 days' notice 
to initiate the program of "Graduated Overt Military Pressure" against 
North Vietnam. 

This was another big step forward on the way to inevitable 
escalation. It is one thing for a nation to plan for a clandestine operation 
with an agent or agents and to arrange for its success, or in the event of 
failure, to totally deny involvement. All such activities are planned in such 
a way that the nation taking the action may be able to disclaim plausibly to 
the entire world that it had anything to do with such an action. But the 
action above is serious international business, because at the very root of 



the plan is the intent to violate the sovereignty of another nation. Wars 
have been started by such events. When a nation feels that it must resort to 
clandestine activities, it does so with great caution and then only with 
agents who are specially prepared for such work. In no case, or in the very 
rarest cases, are members of the diplomatic service and of the uniformed 
military service ever used for such acts. Honor and honesty in the society 
of nations demand that the diplomatic corps and the military services be 
beyond reproach. The paragraph quoted above from McNamara's March 
16 report not only proposed more or less routine covert activity against 
Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam, but it added that the United States 
should plan for "overt military pressure" against North Vietnam, thus 
carrying through the momentum of action initiated with his December 21, 
1963, report. The die was cast. The Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred on 
August 4, 1964, and from that time on to the President's announcement of 
the massive build-up of forces, there could be no doubting the course laid 
out for the United States in Indochina. 

This course was set by the winds of change as this Government 
responded to and reacted to various intelligence-data inputs from as far 
back as 1945. Vietnam was not so much a goal as it was a refuge and 
backlash of everything that had gone wrong in a quarter-century of 
clandestine activities. There can be no questioning the fact that Vietnam 
inherited some of the Korea leftovers; it inherited the Magsaysay team 
from the Philippines with its belief in another Robin-Hood-like 
Magsaysay in the person of Ngo Dinh Diem; it fell heir to the Indonesian 
shambles; it soaked up men and materials from the Tibetan campaign and 
from Laos in particular, and it inherited men and material, including a 
large number of specially modified aircraft, from the Bay of Pigs disaster. 
In its leadership it inherited men who had been in Greece in the late forties 
or during the Eisenhower era and who felt that they knew Communist 
insurgency when they saw it. The nation of South Vietnam had not existed 
as a nation before 1954, rather it was another country's piece of real estate. 
South Vietnam has never really been a nation. It has become the quagmire 
of things gone wrong during the past twenty-five years. 

In the August 7, 1971, issue of The New Republic, the Asian scholar 
Eugene G. Windchy says, "What steered the nation into Vietnam was a 
series of tiny but powerful cabals." What he calls a sense of tiny but 
powerful conspiracies, this book puts all together as the actions of the 
Secret Team. That most valuable book by David Wise and Thomas B. 
Ross calls this power source "The Invisible Government", and in the 
chapter on the various intelligence organizations in the United States they 
use the term "Secret Elite". 

The CIA did not begin as a Secret Team, as a "series of tiny but 
powerful cabals", as the "invisible government", or as members of the 
"secret elite". But before long it became a bit of all of these. President 
Truman was exactly right when he said that the CIA had been diverted 
from its original assignment. This diversion and the things that have 
happened as a result of it will be the subject of the remainder of this book. 



1. This is a gross and crafty misnomer [Pentagon Papers], since all too few of those papers actually were bona fide 
military papers. They may have been written under Pentagon headings; they may have been signed by 
"military" officers or "military department civilians", but for the most part they were not actually military 
papers. They represent the papers of a small group of civilians, some of whom worked in the Pentagon, and 
their military [real and cover] counterparts. 

2. The Pentagon Papers' account and the subsequent NBC-TV presentation of the assassination of the Ngo 
brothers are both excellent representations of what happened during those grim days in Washington and Saigon. 
The only problem is that neither one is a complete and accurate account of what really took place, especially in 
Washington. 

3. McNamara used to make the distinction that the war against North Vietnam was "sophisticated". Whereas the 
war in the South was "unsophisticated". The feeling was that there was an element of design and control over 
the war in the North which was not possible in the South. Walt Rostow had his own term for this. He liked to 
say that the war in the North was a sort of game of tit-for-tat. His idea was that if they hit us, we'd hit back. This 
type of game is all the more "sophisticated" when we hit clandestinely; they strike back overtly and then we 
strike back, claming they hit first! 

4. See clarification on pages 115 and 401 . 



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Chapter 2 

The Nature of Secret Team Activity: 
A Cuban Case Study 



THE CALL WAS FROM MIAMI AND WAS PLACED TO A 
covert CIA phone drop in Washington. It came from a Cuban underground 
contact point on the campus of the University of Miami. The control point 
there had just received a call from an undetermined location in Mexico. 
The call had been made by the pilot of a Cuban crew that had been lost 
and had made a forced landing. The crew was safe and the plane was 
intact... but in Mexico. 

An old C-54, a former U.S. Air Force four-engine transport, had 
taken off the night before from the secret Cuban training base at 
Retalhuleu in Guatemala. It was flown by a Cuban crew, and their target 
had been a drop-zone in the Sierra Madre mountains of Cuba. Everything 
had gone wrong. The dropzone had been cleared and approved by 
Washington just a few hours before take-off yet, it had been hostile. Either 
intelligence had been bad or the Cuban ground reception party had been 
captured. The signals from the ground had been right, luring them in with 
confidence; but as soon as they began the drop, the whole mountainside 
had erupted with small arms fire. They had been ambushed, and they had 
been lucky to get down safely over the waves and back across the 
Caribbean. 

Hours later, somewhere over Central America, in pre-dawn darkness 
they had circled over a heavy layer of clouds, watching their gas gauges, 
waiting for the sunrise, and hoping for a break in the clouds so they could 
let down. Fearful of the mountains and with their radio navigation 
equipment unreliable, they dared not let down until they had clear contact 
with the ground. At that point they cared little for all of the precautionary 
instructions of the Agency mission commander that had been given them 
during their briefing before they took off all they wanted to do was to find 
a safe place to land. They knew the plane was stateless; that it was 
unmarked and had no insignia. It did not even have a legal call sign. In 
fact, the big transport was very special. Although it looked like any other 
C-54 or DC-4, a trained observer would have noted those things, and that 
it had unusual radios, no engine decals, and no manufacturer's labels. It 
was "clean", a non-attributable air plane. It had been "sanitized" and was 
the pride of the clandestine operators' art. 



It could have been flown anywhere in the world, and if it had been 
lost on some clandestine mission, the finder — whether he was Cuban, 
Congolese, or Russian — might have assumed that it had been operated by 
Americans, but he would not have been able to prove it. In other words, 
the U.S. Government, if required, could have plausibly disclaimed 
ownership of the plane and that it had had anything to do with the plane, 
its crew, and its cargo. 

This plane had been on many flights along the Iron Curtain borders, 
on leaflet drops and on electronic intelligence missions. It had been used 
for para-drop missions in Greece and in Jordan. It had been to the Congo 
and had delivered "black" cargoesJH to the Katangese even while other 
U.S. Air Force C-130 aircraft were flying Congolese troops and supplies 
against the rebels. It had been to Clark Field near Manila, flying Tibetans 
to and from operational training sites. It had often been to the old World 
War II B-29 superfortress bomber bases in Saipan where Southeast Asians 
were being trained in sabotage tactics and paramilitary civic action 
programs. But on this flight its crew had been Cuban. 

A former Cuban airline pilot was at the controls, and one of his old 
co-pilots was with him. The Navigator had at one time trained with the 
Cuban Air Force; and the radioman, also a Cuban, had been trained at a 
U.S. Air Force school under cover as a member of a "Nicaraguan Training 
Mission". The crewmen were all natives of Cuba, and all were working 
with the CIA at that secret base that had been cut out of the open country 
of western Guatemala. 

In keeping with clandestine operational procedures, the crew had 
been frisked before they got on the plane and had been given "sanitized" 
uniforms for the trip so that they would have no identification with them 
in the event they fell into enemy hands - in this case a somewhat 
meaningless precaution, but routine anyhow. 

However, in typical old-school pilot fashion the pilot had written 
certain radio frequency numbers on his wrist with a ball-point pen, and 
some of those numbers were a code for the telephone number of the 
contact office in Miami. 

Later that morning, after sunrise, they had flown further to the north 
seeking a clearing in the clouds through which may could descend. As 
soon as they found one, they let down into a broad valley and found a 
small, marked airfield. They landed, and skidded across the field into a 
nearby farm. The first thing they did was to look for a telephone. While 
they were placing that call, the airport manager and his apprentice came 
out to see what had happened. After a few moments of eavesdropping, the 
manager had all the information he needed. The old Mexican drew a gun 
and the crew was captured "somewhere" in Mexico. They were not heard 
from again until after their Cuban friends had attacked the beach at the 
Bay of Pigs, had been imprisoned by Castro, and ransomed by the United 
States. It was only after all of these events that the Mexicans released the 
crew and permitted them to return to Florida. However, their phone call 



had started some frantic work in Miami and in Washington. 

The weather map had shown that the heavy cloud cover over 
Central America gave way to broken clouds further north in Mexico. The 
CIA called the Pentagon and asked for assistance, and a call was made to 
the air attache in Mexico City. He inquired among his Mexican friends 
about a transport plane but learned nothing at first. Then, several days 
later, he heard a rumor that a large transport had made a forced landing at 
a very small southern airfield. He and a CIA man who worked in Mexico 
City under the cover of a cargo airline made a quick trip to that field. As 
they approached they saw the telltale marks of the skidding stop which 
had been made by the DC-4 in the fresh turf. The plane was gone. When 
they landed, the airport manager met them. He told them enough to 
confirm that the plane they were looking for had been there, that the 
Mexican air force had flown it away, and that this Mexican and his 
apprentice knew all there was to know about the incident. 

Some time later, the attach was invited to call upon Mexican air 
force headquarters. He learned that the Mexicans had looked this plane 
over carefully and did not want to keep it. However, the Mexicans added 
that they were sure the Americans would be willing to exchange this 
special plane for another just like it. Not long after that, the old black- 
flight DC-4 was returned to its operational base at Eglin Air Force Base in 
Florida. The CIA arranged for the Mexican air force to receive a good-as- 
new DC-4 from the U.S. Air Force, and far to the south an airport 
manager, his apprentice, and his son (the husband of the telephone 
operator who had heard the whole story too) all sported brand-new 1961 
Ford Thunderbird automobiles from some unknown donor. 

This true story is not really important except that it raises certain 
questions that will shake most Americans. For example: How does one 
government agency "buy" a U.S. Air Force transport aircraft, convert it to 
a civilian aircraft, and then give it as tribute to another country in 
exchange for one which was lost on a clandestine mission? Or, how does a 
government agency purchase three new 1961 Ford Thunderbird 
automobiles and deliver them to a remote site in Mexico and give them to 
some Mexicans? Who makes such decisions? Why Thunderbirds? Why 
pay tribute to Mexico for the airplane that quite obviously, once it had 
been identified, belonged to the United States? (Its very strangeness made 
it easier to identify if desired and harder to identify if disclaimed.) It 
would have been stateless only if the United States had disclaimed it. 
When the United States claimed it, why didn't this Government expect the 
Mexicans to give it back? Who decides such things? And how is all this 
done in total secrecy? 

Then to the next level of questions. Who in the Government 
believes that once tribute is paid to another country such as Mexico the 
problem ends there? Does it not occur to these same officials that 
Mexicans speak to Guatemalans and to Nicaraguans and even to 
Vietnamese ~ and perhaps to Russians and Chinese as well? Who kids 
whom? Does the gift of a DC-4 close the case and really buy silence, or 



does it more likely escalate the problem? And then what does all of this 
behind-the-scenes duplicity do to foreign relations? Doesn't it raise some 
international eyebrows and make some people wonder who is running the 
foreign affairs of the United States in the first place? Isn't that exactly 
what Mr. Krushchev wanted to know when he challenged Eisenhower 
either to reveal those who had sent the U-2 over Russia without the 
President's permission and authorization or to accept the blame himself, 
signifying that United States foreign policy included the authorization of 
covert operations? 

If the Mexicans received tribute for one such mistake, would it be 
surprising to learn that the Indonesians had demanded even more tribute 
for a bigger mistake? Or when government leadership shifts back and 
forth as has happened several times in Laos, doesn't anyone stop to think 
about the tales that are told by those on both sides to their new "friends"? 
What are the Indians telling the Russians about us now in 1972 concerning 
our actions there in 1962? Or what have the Pakistanis been telling the 
Chinese concerning their participation in the former U-2 operations or in 
the Tibetan- support activities that had been launched from Pakistan? 
Doesn't all of this make it seem rather insincere and even hypocritical for 
some Americans to charge other Americans with security indiscretions 
when officials in the Government have been telling thousands of foreign 
people — officials and peons — that the United States has been playing the 
clandestine game to the hilt? How can anyone honestly charge Jack 
Anderson, The New York Times, The Washington Post, the Boston Globe, 
Daniel Ellsberg, or anyone else with serious violations of security when 
some of these same sacrosanct individuals who point the finger have 
themselves approved of such things as the payment of tribute for our 
clandestine indiscretions and misdeeds all over the world? 

All of these questionable operations have begun from such small 
first steps. In the beginning of the Cuban exercise the CIA had made 
contact with the Ydigoras family in Guatemala for the use of a large tract 
of farmland for a training site and an airfield. This site was developed to 
include a full-sized airport, from which heavy transports, bombers, and 
training planes operated on a very heavy schedule. Although this site was 
remote, it was certainly not secret. The extent of the activity that took 
place there was such that it did not take long before there was no secrecy 
and no possibility for denial that something very special was taking place. 
The whole world knew that a major clandestine operation was under way 
and that the United States and Guatemala, at least, were involved. Who 
paid Guatemala for all of this? And was it paid to individuals or was it all 
paid to the Guatemalan Government? These questions give clues to some 
of the characteristics of the CIA and ST operations. 

The ST members have become so powerful and ambitious that 
sometimes they no longer respect the basic fundamentals of their 
profession. As far back as 1948 the CIA had been given limited authority 
by the National Security Council (NSC) to carry out only those 
clandestine operations that the NSC directed. This authority is contained 
in a series of documents, the first of which was issued in the summer of 



1948 and was called NSC 10/ 2. When the NSC granted this authority, it 
did so with the firm stipulation that any such special operation must be 
truly clandestine, that it must be performed in such a manner that if the 
exercise failed or was otherwise discovered, the U.S. Government would 
be able plausibly to disclaim its role in the operation, and further — what 
would seem most obvious, but was added for emphasis — that it must be 
truly secret and concealed. 

These basic parameters, as established by the NSC, have never been 
officially retracted, although they have been badly abused by oversight. 
During the Truman and Eisenhower years "clandestine" meant 
clandestine, and the ability to disclaim the operation plausibly meant that, 
too. But as operations became more frequent and increased in size and 
scope, as they did against Castro in 1960 and 1961, the CIA became 
forgetful of these strictures upon its methods of operations. From time to 
time even Presidents have permitted a relaxation of their stringent 
application. The Pentagon Papers reveal how this doctrine had been 
disregarded especially with regard to the OPLAN-34, the so-called 
"covert" raids against Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam. 

By 1961, the CIA had succeeded in building such a broad base 
within the bureaucracy of the U.S. Government that any meaningful 
reference to the CIA must take into consideration the existence of this vast 
infrastructure and must not be limited to the legal or "Table of 
Organization" CIA. Most references to the CIA and to the Secret Team's 
book are to that part of the CIA that is not under the Deputy Director of 
Intelligence.nl He is responsible primarily for intelligence production and 
not for covert activity. By 1961, the non-intelligence, the clandestine, and 
the support sectors of the Agency had become so large and so predominant 
that they far outnumbered the professional band of intelligence specialists 
assigned to the DD/I both at home and abroad. By 1961, it had become 
apparent that the CIA played a split- personality role to suit its own 
purposes. It would speak of CIA reports which said one thing, when it 
would be doing exactly the opposite with its undercover, covert sections. 
This, too, becomes readily apparent to the diligent reader of the Pentagon 
Papers. 

Lest the tremendous significance of such a change taking place 
within the U.S. Government be insufficiently regarded, consider the words 
of Arnold Toynbee, the eminent British historian and friend of the United 
States, as set forth in The New York Times of May 7, 1970: 

"To most Europeans, I guess, America now looks like 
the most dangerous country in the world. Since America is 
unquestionably the most powerful country, the transformation 
of America's image within the last thirty years is very 
frightening for Europeans. It is probably still more frightening 
for the great majority of the human race who are neither 
Europeans nor North Americans, but are Latin Americans, 
Asians and Africans. They, I imagine, feel even more insecure 
than we feel. They feel that, at any moment, America may 



intervene in their internal affairs with the same appalling 
consequences as have followed from American intervention 
in Southeast Asia." 

For the world as a whole, the CIA has now become the 
bogey that Communism has been for America. Wherever 
there is trouble, violence, suffering, tragedy, the rest of us are 
now quick to suspect the CIA had a hand in it. Our phobia 
about the CIA is, no doubt, as fantastically excessive as 
America's phobia about world Communism; but in this case, 
too, there is just enough convincing guidance to make the 
phobia genuine. In fact, the roles of America and Russia have 
been reversed in the world's eyes. Today America has become 
the world's nightmare. 

When an uncontrolled and perhaps uncontrollable team can flaunt 
the historic and traditional codes of civilization by disregarding the honor 
and sovereignty of other countries large and small, by intervening in the 
internal affairs of other countries for reasons real and contrived, the rest of 
the world does fear for its own welfare and for the future of this country. 
When President Eisenhower accepted the responsibility for the U-2 flights 
over the Soviet Union, no one would have questioned that he did this for 
correct and honorable reasons. National Aeronautics and Space 
Administrator (NASA) Keith Glennan had already made a public 
statement that the U-2 was operating out of Turkey as a NASA high- 
altitude, flight-research aircraft and had strayed over Russian territory 
inadvertently in high winds. Then, Nikita Krushchev produced the 
wreckage of the U-2 deep in Russia near Sverdlovsk, it made a mockery of 
the NASA cover story; and when he produced the pilot alive and well, it 
demolished the rest of the plausible disclaimer. The CIA was caught 
without a plausible cover story, and the President had to choose. He could 
either discredit Allen Dulles and the CIA for operating that clandestine 
flight and a long series of flights without his knowledge, or he could, as 
Eisenhower did, stand up and take the blame himself on the basis that he 
knew of and had ordered the flights and was in complete control of 
everything done in the foreign arena by this Government. The latter choice 
would mean that the President of the United States is Commander in Chief 
during peacetime clandestine operations as he is in time of war. This is a 
totally new doctrine born of the vicissitudes of the Cold War. 

Many have considered this a very noble stand on the part of 
President Eisenhower, and it was. However, this public admission by the 
Chief of State that he had directed clandestine operations within another 
state is exactly the type of thing that reduces the prestige and credibility of 
United States in the family of nations to the condition described by Arnold 
Toynbee. Interference in the internal affairs of one nation by another is an 
unpardonable violation of international law and custom. 

The entire Bay of Pigs build-up and operation went much further in 
flaunting this international code of ethics. At least the U-2 operation on a 
worldwide scale had been managed in such a manner that the chances for 



success were great. That the flights were operated in small units with great 
secrecy and the stipulation that they be strictly clandestine and plausibly 
disclaimable in the event of failure was not outwardly flaunted until, 
perhaps, the Gary Powers flight. But the Cuban program was otherwise. 

By the time Cuban operations had been expanded to the point that 
they had become the beginnings of the bay of Pigs operation, activity of 
all kinds had been discovered and compromised by the press of the world. 
There were no more secrets. The participation and support of the United 
States was known to be taking place in Puerto Rico, Panama, Guatemala, 
and Nicaragua, in addition to some unscheduled action in Mexico. Yet the 
ST continued to launch an increasing number of special operations 
without regard for real secrecy. 

There was not only a breakdown in the traditional ethics of 
international relations but there was also a serious degradation of the usual 
high standard of technical operational methods within the Government. 
The flights from Guatemala themselves were not tactically sound nor were 
they politically effective. Most of these flights not only failed miserably to 
accomplish what the CIA thought they would do, i.e., put in place 
underground cadres of guerrillas and provide equipment and 
communications material for other underground groups in Cuba; but as a 
result of their amateurism and failures, they played into the hands of 
Castro. They never did become a rallying point for anti-Castroites. On the 
contrary, they exposed and compromised them and led to many 
unnecessary firing-squad deaths. The flight paths, by their crossing and 
recrossing, pinpointed and exposed ground-reception parties, which were 
mopped up by Castro's troops; in other cases, aircraft were lured over 
drop- sites that proved to be ambushes. The whole series of operations 
exposed the weaknesses of CIA's tactical capacity. The CIA cannot 
properly direct large operations. It has led many small ones successfully; 
but has failed miserably in a number of large ones. 

An important oversight inherent in such activity was mentioned by 
David Wise and Thomas B. Ross in their book, The Invisible Government. 
They reported The Chiefs (U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) were told that the 
invasion was not a Pentagon operation and that they could give advice 
only when called upon. Because of the secrecy involved, they were not 
allowed to take their staffs into their confidence; this of course, cut down 
on their overall effectiveness. 

This was only a part of the story. The Chiefs were told to keep 
hands off, yet the Agency was operating down through all services to the 
tactical level, taking supplies, arranging training, utilizing all forms of 
transportation. However, few if any military personnel even knew enough 
of what was really going on to give proper advice had they been asked. 
This is one of the greatest weaknesses of the ST's classified method of 
operation. 

Because the ST acts in response to intelligence-data inputs, it does 
not operate in compliance with or in support of a plan or policy. It creates 



an umbrella or catch-all policy such as "anti-Communism", then declares 
that all of its operations are anti-Communist, and attempts to justify what 
it does solely on that basis. To clarify by example: 

A Cuban reported to another Cuban who was in touch with a CIA 
contact man in Miami that be had friends back in Cuba who were willing 
to blow up a major sugar refinery, but they had no munitions or other 
equipment necessary to do this. The CIA Cuban reported this to his 
contact. A meeting was arranged right away in a "safe" house — for 
example, in the Latin American Geological Survey offices somewhere on 
the campus of the University of Miami. The first Cuban showed on a map 
where his friends were and explained what they planned to do. The CIA 
contact man proposed that the first thing to do would be to establish 
contact with them and then to place a clandestine radio with them. To test 
the zeal and veracity of the informant, it was suggested that this be done 
by putting him ashore at night near the target. He agreed, on the assurance 
that he would be picked up the next night. He was taught how to use the 
clandestine radio and was provided with a special kit of munitions. He was 
put over the beach and directed to bring one Cuban out with him for 
further training. All went well to that point. At no time in this almost 
automatic-response process did anyone in the CIA ask, "Why are we 
doing this?" The simple Pavlovian animal-instinct to go ahead and do it 
because it was an anti-Castro move was all the agents needed at this stage 
of activity. 

But this is where it always starts. Of course, the ST members would 
have right on their side in their almost religious missionary zeal to do 
good. The first agent would not only have heard that the Cubans planned 
to blow up the sugar refinery; but they would have flavored this with ideas 
of the injustice there and with accounts of the brutality of Castro's police. 
And they would have pledged that the reason they wanted to kill Castro 
was that they want to bring democracy to their homeland and to all Cuban 
people. 

The "fun and games' must always be founded upon sanctimonious 
grounds. At the same time lip service is paid to do-gooder causes, there is 
scarcely ever any practical consideration of whether or not such an action, 
or those that will follow whether the initial action succeeds or fails, are 
really in the best interests of the United States. 

The exfiltrated Cuban was given rudimentary demolition training at 
a remote site in Florida and was taught to use signal lights and panels, as 
well as the radio. Less than a week later, he was back in Cuba at work 
with his neighbors in the sugar refinery gang. 

Although everything seemed to have gone well, these inexperienced 
though patriotic Cubans had no understanding of the Castro operated, 
Communist-perfected block system that was in effect in Cuba and that 
blanketed the entire island. No one in the CIA had warned them about this, 
if the thought had ever crossed their minds. As soon as the first Cuban had 
been exfiltrated, his absence was duly noted by the "system". He had not 



appeared for work at the refinery, but not a word was said there. A teacher 
at school was tipped off to make a discreet inquiry of the man's child: 
"Could your father come to school to see your pretty drawings?" "Well no, 
teacher, you see my father is not feeling well. He's sick." Then a state 
medical technician stopped by his home and asked to see the father 
"because it has been reported he is sick". The mother explained that he 
was not really sick; it was his uncle in Santiago who was sick, and he had 
gone to see the uncle. So the net was drawn tighter. Even before he had 
been returned to Cuba, a Castro agent had been infiltrated into the refinery 
work crew, and by the time the patriot returned, Castro's men were ready. 
They waited, alert. They listened to all of the plans. Perhaps they joined in 
encouraging the plans. 

Then, on the night of the raid on the refinery everything went 
wrong. The whole cabal had been rounded up, and in no more time than it 
took for the radio operator to flash an emergency signal to Miami, it was 
all over. The reaction to the first information input by that first CIA agent 
had doomed those men to death, and their families and friends to lives of 
misery. Castro's control, rather than being weakened, had been 
strengthened by the brutal elimination of a few more men of blind courage 
and the example of that same fate for others who might wish to conspire 
with the Yankees. 

In this example, which is a true case, if the attack had been 
successful, what good would it have done? Do such random bits of 
vandalism and sabotage actually further the foreign policy goals of the 
United States? Is this kind of anti-Castroism really pro- American? The 
very little harm to Castro and his Government, if any, that might possibly 
have been done, could not conceivably generate enough benefit to the 
United States ever to compensate for the loss this country suffers when 
such activities fail, as they so often do. This brings to mind the prophetic 
words from the Rubdiydt of Omar Khayyam, 

"I wonder often what the Vintners buy One half so precious as 
the stuff they sell." 

Nevertheless, the ST takes even such a gross failure as a challenge. 
They interpret it as some sort of Castroite dare, and they leap into action 
again to gamble with other men's lives. In Miami and in Washington the 
failure of this first raid was only the beginning. Word was flashed to CIA 
that a Castro attack had wiped out an anti-Communist underground cell. 
Instead of leaving the blown operation at that, the CIA readied the next 
step. No mention was made of how the initial contact was begun nor of the 
agent-assisted first attempt, which was the provocation to Castro. Instead, 
it was made to look as though Castro's attack upon the people was entirely 
unprovoked except by their anti-Communism. 

As the next level of reaction, the CIA suggested an attack over the 
beach against that sugar refinery in reprisal for Castro's so-called "brutal 
attack upon the anti-Communist Cubans". It would be added as part of the 
"line" that one of the reasons for this next attack would be to show "the 



Cuban people that the United States was right behind them". A briefing 
along these lines was prepared and delivered to the Special Group of the 
NSC as much for intragovernmental public relations and flag-waving as 
for the approval the CIA felt it should get for this covert operation which 
was expected to be closely supported by Americans. In this manner small 
clandestine operations escalate, even though there may have been no real 
foreign policy guideline for such courses of action. 

The CIA selected a team of Cubans from one of the major training 
sites in the United States or Central America and trained and equipped 
them for the major reprisal raid against the Castro provocation against 
innocent Cubans. The U.S. Navy was requested to provide offshore 
assistance limited to action in international waters. The Navy would 
launch and recover a small, fast boat which would make the actual 
landing. A date during the dark phase of the moon was picked, the weather 
checked, and the small boat with the special Cuban team aboard was 
launched. They were crack demolitions experts, familiar with the Navy 
SEAL-team method of high-speed operation. They made a successful 
landing and approached the refinery. The block system was already alerted 
and had been waiting. Sentry dogs picked up the men as they moved 
ashore, and the whole team was wiped out. Their rafts were found hidden 
on the beach, and when the sentry boat returned for the preplanned 
recovery, the correct light signals, beaten from the team by Castro's 
experts, lured the fast boat near the beach into an ambush. In the sky 
above, Castro's planes, alerted to the position off shore, observed the 
waiting U.S. Navy vessel and confirmed that this action had official U.S. 
Government support. 

Again, things did not stop there. The challenge was greater. 

Americans had been involved closely in that activity. The urge to 
outwit and to whip Castro was strong. The next round of attacks was to be 
even greater effort, until the ultimate invasion at the Pay of Pigs. This type 
of scenario happened many times and in varying target areas and with new 
characters and new supporting casts. Some of them were successful to the 
extent that the teams participating accomplished their assigned tasks, or 
said they did, and returned safely. Others were lost, as this first one was. 
And in every case it may be certain that success or failure resulted in 
massive punitive action against the local population. It wasn't long before 
all Cubans prayed that they would not be the "lucky and fortunate anti- 
Communists" selected by the benevolent Americans for the next anti- 
Castro strike. 

The CIA's greatest strength derives from its ability to activate 
various parts of the U.S. Government, usually the Defense Department, 
with minor inputs designed to create reaction. It finds a minor fact, which 
it interprets and evaluates to be Communist inspired, or inspired by some 
other favorite enemy (Trujillo or De Gaulle), then it feeds this item into 
the White House and to Defense, where a response re- action takes place 
predictably and automatically. To carry this to the next level, the CIA, by 
utilizing its clandestine facilities, can stir up the action it wants for further 



use in turn to stir up a re-action response within the U.S. Government 
structure. Although such actions and re-actions usually begin on a very 
small scale, they escalate rapidly as in Indonesia, Tibet and Greece. (They 
went completely out of control in Southeast Asia.) 

It is the type of game played by the clandestine operator. He sets up 
the scene by declaring in many ways and over a long period of time that 
Communism is the general enemy and that the enemy is about to strike or 
has begun a subversive insurgency campaign in a third country. Then the 
clandestine operator prepares the stage by launching a very minor and 
very secret, provocative attack of a kind that is bound to bring open 
reprisal. These secret attacks, which may have been made by third parties 
or by stateless mercenaries whose materials were supplied secretly by the 
CIA, will undoubtedly create reaction which in turn is observed in the 
United States. (This technique was developed to a high art in the 
Philippines during the early Magsaysay build-up to the point where the 
Huks were actually some of Magsaysay's own troops disguised and set 
upon the unwary village in the grand manner of a Cecil B. De Mille 
production.) 

The next step is to declare the enemy's act one of "aggression" or 
"subversive insurgency", and then the next part of the game is activated by 
the CIA. This part of the operation will be briefed to the NSC Special 
Group, and it will include, at some point, Americans in support. So it will 
go, as high and as mighty as the situation and authorities will allow. It is 
not a new game. It was practiced, albeit amateurishly and uncertainly, in 
Greece during the late forties, and it was raised to a high state of art under 
Walt Rostow and McGeorge Bundy against North Vietnam, to set the 
pattern for the Gulf of Tonkin attacks. In fact, a number of the leading 
actors in the cast of key characters in the greatest scenario of them all, 
"The War in Vietnam", received the earliest training in the Greek 
campaign of the forties. All of the mystery surrounding those actions was 
unveiled in the Pentagon Papers with the revelation of such things as the 
covert OPLAN-34. 

Operations arising in this manner and from such sources are, 
unfortunately, frequently the result of the endeavors of the overambitious, 
the irresponsible, and the ignorant. They are often enmeshed with and 
enhanced by the concealed drives of the special interest groups like the 
Marines who wanted a share of Vietnam in 1964, the general-contractor 
interests who wanted to dig a big hole in the shore and call it "Cam Ranh 
Bay", the Special Forces Green Berets who wanted to resurrect the 
doughboy, and many others who simply wanted to sell billions of dollars 
worth of armaments. Such operations are carried out by those who either 
do not care about the results or who do not see far enough ahead to 
understand the consequences of what they are doing. 

This is a delicate subject and needs much understanding. Many 
innocent and totally loyal men become involved in these activities; but the 
trouble is that they come upon the scene after the first provocations have 
been made, and they are generally unaware of them. An allowance must 



be made for the fact that the provocation can come from either side. 
Neither side is all right or all wrong. But the fact remains that most of the 
men who become involved in these activities do so after there has already 
been some clandestine exchange. They are trying to correct what they 
believe has been a serious abuse. They do not know where the real action 
began; to put it simply, they don't know whether they came in on the first 
or the second retaliation strike. Very few would ever be party to striking 
first in any event. So the first strike takes place in deep secrecy. No one 
knows this hidden key fact. This is a fundamental game of the ST. 

They have this power because they control secrecy and secret 
intelligence and because they have the ability to take advantage of the 
most modern communications system in the world, of global 
transportation systems, of quantities of weapons of all kinds, of a 
worldwide U.S. military supporting base structure. They can use the finest 
intelligence system in the world, and most importantly, they are able to 
operate under the canopy of an ever-present "enemy" called 
"Communism". And then, to top all of this, there is the fact that the CIA 
has assumed the right to generate and direct secret operations. 

When we stop and think what the real struggle is and what we have 
been doing, we are faced with the stark realization that what has been 
going on is not anti-Communist, nor is it pro-American. It is more 
truthfully exactly what those wise and wily chess players in the Kremlin 
have hoped we would do. They have been the beneficiaries of our own 
defense-oriented, reaction prompted, intelligence-duped Pavlovian self- 
destruction. How can anyone justify the fact that the United States has lost 
fifty-five thousand men in Indochina and that the Russians have lost none 
and then call that anti-Communist — or worse yet, pro- American? 

How can anyone note that we have poured more than $200 billion 
into Indochina since 1945 and that the Kremlin may have put up 
somewhere between $3 and $5 billion as their ante to keep the game 
going, and then call that tragic ratio anti-Communist and pro-American? 
How can anyone believe that after more than twenty-five years of 
clandestine and overt engagement in Indochina that finds ourselves wasted 
and demoralized and precariously degraded in the eyes of much of the 
world, including our friends, we have accomplished anything that is really 
anti-Communist and pro-American? What do words have to mean and 
what do events have to prove to wake us all up to the fact that pro- 
American actions are those that strengthen this country and that anti- 
Communist actions are those that weaken Communism. It certainly 
bothers the Kremlin not at all to see Americans dying in Asia and to see 
Asians dying at the hands of the Americans. 

There are tens of thousands of loyal, dedicated, and experienced 
men in the DOD, both military and civilian, who have the type of 
experience it takes to make an operation effective. In matters of tactics and 
logistics there are few men in the world who know more about the subject 
than they do. However, the ST operates behind such a shield of secrecy 
that they keep facts of what they are doing from these experts as well as 



from the enemy. As a result, all of these people who could help are left 
out. The very men who by their experience and ability could make these 
operations succeed, or who would have the good sense to say that they 
have no hope of success, are ignored and excluded from participation at 
the very time when they are needed the most. Once these minor actions are 
set in motion on the basis that they are anti- Communist, whether they 
succeed or fail they escalate unless specifically halted by top-echelon 
authority, and then the whole pattern of events is locked in as anti- 
Communist whether or not this really is so. Furthermore, these very 
difficult operations are left in the hands of the inexperienced, the 
irresponsible, and the ignorant. 

Whenever an operation grows to the extent that the Bay of Pigs 
project did, the President and at least the NSC must insist that the finest 
men in the country be brought in to assist with the planning, the tactical 
details, and the essential logistics, and that these men should have the right 
to veto the project if need be, not just to remain silent, as has happened in 
the case of men as high as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Such 
silence even in the face of the CIA|31 is inexcusable, even though the men 
involved in stating their case might be fired, as happened to one of the 
military chiefs after the Cuban rocket crisis of 1962. 

Everyone understands that a certain amount of secrecy, used 
properly and applied with an eye to the impact which the normal erosion 
of time plays on events, is essential. However, when secrecy becomes a 
means of existence itself, when operations take place that never should 
have been permitted had they been fully revealed, when operations take 
place that grow out of all proportion to the action originally proposed and 
briefed to higher authority, and when all of this is veiled in unnecessary 
secrecy applied within the U.S. Government and against some of the 
people whose assigned responsibilities would most qualify them to know 
what was going on, then this type of secrecy is totally wrong and leads to 
the ghastly and insidious situation that has been quite honestly and 
accurately described above by Arnold Toynbee. And lest there be those 
who wish to brush aside Toynbee as an old meddler, let us recall the wise 
words of Harry S. Truman when he wrote that the, "CIA is being 
interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign intrigue and a 
subject for cold war enemy propaganda." 

When one of our own Presidents feels that he must warn that the 
CIA, which he created, has become a tool of enemy propaganda against 
the United States, it is time to underscore that things are not as they should 
be. 

The very fact that the CIA would not allow the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
to take their staffs into their confidence regarding the Cuban invasion is 
one of the deepest problems such an ad hoc type of operation creates. This 
is a two-edged problem, however. No chairman of the JCS, especially not 
the very experienced and able Lyman L. Lemnitzer, should ever have 
permitted such a thing to have happened. If what Wise and Ross wrote is 
true — and we don't question it — and if it was known to the chairman of 



the JCS that he could not use his experienced staff as they have stated it, 
then it certainly must have been the duty of that chairman to make this 
known to the Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and to President 
Kennedy. The law gives him that right and it gives him that duty. The 
chairman is quite properly in the position to take such matters to the 
President, and he could at any time have done so. Why didn't he? 

It would seem to have been an easy solution; but as with other 
things in this confusing area, it was not that simple. For one thing, there 
was so much he did not know about the total plan. If he knew the whole 
operation and then did not speak to the President, that would be one thing: 
but if he knew only fragments of the plan and if he had been told by his 
higher authority, namely the Secretary of Defense and the President that 
an invasion was not contemplated, then it would be an entirely different 
matter. It should be recalled that early Cuban action began during the 
Eisenhower Administration and that these early projects did not involve an 
invasion. In fact, all of the Eisenhower-era schemes were extremely 
modest when it came to actions against Cuban soil and property. 

Furthermore, President Eisenhower, having been sorely hurt by the 
U-2 affair and all that it did to his plans for a summit conference and a 
final peace crusade, had positively directed that overflights and 
clandestine operations be curtailed. He did not want the next 
administration to inherit anything in that category from his regime. 

However, immediately following the election of John F. Kennedy 
things began to move; stalled activities began to stir. This all took place 
very secretly and most certainly without instructions or approval from the 
President and his Secretary of State Christian Herter and Defense 
Secretary Thomas Gates. It was not unknown to the Secretary of Defense 
and to his deputy; but the extent of their knowledge may have been 
unclear, since they had no reason to believe that such things had been 
rekindled without Presidential direction. (We shall see later the language 
of the law involved and the distinction between the terms, "by direction" 
and "with approval".) 

As a result of these unusual events it was not until the middle of 
January 1961 that the chairman of the JCS heard his first reasonably 
accurate and complete briefing of what the CIA was contemplating on the 
shores of Cuba. This was a strange time for such a briefing, because in less 
than a week the Secretary of Defense would have departed and a new one 
would have taken office, and in that same week the Eisenhower team 
would have left and John F. Kennedy would have become President. 
Therefore, even if the chairman had seen fit to carry this information to the 
Secretary of Defense and to the President, he could scarcely have expected 
either of them to have been in a position to have done much about it just at 
that time. 

This business of the exploitation of the right moment by the ST is 
interesting and has been quite apparent in other situations. We have earlier 
discussed the crucial ninety-day period just before and after the 



assassination of President Kennedy. This was another such time. 

In the Bay of Pigs project the Secretary of Defense or his deputy 
was briefed almost daily. Furthermore, the same briefing that was given to 
them would usually be given to the chairman of the JCS or to his 
executive officer. However, these briefings were piecemeal, arising from 
events day by day and not from a plan, and they were often colored and 
fragmented by cover-story inserts. In retrospect, the view of the Bay of 
Pigs which a man like General Lemnitzer or Robert McNamara[41 had was 
something like what would happen if someone showed a long movie to 
them a few frames at a time each day. As a result of this technique, who 
can blame a busy Secretary of Defense or Chairman if he is not able to 
piece all of these things together to find the central theme or plot. 

This may sound unreal, but in the helter-skelter of activity in official 
Washington this is exactly what happens, especially with secret 
operations. 

When an operation begins as a minor action, as did the first steps of 
the Cuban activity, no one knows what may evolve. At that point, with 
only tenuous bits of information, it seemed ridiculous to take each item to 
the President, the Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense for their 
edification and approval. Yet, because clandestine affairs must be so 
closely held and because of the limits of the need-to-know restrictions, 
this is what happened. These busy men received the minor briefings along 
with the major ones, it became a question of either tell them or tell no one. 
Thus, as each day's moves occurred, the CIA and the Focal Point Offices 
agreed either to tell no one or to tell only the top men. This decision did 
nothing to overcome the fact that these top men were getting the story 
piecemeal. 

Later, there were some relatively major steps, such as planned over- 
the -beach sorties involving the U.S. Navy in offshore support of CIA and 
Cuban saboteurs. Only then was the Secretary of Defense told that the 
CIA was going to put some men into Cuba to blow up a refinery the 
following night. Such briefings were complete with charts, maps, and 
pictures from U-2s or other such sources. If the Secretary of Defense 
questioned any part of the plan with respect to approval, the briefer would 
say, for example, "This is all part of the 'training and arming authority' for 
Cuban exiles that was approved by the NSC 5412/2 committee on March 
17, 1960." The usual reply at that point from the Secretary would be, 
"O.K., but be sure Lemnitzer and Burke [Admiral Arleigh Burke, former 
Chief of Naval Operations] know about it." Then the mission would be 
ordered into action. By this process, such missions were not so much 
approved as they were not specifically disapproved. 

The ST knew that it could use and depend upon Allen Dulles to gain 
approval for the big steps along the way by having him get an O.K. for an 
overall amorphous project, such as "training and arming exile Cubans". 
Then they could take it from there bit by bit. From that time on, 
everything they did in conjunction with the Cubans was to be attributed to 



that initial blanket approval. Their control over all events by means of 
secrecy kept anyone else from knowing the whole plan. Most of the time 
they did not really have any plan anyhow. Each event was derived from an 
earlier one or from a new bit of intelligence data input. 

The Air Force, for example, protested the utilization of active-duty 
personnel on a full-scale basis in Guatemala, but did agree to permit 
aircraft and crews to fly in and out of Guatemala regularly with supplies 
and to deliver Cubans there. The Air Force was aware of the uncertain 
condition of the Ydigoras Government then precariously in power and did 
not want to have its personnel "sheep-dipped" (a cover category which 
meant that they would be non- attributable to the Air Force and thence 
technically stateless in Guatemala). 

The Air Force held out for official accreditation of its own men to 
the U.S. Ambassador in Guatemala before it would permit them to remain 
at the Cuban/Guatemalan base. It received a signed agreement from the 
Department of State acknowledging the cover status of its men as 
"civilians" while on duty in Guatemala. (The State Department does not 
like to do this, because it automatically includes that department in the 
clandestine game.) These men then lived at the training base at Retalhuleu 
and trained Cubans to fly the C-46, C-54 (DC-4), and the combat-ready B- 
26 medium bomber. There were from eight to sixteen World War II B-26s 
at Retalhuleu. By Latin American standards this was the equivalent of a 
major air force. 

As the Air Force had suspected, there was an attempt to overthrow 
Ydigoras. At first the coup group appeared to be victorious. Then the CIA 
and Air Force men realized that if the rebels took over the government, 
they and everyone else at Retalhuleu would become hostages of the rebel 
government and might even end up in Cuban prison camps. They were in 
a desperate position. Their choice was either to fly back to Florida and 
leave the Cubans, or to fight. The Air Force pilots were all combat 
veterans of the Korean War. They chose to fight. They got target 
information from loyal Guatemalans who flew with them to Guatemala 
City, where they bombed and strafed the rebel headquarters. Caught 
completely by surprise, and defenseless against this unexpected force, the 
rebels surrendered. Troops loyal to Ydigoras, and others who swung back 
to him in the face of this great show of power, cleaned up the remainder of 
the opposition, and the rebellion collapsed. Ydigoras was back in power, 
with Yankee help born of desperation. This was the only victory of the 
invasion task force. 

Here again, the CIA had gotten in over its head. If that force of 
Americans, Filipinos, and Cubans who were at Retalhuleu, along with all 
of their equipment, had been captured by the rebels, their ransom — like 
that exacted quietly by the Mexicans of the downed DC-4 — would have 
been stupendous. As it was, the United States had to pay heavily for the 
invasion's failure in other ways. 

At Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua the CIA had gathered all the 



clandestine aircraft and considerable quantities of supplies and 
ammunition to support the invasion. Many of these aircraft were lost to 
Castro's jets; but vast amounts of equipment and some of the planes 
remained. With the collapse of the invasion, this material was unused. The 
U.S. pilots returned to Florida with a few planes. Later, the CIA asked the 
Army and Air Force mission personnel in Nicaragua to gather up and 
return all of this equipment. These officers were told by the Nicaraguans 
very politely and firmly that there was not a thing left at Puerto Cabezas. 
Since it was all black cargo, it was stateless and it was title-less. The 
United States never got any of it back. And this was only a fraction of the 
loss. 

All Latin American countries keep a very close eye on the 
apportionment of U.S. military aircraft, ships, and other material made 
available to other Latin American states. The formula for the balance of 
forces is very complex, and this arrangement is a most delicate issue. 

Other nations soon observed that Nicaragua had been given a large 
force- supplement of B-26s and C-46s. The B-26s were specially modified 
and carried much more firepower per aircraft than those that had been 
given to other Latin American nations. The other military supplies, guns, 
rockets, and mountains of ammunition were also noted. The Nicaraguan 
Government would not reveal how it obtained this unscheduled largesse 
and the U.S. Government could not. The other governments guessed, and 
no doubt knew; but they too played the game. They just kept the pressure 
on. 

Needless to say, the U.S. Government had to make similar 
equipment available to a number of Latin American countries. The cost of 
all of this, plus the logistics support of this equipment, which goes on year 
after year, is another of the many high cost-factors that should be added to 
the total cost of the Bay of Pigs fiasco. Again, because of security — 
secrecy from Americans, not from the enemy — these facts have remained 
undeclared, along with so many others over the years. 

Early in 1960, President Eisenhower had authorized the secret 
training and arming of Cuban exiles in the United States. Thousands of 
able-bodied Cubans had fled their homeland, and many of them were 
dedicated to fighting their way back in and throwing Castro out. 
Eisenhower's approval was very general and nonspecific; it in no way 
contemplated anything like the invasion. It was understood that any 
special operation which would involve Cuba, planned at any time, would 
have to be cleared by the DCI in accordance with existing directives. This 
meant presenting the operation to Special Group 5412/2. 

In what appeared to the DOD as a separate and certainly 
inconspicuous action, the CIA began to utilize a portion of Ft. Gulick, a 
de-activated U.S. Army base in Panama. Gradually, a group of Cubans, 
identified in Panama only as Latin American trainees in a Military 
Assistance Program (MAP), began to increase in size and activity there. 
The CIA soon found that this burgeoning camp needed military doctors. In 



accordance with an agreement between the CIA and the DOD, the Agency 
asked the Army for three doctors. At that time the Army had a shortage of 
doctors, so it turned down the request for support from the CIA. Then the 
Navy was asked; it too turned down the request, on the basis that Navy 
doctors on an Army post would be conspicuous and would not fit into the 
cover story. The CIA did not need flight surgeons; so it did not ask the Air 
Force for doctors. 

With these refusals in hand, the CIA made a direct appeal to the 
office of the Secretary of Defense and won support for its request. This 
was the very first covert action in the long chain of events that ended in 
the invasion of the beach at the Bay of Pigs on April 17, 1961. At the time 
of the request for these doctors, no one anywhere in the Government of the 
United States ever dreamed that the little mound that was being built 
would ever become that mountainous disaster which finally resulted. It is 
characteristic to note that the CIA's request was honored and then directed 
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense. At that top echelon the Office 
of Special Operations acted as the liaison between the CIA and the DOD. 
What most people in Defense were totally unaware of was that in the very 
office that was supposed to serve the military departments and shield them 
from promiscuous requests, there were concealed and harbored some of 
the most effective agents the CIA has ever had. Their approval of CIA 
requests was assured. The amazing fact was that their cover was so good 
that they could then turn right around and write orders directing the 
service concerned to comply with the request. 

There may have been some mention of the end-use of these doctors 
for the Cuban training program. But if there was any mention, it would 
have meant little or nothing to those who had not been briefed. 

The Secretary of Defense and the chairman heard many more such 
requests during the next twelve months, but the complexities of the veil of 
secrecy woven by the Secret Team around the project was such that no 
one ever saw the whole plan. The use of the control device of need-to- 
know classification made this possible. As this control is generally 
practiced, the CIA accepts that a group of men have "the clearances" after 
a very thorough review by its own resources and, as requested, those of 
the FBI. 

Always, in the case of CIA work, this clearance begins at the top 
secret level. Beyond this, men are cleared for individual areas of 
information. A man may have a top secret clearance and a "North Side "[51 
clearance, meaning that he may be given both classifications of 
information. However, those in control of North Side may decide 
arbitrarily that certain men may not have some of the information even 
though they have the necessary clearance. The control team simply states 
that those men do not have a need to know, and from that time on, unless 
they are reinstated, they are excluded from all, or part of the project. There 
are, of course, some sensible and reasonable reasons for such practices; 
but that is not what is important here. The fact is that this exclusionary 
process is used as a tool, arbitrarily. 



One way to make sure that there is little opposition to a proposed 
activity is to exclude possible opponents on the basis of lack of need-to- 
know. Thus, even though men are in high-ranking, policy-making jobs and 
have the appropriate top secret and other special clearances, they may be 
kept in the dark about ST plans, and they will never know it — at least not 
for a while. Thus Adlai Stevenson, Ambassador to the United Nations at 
the time of the Bay of Pigs, was not informed about the projected plans 
until the very last minute, when rumors and news releases appearing in 
The New York Times were being spread everywhere. Even then, Tracy 
Barnes, the CIA man sent to brief Stevenson, gave a vague and incomplete 
picture of the operation. 

The CIA could, if pressed, prove that the OSD and the JCS had been 
briefed almost daily from early 1960 until the very day of the invasion. 
But in spite of this kind of bit-by-bit briefing, it was not until just before 
John Kennedy's inauguration in late January 1961 that the JCS got any 
kind of a reasonably thorough briefing. By that time it was much too late. 
The ST had strong armed the early Eisenhower authorization of the 
training and arming of Cubans into an invasion of a foreign country, 
during the "lame duck" period of his administration. 

Need-to-know control can also be bent in the other direction in 
order to secure the support of potential allies and further those allies' 
careers. Members of the Team who strongly favored the election of John 
F. Kennedy over Richard Nixon played a very special role in the 1960 
election campaign. Nixon presided over the NSC and therefore knew in 
detail the plans that were intended to have been carried out under the 
earlier Eisenhower authorization. For one thing, he knew that such 
authorization did not include anything like the invasion of a foreign 
country. At the same time it was assumed that Senator Kennedy, as an 
outsider, did not know those highly classified details. However, he did 
know. In his book, Six Crises, Nixon wrote that Kennedy was told about 
the invasion by Allen Dulles during the traditional CIA briefing for 
candidates. But there was more than that to the story, too, it appears. 

A former staff member from the OSD recollects that during the 
summer of 1960 he was sent to the Senate Office Building to pick up and 
escort to the Pentagon four Cuban exile leaders, among them one of the 
future commanders of the Bay of Pigs invasion forces, who had been 
meeting with the then-Senator Kennedy. Those men — Manuel Artime 
Buesa, Jose Miro Cordona (first Premier of Cuba under Castro), Manuel 
Antonio de Varona (former Premier of Cuba before Bastista regime) and 
the fourth man, who may have been Aureliano Sanchez Arango (former 
Foreign Minister of Cuba) — were all supposed to be under special 
security wraps. They certainly were not expected to be exposed to 
members of Congress, least of all to a Senator who was close to being 
nominated as the Democratic flagbearer. However, certain CIA officials 
had introduced them to Kennedy, thus making sure that he knew as much 
about the plans they were contemplating as did Nixon. In fact, Kennedy 
may have learned more than Nixon as the result of this personal meeting - 
an opportunity Nixon did not have — with the Cuban refugee front and 



with its American secret sponsors. 

Throughout this period in 1960, Eisenhower had directed that the 
Cuban exiles' training and arming be kept at a low level. He felt that he 
should not bequeath to the incoming administration, whether Republican 
or Democratic, any such clandestine operations, small as they were under 
the limited proposal which he had approved. As a result, any plans for 
expansion of Cuban activities were made to appear by the ST to be the 
Cubans' alone. The CIA carefully saw to it that the Cubans had the means 
to travel to and visit such activist headquarters as the American Legion 
convention and other avowedly anti-Castro strongholds. As the political 
campaign picked up momentum so did the Cuban exiles' activities, with 
John Kennedy playing a strong, quiet role on their behalf. His support 
further endeared him to the CIA, because the anti-Castro project was their 
biggest special operation at that time since the Tibetan and Laotian 
projects had began to wane. 

When the candidates appeared on television together during the 
crucial campaign debates, Nixon, abiding by security restrictions which, in 
his case, he could not disavow even if he had wished to, limited himself in 
his discussion of the Government's plans for Cuba. This official control 
did not publicly apply to Kennedy. Since he had been briefed by Allen 
Dulles, he could have been warned about security violations; but the CIA 
can be quite liberal with respect to security when it is to that Agency's 
advantage. As a result, Kennedy could and did openly advocate the 
overthrow of the Castro Government, and for the strong position he won 
popular support from a great number of the voters. 

Nixon's frustration and anger at Kennedy's calculated tactics were 
clearly evident on the television screen. As television audiences have 
learned in the years since those famous debates, when Nixon feels 
frustration and anger on television he shows it, and when he felt both 
during the Kennedy debates the audience knew it, and Kennedy made 
points. Many observers believe that that confrontation over Cuba was one 
of the peak moments during the debates, when Kennedy scored most 
heavily — and of course most observers credit Kennedy's performance 
during the debates with his narrow margin of victory in the election. Few 
knew that his carefree television position on Cuba was in reality Nixon's 
official stand in time security-bound NSC record. 

That Kennedy's connection with the Cuban refugees before his 
election was anything but casual or fortuitous was demonstrated nearly 
two years later. On December 29, 1962, in the Orange Bowl in Miami, 
before a national television audience, at a welcome-back celebration for 
the ransomed prisoners of the Cuban Brigade, before a thundering ovation 
from the jammed stadium, the President spoke informally with the Brigade 
and with the tens of thousands of Cubans who came to pack the stadium. 
At one point during the ceremonies, the President walked among the 
former prisoners, chatted with them, and then threw his arm over the 
shoulders of one of them. If those watching in the stadium and on TV 
thought he had chosen the man at random, they were mistaken. The Cuban 



he embraced was his old friend who had visited him in his Senate offices 
during the summer of 1960 and also at his West Palm Beach home. This 
man was Manuel Artime, a leader of the invasion. 

One of the most significant aspects of ST work is its control of 
operational planning by need-to-know secrecy. And as we stated earlier, 
such control seriously limits the level of competency that can be brought 
to a major operation such as the Bay of Pigs. The CIA never really knew 
what to do about Castro and Cuba. During the latter days of 1958, the CIA 
assembled a staff of Cuban 'experts' under the leadership of its old 
Western Hemisphere Division hands such as Colonel J. C. King. But the 
real inside men, those who had responsible roles in these operations and in 
their so-called planning, are never discovered. The first somewhat obvious 
reason usually given is that of course those names would not show up 
because the Agency very wisely kept them concealed under proper 
security. 

This may be part of the answer, but it is more probable that they 
never would have been linked with the exercise for two other reasons. 
First, they were truly faceless and practically meaningless participants in 
the action; they were in their jobs simply to see that things rolled along. 
Second, because once such an operation has been briefed to the NSC and 
the lower, middle level of the Agency's operations and support staffs know 
that the green light is on, they begin to move in all directions, and from 
that time on there is very little real leadership. Money becomes obtainable, 
equipment is made available, travel is abundant, the horn of plenty spills 
over, and all is hidden in secrecy. Partly by plan but mostly by the simple 
fact that no one at the top restrains the action of these activists at the lower 
levels. Everything begins to happen everywhere at the same time. There is 
a special sort of Murphy's Law about clandestine activities once they have 
received an initial and very general approval: "If anything can happen, it 
will." The U.S. Government is simply not constituted to become aware of 
and to control such faceless and random activities as those that take place 
under the shield of secrecy once the game has been discovered and 
perfected by the often amorphous ST. Nothing demonstrates this better 
than the single bitter underlying reason for the failure of the Bay of Pigs 
operation. 

The Bay of Pigs effort failed for the lack of effective leadership, and 
for no other reason. It could have worked and it could have succeeded. 
Everything was there that had to be there. The goals were not so grand that 
they could not have been achieved: "To maintain an invasion force on 
Cuban territory for at least 72 hours and then to proclaim the free 
Government of Cuba there on that bit of territory." After that, it would 
have been up to the Organization of the American States and the United 
States to support them. But the Bay of Pigs operation did not have 
leadership when it was most needed. Allen Dulles, the man at the helm, 
was not even in Washington. Perhaps he thought the invasion could run by 
itself. For whatever reason he had in mind, Allen Welsh Dulles was not 
even in the United States at the time of these crucial landings. 



As poorly planned as this over-the-beach operation was, it could 
have been a success within the original parameters of the effort. Jose Miro 
Cordona had been told that when the invasion forces had been on Cuban 
soil for seventy-two hours, had raised the Free Cuba flag on Cuban soil, 
and had proclaimed themselves to be the new government, he would be 
delivered to the beachhead. Then, when he appealed for assistance from 
the Organization of American States, the United States would give his 
"Government of Free Cuba" the assistance it needed 

It was expected that once such a government had been established, 
albeit on the flimsiest grounds, Cubans would flock to its support, and that 
once U.S. Government assistance was visible and real — such as U.S. 
warships off the coast, U.S. aircraft flying unopposed all over Cuba, and 
even U.S. Marines at the beachhead — then the decay of Castro's Cuba 
would be certain. In essence, this is what the Cubans believed. It may have 
been what the CIA had in mind as it got caught up in the fervor of the 
training and arming authorized by President Eisenhower. However, no one 
could say that Eisenhower, the tough and experienced commanding 
general of the greatest invasion force of all time, had ever suggested or 
approved the invasion of Cuba clandestinely with a force of less than two 
thousand Cuban exiles. Whatever the Cuban project had grown to in the 
hands of the CIA took place after election day in 1960. 

The leadership on the beach was competent enough for the job at 
hand. The Cubans themselves were good. The tactical leadership back in 
Nicaragua both for the invasion and for the small air strikes was adequate. 
The substratum of U.S. military personnel attached to the CIA to bring 
some order out of the training program was competent, especially the U.S. 
Marine Corps colonel who worked so hard and effectively to see that the 
little band of Cubans had some idea of what to do when they hit the beach. 
The U.S. Air Force officers attached to the CIA who pulled together the 
small hard-hitting air force of World War II B-26s and C-46s were skilled 
and combat qualified. But above them leadership was practically 
nonexistent. 

No proper official would have approved of the Bay of Pigs 
operation unless there was a guarantee that Castro would not have been 
able to give it any effective air opposition. The few close-in, hard-core 
officers who knew the real plan would never have given any support to the 
plan if they did not have assurances that Allen Dulles would be able to 
guarantee that Castro's few combat-ready aircraft would have been 
bombed out of existence before the men hit the beach. This was the 
fundament upon which the operation was established; it was its failure that 
sealed its doom. 

Before the first Cuban exiles' B-26 attacks on Castro's aircraft, U-2 
pictures detailed exactly where Fidel's planes were and how many there 
were. The first wave of B-26s hit those planes and destroyed them, with 
the exception of the three T-33 jet trainers, two B-26s, and a few old 
British Sea Furies. In modern air- weapons-system technology the T-33 is 
a very low-order combat aircraft, and actually it has very little combat 



capability. However, it is a big jump better than the B-26 bomber in air-to- 
air combat. Therefore, until these three T-33s had been located and 
destroyed, there was to be no invasion. The B-26s and the Sea Furies 
could be handled and ignored. Castro's B-26s were not nearly as effective 
as the newly modified ones of the Cuban exiles. 

It had just happened that the three T-33 jets had been flown to a 
small airfield outside of the Havana area for the weekend. The chance 
removal of these planes saved them from the first attack. 

The Bay of Pigs instructions called for additional air strikes to get 
all of Castro's planes if this was not accomplished by the first strikes. This 
prerequisite was simple and necessary. Damage assessment photos not 
only showed that the T-33s had escaped, but they showed where they 
were, lined up on an airfield near Santiago. With this knowledge, a flight 
of B-26s at Puerto Cabezas in Nicaragua was loaded with bombs and 
fueled for the long flight to the target. These were excellent B-26s, which 
had been modified by the CIA to have a cluster of eight 50-caliber 
machine guns firing from the nose. This gun-pack is most lethal and 
unsurpassed for the type of operation contemplated. The guns could have 
made mincemeat of Castro's T-33s on the ground. In the air, the T-33s 
would have chopped them up. Thus the plan was for these planes to leave 
Puerto Cabezas at an early hour to assure undetected arrival at the target at 
sunrise and to permit them to sweep in over the airfield with the sun low 
and at their backs to give them as much groundfire protection as they 
could get. 

As late as one thirty that morning the CIA agent who was in charge 
of these planes in Nicaragua had not received the expected message from 
Washington that would authorize their take-off. Later, acting on his own 
initiative and to keep the excited and ready-to-go Cubans quiet, he 
permitted them to start their engines on condition that they wait for his 
signal for take-off. Meanwhile in Washington, heated arguments had 
arisen over the air strikes. There was so much opposition to the second 
strike that those who sought the authority to release these planes were 
unable to gain approval. 

On the one hand, General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central 
Intelligence, and Richard Bissell, the Deputy Director of Plans, and the 
man who was responsible for the entire operation, were second-level 
officials. They were unable to release the planes on their own authority, 
and they were opposed by others, some of whom were of Cabinet level. It 
became a question of who would awaken the President at his Glen Ora 
retreat in Virginia in an attempt to get his approval. Neither Cabell nor 
Bissell had the authority to do that, and Allen Dulles was not in 
Washington. At this crucial time when his agency was faced with its most 
momentous crisis, a crisis of leadership, Dulles had left Washington to go 
to Puerto Rico to address the convention of the Young Presidents 
Organization. He was the man who could have given permission for the 
planes to go, or who could have gone to the President himself for that 
authority. On that fateful night the CIA was leaderless. The opposition 



stood its ground, and the air strike was not ordered to attack the jets at 
Santiago. This was the key to the failure of the whole operation. Those 
three jets destroyed no less than ten B-26s, along with some ground 
equipment, and sank the vital supply ship offshore. 

Perhaps if one CIA agent had taken a short bicycle ride, the whole 
invasion would have been a success. The Cuban pilots in those B-26s on 
the ground at Puerto Cabezas, with their engines running, were on the 
point of mutiny. They were going to go without word from Washington, 
except for one thing. The agent who had the sole authority there to release 
them had told them that Washington was making a last-minute check of 
the target photographs and that they had better wait until he got the word. 
They half believed him. Later, his own faith in the system wavered badly, 
and he knew that as the moments ticked away the last chance the B-26s 
would have to get to the target airfield before sunrise would be gone. After 
that, Castro s jets could be expected to be gone. 

Nearby, the agent had a bicycle that he used for his trips back and 
forth to the operations shack where the circuit to Washington was. During 
those last few moments he looked at that bicycle, certain that if he just got 
on it and rode away toward the shack the Cubans would go without 
waiting for his signal. The temptation was great. He had worked with 
some of those Cubans for two years; he knew how badly they wanted the 
operation to succeed. But his own discipline was stronger, and he did not 
take that ride. Finally, it was too late. The crews shut down the engines 
and got out of the planes. 

Far across the Caribbean the small invasion fleet approached the 
shore secure in the belief that Castro's planes had been destroyed. They hit 
the beach shortly after sunrise, and it wasn't long before they came under 
heavy air attack. They knew then that their time was limited. To add to 
this tragedy, the same B- 26s that were to have wiped out the jets were 
ordered over the beach to give the invasion troops some firepower against 
ground opposition. The B-26s were shot down by those jets which only a 
few hours earlier they could have destroyed. And in sunny Puerto Rico the 
DCI entered a convention hall to give a speech to a group of young 
businessmen. This was the kind of elite group he liked. He was at his best 
among them, and he enlisted their support on behalf of the Agency, which 
was "saving the world from communism." Many of those same men have 
since traveled throughout the world on matters concerning business, 
wearing around their necks the mark of the Agency — the shoulder strap of 
a new camera. These same men eagerly went from country to country as 
special agents for the CIA. But when the chips were down and those brave 
Cubans had been landed on the beach by the CIA, Allen Dulles was not 
there. He was perhaps the one man in Washington, had he been there, who 
could have sent those bombers out that morning for the purpose of 
destroying Castro's jets. 

The Bay of Pigs operation serves as an excellent example of what is 
good and what is bad about clandestine operations and about the way they 
are developed, supported, and managed by the ST. From the first 



assistance to the first small group of Cubans in Miami, from the first light 
plane touchdown on a remote road in Cuba to exfiltrate one or two men to 
the huge operation involving thousands of men and tens of millions of 
dollars worth of equipment, to the tragic failure on the beach and the 
imprisonment and eventual payment of ransom tribute to Castro, the Bay 
of Pigs operation was nothing but a somewhat related series of escalating 
events which, simply stated, just got out of hand after the election of John 
F. Kennedy. 

Some peripheral incidents that have not been apparent are worth a 
word. After Castro took over Cuba, he nationalized industry and kicked all 
Americans out of the country. Those companies that had been doing 
business in Cuba suffered heavy losses. Among the worst of these losses 
were those felt by the sugar companies. The stock of some of these firms 
traded at very low rates, if it could be traded at all. With the Cuban 
support program moving into high gear after the election of Kennedy, a 
large number of CIA personnel made heavy purchases of these deflated 
stocks, and word spread to some of their friends that a flyer in sugar stock 
might be worth the gamble. So orders to buy sugar stock went out all over 
the country. 

The stockbroker community in Washington is most sophisticated. 
Over the years they see a lot of inside buying for reasons they have no 
way of knowing. In an attempt to ferret out some of these deals, they have 
developed their own expertise in divining what is going on. When the 
sugar purchases were at their peak, some of these brokers called their 
sources in the Pentagon on the assumption that if something was going to 
happen in Cuba the military would know about it. Of course, very few 
military knew about the invasion, and those who did would not have the 
temerity to let anyone know, most of all a broker. So the brokers were not 
getting much help in the usual channels. However, one broker who 
happened to hit on an idea, called a certain mutual fund group where he 
had reason to believe that there was some more than routine contact with 
the secret areas in the government. He was able to learn that they had been 
buying a little sugar stock. He put two and two together and inadvertently 
started a small buying spree among his and his company's clients. 

Needless to say, the sugar balloon burst on those beaches in Cuba; 
but there have been many other times when the very special inside scoop 
the ST is able to control has led to some very good investments. More will 
be said about this as more is learned about the early days of the Indochina 
affairs during the past ten years. It does not take anyone long to become an 
avid ST booster once he has sipped the elixir of certain and easy money 
derived from an inside tip on a sure thing. 



1. In Special Operations, black flights deliver black cargo into denied or unwitting areas. "Black" in this sense is 
usually synonymous with clandestine. A black cargo would not go through customs, USA or foreign. A black 
cargo, might be a defector from the communist world being flown to a safe house in the USA or other host 



country. If the black flight crossed the ocean, it would be known as a "deep water" flight. Clandestine shipments 
are made by all modes of transportation, including submarines and PT boats. 



2. DCI— Director of Central intelligence; DDCI is his Deputy, below these men are three other Deputy Directors: 
DD/I— Deputy Director of Intelligence (responsible for the real and overt intelligence activity of the Agency.) 
DD/P— Deputy Director of Plans (responsible for the clandestine activity of the Agency. By far the largest and 
most complex portion of the Agency in the Special Operations part of the business.) 

DD/S— Deputy Director of Support (responsible for the logistics support. This is the most effective part of the 
Agency and makes the others look good.) 

(DD/A— Deputy Director of Administration — no longer a part of the Agency.) 

Note: To an Agency man DD/P can be used as an adjective, as in: "I'm going to Europe with some of the DD/S 
guys on that new DD/P project." 

The same applies with Divisions, Directorates, and Sections. The CIA is very loose about these things. 
For example: You can say something was done by Special Operations without ever having to say that it was a 
special operations division (there is no special operations division in the Agency). 

3. If a military chief of staff did disagree so deeply with a plan briefed to him by the CIA that he decided to 
discuss his views with others, it is more than likely the CIA would charge him with a security violation or 
withdraw his clearance, or both. The Agency would attack him on security grounds, not on substantive grounds 
or on the merits of the case. 

4. To add to this confusion, Mr. Thomas Gates was Secretary of Defense and Mr. James Douglas his deputy until 
January 20, 1961 (Kennedy's inauguration, and then Mr. Robert McNamara and Mr. Roswell Gilpatric followed 
them. Mr. Douglas told the author on January 19 at 4:30 p.m. that there had been no transition briefing between 
them. 

5. A hypothetical name in this instance. Such code names are given in great numbers to all operations and even to 
various phases or segments of classified operations. 



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PART II 
The CIA: How It Runs 

Chapter 3 
An Overview of the CIA 



SECTION I: Intelligence versus Secret Operations 



WHAT OTHER AGENCY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT has 
ever had as much blame heaped upon it as the CIA? President Truman 
wrote that it was being interpreted as a symbol of sinister and mysterious 
foreign intrigue and a subject for Cold War propaganda. Arnold Toynbee 
wrote: "For the whole world, the CIA has now become the bogey that 
Communism has been for America." John F. Kennedy said, "Your 
successes are unheralded, your failures are trumpeted." Tibetans once 
supported by the CIA had been left to fend for themselves against the 
Chinese. Hungarians armed and urged to fight on for their freedom were 
left to fight by themselves. Cubans stranded on the beaches of the Bay of 
Pigs were left for Castro's jails. Tens of thousands of people who have 
contributed to Radio Free Europe and to CARE on the assumption that 
they were private organizations have learned that the CIA was using them 
for its own devices. And during the summer of 1971, Congress was faced 
with a ground swell of indignation over the actions of the CIA in the wake 
of events in Indochina and as a result of revelations contained in the 
Pentagon papers. The frequently asked questions are: How responsible is 
the CIA? How is the CIA permitted to operate independent of national 
policy and of the general standards of conduct expected of the U.S. 
Government? 

In seeking to solve the dilemma of the CIA, it is important from the 
beginning to understand the intimate language of the Agency and of the 
intelligence profession. Intelligence professionals become so accustomed 



to using and living with cover stories, cover language, and code terms that 
they use them interchangeably with their normal, or dictionary, usage. 
Thus the outsider has little opportunity to break through this fabric to get 
to the real thing. 

In the beginning, when Roosevelt assigned Donovan to the task of 
Coordinator of Information, there was a belief that the United States had 
within its resources reasonably adequate intelligence organizations in the 
Army, Navy, and Department of State, but that the gross intelligence 
product was sadly lacking in coordination. As a result, the President felt 
that he was not getting the best Intelligence. Thus his insistence that the 
new chief of intelligence should be a coordinator. This view of the role of 
the Director of Central Intelligence has persisted through the years, and it 
is still the primary statement of his mission and responsibility as contained 
in present law. 

The other key word is "information". In 1941, President Roosevelt 
felt that he required coordinated information, and because of certain 
unacceptable connotations for the profession of Intelligence, the word 
"Intelligence" was not used at all. It was not too long before that time 
(1929) that the then Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, had downgraded 
Intelligence, actually that special part pertaining to cryptoanalysis, with 
the statement: "Gentlemen don't read other people's mail." 

The profession of Intelligence always is beset by one characteristic 
problem. It is a staff function. It is the kind of effort that can succeed only 
insofar as it is accepted and used by the leadership. If the commanding 
general trusts his Intelligence people and makes use of their product, he 
will generally have good intelligence. If a business leader uses his 
Intelligence people as a real adjunct to his operations and provides them 
with the resources they need, he will have good Intelligence. And if the 
President of the United States uses intelligence as intelligence, and 
demands a really professional product, he will get the best intelligence in 
the world. But leadership is often prone to disparage the intelligence 
product. At one time, in 1939, Winston Churchill said the following about 
Intelligence: "It seems to me that Ministers run the most tremendous risks 
if they allow the information collected by the Intelligence Department and 
sent them, I am sure, in good time, to be shifted and colored and reduced 
in consequence and importance, and if they ever get themselves into a 
mood of attaching weight only to those pieces of information which 
accord with their earnest and honorable desire that the peace of the world 
should remain unbroken. "[11 

The profession of Intelligence before World War II was not well 
thought of, and it was not very good. There can be no question that the 
two go hand in hand. Had there been more real demand for good 
Intelligence, there would have been more funds and personnel provided 
for its support, and as a consequence, intelligence services would have 
been better. But history is full of incidents citing very poor intelligence 
service, under Hitler, Stalin, and the Western powers. 



I was at Fort Knox, Kentucky, at the time of the attack on Pearl 
Harbor. This attack came as such a surprise and with so little preparation 
or understanding in the United States Army that although that attack 
occurred more than four thousand miles away, the Commanding General 
of the Armored Force headquarters at Fort Knox ordered tanks and heavy 
guns out in a perimeter defense of Fort Knox and of the U.S. gold reserves 
that were stored there. No one knew what to expect the Japanese to do 
next after they had hit Pearl Harbor. 

A few years later, during World War II, I was the pilot of a large 
transport plane being sent on an emergency mission deep into the 
heartland of Russia from Tehran, Iran. Since this was to be one of the first 
unescorted U.S. flights deep into the Soviet Union, I was called aside by a 
military intelligence staff officer and told that the maps he had to give me 
for the flight were of very little value and would I please keep a careful 
log of everything I saw as I flew some eighteen hundred miles into Russia 
in order that mapping information and other data might be improved. 
Then, as I left this briefing, he more or less apologetically wished me well 
because I had to find my way into Russia without the aid of reliable maps. 
Before I left Tehran I managed to obtain the maps that had been used by 
Wendell Willkie's pilot and had been hand annotated. They were the best 
available at that time. 

It was not surprising, then, that President Roosevelt directed that 
Colonel Donovan be Coordinator of Information (COI). By 1942, 
Donovan had made some headway, and the war had become better 
organized. He had built up the reputation of intelligence activities and he 
had been successful in refining the problem. At the same time, he had 
learned that the role of coordinator was unworkable, untenable, and 
undesirable — in other words, hopeless. General MacArthur had 
preempted the intelligence role in the Far East — that is, those intelligence 
activities which were not under the control of the Navy — and the FBI had 
been given the responsibility for intelligence operations in Latin America. 
As a result, in 1942 the COI became the Office of Strategic Services, 
(OSS), and the task of that new organization was broadened to include 
collecting and analyzing information and planning and operating special 
services. On that day Donovan no doubt put his intelligence hat on the 
shelf and concentrated on his first love, special services. 

In pursuit of the business of definitions in this most elusive of 
professions, few terms have been so confused and misused as "special 
services". These two words simply mean clandestine operations. General 
Donovan's office was called Strategic Services, and his duties were 
described as special services. It was all the same clandestine operations. 
As the intelligence profession has labored through its first quarter-century 
since World War II, these terms have acquired additional synonyms. 
Clandestine operations are also known as covert operations, special 
operations, and peacetime operations or peacetime special operations, 
and secret operations. 

There are two other terms that need clarification here in order that 



they not be confused with the above. Secret intelligence is the deep 
penetration of the enemy by secret agents and other devices. It is more 
specifically clandestine intelligence, as differentiated from the more open 
and more academic type of intelligence. This leads to intelligence 
operations, which may or may not be clandestine, but are operations 
carried out to obtain intelligence, and not operations carried out to achieve 
a certain objective as a result of the gaining of certain intelligence input 
data. In the former, the operation is carried out to get intelligence, and in 
the latter the operation is carried out using intelligence input data. 

Then there are secret intelligence operations, which are deeper and 
more clandestine operations carried out to get deep-secret intelligence 
data. It can be said that it is the business of secret intelligence operations 
to get information required in the making of foreign policy that is 
unavailable through routine and overt intelligence channels. 

The fundamental dichotomy that has always divided Intelligence 
community and which in the long run has given it its bad reputation is that 
the Intelligence operator just cannot keep his hands and his heart out of 
operations. This same affliction leaves its mark on the entire community, 
not just on individual agents. Established for the legitimate business of 
intelligence, the Agency has become deeply involved in clandestine 
operations; yet to maintain its status and reputation in the structure of this 
open government, it must continually give the appearance of being 
nothing more than an Intelligence Agency while it keeps itself covertly 
occupied with special operations on an ever expanding scale. 

Nowhere has this attempt to be legitimate been more apparent than 
in the revelations of the publication of the Pentagon Papers. One of the 
primary objectives of that inner group (who directed the compilation of 
that fantastic massive reconstruction of the history of the United States' 
role in Indochina) was, without doubt, to make certain that the role of the 
CIA always appeared in a most laudable and commendable manner, to be 
that of an intelligence organization and no more. Thus the product of the 
intelligence staff has been extracted from the great mass of records 
available and portrayed most favorably, while at the same time the role of 
the CIA, special operations, or clandestine organization as a sinister and 
secret operational activity has been submerged. In retrospect, the CIA, that 
part which publishes intelligence reports, always appears to have come up 
with the correct analysis and evaluation. 

On the other hand, this review as it appears in The New York Times 
publication, almost totally conceals or fails to identify the records of the 
covert activities of the clandestine organizations. When it does present 
accounts of that action it reveals them under the label of cover 
organizations either as part of the military establishment or of some other 
apparatus. Interestingly, the CIA can't help doing both things at the same 
time, and its leaders are seldom, if ever, concerned with the fact that what 
they are doing may be at cross purposes. They are duty bound to perform 
the former and they much prefer to become involved in the latter, secure in 
the knowledge that their control of security within this country even more 



than elsewhere is nearly absolute. In fact Allen Dulles and other following 
DCI's were fully aware of this discrepancy, yet would authorize the 
publication of intelligence reports saying one thing at the same time they 
were authorizing clandestine forces to do exactly the opposite. 

One aspect of the Pentagon Papers that makes them suspect of not 
being exactly what they are purported to be, that is, an expose of the role 
of the Pentagon in the United States' involvement in Vietnam (this is an 
oversimplified definition of them, but it will serve here) is that they laud 
the role of the CIA and the overall intelligence community while they 
disparage the rest of the Government, especially the Pentagon. The 
following extract is from The New York Times' book of the Pentagon 
Papers, in an introductory and formative early chapter, page 6: 

The Pentagon account discloses that most of these 
major decisions from 1950 on were made against the advice 
of the American intelligence community. Intelligence analysts 
in the CIA warned that the French, Emperor Bao Dai and 
Premier Diem were weak and unpopular and that the 
Communists were strong. In early August 1954, for example, 
just before the NSC decided to commit the U.S. to propping 
up Premier Diem, a national intelligence estimate warned: 
"Although it is possible that the French and Vietnamese even 
with firm support from the U.S. and other powers, may be 
able to establish a strong regime in South Vietnam, we 
believe that the chances for this development are poor and 
moreover, that the situation is more likely to continue to 
deteriorate progressively over the next year." The NIE 
continues. Given the generally bleak appraisals of Diem's 
prospects, they who made U.S. policy could only have done 
so while assuming a significant measure of risk." 

And The New York Times goes on to editorialize: "The Pentagon 
study does not deal at length with a major question. Why did the policy 
makers go ahead despite the intelligence estimates prepared by their most 
senior intelligence officials?" 

These brief statements are truly amazing and in some respects may 
be among the most important lines in the entire New York Times 
presentation of the Pentagon Papers. They show how deeply the 
clandestine, operating side of the CIA hid behind its first and best cover, 
that of being an intelligence agency. How can the Times miss the point so 
significantly? Either the Times is innocent of the CIA as an intelligence 
organization versus the CIA as a clandestine organization, a highly 
antagonistic and competitive relationship, or the Times somehow played 
into the hands of those skillful apologists who would have us all believe 
that the Vietnam problem was the responsibility of others and not of the 
CIA operating as a clandestine operation. Let us consider an example: 

A few pages after this statement, the Times version of the Papers 
tells us that Edward G. Lansdale went to Saigon with a team in August 



1954. This date may be one of the correct dates, but the facts are that plans 
for Lansdale's move to Saigon from Manila, where he had engineered 
Magsaysay's rise from soldier to President, were laid long before he 
actually went there with his team. (The author was a frequent visitor to 
Manila and Saigon from 1952 through 1954 as the commanding officer of 
a Military Air Transport Service squadron which provided much of the 
military airlift between those cities in those days, and on more than one 
flight carried as special passengers members of the Lansdale team, both 
U.S. and Filipino personnel, to and from Saigon). 

These plans, which were made for the development of a United 
States presence in Vietnam to replace the French after their defeat at Dien 
Bien Phu and to create a new leader to replace the French puppet, Bao 
Dai, had been primarily developed by the operational CIA, almost as a 
natural follow-on of their production of Magsaysay. 

Ngo Dinh Diem was a selection and creation of the CIA, as well as 
others such as Admiral Arthur Radford and Cardinal Spellman, but the 
primary role in the early creation of the "father of his country" image for 
Ngo Dinh Diem was played by the CIA — and Edward G. Lansdale was 
the man upon whom this responsibility fell. He became such a firm 
supporter of Diem that when he visited Diem just after Kennedy's election 
he carried with him a gift "from the U.S. Government", a huge desk set 
with a brass plate across its base reading, "To Ngo Dinh Diem, The Father 
of His Country." The presentation of that gift to Diem by Lansdale marked 
nearly seven years of close personal and official relationship, all under the 
sponsorship of the CIA. 

It was the CIA that created Diem's first elite bodyguard to keep him 
alive in those early and precarious days. It was the CIA that created the 
Special Forces of Vietnamese troops, which were under the tight control 
of Ngo Dinh Nhu, and it was the CIA that created and directed the tens of 
thousands of paramilitary forces of all kinds in South Vietnam during 
those difficult years of the Diem regime. Not until the U.S. Marines 
landed in South Vietnam, in the van of the escalation in 1964, did an 
element of American troops arrive in Vietnam that were not under the 
operational control of the CIA. 

From 1945 through the crucial years of 1954 and 1955 and on to 
1964, almost everything that was done in South Vietnam, including even a 
strong role in the selection of generals and ambassadors, was the action of 
the CIA, with the DOD playing a supporting role and the Department of 
State almost in total eclipse. Thus, when The New York Times asks, "Why 
did the policy makers go ahead despite the intelligence estimates prepared 
by their most senior intelligence officials?" it has asked an excellent 
question, because it must include in the "most senior intelligence officials" 
the Director of Central Intelligence and others of the Agency. This makes 
one wonder at what point a man like Allen Dulles stops playing the role of 
intelligence official and sees himself in the mirror as CIA clandestine 
commander in chief. 



These examples have to make certain aspects of the release and 
publication of the Pentagon Papers deeply suspect, especially since the 
man who says he released these vast volumes to the newspapers, Daniel 
Ellsberg, was ideally suited for this role by virtue of his Vietnam 
experience with the very same Edward G. Lansdale. No matter what one 
might wish to believe the intentions of Ellsberg were when he did this, it 
would be most difficult to accept that he of all people did not know all the 
facts. And if he did know all of the facts I have described, why did he 
want to make it appear that it was Pentagon policymakers who went ahead 
"despite the intelligence estimates prepared by their most senior 
intelligence officials"? Why has so much care been taken to make it 
appear that these are papers from the Pentagon that he has dumped on the 
news media's doorstep? Why has no one made the proper distinction that 
the majority of these documents were not really Pentagon originated at all, 
but were originated in, among other places, the CIA (Covert side)? 
Certainly if his facts, as well as those presented by The New York Times, 
are right, the CIA (Covert side) was in a much better position to heed its 
own CIA (Intelligence side) warnings and advice than any other 
department or agency in Washington. 

The answer to these questions becomes obvious. The CIA uses its 
intelligence role as a cover mechanism for its operational activities. 
Furthermore it uses its own secret intelligence as an initiator for its own 
secret operations. This is what pleased General Donovan when President 
Roosevelt unleashed him with the OSS and it is what has been the driving 
force behind the hard core operational agents within the intelligence 
community since that time. 

Allen Dulles himself helps us to define General Donovan's new title 
in 1942 in his own words: "Special Services was the cover designation for 
Secret Intelligence and Special Operations of all kinds and character." To 
the old pro the new designation was an important step forward in the 
evolution of the intelligence profession in the United States. One could 
almost see him hunching up to his desk to write a few more memoranda to 
the President about the development of the intelligence services. It was no 
mistake when Dulles entitled his book The Craft of Intelligence. He was 
the crafty professional in a fast-growing profession. 

During 1943, General Donovan did his best to extend the OSS into 
all those parts of the world left to him by the Navy, General MacArthur, 
and J. Edgar Hoover. At one time in 1943 he got a bit overambitious and 
went to Moscow. There he met with his counterparts in the intelligence 
profession and was so won over by their good fellowship that he came 
back to Washington to propose that there be an exchange program 
between the Russians and the Americans. Donovan proposed that their 
hand-picked agents be brought to this country to learn all about 
Intelligence and special operations with Americans, utilizing new 
techniques and equipment that we had. To those who recall the same 
General Donovan on countless platforms ranting about the "communist 
threat" only a few years later, this proposal of his must seem to have been 
part of a soft-headed era. In any event, others such as J. Edgar Hoover and 



Admiral Leahy overruled Donovan's gesture of hospitality to the Russians. 

The OSS did set up a Guerrilla and Resistance Branch, which 
operated from Europe to Burma and was patterned after the highly 
successful British Special Operations Executive (SOE) model. But 
General Donovan never got over the blows he suffered from MacArthur 
and Hoover. His wartime disappointment led him on many occasions to 
recommend that there be a single top intelligence director who would be 
placed within the immediate Office of the President and that this director 
be a civilian who would control all other intelligence services, particularly 
most of the military. By 1944, his views were so firm that he wrote to 
President Roosevelt: 

"I have given consideration to the organization of our 
intelligence service for the postwar period. 

"Once our enemies are defeated the demand will be 
equally pressing for information that will aid in solving the 
problems of peace. 

"This requires two things: 

1. That Intelligence control be returned to the 
supervision of the President. 

2. The establishment of a central authority reporting 
directly to you." 

On careful scrutiny, this is a most unusual memorandum to be 
written during time of war to the Commander in Chief of the greatest 
military force ever assembled. First there is the assumption, and perhaps 
even an implied criticism, that the control of Intelligence was not under 
the President, or that the President had lost control of that aspect of the 
military effort world wide. (Later historians may be able to probe the 
depths of Donovan's feelings about General MacArthur by delving into the 
meaning of such papers as that memo.) The other veiled criticism was his 
proposal that the central authority be made to report directly to the 
President. By this, Donovan hoped that Roosevelt might establish such a 
central authority, that would be himself, and that he might thereby gain 
ascendancy over his arch rivals, J. Edgar Hoover, the Navy, and most of 
all, General Douglas MacArthur. 

The germ of these ideas lived throughout the following quarter- 
century. Even today, there are those who still propose that the DCI be 
assigned to the immediate Office of the President. The zeal within the 
"silent arm of the President", as the intelligence service is fondly called by 
its own, is so strong that they have created a special meaning for the 
phrase, "the immediate Office of the President". It might generally be 
considered that the Cabinet is part of this office, but what the Intelligence 
buffs mean is that the DCI would be above or, to put it more precisely, 
equal to and separate from the Cabinet. From General Donovan's day 
down to the present time, it has been the goal of a good segment of the 
intelligence community to install their Director next to the President. They 
always claim that the reason for this is so that the President may always 



have at his elbow the best and most current intelligence available. This, 
too, is a master cover story. Just like General Donovan and his clan, what 
they really want is the place at the elbow of the President, unfettered by 
the Secretaries of State and Defense, in order to have their way with the 
function of Special Operations. Of course, what follows from this is what 
would amount to having the ability to make and to control the foreign 
policy and military policymaking machinery of this country. We shall 
have more to say about this. It suffices now to point out where and when 
the seed was planted. 

Shortly after the war had ended, President Truman dissolved the 
OSS. On September 20, 1945, certain functions of the OSS were 
transferred to the Departments of State and of War. Although the United 
States did not delay in disbanding her military might as soon as the war 
had ended, no group was terminated faster than the OSS. Some of the 
pressure to dissolve this agency came from the FBI, the Department of 
State, the Armed Forces, the Bureau of the Budget, and from President 
Truman's own belief that the "fun and games" was over. He felt that there 
would be no need for clandestine activities during peacetime, and he 
meant to devote his time to winning a peace of lasting duration for the 
generation which had fought its way through the worst depression in 
history and then through the most terrible war in history. 

In this rapid divestiture of its clandestine wartime service, only two 
sections were saved. The Secret Intelligence Branch and the Analysis 
Branch were tucked away among the labyrinth of the departments of State 
and War, where a few dedicated veterans labored quietly through a 
precarious existence to preserve files and other highly classified materials. 
Had it not been for the professionalism and zeal of this group of 
responsible men, these files that had been created during the war would 
have been lost. Had they been lost or destroyed, or most serious of all, had 
they been compromised, they might have occasioned the deaths of 
hundreds of agents who had risked their lives for the United States and 
who lived in constant fear lest they be exposed in their homelands, which 
had fallen under Soviet control. Fortunately, these records, along with 
irreplaceable talent, were saved. Thus ended an era of war-time inspired 
clandestine activity, the contagion of which was sufficient to infect a new 
generation of intelligence professionals for the next twenty-five years. 



1. Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, p. 29. 



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Chapter 3 
An Overview of the CIA 

SECTION II: Origins of the Agency 
and Seeds of Secret Operations 



By the end of world war II it was abundantly clear that the U.S. 
must have a central intelligence authority. The mistakes which were made, 
more by omission than by commission, by the intelligence community 
during the war were serious. This country could never again afford the 
luxury of overlooking the need for reliable intelligence. The witch hunt 
that took place right after the war in an attempt to fix the blame for the 
disaster at Pearl Harbor was indicative of the depth of the problem. After 
the war, it became clear to many that we had seriously overestimated the 
strength of the Japanese and that we had as a result seriously overrated the 
task that confronted the Russians in moving their eastern armies across 
Manchuria against the Japanese at the end of the war. 

In addition to these rather obvious criticisms, there was the fact of 
the atomic bomb. It had been developed in great secrecy under the 
Manhattan Project; but once it had been demonstrated at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, it was no longer a secret. Scientists all over the world would be 
attempting to solve the bomb's problems, knowing now that it was entirely 
feasible and practical, and their own intelligence and spy networks would 
be trying to steal the secrets of the bomb from the United States. This put 
another serious burden upon the intelligence community. 

Not long after the cessation of hostilities, the first measures toward 
the establishment of a central intelligence authority were announced. Less 
than six months after the end of the war the President set up the Central 
Intelligence Group. The New York Times on January 23, 1946, reported 
that President Truman established a National Intelligence Authority 
composed of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy. It was to be headed 
by a Director of Central Intelligence. The DCI would have at his disposal 
the staffs and organizations of all government intelligence units, including 
those overseas, and would undertake "such services of common concern as 
the National Intelligence Authority determines can be more efficiently 
accomplished centrally". This provision would enable the Director to 



operate his own staff for top secret and high priority missions, while 
utilizing the production of all other Agency staff operations for general 
intelligence production. 

The plan was devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a modification 
of one submitted by Major General William J. Donovan at the time of the 
dissolution of the OSS. It deviated from Donovan's suggestion in several 
important particulars, however. First, it placed the Central Intelligence 
Group and its Director under the jurisdiction of the Secretarial triumvirate. 
In the accepted plan this triumvirate retained authority over the Central 
Intelligence Group instead of placing the Group directly under the 
President. Second, it provided that operating funds for the organization 
would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy rather 
than directly from Congress as had been provided for by Donovan's plan. 
As a consequence, the Group was responsible not to Congress but to the 
Cabinet members making up the top authority. In his directive, the 
President ordered that "all Federal and foreign intelligence activities be 
planned, developed, and coordinated so as to assure the most effective 
accomplishment of the intelligence mission related to the National 
Security." 

Thus, less than six months after the end of World War II, the battle 
lines for a major internal war had been drawn. 

Most of the problems and the failures of the past twenty-five years 
can be attributed directly to inadequate and improper decisions made 
during these struggles within the Government during this immediate 
postwar period and to the impact they have had upon the welfare of this 
country since that time. 

On one side were the tradition experienced planners who believed in 
the power of this great nation, all who felt that our future course lay in the 
increase of our own strength and of the beneficent impact of this strength 
upon the rest of the world. These men believed in the American way of 
life and in the ability of our economy to cope with world competition and 
of American diplomacy to plan our course of action wisely and to carry 
out effective national policy. They further believed in the capabilities of 
American military might to back up our diplomats and businessmen. To 
put it bluntly, these men were not afraid of the Communist bogeyman. 
They respected Communism for what it was, and they respected the power 
and strength of the Russian people. At the same time, they were willing 
and ready to plan for a common world future and an undivided world at 
peace. 

The other side, however, wished to create a sort of Maginot Line of 
intelligence people around the world, separating the Communist world 
from the Free World. Then they would peer out at the rest of the world 
through a veil of secrecy plugged in to data inputs of the intelligence 
gathering sources wherever they were and supported by a military 
machine in a defense posture, ready for "reaction" at all times. In essence, 
this latter point of view of foreign policy operations is passive and 



reactive, implemented not by plan but only by response to the initiatives of 
others. 

This is well stated by Allen Dulles in his book, The Craft of 
Intelligence: "The military threat in the nuclear missile age is well 
understood, and we are rightly spending billions to counter it. We must 
similarly deal with all aspects of the invisible war, Krushchev's wars of 
liberation, the subversive threats orchestrated by the Soviet Communist 
party with all its ramifications and fronts, supported by espionage. The last 
thing we can afford to do today is to put our Intelligence in chains. Its 
protective and information role is indispensable in an era of unique and 
continuing danger." The key word, "counter", appears in the first sentence. 

This final and summary paragraph of the old master's book is the 
best sample of the intelligence team's view of how to live in the modern 
nuclear age. They would have us establish the most extensive and 
expensive intelligence network possible and then develop a feedback 
capability that would automatically counter every threat they saw. 

Although Allen Dulles does not say it in his book, his concept of 
Intelligence is about 10 percent real Intelligence and 90 percent 
clandestine operations. In other words, he would have us busy all around 
the world all of the time countering "all aspects of the invisible war". By 
this he means intervening in the internal affairs of other nations with or 
without their knowledge and permission. (This leads to a serious danger, 
which will be treated at some length later.) It is what the United States has 
been doing in an increasing crescendo of events, beginning with such 
actions as the involvement in Berlin and Iran in the 1940s and culminating 
in the terrible disaster of Vietnam that began as a major intelligence 
operation, went on into the clandestine operations stage, then got out of 
hand and had to become an overt activity during the Johnson era. 

Traditionally, the foreign policy of the nation has been planned, and 
to the extent possible, has been openly arrived at. On those occasions 
when diplomacy has failed, the armed might of this country has been 
exploited overtly to back up foreign policy, or in the last resort to 
accomplish what diplomacy has been unable to do, by going to war. In the 
view of foreign policy action and the role of Intelligence as stated by 
Allen Dulles, however, intelligence would be the device used to set 
foreign policy actions in motion to "counter... all aspects of the invisible 
war." If this is not clear, he emphasizes, "The military threat in the nuclear 
missile age is well understood, and we are rightly spending billions to 
counter it." The idea is that intelligence is the catalytic element that 
triggers response and that this response will be covert, operational, and 
military as required. 

With the advent of a strong Intelligence community and with the 
ascendancy of that voice in the higher echelons of the Government, the 
Government has slowly but positively moved from an active course of 
following plans and policies to the easier and more expedient course of the 
counterpuncher. The Government has become increasingly adept at 



reaction and response. A simple review of what this Government really 
found itself doing in the Congo or in Laos or Tibet during the sixties 
would be enough to clarify and support the argument that the Government 
responded to action inputs and "did something", instead of turning to plans 
and national objectives, which it did not have. Further support of this 
thesis that the Government has been weaned away from plans and policy 
in favor of the easier response mechanism activated by intelligence is 
apparent in even a cursory look at the degradation of the roles of the once 
prestigious Departments of State and Defense. Lately, the Army has found 
new worlds to conquer under the cloak of the Green Berets who operate 
with the CIA. Even the Air Force welcomes the utilization of the once 
proud B-52 strategic bomber in a function that is totally degrading — the 
blind bombardment of Indochina's forests and wastelands on the 
assumption that there are worthwhile targets on the Ho Chi Minh trail. The 
only reason State and Defense can give for what they have permitted 
themselves to become engaged in is that "the intelligence reports" say the 
"enemy" is there. No one asks, What is the national objective in 
Indochina? No one has a national plan for Indochina. We have become 
counterpunchers without a game plan, and we have become that because 
we take our cues from raw intelligence data. 

In our form of government this is a fairly recent approach. In 1929, 
when Secretary of State Stimson said, "Gentlemen do not read other 
people's mail," he was voicing the conditions of another era. We have 
come a long way since the days of 1929, and nations do read each other's 
mail because it is easier to do now than it used to be and because the 
dangers that exist today are much closer to home. We need to know as 
much as it is possible to learn about Russian capabilities and Russian 
intent. Total destruction is only about forty-five minutes away. 

But there was another reason Stimson made that statement. In an 
open society we do not develop the same wiles that are necessary in a 
world in which everyone reads everyone else's mail. Therefore, if you are 
going to defend yourself by reading the other man's mail, you had better 
know what he means by what he has written in his letters. He knows you 
are reading his mail, and he will bluff you right out of the game. And what 
is more important, we must carry out our own policies in such a way that 
he cannot keep us from our own goals. 

It is this point that looms larger when a government such as ours 
carries out its foreign and military affairs on a response basis. Such action 
over a period of time denies us all initiative and leadership and virtually 
precludes the possibility of bluff or skillful design. One cannot very well 
bluff or use surprise when he has been set in the pattern of response for 
twenty-five years. In military terms, the employment of proper tactics and 
strategy must be tempered by surprise when needed. In the great contest 
that has been going on between the major powers today, one can see that 
our course in response to such things as "Communist-inspired subversive 
insurgency" has cost us hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of 
thousands of lives; it has cost the same Communists we proclaim we are 
"countering" almost nothing. The response method of anything is a trap. 



The most frustrating and debilitating thing about it is that we have no 
objectives, no goals. We simply have an inertial drift into whatever 
direction the men in the Kremlin lure us. It is important to realize that if 
the highest echelons in government become preoccupied and preempted 
by intelligence inputs, voluminous reports, and other briefings, they do not 
have the chance to get planning done to weigh alternatives and to see that 
policies are effective. 

General Donovan and Allen Dulles made a career of trying to have 
the Director of Central Intelligence assigned to the immediate Office of 
the President for just the reason outlined above. They wanted to be placed 
in the dominant position in this Government. They knew that with modern 
techniques, with modern communications and effective controls, all 
supported by money and equipment wherever needed, Intelligence was 
capable of running the Government and its foreign affairs. The Kissinger 
example is a case in point. This was the danger that the legislators saw in 
Donovan's early proposal. It is why the President, acting on his own 
authority, placed the Director under the jurisdiction of the three 
Secretaries. 

To emphasize his intent and to make sure that it would work his 
way, President Truman directed that "operating funds for the organization 
would be obtained from the Departments of State, War, and Navy instead 
of directly from Congress." The Donovan plan had proposed the opposite. 
If the DCI was required to get his money each year through these other 
departments, he would be subservient to them and he would carry out their 
wishes. 

These were the surface reasons for this decision. The real reason for 
this relegation of the DCI to a subordinate position was to prevent the 
Director and his organization from participating in clandestine operations 
without the express direction and authority of the Secretaries and the 
White House. As we have noted, President Truman planned for the CIA to 
be the "quiet intelligence arm of the President". He and those of his 
Administration never intended that it become an autonomous operational 
agency in the clandestine field. 

Because of the general secrecy that surrounds such things, this 
debate did not become public. The establishment of a "National 
Intelligence Authority" by Truman was considered an interim 
arrangement. The day after he set up the group, the President announced 
the appointment of Rear Admiral Sidney Souers as the first Director of 
Central Intelligence. At the same time, the President established a 
precedent that has continued to this day, by designating Admiral William 
D. Leahy to represent him as a member of the National Intelligence 
Authority. Before his appointment to his new job, Admiral Souers had 
been the deputy chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence. 

It was learned concurrently that President Truman had ordered that 
"all federal and foreign intelligence activities be planned, developed and 
coordinated so as to assure the most effective accomplishment of the 



intelligence mission related to the national security. "[11 

The President's directive contained further instructions to the 
Director of Central Intelligence. They were: 

1 . Accomplish the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to 
national security and provide for appropriate dissemination within 
the government of the resulting strategic and national intelligence. 

2. Plan for the coordination of such of the activities of the intelligence 
agencies of all departments as relate to the National Security and 
recommend to the National Intelligence Authority the establishment 
of such overall policies and objectives as will assure the most 
effective accomplishment of the national intelligence mission. 

A few weeks later, The New York Times published an article by 
Hanson Baldwin, its Military Affairs columnist, saying: "The 
establishment of a National intelligence Authority is a very important 
move. It is more important than the proposed merger of the War and Navy 
Departments. In all parts of the world today intelligence is most 
emphatically the first line of defense." This is an interesting use of this 
term "first line of defense". It appears many times later in the writings and 
speeches of such men as Allen Dulles and General Donovan. To them, 
intelligence was not limited to information. It was very much an 
operational organization and function. 

Baldwin went on to say that the new Intelligence Authority under 
Admiral Souers "will at most just collate and analyze intelligence. Later 
on it may take over the job of collection of intelligence, and later its agents 
will supplement the normal intelligence sources of the military services." 
He added, "The State Department's new Intelligence service under Colonel 
Alfred McCormick will continue but will probably be somewhat more 
restricted in scope than it has been." Both of these statements were 
prophetic and indicate that Baldwin had obtained his information from 
Donovan-Dulles sources. It was the "party line" that Intelligence would 
take over the task of collection, whether Congress and the Administration 
had that function in the law or not. 

In the heat of this major behind-the-scenes power play, there was 
bound to be an explosion. It is quite possible that this development, which 
occurred during the first week of March 1946, did not carry with it at that 
time the same significance that it does in retrospect. On the first day of 
March 1946, General Donovan gave an impassioned and hard-hitting 
speech before the Overseas Press Club in New York City. He stated that 
there had been numerous times when faulty and inaccurate intelligence 
had done great damage to this country's prosecution of the war. But the 
main burden of his speech concerned the new intelligence Authority. He 
said that experience had shown that we could obtain tested knowledge 
only through a coordinated, centralized, civilian directed intelligence 
service independent of other departments of the Government. Here he was 
taking a direct slap at General MacArthur and the JCS as well as at the 



Administration. He agreed that the new Central Intelligence Group 
established by the President was an advance over anything we had 
previously had in peacetime, but it lacked civilian control and 
independence. 

Donovan voiced displeasure over any intelligence setup that did not 
dominate the scene. While Admiral Souers was setting up his new 
organization, Congress was working on the National Defense Act. The 
public was interested in and aroused over the provisions of this Act as it 
pertained to a new Department of Defense. The big word at that time was 
"unification". Feeling had run strong during World War II that the military 
services should have been more unified. It was claimed that they would 
have been more efficient, and there might have been less confusion and 
waste. At the same time, there were a number of advocates of an 
independent Air Force. Up to that time, the Air Force had always been a 
part of the Army. What was called unification at that time seems more like 
separation today, because the new law, when it was enacted, established a 
separate Army and Navy and a new Air Force. As we know them today 
they are still far from unified. In the heat of all this discussion, there was 
little public airing of the provision for the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Those were troubled and confused times. The war was less than one 
year past, and people who looked back at it forgot all of the worldwide 
campaigns and remembered only the shock and terror of the atomic 
explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With fear of the unknown always 
more deadly than fear of a conventional shooting war, there was no chance 
to relax from the tensions of world struggle, safe in the knowledge that 
another war could not start up at any time, as we had believed after World 
War I. On the contrary, the threat of atomic warfare, even though it might 
be sometime in the future, was so terrifying that many felt the potential 
danger of nuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union represented a 
graver peril than all the battles of World War II. As a result, with the war 
only six months behind them, Congress and the Administration turned to 
the serious problems of defense. 

Thus, on the same day that General Donovan had spoken to the 
Overseas Press Club, Secretary of State James Byrnes also addressed that 
group. It is most revealing to look back at the major differences between 
the two speeches. Addressing this group as the official spokesman of the 
administration, he said that there was one thing that was very important: 
"The question is what can we do to make certain that there will never be 
another war?" Then, citing problems of the war, he went on, "Our relief 
and our gratitude for victory are mixed with uncertainty. Our goal now is 
permanent peace, and certainly we seek it even more anxiously than we 
sought victory. The difficulty is that the path to permanent peace is not so 
easy to see and to follow as was the path to victory." He said that "because 
we know that no nation can make peace by itself, we have pinned our 
hopes to the banner of the U.S." Byrnes added, "If we are going to do our 
part to maintain peace in the world, we must maintain our power to do so. 
We must make it clear that we will stand united with the other great states 
in defense of the charter of the UN. If we are to be a great power, we must 



act as a great power, not only in order to insure our own security but in 
order to preserve the peace of the world." Continuing, he said, "It is not in 
accord with our traditions to maintain a large professional standing army, 
but we must be able and ready to provide an armed contingent that may be 
required on short notice. We must have a trained citizenry ready to 
supplement those of the armed contingents." After making these 
statements, Byrnes added a very interesting comment that has special 
significance and applicability today. He said, "Our tradition as a 
peaceloving, law-abiding democratic people should be an assurance that 
our forces will not be used except as they may be called into action by the 
Security Council, and cannot be employed in war without the consent of 
Congress. We need not fear their misuse unless we distrust the 
representatives of the people." 

In view of what has transpired in the Vietnam war, Byrnes' last 
statement takes on special meaning. As he continued his speech he made 
another most interesting remark: "So far as the United States is concerned, 
we will gang up against no state. We will do nothing to break the world 
into exclusive blocks or spheres of influence in this atomic age. We will 
not seek to divide a world which is one and indivisible." This "oneworld" 
view, this idea that no nation should do that which would destroy hopes 
for world unity and harmony, was the official policy of the Administration 
at that time. It was the national policy of a people dedicated to the 
proposition that this country was strong and able enough to stand upon its 
own feet and make its own way in the world. It was a positive and active 
policy that would plan for the future; yet only five days later another 
speech of another kind did more to turn the minds of the world, and 
especially of the United States, and to blight our future than any other 
speech in the following quarter-century. 

It is startling and most significant to recall that the then leader of the 
Loyal Opposition in the British House of Commons, Sir Winston 
Churchill, only five days after Secretary Byrnes' speech made a speech 
that was just the opposite. He declared: "Beware... the time may be short... 
from Staten in the Baltic to Truest in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has 
descended across the continent." 

In this famous Iron Curtain speech Churchill, like many others, was 
driving the tip of the wedge between the great powers of the world, while 
at almost the same time the Secretary of State had said, "We will do 
nothing to break the world into exclusive blocks or spheres of influence in 
the atomic age. We will not seek to divide a world which is one and 
indivisible." Here again was the classic contest. The active overt planner, 
Byrnes, versus the passive covert reactivist, Churchill. 

These were not simply the comments of one man. They were 
typical, and they were indicative of the thinking and of the intentions of 
the official, elected leaders of the United States right after the end of 
World War II, and of their deep-seated opposition. Great forces were 
working to divide the world — to set up one half as Communist, and the 
other half Free World and anti-Communist. There was the inertial drift 



that was transferring the initiative to the Kremlin. 

The source of most of our problems of the past twenty-five years 
and certainly of the grave problems that beset our country today, lies in 
this schism between those who believed in the traditional school of 
national planning and overt diplomacy and those who believed in a 
passive role of reaction to a general enemy (Communism). This latter 
school would operate in response to intelligence inputs, without plans and 
without national objectives, would hide everything it did in secrecy, and 
would justify its actions in all instances as being anti-Communist. On the 
other hand, there were those who believed that the United States was the 
new leader of the world and that its responsibility to its own people and to 
those of the rest of the world lay in making a better world for all mankind 
along the lines of the example of the United States' tradition. At its best, 
this represented the dreams of free men for liberty and individual freedom 
under law and justice. 

The maintenance of such a world and the expansion of such 
conditions to other parts of the world would require planning and great 
effort. The original concept of the Marshall Plan was an example of the 
best that such endeavors can accomplish in the face of Communist threats 
and opposition. Communism was met head on in Europe right after World 
War II and was defeated in France and Italy without resort to war and 
without response mechanisms. Communism was beaten by superior U.S. 
planning and policy. However, this kind of international effort requires 
dedicated leadership and great effort. One of the most difficult things for 
any government to do is develop and carry out long-range plans. That 
takes a certain inspired vision and rare leadership that is not often 
available. 

On the other hand, it is easier and more typical to react and respond 
to outside pressures than to act in accordance with approved plans. In a 
modern government vested with immense capacity and advanced 
communications, it can be made to look more effective to set up and 
operate from a feedback system that will respond almost automatically to 
inputs, most of which are derived from a new style comprehensive 
intelligence information system fed by bits of data from everything 
including agents to satellite photography and other sophisticated sensors. 
The government in this case defines a threat, real or imagined, and 
responds to each data input from the threat and the danger. 

This is what has been developed, and at this stage of the system this 
has become the normal course. Therefore, since it was all but inevitable 
that there would be a power struggle of some kind between the two great 
power centers on earth, even without declared hostility, the intelligence 
community proponents said that it would be easier to begin our national 
defense posture by delineating the source of all concern and danger, i.e. 
world communism, and then to draw lines for a never-ending battle, 
sometimes called the Cold War. The line so constructed was, in the 
beginning, the Iron Curtain. Although one might expect that the battles 
would be waged by our forces on their side of the curtain, and the 



skirmishes by their forces would be on our side, it has not turned out that 
way. The battles that have been fought since 1947 for the most part have 
been fought on our side of the Iron Curtain. It had to happen this way 
because the intelligence community has gained the initiative, and the 
response technique will not work on the other side. This was the great 
contest and although the principals on both sides of the argument, which 
was of such vital concern to the foreign policy and defense posture of this 
country, might deny it, this was the basis for the contention that the 
Central Intelligence Group should be assigned to a position subordinate to 
the Secretaries of State and Defense and under their direction. 

These two pressure groups have vied for power repeatedly since 
1946. It is entirely possible that the leak of the "Anderson Papers" in 
December 1971, and January 1972, was current evidence of an outbreak of 
this continuing struggle. Henry Kissinger is the titular head of the 
intelligence community's clandestine operations reaction faction. His 
appearance as a one-man power center is simply due to the fact that he 
fronts for the Secret Team and the secret intelligence community. Thus, he 
vies with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, and certain others 
in the "traditionalist" group, who would like to see a return to national 
planning, strong diplomacy, and moves toward peace through successful 
conferences between the United States and other countries of the world. 

The traditionalists had finally found a long-awaited opportunity to 
exploit Kissinger's weakened position in the India-Pakistani War, to 
expose him. Such events will occur repeatedly with the ebb and flow of 
power between these two positions. 

As we continue with the development of the CIA and the ST in the 
following chapters, we shall see many more examples of the "active" 
versus "passive" contest. 



1 . Note that from the beginning the Agency was considered a coordination center, and that it was not empowered 
to be a collection agency. The original plan was that the agency simply coordinate all of the intelligence that 
was readily available from other government departments. As the agency grew during the following twenty-five 
years, it expanded its role bit by bit from this first limited charter, and it did so by its own zeal and initiative, not 
by law or direction. 



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Chapter 3 
An Overview of the CIA 



SECTION III: A Simple Coup d'Etat 
to a Global Mechanism 



For nothing is hid that shall not be made manifest, nor anything secret that shall not be 
known and come to light... take heed then how you hear... 
Luke 8:1718 



A Modern Parable. . . . 

The jet airliner had just left the runway with the ex-president of Gandia 
aboard and was winging its way high over the snowballed Andes. In less 
than two hours it would land in the capital of Pegoan, where the ex- 
president had been assured of asylum and safety. 

In a remote office in Washington the watch officer awaited the 
expected word from the agent who had arranged this flight, confirming 
that the departure had taken place. It was too soon to expect the collateral 
news that General Alfredo Elciario Illona had secured the reins of the 
Government of Gandia. This news he would get as soon as a second agent 
arrived in the capital with the new president. Desk officers had worked all 
night preparing releases for the news media and sending instructions to its 
operatives, readying them to support General Elciario's new government. 

In distant Gandia all was quiet in spite of the sudden coup d'etat. It 
may have been the quiet before the storm. For the time being all had gone 
well. 

In the cabin of an old converted transport C47 (DC-3) General 
Elciario was sleeping off the effects of a heavy drinking bout, on an army 
style cot that had been fitted into his modest VIP airplane. As soon as the 
plane had landed on its return from the frontier outpost, the pilot had 
parked it behind the U.S. Air Force surplus World War II hangar. The 
General and his closest friends had not even left the plane. Their party had 



continued on through the night in the plane. The pilot and friend of the 
General, a U.S. Air Force Major, had sent the others home while he stayed 
until the General had slept it off. 

As he tidied up the plane he recalled similar days in Greece and 
Iran, where he had worked as the mission commander on other exercises 
for 'Acme Plumbing"JH But this was the first time that he himself had 
been the key agent in the making of a President. It had been hard work, 
and now all he could do was wait for the brilliant mountain sunrise and 
word from the embassy that all was well and that the city was under 
control. In a few hours the General would be awakened and prepared to 
enter the capital as the new President. Now, as he lay there on that crude 
cot he did not even know that the coup d'etat had already taken place and 
that it had been completely successful. 

The Major had been in Gandia for slightly more than one year. He 
had come to join the U.S. Air Force mission there after six months of 
accelerated training at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. He had flown little 
since his duty in Korea, but it had come back quickly with the intensive 
program the CIA had scheduled for him there. At Eglin he had learned 
new paradrop techniques and had worked closely with the newly formed 
Special Air Warfare Squadrons. One squadron had been sent to South 
Vietnam, another had gone to Europe, and the one he was to join had 
flown to Panama. There he had received further operational training 
exercises with the U.S. Army Special Forces troops in Colombia, 
Venezuela, and Ecuador. Other operations had taken him on an earthquake 
mercy mission to Peru and a medical team paradrop exercise into a mining 
town in Bolivia. It was while he was in Bolivia that the western 
hemisphere division (WH) had contacted him through the embassy and 
told him to report to Gandia. 

Not long after he had arrived in Gandia, he met General Elciario. 
The General had been working with a specially equipped transport plane 
doing paradrop work over the mountain forests of the eastern frontier. The 
General was from a leading family of Gandia and could trace his ancestry 
back to the days of Simon Bolivar. Yet he was proud of the fact that he 
was Gandian and made slight reference to his Castilian ancestry. He loved 
the squat, barrel-chested mountain people. He was one of them. He was a 
man of the people, and he was the most famous flyer in the country. He 
had flown serum to stricken villages during an epidemic, and he had 
airdropped tons of relief supplies after an earthquake. The people of the 
villages loved the General, even though he was not a favorite in the 
capital. As in most Latin American countries, the government was 
centered in the capital. What took place in the capital was important; what 
took place in the villages could be ignored. When the General was made 
the chief of staff of the Gandian Air Force, the old President thought he 
had made a safe assignment. The General was part of no clique in the city, 
and he was no threat to anyone. 

From the first, the General and the U.S. Major got along fine. The 
Major preferred the men of the villages to those in the capital, and in no 



time at all he was popular. Wherever he went the General, too, was 
popular. In this remote site the Major had become the friend of everyone 
in the village and in the Gandian Air Force unit. The General had noticed 
that the units the Major worked with always seemed able to get supplies 
and favors, which had been hard to get before from military aid channels. 
The Major must have had some special influence with Washington. On the 
other hand, whenever the Major distributed these hard to get items, he 
always credited the General with getting them. This "magic" was simply a 
part of the long reach of the Secret Team. 

The "major" was on a CIA cover assignment, and although 
everything he did had the appearance of normal U.S. Air Force duty, he 
was in Gandia to gather intelligence. He was part of a very normal inside 
operation. He knew who was on General Elciaro's team, and he knew who 
was not. He knew which elements of the government worked with the Air 
Force and which were aloof or antagonistic. When his routine reports, 
which he filed daily through his contact in the embassy and not through 
Air Force channels, revealed that he was getting quite close to the General, 
they were passed on by the Deputy Director of Intelligence to the Deputy 
Director of Plans, and thence to Western Hemisphere. From that date on, 
WH monitored all traffic to and from the "major", and from time to time 
would feed him special instructions and other data. WH wanted to know 
exactly whom the General trusted and who in the government he worked 
with on official matters. In Gandia as in many other countries this could 
mean, "Who does he share his cut of government funds with and who 
shares theirs with him?" 

One day, General Elciario told the major of his growing displeasure 
with the Government of the old President. This was passed on to WH. Day 
by day the Major increased the scope and coverage of the civic action 
training exercises that the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army Special 
Forces troops were interested in and that gave special credit to General 
Elciario. He was seen everywhere with new projects to build rural schools. 
He was seen delivering water pipe to a remote village from an Air Force 
transport. His fighters roared over distant cities and towns, letting the 
people know that the Air Force was everywhere. General Elciario opened 
the new U.S. satellite tracking station, and he was at the dedication 
ceremony of a new U.S. mining company's mountain airfield. And 
everywhere the General went the Major was somewhere in the 
background. 

The Major found ways to be helpful to the General, and he gave the 
General an opportunity to widen the gap between himself and his 
government, before long, the General was led to believe that the U.S. 
Government also was displeased with the old President. Although nothing 
was ever said, General Elciario was quite certain that if he made a move to 
take over the government, the U.S. Government would not make a move 
to support the present regime. 

Note the formula: There was no commitment of any kind to support 
a coup d'etat. On the contrary, the formula calls only for tacit agreement 



not to support the incumbent. As a matter of fact, the "major" had been 
sent to Gandia to look out for subversive insurgency. The possibility of a 
coup had developed quite spontaneously. And once it became a 
possibility, it was nurtured. As soon as the General realized this, he began 
to see himself as the person in power. The lure was undeniable. He began 
to create his own team, and he began to count his chances. 

It was not long before he came to the Major with the outline of a 
well planned scheme that purported to see a real and immediate 
requirement for a big civic action exercise in a remote province. This 
exercise would require a special consignment of weapons, ammunition, 
and perhaps silver bullion to buy off some of the dissident tribesmen. 
General Elciario made a good case for his plan and assured the Major that 
the natives would be properly stirred up at the right time to make it seem 
to everyone that this exercise was not only the real thing for training 
purposes but that a government show of force in that area would help put 
down rampant "Communist inspired subversion" in the area. The only 
problem would be the weapons. The General had no way to get that much 
material without arousing suspicion. The incumbent government kept all 
munitions under close control in secured magazines. Otherwise, not a 
word was said about even the remote possibility of a coup d'etat. But both 
men, the U.S. Major and the ambitious General, understood each other. 

That night the messages from the embassy to WH were highly 
classified and loaded with instructions to include the requests for 
munitions and airlift. WH was quick to respond. The neighboring country, 
Pegoan, had been scheduled to receive a normal, large shipment of 
military assistance munitions. The CIA arranged to have these delivered 
ahead of schedule and to seed the order with extra items for General 
Elciario. The U.S. Air Force was directed to make available four medium 
transport aircraft for the Gandian Air Force's "Civic Action" timing 
exercise. When all was in readiness, two large C-130 heavy four engine 
transport planes took off from Panama, bound for Pegoan. However, they 
filed a devious flight plan in order to make some "upper altitude weather 
tests for NASA". This gave them extra time en route. They landed in 
Pegoan on schedule; but unknown to that Government they had touched 
down on a remote mountain airstrip long enough to dump off a number of 
pallets loaded with munitions for Gandia. The two C-130s were able to get 
back in the air with only a thirty minute delay and to make their scheduled 
arrival time at their original destination. No one knew that they had 
delivered this cache of arms for the rebels in Gandia. 

At the barren air strip, there had been only four men, all from the 
USAF. They had arrived unnoticed and unannounced in one of the U.S. 
Air Force Special Air Warfare U10 "Helio" light aircraft. This rugged 
light plane was especially designed to land in short distances on rough 
terrain. Yet it could carry six men, or four men and a cargo of special 
equipment. These men had set up panel signals to show the C-130s where 
to land. Then they had driven a number of heavy crowbars into the 
ground. To each one they affixed the loop end of a long nylon rope with a 
hook at the end. As soon as the first C-130 had landed, they directed it to 



turn around and open its huge rear end cargo doors. The lines were passed 
in to the crew and attached to pallets on which ammunition was firmly 
strapped. Then, as the C-130 gunned its engines for takeoff, the ropes 
pulled each pallet out of the plane and left a string of cargo on one side of 
the clearing. The process was repeated with the other C-130 on the other 
side of the clearing. No sooner had the C-130s left than four smaller C- 
123 medium transports arrived from Gandia, flying low over the mountain 
ridges to escape detection. The first plane landed short and spun around 
ready for take-off. It carried a small forklift unit that was used to load all 
four planes. The whole operation had taken less than an hour, and just 
before the four men left in their Helio, one of them drove the forklift over 
the cliff at the edge of the runway. The C-123s hedgehopped to the remote 
airfield in preparation for the civic action exercise. 

Two U.S. Army Special Forces "advisers", working with the tribes 
in the exercise area, staged a pre-dawn "attack" using "fire fight" 
packages, along with a team of Gandian Army Special Forces who were 
told that they were on a training exercise. 

The villagers were told this was a hostile attack, and the chieftain 
dutifully reported subversive insurgency to the district police headquarters 
in the nearest town. News spread to the capital, and this sector was 
reported to be in rebellion. General Elciario's field headquarters reported 
they would put down the trouble and that all would be under control. The 
increased activity was overlooked in the capital as one of those occasional 
native outbreaks. Then, under the cover of this "emergency", the 
incumbent government was served with an ultimatum. A well armed force 
of paratroopers disembarked at the main airport and began to take over the 
national radio station and other government centers. Since they were 
heavily armed, the president assumed that they included men upon whom 
he had relied and who had keys to the ammunition magazines. He called in 
his United States CIA friend who "reluctantly" confirmed that this was the 
case and that safe passage could be arranged for the president and his 
immediate family in a Fawcett Airlines plane, which "happened" to be at 
the airport. In a matter of hours, the old president was on his way, and a 
courier drove onto the Gandian Air Force Base to inform the Major that he 
could prepare Elciario for his victory march into the capital and to the 
Presidential Palace. 

Elciario served his country for several years, and he may have been 
replaced in the same manner. Meanwhile the "major" has left for other 
duties. If the General had had the opportunity to visit the Guatemalan 
airfield, which was constructed on the ranch at Retalhuleu for the purpose 
of training Cuban air crews, he would have seen his old friend the "major" 
busy with those ex-Cuban airline pilots, trying to teach them how to fly 
the latest and most lethal model of the old B-26. Or he could have seen the 
"major" a while later at his primary support base in Arizona, where T-28s 
and other aircraft were being outfitted for Laos. Such men are members of 
a small and highly competent group of professionals who prepare the way 
for the operations dreamed up by the ST in any part of the world. 



The real day to day operational work of the ST and of its principle 
action organization, the CIA, is so different from that of any ordinary arm 
of the Government that it would be worth the time and space here to 
define it and explain it as it is revealed in the scenes just outlined. The 
coup d'etat described was a composite of real ones although the names of 
the countries involved and the name of the General are changed. Oddly 
enough, the General did become president after an all night party, and the 
"major" did have his hands full trying to get him ready for his victorious 
entry into town. 

The CIA had a full-time man in the embassy who was responsible 
for what might be called routine intelligence. It was noted that there was 
increasing opposition to the incumbent President, so an Agency man was 
introduced into the country as an Army Colonel. He was a Special Forces 
officer and well known in the U.S. Army as an instructor at Fort Bragg. 
Actually, he had been at Fort Bragg in the John F. Kennedy Center on a 
CIA cover assignment. He had been in the Army during World War II and 
he had a bona fide Reserve commission. Technically, he was recalled to 
active duty; but he was paid by the CIA, and he was not on the basic Army 
roles except as a cover assignment. 

When this special requirement in Gandia arose, the CIA got him 
transferred to the Army mission in Gandia by suggesting that the 
incumbent Army colonel be called back to attend the National War 
College. This excuse satisfied the Army headquarters in Panama and 
enabled the "cover" colonel to take over the mission without delay. 

No sooner had this Colonel reported for duty than the ambassador 
began a buildup program for him so that he would have a chance to meet 
the president frequently and to talk with him sufficiently to win him over 
to the U.S. Army doctrine on civic action and to convince him that this 
could be applied to the "rebellious" areas in the border outposts. In this 
manner he became a confidant of the president and was very useful later 
during the coup d'etat. 

At about the same time that the "Army Colonel" arrived in Gandia, 
an American businessman, who was president of a small independent 
airline with its main offices in Panama, came into the capital city to open a 
one-man office to represent his airline. He rented a small space at the 
airport and hired a clerk and a young mamma who had been working with 
the well known Latin American airline, Fawcett Airways. Ostensibly to 
assure the success of his new venture, this man remained in Gandia for 
several months and visited all major companies in an attempt to sell them 
special air services which his company, by using small aircraft and one or 
two old World War II Flying Boat PBYs, could provide for them. He 
became a regular figure in town and was accepted as a hardworking, 
friendly businessman who knew Latin America and who could speak 
fluent Spanish. Otherwise, he stayed in the background and was rarely 
seen in the official American community. He seemed to know no one at 
the embassy, and they were never seen with him. He was gathering 
intelligence, and he was an old professional. He had a drop for routine 



messages, which the Agency communications man sent through the 
special CIA transmitter in the embassy; but even the CIA people in Gandia 
did not know that he had his own network for highly classified messages 
out of Pegoan. He would fly there frequently, so that when he had 
important messages his sudden departure would not be noticed by the 
Gandians or the Americans. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. Air Force "major" had been introduced through 
Air Force channels. He was technically an "overage" in Gandia and was 
carried on temporary duty status there for the duration of the civic action 
exercises, which were scheduled to last throughout the year. He was 
assigned to the U.S. Air Force Special Air Warfare unit in Panama. He 
was a longtime CIA employee who had served in many countries and was 
one of their best career pilots and blackflight specialists. 

Although firm intelligence had shown the possibility that the old 
president was apt to be overthrown because of incipient developments, 
there were no reliable indications which would identify a possible 
successor. This left the Agency with the option of waiting to see who 
might rise to power by his own ability, or of stepping in with an attempt to 
create a man who could take over when the president's position became 
dangerously weakened. The former choice was poor because it left the 
door open for other interests, always considered to be Castroite or 
Communist, to step in with their own man. Since the Agency believed the 
fall of the present government to be about as certain as such a thing can 
be, it was decided to use the "Magsaysay formula" and to create the next 
president by making him the hero of the people throughout the country as 
a first step. It would be the job of the major to groom the man they had 
selected for the role. 

The "major" did not know the American businessman who was 
president of the small airline, and had never come across him during his 
Agency career. The airline president did not know him either. The Agency 
planned to keep them working independently so that it could cross-check 
their reports. The "major" had met the Army Colonel during airdrop 
exercises at Fort Bragg, but he thought he was a real Army Special Forces 
instructor and did not know that he, too, was a CIA career man. The 
Agency gave him clearance to work with the Colonel very closely and 
cleared the Colonel similarly. The "major" did not know of the Colonel's 
role with the old President and the Colonel did not know the "major's" 
assignment. Each man was to play his role straight. 

The ambassador was fully informed of the Agency's plan, since he 
was the recipient of its secret intelligence reports, and he knew that one of 
the men in his communications room was an Agency man. He had never 
made an attempt to determine which man it was because he thought his 
charge d'affaires knew; also, it would be better for him to keep his fingers 
out of that kind of thing. He did not know that the "major", the Colonel, 
and the airline president were CIA men. He did not see their message 
traffic, although the Agency took pains to make sure that he received 
"cleaned" copies of their dispatches, which he assumed had been culled 



from attach reports and other more or less normal sources. The 
ambassador was not interested in intelligence; he had been in the country 
only one year, and if he could keep things calm, he hoped to be transferred 
at the end of the second year. He was a political appointee and not a career 
man. 

The "major" spent a considerable amount of time setting up 
elaborate civic action exercises in all areas of the country. These were 
staged like carnivals, and at the climax of every operation, General 
Elciario would fly in and address the village and local tribesmen. There 
had been a few native uprisings, and some operations were directed into 
those areas to impress the villagers with the power of the new air force. 
The "major" found a few villages that lived in fear of bandit tribes. Here 
he took a page from the Magsaysay book and rigged some early morning 
"attacks" by what he called the Red team. These attacks were always 
repulsed by a Blue team, which just happened to be in the area. In every 
case, Elciario would show up leading the victorious "anti-guerrillas". The 
unwitting natives took this as the real thing, and the fame of General 
Elciario as the greatest guerrilla fighter since Simon Bolivar spread 
throughout the country. 

This kind of script calls for the utilization of equipment "borrowed" 
from the U.S. Armed Forces, along with personnel to carry out such 
missions. It also calls for the liberal use of a blank checkbook, which the 
General is urged to use to win over those who might be useful. 

Up to this stage of the action, most of what the CIA has been doing 
falls in the category of intelligence, with only a preparatory stage of 
clandestine operations. As its agents report a worsening position for the 
old President and general disillusionment on the part of key businessmen 
and other leaders, along with a growing national awareness of General 
Elciario, WH puts together the outline of a proposed operation to be 
briefed to the DD/P (clandestine services) and thence to the DCI. 
Following this briefing, and with the approval of these men, the Agency 
will brief selected key people in Defense and State to see how they feel 
about the situation and whether or not they are ready to see a change of 
government in Gandia. 

Throughout this period, the Agency will have been sending special 
messages to its man in the embassy. He will use these to brief the 
ambassador, or perhaps to have the Army Colonel brief the ambassador to 
guide him in this situation. Some of the very messages the Agency will 
have sent to Gandia will come back over the embassy network as 
intelligence input, and at the same time will be transmitted by the attaches 
to the Defense Department. Thus a wave of messages, all corroborating 
one another, will fill the "In" baskets in State, Defense, and the White 
House. In his role as intelligence coordinator the DCI will prepare his own 
analysis of all of this and will prepare to place this business on the agenda 
of the next NSC Special Group meeting; he will present the current 
situation only, and propose a special operation. 



By this time, the Agency and a number of the Secret Team 
operatives will have just about decided that the only thing to do in Gandia 
is to go along with General Elciario and permit him to exploit the 
situation. They will have convinced themselves that if the government is 
that shaky in the first place, they had better be on the winning side rather 
than on the "Communists". A special group meeting will be held, and the 
designated substitute for each NSC member will attend. The consensus of 
the meeting will be to go ahead with the "major's" program but to hold up 
until each member has had an opportunity to inform his principal of the 
action. 

The DCI will offer to visit the President and will get his approval; 
this makes the visit to the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense 
purely informational. 

This account of developments may seem somewhat unreal. Anyone 
who has carefully read the Pentagon Papers will recognize most of the 
above. In fact, most people who have read the Pentagon Papers will see 
that this is what was done in the case of the Diems in South Vietnam. The 
significant point is that the CIA may have sent the "major" to Gandia in 
the first place simply to see how things were going there and perhaps to 
have him ready for action in a neighboring country if needed. But the 
"major" is an old firehorse, and when he hears the bell, he cannot help 
getting into harness. The scenario is somewhat like the movie Fahrenheit 
451, in which the firemen were the men who started fires rather than the 
men who put them out. 

It is so easy to topple over a government in most small countries 
simply by finding the key to control. If all arms and equipment are kept 
under close control, then the armed forces and the police have few useful 
weapons at any given time. Thus, if the leader of the rebellion all of a 
sudden shows up with a large and unaccounted for supply of weapons, he 
may be able to take the government over without a shot, simply by the fact 
that he has them outgunned before they start. Thus it is not too difficult for 
a man with boundless resources such as the "major" could command to be 
able to arrange things almost effortlessly. At that point, all he has to know, 
and all the man he is supporting has to know, is that the United States will 
not make a move to support the incumbent. Then, when the tide begins to 
turn, the incumbent finds himself alone with no one in a position to help 
him. Like so many things the ST does, this is more a negative coup d'etat 
than a positive action. 

It is not to be presumed that a program such as this can be fully 
implemented in a short time, or that it is set in motion with the objective 
of causing and supporting a coup d'etat. As a matter of fact, the 
characteristic of the ST that supersedes all others in such a situation as this 
is that events should take their natural course, with some covert help. 

A document that was circulated from the CIA through other 
government agencies and extra governmental organizations such as the 
RAND Corporation and the Institute for Defense Analysis shows how this 



is done. Once a country is included on the "counterinsurgency" list, or any 
other such category, a move is made to develop a CIA echelon, usually 
within the structure of whatever U.S. military organization exists there at 
the time. Then the CIA operation begins Phase I by proposing the 
introduction of some rather conventional aircraft. No developing country 
can resist such an offer, and this serves to create a base of operations, 
usually in a remote and potentially hostile area. While the aircraft program 
is getting started the Agency will set up a high frequency radio network, 
using radios positioned in villages throughout the host country. The local 
inhabitants are told that these radios will provide a warning of guerrilla 
activity. 

Phase II of such a project calls for the introduction of medium 
transport type aircraft that meet anti-guerrilla warfare support 
requirements. The crew training program continues, and every effort is 
made to develop an in-house maintenance capability. As the level of this 
activity increases, more and more Americans are brought in, ostensibly as 
instructors and advisers; at this phase many of the Americans are Army 
Special Forces personnel who begin civic action programs. The country is 
sold the idea that it is the Army in most developing nations that is the 
usual stabilizing influence and that it is the Army that can be trusted. This 
is the American doctrine; promoting the same idea, but in other words, it 
is a near paraphrase of the words of Chairman Mao. 

In the final phase of this effort, light transports and liaison type 
aircraft are introduced to be used for border surveillance, landing in 
remote areas, and for resupplying small groups of anti-guerrilla warfare 
troops who are operating away from fixed bases. These small specialized 
aircraft are usually augmented by helicopters. 

When the plan has developed this far, efforts are made to spread the 
program throughout the frontier area of the country. Villagers are 
encouraged to clear off small runways or helicopter landing pads, and 
more warning network radios are brought into remote areas. 

While this work is continuing, the government is told that these 
activities will develop their own military capability and that there will be a 
bonus economic benefit from such development, each complementing the 
other. It also makes the central government able to contact areas in which 
it may never have been able to operate before, and it will serve as a 
tripwire warning system for any real guerrilla activities that may arise in 
the area. 

There is no question that this whole political economic social 
program sounds very nice, and most host governments have taken the bait 
eagerly. What they do not realize, and in many cases what most of the 
U.S. Government does not realize, is that this is a CIA program, and it 
exists to develop intelligence. If it stopped there, it might be acceptable 
but intelligence serves as its own propellant, and before long the agents 
working on this type of project see, or perhaps are a factor in creating, 
internal dissension. Or they may find areas of ancient border contacts, or 



they may run into some legitimate probing and prodding from a 
neighboring country, which may or may not have its origins in Moscow, 
just as our program had its origins in Washington. In any event, the 
intelligence operator at this point begins to propose operations, and use 
clandestine operations lead to minor "Vietnams" or other such bleeding 
ulcer type projects that drain United States resources, wealth, and 
manpower on behalf of no meaningful national objective. 

The CIA maintains hundreds of U.S. military units for its own 
purposes. Many of these units become involved in this type of operation. 
After these cover units have been in existence for several years, the 
military has a hard time keeping track of them. The military system is 
prone to try to ignore such abnormalities, and the CIA capitalizes on this 
to bury some units deep in the military wasteland. 

The CIA also maintains countless paramilitary and pseudobusiness 
organizations that weave in and out of legitimacy and do business much as 
their civilian counterparts would. The small airline alluded to in the 
Gandia example actually exists and very capably operates in Latin 
America. It operates as a viable business and competes with other airlines 
of its type. The only difference is that the officials of the other airlines, 
who have a hard time meeting the payroll at times, wonder how their 
competition is able to stay in business year after year with no more 
volume than they have. At such a point, most of the competition will 
rationalize that the cover airline must be in some illegitimate business like 
smuggling and the drug trade, or else that it is connected with the CIA. 
They could be right on both counts. Most of these cover businesses have 
to be closed out and reestablished from time to time to support their 
usefulness. (It may be interesting to note that in September 1963, none 
other than the Secretary of the Senate, Bobby Baker, got mixed up with 
one of these cover airlines, Fairways Incorporated, without knowing it, 
and that the exposure resulting from his accidental charter of this small 
airline played a part in bringing down his house of cards. 

Part of the Gandia coup d'etat demonstrates that the ambassador will 
be briefed on most things that happen in his country, and if he is alert and 
insistent, he may be on top of most of the things the ST is doing there. In 
actual practice, however, there may be quite a bit of communications 
traced that he will know nothing about. The CIA will have its own 
communications network, and in addition to that, agents who come and go 
will be sending messages outside of the country that he may never know 
about. It would be an unusually adept ambassador who would catch all of 
the by-play in the incoming messages and the outgoing traffic. Most 
ambassadors would be surprised to learn that some of the staff messages 
that are proposed to them for authorization to transmit were received from 
the ST almost verbatim in the form which his "staff" have given him to 
send back to Washington. This is a useful device for the ST because it gets 
a message of unquestioned authority from the ambassador into the 
Department of State and usually into Defense via attach channels. 

By this innocent appearing device, the ST is able to create 



intelligence inputs that are then used for clandestine operations feedback. 
This becomes a possible ploy, because the Team can separate the people 
who know about the outgoing messages from those who know about the 
incoming messages by the "need to know" and "eyes only" restrictive 
methods. Such methods are not commonly used, but they are used when 
someone on the ST feels that the desired end will justify this means. 

In this example we saw that the Agency had operatives working in 
Gandia who were unaware of each other's presence. It is entirely possible 
that the ambassador may not have known either that all of the CIA men 
working on this project were CIA men. He would have had available to 
him a list of all Americans in Gandia if he had wanted to research it; but in 
operational exercises such as this, it is most likely that he would not know 
all the agents. This is a most touchy area, and there have been times when 
the CIA's own chief of station, its senior man in the country, was not 
aware of the fact that other CIA men were working in his country. This 
can create some very complex problems. In one case of record it resulted 
in a very serious altercation between two CIA factions, with the result that 
the chief of station demanded that the other men leave or that he would 
leave. In that instance, the chief of station left. 

Another way the ST gets around the special operative problem is to 
employ non U.S. citizens to assist in countries where an overscrupulous 
ambassador or cautious chief of station have given trouble. A number of 
such personnel have been used by the CIA in Indochina in a variety of 
roles, and in some exceptional cases, they have been used on special 
assignments in Latin America. 

The Gandia incident shows another special facility in the hands of 
the ST. In order to equip General Elciario with an abundance of arms and 
ammunition, the CIA arranged with the Air Force to airlift these munitions 
to a remote site. In order to do this the two large C-130 aircraft had to 
depart from the U.S. Air Force base in Panama with cargo manifests that 
showed only the actual cargo that was being delivered to the final 
destination in the capital of Pegoan. This meant that a deal had to be made 
with customs in order to get out of Panama. The landing in Pegoan had to 
be clandestine, and the chance of discovery had to be gambled. There have 
been incidents where such illicit cargo drops were made and then 
discovered before they could be picked up. In such cases, the cargo had to 
be abandoned, and the finder was so much the richer; the U.S. 
Government could not make a move to identify itself as owner of the 
property. 

The pickup flights also had to be clandestine in that they left Gandia 
and entered Pegoan without clearance or flight plan, made their landing, 
pickup, and return with no manifested cargo in Gandia. This part of the 
operation may not seem important, but should there have been exposure of 
any of those illicit flights, it could have led to exposure of the entire plot, 
and a coup d'etat by the opposite side may have taken place or the old 
President may have had sufficient warning to take strong measures to 
remain in power. Certainly if he did learn of this business, he would no 



longer be a friend of the United States. 

We have mentioned the Magsaysay incident before. The way in 
which the ST was able to build up Magsaysay from an unknown Army 
captain to a national hero and eventually to president was so appealing that 
the technique has been attempted in other countries. One of the gambles 
with that game is that a situation has to be developed, preferably in some 
remote area where it can be alleged that there is a pro-Communist activity 
— in the case in point, Huk (Communist sympathizers) activities. In the 
beginning there may be an incipient outbreak of banditry caused by crop 
damage or other hardship. The natives will attack other villages for food 
and other plunder, usually for the sole purpose of staying alive. As this 
situation continues and spreads it will come to the attention of the national 
police or the border patrol. They may not have the means to cope with the 
uprising and may ask the government to help them. At this point the 
armed forces may recall their civic action training at Fort Bragg or in 
Panama and they may ask the U.S. military mission personnel to assist 
them. No country likes to admit that it has some internal problems, so they 
quite readily call the banditry "subversive insurgency" and imply that it 
may be Communist-inspired. 

This puts the flame to the wick. Nothing will get a rise out of 
Special Forces — both Army and Air Force - faster. In short order they 
will be on the spot to see what can be done, and in every case the CIA will 
have men seeded in the units. At this point this is still a CIA effort, and it 
may stay in that category as far as the ST is concerned until the disorders 
have receded or have flared higher. Usually, the breakpoint occurs when it 
is discovered that the rioting is being blamed upon the incumbent 
administration. Then the CIA looks for the possibility of a coup, from 
there on it is the familiar pattern. Such events - and there have been so 
many during the past fifteen to twenty years - show how easily 
intelligence becomes clandestine operations, and how clandestine 
operations are usually the result of a reaction or a response mechanism and 
are not a part of any planning or policy. 

This is the great danger. The leaders of CIA and important members 
of the ST have protested countless times that the CIA does not enter into 
policy making. In this they are correct on most counts. The problem lies in 
the fact that they are not policy making, and on top of that, the operations 
they carry out are not in support of policy, either. They simply grow like 
Topsy, arising out of a feedback from intelligence data inputs; in some 
cases there is no reason at all for the action. In other words, there may be 
no national objective other than the loose coverall or blanket observation 
that the operation is anti-Communist. 

Another special area in which the ST excels is that of logistics 
support of clandestine operations. They always seem to operate out of a 
boundless horn of plenty. In the Gandia example, the CIA was able to call 
for and have delivered a large quantity of munitions, and to have it 
delivered in heavy aircraft, all of which cost someone a lot of money. We 
shall have a general discussion of logistics support in a later chapter and 



will not go unto detail here, but it should be noted that it is one thing to be 
able to move such a cargo in and out of various countries without customs 
and other controls, and it is another thing to get the cargo in the first place. 
Most of us have been led to believe that the Armed Forces are required to 
account for each and every item they have procured with the taxpayer's 
dollar. Then how does the CIA manage to get so much, so easily? All 
munitions have to be transferred from control depots to transportation 
points, and all such transactions are under control and regulation. To get 
around this, the ST has developed a system of its own storage depots and 
has them so interlaced with the military system that not even the military 
can track down some of the transactions. 

These transactions are often written off with the comment, "It's all 
in the government"; but there is one area of imbalance that adds 
appreciably to the cost of such extracurricular activities. In the foreign aid 
program, there are very careful balances in aid maintained between 
different countries, especially neighboring countries or countries in the 
same sphere of influence. If we give one country a new series of Army 
tanks, then we must be prepared to give the neighbor the same. This will 
repeat itself like a row of dominoes, and the next thing we know we have 
to re-equip a whole series of countries with the newer equipment, because 
we started with one. This situation is expensive, and it is hard to control. A 
delivery to Pakistan of equipment not delivered to India will set off a most 
unpleasant round of talks with India. During India's border problems in 
196-., offers were made to deliver a large shipment of arms to India. 
Although Pakistan was also involved to a lesser degree in the border 
problem, this was forgotten in the argument over the imbalance which the 
former delivery would create between India and Pakistan. In the end, 
Pakistan did increase its contact with China and became less friendly to 
the United States. 

This system is very complicated and few would have the temerity to 
interfere with it. However, the CIA has from time to time created 
situations where munitions delivered to one country, ostensibly for a 
clandestine operation have ended up in the hands of the central 
government and have created a gross imbalance within the same sphere. 
An example of this occurred after the Bay of Pigs operation, when 
Nicaragua took possession of aircraft and other valuable munitions that 
had been stockpiled at Puerto Cabezas and had not been used. The 
advanced model of the B-26 bomber being prepared for the use of the 
Cubans was a much more lethal aircraft than any neighbor of Nicaragua 
had in its own inventory. This set off a whole round of arguments about 
increasing the aircraft inventory of the other countries. Though these 
examples are limited and incomplete, they serve to point out the nature of 
clandestine operations. 

The principle reason why the creation of the CIA within the 
framework of our free society has caused very serious problems is because 
the intelligence function, as it has been operating under the DCI and the 
rest of the community, almost inevitably leads to clandestine operations. 
The law intended otherwise, but general practice during the past twenty- 



five years has served to erode the barriers between Intelligence and 
clandestine operations to the point where today this type of thing, 
unfortunately, has become rather commonplace. And why has it become 
so commonplace? The most basic reason is because nations' ills of all 
kinds are highlighted by instant global communications and then are 
generally attributed to the Communist bogeyman. This is not to say, of 
course, that some ills may not be caused by Communist pressures, just as 
some are caused by American pressures. (In fact, the benefits of being 
charged with so many actions are so tremendous for the men in the 
Kremlin that they would be less than skillful if they did not stir up a few 
obvious cases now and then to keep the pot boiling. When a small 
contribution to the effort in Indochina on the part of the men in the 
Kremlin can get fifty-five thousand Americans killed and $200 billion 
wasted versus no Russians killed and only a few billion dollars invested, 
the Kremlin cannot be blamed for using this tactic to its advantage.) 

In the Philippines, lumbering interests and major sugar interests 
have forced tens of thousands of simple, backward villagers to leave areas 
where they have lived for centuries. When these poor people flee to other 
areas, it should be quite obvious that they in turn then infringe upon the 
territorial rights of other villagers or landowners. This creates violent 
rioting or at least sporadic outbreaks of banditry, that last lowly recourse 
of dying and terrorized people. Then when the distant government learns 
of the banditry and rioting, it must offer some safe explanation. The last 
thing that regional government would want to do would be to say that the 
huge lumbering or paper interests had driven the people out of their 
ancestral homeland. In the Philippines it is customary for the local 
regional government to get a 10 percent rake-off on all such enterprise and 
for national politicians to get another 10 percent. So the safe explanation 
becomes "Communist- inspired subversive insurgency". The word for this 
in the Philippines is Huk. 

In the piece of real estate we now call South Vietnam, the refugee 
problem that resulted in rioting and incipient banditry was derived from 
three sources. The huge French rubber plantation holdings and lumbering 
interests, the mass movement of hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese 
from north of the 17th parallel, and the complete collapse of the ancient 
rice economy, which included the destruction of potable water resources 
during the early years of the Diem regime — all came at about the same 
time to create a terroristic situation among millions of people in what 
would otherwise have been their ancestral homeland. Again this was 
attributed to subversive insurgency inspired by Communism. 

This is a familiar formula in Latin America, too, and is found to be 
at the root of the problem in the emerging nations of Africa. In following 
chapters we shall see how the new U.S. Army doctrine that has been 
developed at the White House by a special Presidential committee is 
designed expressly to meet such situations and to create in those countries 
a military center of power bracketing all political-economic and social 
activity. 



In the context of "Army" policy this committee's two major 
contributors and authors were both U.S. military generals who were 
actually the spokesmen for the CIA. The policy that they developed has 
become the CIA's most effective tool during the "Counterinsurgency era", 
which began in about 1960-61. 



1. One of the most frequently used unclassified code names for the CIA; in general conversation by employees 
and those familiar with their intimate jargon. Note how the White House/Watergate Affair Group called 
themselves "the Plumbers," showing their CIA lineage. 



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Chapter 4 

From the Word of the Law to the Interpretation: 
President Kennedy Attempts 
to Put the CIA Under Control 



BESIDE THE TOWERING MOUNTAINS THE FIELD looked 
more like pastureland than a hidden airfield. As a result, it was not 
surprising to see mud-covered water buffalo grazing in the shade beneath 
the wing of the old World War II B-17 Flying Fortress. Low rambling 
sheds, some of them stables and others supply shelters, were scattered 
along the perimeter of the field. A full stand of grass and small underbrush 
had grown up through the mesh of the pierced steel plank that had been 
laid on the ground to form a parking ramp for a collection of clandestine 
aircraft. 

Coils of barbed wire had been spread everywhere in a cleverly 
concealed random pattern, with wild flowers growing through it in 
abundance. Yet for all its appearance of tranquillity, this remote airfield 
was the center of a most active clandestine air activity. The pastoral scene 
camouflaged the muted industry of teams of Chinese Nationalist 
specialists who prepared the B-17s for deep flights over the mainland. 
Agent information told of trouble deep in China that was being exploited 
by leaflet drops from the old bombers. Skilled crews, who flew low to use 
the terrain as cover from radar, pinpointed the trouble cities on each flight 
because they were natives of the area. 

Upon return, one crew reported the city ringed with searchlights 
probing for the planes through the murky sky. The pilot had dropped 
through the clouds and actually flown the B-17 in a tight circle inside the 
ring of searchlights, right over the heart of the ancient city, spraying 
leaflets all the time. As soon as his leaflet cargo had been dropped, he 
brought the plane down into the dark path of the river and flew at tree-top 
level back to the sea coast. 

One morning, just after the sun had burst above the eastern peaks of 
Formosa, I saw two of these aircraft drop into the pasture for a safe 
landing after an all-night mission. As they taxied to a halt on the steel 
plank the Chinese ground crews swarmed around the planes, thrilled at the 
return of the crews and the success of the night and eager to hear how 



everything had gone. Then I noticed a few American technicians 
systematically removing tape and film canisters and other specialized 
equipment from in the planes to the laboratory for development and 
processing. I couldn't help but ponder the significance of these flights 
upon these two professional groups and the meaning of the word 
clandestine, as well as the nature of the policy that accounted for these 
flights. 

To these Chinese the flights were a return to the homeland. They 
were probes at the remaining weak spots in the Chinese Communist 
shield. They were a serious attempt designed to arouse mainland Chinese, 
to demonstrate that the old regime still cared and that the Western World 
was still with them. 

For the Americans these flights were entirely different. I had 
traveled to Taiwan with a CIA career man, after having completed eight 
months of concentrated staff work devising and designing an elaborate 
logistical system for special operations work all over the world. We had 
flown to Taiwan to see some of the field operations that were supported by 
this system. As I watched these two distinct elements work, supporting the 
same mission, from the same base, I saw at first hand a truth that had not 
been evident back in the Pentagon. The Chinese were very proud of these 
flights and of their part in doing something for their own people. To the 
Americans this was just a job, and it was one in which they could not 
become identified. If a mission failed, as some did, and the crew and the 
plane were lost, the Chinese Nationalists would honor their gallant men. If 
a mission was lost, the Americans would have to ignore it and deny they 
had played any part in the operation at all. In that sense, warfare is 
honorable and part of an ancient and respected tradition. On the other 
hand, clandestine warfare is never honorable and must always be denied. 
With this in mind, why were Americans themselves involved in these 
operations and others like them all around the world? 

The answer is complex. The more intimate one becomes with this 
activity, the more one begins to realize that such operations are rarely, if 
ever, initiated from an intent to become involved in pursuit of some 
national objective in the first place. It would be hard to find an example of 
a clandestine operation that had been developed from the beginning solely 
in support of some significant national objective. 

The lure of "fun and games" is addictive, and it is most powerful. 
There would be no intelligence problem at any level within the community 
if it were not for the inevitability of the desire to divert intelligence 
operations into secret operations. There would be little complaint and few 
problems if the CIA was limited to include secret intelligence and no 
more. In this day of three-dimensional capability with electronic snoopers 
and satellites, there is no place to hide anyhow, and concealment and 
secrecy are time-limited devices at best. 

It used to be that if a nation defended its borders and saw to it that 
no one entered its territory, it could keep secret its actions, its maneuvers, 



and its intentions. It was the secret development of the simple iron ramrod 
that gave the armies of Frederick the Great of Prussia such a predominant 
margin of superiority in battle. Today, such singular and distinct advances 
might occur, as with the atom bomb. But the secret — if it is a secret at all - 
- cannot be kept. There is no way to hide it and no place to hide. High- 
flying aircraft and satellite observation platforms provide us with accurate 
photographic information sufficient to identify and distinguish such an 
object as a round card table from a square card table. Special sensors give 
evidence of crop yields, thermal output variations, and many other areas of 
information. Nuclear weapons plants can be observed on a regular 
schedule and activity gauged quite accurately by several methods. Various 
electronic and communications monitors provide much more valuable 
information that even the satellites cannot get. Sophisticated economic 
studies provide volumes of essential and very precise information that 
cannot be hidden except at great cost and inconvenience. The very fact 
that modern industrial production methods require numbering, marking, 
and serial coding of products and parts manufactured plays directly into 
the hands of the vigilant intelligence operator. There can be few real 
secrets, and even these become fewer as soon as a little time is involved. 

A good secret will last only a short time at best. Even the secret of 
the atom bomb and of its delivery system was more than 50 percent 
compromised once the bomb had burst over Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As 
Norbert Wiener had said in his book, The Human Use of Human Beings: 
"When we consider a problem of nature such as that of atomic reactions 
and atomic explosions, the largest single item of information which we 
can make public is that they exist. Once a scientist attacks a problem 
which he knows to have an answer, his entire attitude is changed. He is 
already some fifty percent of his way toward that answer." And of more 
particular relevancy to the field of intelligence is another quote from 
Wiener: "The most important information which we can possess is the 
knowledge that the message which we are reading is not gibberish." In this 
context he is talking about the problem of codebreakers; but this is also 
applicable to many other areas of interest involving data acquired from 
numberless sources in tremendous quantities. The responsibility lies 
heavily upon the intelligence system itself to assure that it has been able to 
separate the wheat from the chaff. Data may not be gibberish as it comes 
in, but if it is not processed and evaluated properly, it may be useless 
when it comes out. 

It is always of paramount importance to know that the information 
we have is not planted, false or a product of deception. So even the quest 
for secret intelligence may not exist as a major requirement to the extent 
that the CIA purists would like to make it seem. But this is not the real 
problem. The real problem is with clandestine operations In peacetime that 
have been mounted in response to intelligence data inputs that might have 
been deceptive or misinterpreted in the first place 

During World War II there were reasons for clandestine operations, 
and much essential information was obtained by such means. However, as 
many students and researchers in this area have discovered, the value of 



such clandestine means was relatively small. As soon as World War II was 
over, President Truman dissolved the OSS to assure that clandestine 
operations would cease immediately. Six months later, when he founded 
the Central intelligence Group, he expressly denied a covert role for that 
authority and restricted the DCI to a coordinating function. During the 
debates leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 
(NSA/47), proponents of a clandestine role for the CIA were repeatedly 
outmaneuvered and outvoted in Congress. In his book The Secret War, 
Sanche de Gramont reports: "The NSA/47 replaced the CIG with the CIA, 
a far more powerful body. From the hearings on the NSA/47 it is evident 
that no one knew exactly what the nature of the beast would be." At that 
time a member of the House, Representative Fred Busby, made the 
prophetic and quite accurate remark: "I wonder if there is any foundation 
for the rumors that have come to me to the effect that through this CIA 
they are contemplating operational activities." That congressman knew 
what he was talking about, and as we look back upon a quarter-century of 
the CIA it seems hard to believe that he wasn't sure that was exactly what 
they were up to in the first place. 

When the law was passed, it contained no provision whatsoever 
either for collection of intelligence or for clandestine activities. However it 
did contain one clause that left the door ajar for later interpretation and 
exploitation. The CIA was created by the NSA/47 and placed under the 
direction of the NSC, a committee. This same act had established the NSC 
at the same time. Therefore, the CIA's position relative to the NSC was 
without practice and precedent; but the law was specific in placing the 
agency under the direction of that committee, and in not placing the 
Agency in the Office of the President and directly under his control. In 
conclusion, this act provided that among the duties the CIA would 
perform, it would: 

... (5) perform such other functions and duties related 
to intelligence affecting the National Security as the NSC may 
from time to time direct. 

This was the inevitable loophole, and as time passed and as the CIA 
and the ST grew in power and know-how they tested this clause in the Act 
and began to practice their own interpretation of its meaning. They 
believed that it meant they could practice clandestine operations. Their 
perseverance paid off. During the summer of 1948 the NSC issued a 
directive, number 10/2, which authorized special operations, with two 
stipulations: (a) Such operations must be secret, and (b) such operations 
must be plausibly deniable. These were important prerequisites. 

The CIA really worked at the achievement of this goal toward 
unlimited and unrestrained covert operations. In its earlier years the 
directors, Admiral Souers and General W. B. Smith, were preoccupied 
with the task of getting the Agency organized, with beating down the 
traditional opposition of the older members of the community, and with 
performing their primary function, that of coordinating national 
intelligence. However, with the advent of the Allen Dulles era, ever- 



increasing pressure was placed on the restraints that bound covert 
operations. Dulles succeeded in freeing the Agency from these fetters to 
such an extent that five years after his departing from the Agency the 
retiring DCI, Admiral Raborn, was so conditioned to the CIA "party line" 
that he could not quote the law correctly. 

In reply to a question put to him by the U.S. News and World Report 
of July 18, 1966, asking what was the specific charter of the CIA, he said, 
". . . to perform such other services as the NSC may direct. . . That fifth 
assignment is the Agency's charter for clandestine activities. . . " This is a 
very small deviation from the exact language of the law, but it is 
fundamental, and it shows how the Agency and even its DCI in 1966 
believed and wanted others to believe that the NSA/47 did in fact give the 
CIA a clandestine activity charter, whereas it did not. The Act carefully 
stipulated that the CIA could perform such other activities as the "NSC 
would from time to time direct". That "time to time" stipulation clearly 
limits the Agency's "other services" to intermittent matters and does not 
give the Agency any clear authority to perform clandestine activities. As a 
matter of fact, many other actions, as we shall see, took place to prevent 
the Agency from getting any such automatic and routine authority. 

Another statement of Admiral Raborn's is equally slanted. In 
response to a question about clandestine activity, he states that the Agency 
"must have the prior approval — in detail — of a committee of the NSC" 
before it can carry out such activity. Again there is but a shading of the 
language of the law; but again it is most fundamental. The law says that 
the Agency is under the direction of the NSC. In terms of how the Agency 
should, in accordance with the law, become involved in clandestine 
activity, the law follows its "from time to time" stipulation by saying that 
the Agency will perform such activity "by direction of the NSC". There is 
a distinct difference between winning approval of something and doing it 
by direction of the NSC. The distinction is in the area of the origin of the 
idea. The laws sees the NSC as responsible for the origination of the idea 
and then for the direction of the Agency. The Agency sees this as being 
something that it originates, ostensibly through its intelligence sources, 
and then takes to the NSC for approval. This was not contemplated by the 
law. Furthermore, the law did not authorize the creation of a "committee 
of NSC" for such important matters. It was the intent of the Congress that 
the NSC itself direct such things. 

It should be noted also that Admiral Raborn got carried away in this 
interview with another statement. In response to the question, "Would the 
U.S. ambassador in the country concerned know about your activities 
there?" Raborn replied, "CIA's overseas personnel are subordinate to the 
U.S. ambassadors. We operate with the foreknowledge and approval of the 
ambassador." The reader may have his choice in concluding that Admiral 
Raborn either made an untrue statement, or that he did not know how his 
clandestine services operated. I choose to believe the latter. In either case, 
there are countless instances in which the ambassador does not know what 
the CIA is doing. Kenneth Galbraith's Ambassador's Journal is all anyone 
needs to read to see that. Or would someone like to say that Ambassador 



Keating in India knew what Henry Kissinger and his Agency friends were 
doing in Pakistan and India during the December, 1971, conflict? Another 
case would be that of Ambassador Timberlake in the Congo. 

It would be unthinkable that the DCI, in this case Admiral Raborn, 
would intentionally make untrue statements in a national publication such 
as the U.S. News and World Report. The least he could have done would 
have been to avoid the question entirely. The deeper meaning of this 
interview is that Admiral Raborn, after more than a year of duty as DCI, 
simply did not know how his operating agents worked. He thought he had 
a clear ticket for clandestine operations, and he thought that arrangements 
were such that ambassadors would know about the actions of the CIA's 
clandestine operators. This is a clear example of how far the Agency has 
gone in getting around the law and in creating its own inertial drift, which 
puts it into things almost by an intelligence-input-induced automation 
system, without the knowledge of its own leaders and certainly without 
the knowledge of most higher-level authorities. 

In times of peace it would have been unthinkable for one nation to 
interfere openly in the internal affairs of another without some prior 
understanding. All such occurrences otherwise are met with disapproval 
from all over the world. It must be admitted at the present time such fine 
points are sometimes overlooked for various emergency reasons; but these 
are the exceptions and not the rule. Even in South Vietnam, where there 
has never been a really independent government and where the United 
States, for all its sacrifice and assistance, might be expected quite 
understandably to have some rights, we find that the ambassador leans 
over backwards, at least in appearance, not to interfere in the internal 
affairs of that beleaguered nation. And that is a rather extreme example. 

In the world family of nations, sovereignty is one of the key 
conditions of existence, and sovereignty is inviolate. Even if we talk about 
some small country such as Monaco or Luxembourg, the code of nations 
regards their sovereignty to be as precious as that of the United States or 
the USSR. The day this code breaks down will be the beginning of the end 
of world order and of a return to the rule of brute force. Liberty begins as 
the aspiration of the individual, and sovereignty is the measure of the 
absolute power of a state. As we look around us today, we see an erosion 
of this fundament of international society. It is for this reason that we must 
look into this situation and consider how important it is to the world 
community to uphold principles that we hold to be essential and priceless 
assets of our civilization. 

Since sovereignty is priceless and must be inviolate, it is 
fundamental that no nation has the right to do that which if every other 
nation did likewise, would destroy this fragile fabric of civilization. We all 
agree in 99 percent of the cases that no nation has the right to infringe 
overtly upon the sovereignty of another. Since there is no higher court or 
other jurisdictional body empowered as final and absolute arbiter over the 
nations of the world, judgments in such cases must be left to the honor that 
exists among nations. When this fails, the only other alternative is for all 



nations large and small to form power blocks and alliances that in one way 
or another result in dependence upon brute force and sufficient leverage to 
demand compliance with the doctrine of sovereignty. Such moves in 
themselves result in the sacrifice of some measure of sovereignty. The 
price of alliance is generally some form of agreement and limitation of 
sovereignty that binds each party to assist the other even to the point of 
maintaining troops on the other's soil, or some other such measure. But for 
lack of other means, all nations must in the final issue seek their own 
security as best they can, and somewhere in this fabric the common good 
directs that all nations honor and respect certain unassailable rights. 

Since no nation would then resort to overt infringement of 
sovereignty without being ready to face up to a war with that nation — 
perhaps a war of major proportions involving nations in alliance with that 
nation — then overt infringement is for all practical purposes out of the 
question. In all respects overt violation of the sovereignty of one nation by 
another would be a more difficult decision to make than a covert or 
clandestine infringement of sovereignty. If one nation believes that it has 
so much at stake that it must infringe upon the sovereignty of another 
nation, it will resort to clandestine means as the lesser of two evils. 

Choosing a clandestine act leads to a rich dilemma: either the 
operation will be successful and it will never be discovered, or it will fail 
and the guilty nation may be found out. And then, realizing that such 
operations are directed and manned by human beings and that failure is 
inevitable, the NSC added a second most important stipulation, to the 
effect that in the case of failure the U.S. Government must be able to 
disclaim plausibly any part in such an operation. These safeguards take 
none of the gravity away from the nature of the operation; they simply 
serve as a precautionary and stringent guidelines to remind the Agency 
that clandestine operations directed by an agency of the U.S. Government 
are serious business. 

Lest anyone think that the only barriers to the conduct of covert 
operations are those that reflect upon honor, prestige, and other 
gentlemanly intangibles, we should not overlook the other side of the coin. 
The U.S. Government has been blackmailed to the tune of hundreds of 
millions of dollars in goods, materials, and preferential trade agreements 
as a result of the failures of clandestine operations in Cuba, Nicaragua, 
Greece, Indonesia, the Congo, Tibet, Pakistan, Norway, and other nations. 
This is one of the seldom noted and rarely announced hidden costs of such 
activities. 

At the time the NSC published its guidelines in 1948, they were 
heeded with great care. One of the most important characteristics of a 
covert operation, in addition to the fact that it must be secret, is that it be 
very small. There is no such thing as a successful big clandestine 
operation. The bigger the operation, the less chance there is that it can be 
secret. This issue was one of the most serious matters to come out of the 
personal review of the Bay of Pigs failure that was made by President 
Kennedy and his brother. Although the law states that the CIA is under the 



direction of the NSC, there have been times, usually after the failure of a 
major operation, when the President has had to accept publicly the 
responsibility for the operation. It is obvious to anyone that the President 
as the elected leader of this nation is responsible for all activity of the 
Government. It is even more evident that the President as Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces of this country bears the final and sole 
responsibility for all military action; but nothing in the traditional military 
doctrine provides for the role of the Commander in Chief when involved 
in peacetime covert operations. A nation is not supposed to become 
involved in covert activity — ever. Therefore its commander in chief is not 
— ever — supposed to be involved either in the success or the failure of 
such action. Recent CIA failures such as the U-2, Indonesia, the Bay of 
Pigs, and more recently, Indochina, have involved the Commander in 
Chief. 

At this point when a covert operation has failed and has become 
public knowledge, the President is faced with a most unpleasant dilemma. 
He must accept the responsibility for the operation or he must not. If he 
does, he admits that this country has been officially and willfully involved 
in an illegal and traditionally unpardonable activity. If he does not, he 
admits that there are subordinates within his Government who have taken 
upon themselves the direction of such operations, to jeopardize the welfare 
and good name of this country by mounting clandestine operations. Such 
an admission requires that he dismiss such individuals and banish them 
from his Administration. 

However, by the terms of the definition of clandestine activities, no 
one should be put in a position of having to admit responsibility for such 
operations. It is always agreed before the operation is launched that should 
it fail it will be disowned and denied. If this is not done and if extreme 
care has not been taken to assure the secrecy, success, and then if 
necessary, the deniability of each operation, no clandestine operation 
should ever be launched. If clandestine operations that do not meet these 
stringent requirements are set in motion they should not be pursued. They 
are falsely clandestine if they do not meet these requirements and thus 
enter the realm of open and inexcusable overt operations, disguised as it 
were as clandestine operations, or finally, in the last analysis, they are the 
product of shallow hypocrisy and callousness. During the past fifteen 
years things have gone that far, and there have been so-called clandestine 
operations that were in reality bold-faced overt activities carried out within 
another country without its consent. Most such events have resulted in 
coups d'etat, some of which have been successful and some failures; but in 
all cases the open "clandestine" activity was rationalized on the basis that 
the old government was undesirable, that it was going to be overthrown 
and a little intervention was necessary anyhow. 

The Bay of Pigs invasion and all of the other operational evens that 
accompanied that ill-fated exercise were more or less in that category. The 
whole campaign was much too large to have been clandestine. It had been 
too long and too open in the preparatory stages, and there had been too 
many leaks of what was going on. Secrecy was an hypocritical sham. To 



top this all off, what secrecy there was — what real deep and deceptive 
secrecy existed — existed within the U.S. Government itself. More effort 
had been made by the ST to shield, deceive, and confuse people inside the 
Government than took place on the outside. And since the great thrust of 
the program came after the Kennedy election in November 1960, the great 
bulk of the build-up in secrecy and under elaborate cover story scenarios 
took place right in the White House, the Pentagon, the Department of 
State, and other agencies that might have been expected to have known 
what was being planned. The result of all of this was that no one outside 
of a very few men at the heart of the ST in and out of the CIA had access 
to all of the facts. I use the words "had access to" intentionally, because 
even though a small team of men were in a position to know all that was 
going on by virtue of their being on the "inside" of the ring of need-to- 
know, they did not know all that was going on because they were not in a 
position to encompass the entire operation, nor did they comprehend all 
that they did see. Such an operation, once it begins to grow, takes on a 
corporate existence of its own, and unless there is unusually competent 
leadership at the top, the kind of leadership that can tighten things up by 
saying "No" at the right time and for the right reasons, the whole operation 
blooms by itself and runs on like wildfire. As we have said earlier, Allen 
Dulles did not even attempt to apply such leadership, and his chief 
lieutenants were not in a position to provide it. Thus it was that the Bay of 
Pigs operation went off pretty much by itself and foundered. 

It was only after its failure that Kennedy really began to see the 
scope and magnitude of the problem. Kennedy was not experience in this 
type of thing. He had very little useful military experience that would have 
stood him in good stead here, and he had not been on the inside of a 
clandestine operation development before. This is a special knowledge 
that is not learned by equivalent experience in other walks of life, and he 
had not suspected the problems that he would inherit with this failure. But 
President Kennedy was also not the type to permit such a thing to hit him 
twice. He was smart, tough, and politically alert. He saw no other way to 
quiet the situation after this dismal failure then to accept total 
responsibility and to try to make the best of a tragic situation. On April 3 
he appointed a committee to investigate the entire operation, and on April 
4, 1961, the White House issued the following statement: 

"President Kennedy has stated from the beginning that 
as President he bears sole responsibility for the events of the 
past few days. He has stated it on all occasions and he restates 
it now so that it will be understood by all. The President is 
strongly opposed to anyone within or without the 
administration attempting to shift the responsibility." 

This statement was reminiscent of the blanket statement issued by 
Eisenhower after the U-2 failure in Russia on May 1, 1960. Once the 
Government is caught in a "blown" and uncovered clandestine activity that 
has failed, there can be no other out but to admit that the Government of 
the United States, for reasons of its own, had planned an intrusion into 
another government's sovereign territory, and then accept the 



consequences and see what can be made of a bad situation. 

The committee appointed by President Kennedy consisted of Allen 
Dulles, General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and the 
President's brother Robert F. Kennedy. This was a most fortuitous group 
for many reasons, and it is worth a few lines here to discuss these men and 
their selection. 

Allen Dulles had the special knack of being able to move forward in 
adversity. He could shed problems and move into the next series of 
ventures while the Government, the public, and the newspapermen were 
sifting through the ashes of a past failure. He was confident in this ability 
because he knew how to make secrecy work for him and how to 
compartmentalize so that few people, even within his inner circle, really 
knew which way he was going to move. It would be perfectly correct to 
point out that this ability to move within a cloak of secrecy comes not so 
much from some inner wisdom as from the persistent small force, not 
unlike gravity, that leads the ST from one operation to another for no other 
reason than that they find a new bit of input data and their built-in 
feedback system begins to respond like water finding a new course around 
a temporary obstacle. Thus, Allen Dulles was in an ideal — for him — 
situation when he was appointed to this committee. Immediately, he began 
to set the committee up for his net venture, and he maneuvered the 
hearings to bring about the most gain for the ST and his Agency, even 
though he no doubt realized that he would not last much longer as the DCI 
under Kennedy. 

It was important to him to see that his chief of clandestine 
operations, Richard Bissell, was placed properly in another quiet and 
influential post and that Bissell's successor would be one whom he could 
rely upon to carry out the goals of the Agency. Bissell was maneuvered 
into the job of director of the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA), a high 
powered think-tank that works directly for the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. IDA is also a frequently valuable 
conduit for CIA proposals that it wants introduced without attribution to 
the Pentagon, the Department of State, and the White House. In such 
situations, the CIA will pass a paper to IDA for its processing. IDA will 
put it on its letterhead, and an IDA team which may include an agent on 
cover assignment, will take the project to the Pentagon. Then, instead of 
going into the Pentagon in the usual prescribed manner in which CIA 
matters are handled, IDA will meet with officials, for example in the 
prestigious office of the deputy director for Research and Engineering. 
From there the paper may be staffed throughout the rest of the Office of 
the Secretary, the JCS, and the Services. This assignment of Dick Bissell 
to IDA was most helpful to the CIA. And although he was being publicly 
removed from the Kennedy Administration and banished from the public 
sector, he was a close as ever to the activity of the Agency in a think-tank 
totally sponsored by government money. Subsequently, Allen Dulles 
moved Richard Helms into the position vacated by Bissell. 

Dulles' next goal was to rebuild the influence of the CIA in the 



White House. He accomplished this masterfully by seeing to it that Bobby 
Kennedy heard all the things he wanted him to hear during these hearings. 
He won him over without the appearance of catering to him or doting 
upon him. Therefore, he saw to it that Bobby was left to his own thoughts 
as each day's witnesses entered the committee rooms in the windowless 
confines of the inner JCS area of the Pentagon. All he did was to make 
certain that the train of witnesses was so selected that their testimony 
would be patterned to present the Agency in its best light and to 
inconspicuously transfer blame to others, such as the JCS. But most of all 
he arranged for witnesses who would provide background briefings of the 
new Agency drift into counterinsurgency. The broad plan for 
counterinsurgency as a marriage of the CIA and of the U.S. Army had 
been laid down during the last months of the Eisenhower Administration. 
It remained for its proponents, mostly men of the ST, to sell it to the 
Kennedy team. 

Throughout this complex process his primary target for conversion 
to the CIA was General Maxwell Taylor. Here was the right man at the 
time for Allen Dulles' exploitation and for the use of the ST. Dulles was 
very good at this kind of thing. He had used General Edward G. Lansdale 
this way many times, to the considerable personal benefit of Lansdale and 
for the immeasurable benefit of the CIA. Lansdale had had good fortune in 
the Philippines in making a president out of the unknown Magsaysay; but 
it had been Allen Dulles, with skillful assistance from Admiral Radford 
and Cardinal Spellman, whose bottomless blank-check tactics made the 
whole thing work. Now Dulles was playing for bigger stakes, and his man 
was to be General Taylor. Dulles needed a man like Taylor in the White 
House to rebuild confidence in the Agency after the Bay of Pigs fiasco. 

General Taylor's career was interesting. He always seemed to be 
displeased with the way things were going, and he always seemed to be 
pushing some "cause" against a real or imagined adversary. Years ago he 
had followed in the high-speed wake of Admiral Arleigh Burke in 
attacking the Air Force over the intercontinental bomber B-36 issues and 
the related strategic concept of massive retaliation. He surrounded himself 
with a coterie of young hotheads and let them stir up the dust while he 
pounded the table. In a most characteristic scene, he rose up out of the 
sound and fury of the post-Suez era in 1956, when Krushchev had 
threatened London and Paris with rockets, to sound his trumpet for an 
intermediate -range ballistic missile. At that time this created quite a stir in 
Washington and eventually led to the replacement of the Secretary of 
Defense because of the friction generated by the Army and Air Force 
protagonists over a missile that nobody needed in the first place. It had 
just happened that Krushchevs rockets, to have been effective, would have 
to have had a range of about fifteen hundred miles. The Taylor and 
Medaris (Army General Medaris) version of the tactics involved to 
counter them would then require an American missile with an intermediate 
range, judged by them to be about fifteen hundred miles. And the Army 
believed it had just the missile, a rocket called Jupiter. The details of this 
great debate are not important here; it is simply useful to point out that it is 
typical of General Taylor to leap into a cause, frequently with a hotheaded 



team of firebrands, and to joust with the windmill. He got nowhere in the 
B-36 debates, and he forced an unnecessary showdown over the 
intermediate range ballistic missile, which went counter to the best 
interests of the Army. 

Later, Taylor had other arguments with the Eisenhower 
Administration that caused him to resign in a huff in 1959. Immediately, 
he set out to write a book, The Uncertain Trumpet, which purported to 
show the fallacy of the massive retaliation strategy, but which was more a 
polemic on the Eisenhower administration's relegation of the Army to a 
reduced role in national military planning. With this background he was 
an ideal figure for Allen Dulles to cultivate to act as a front man for the 
CIA in the White House. 

The CIA had learned how to turn the restrictions of the NSC 
directives around to their advantage with respect to the promotion and 
approval of clandestine activities. Since the CIA was bound to win the 
approval of the NSC before it could mount such exercises, the best thing 
to do was to create a group of participants in the NSC structure itself who 
would always perform as Allen Dulles wanted them to perform. This left 
him with a few things to get set up his way. 

As we have noted, the law states that the CIA is under the direction 
of the NSC; and further it states in the escape clause, which is interpreted 
to suggest that the CIA may get into the clandestine business, that the CIA 
may perform such other activities as the NSC may from time to time 
direct. The first thing that the ST did was to wear down the meaning of the 
word "direct". In the original context it was the intent of the Government 
that there be no clandestine activity whatsoever except in those rare 
instances when the NSC might see something so important that it would 
"direct" an agency, presumably the CIA, to perform the operation. In the 
strict sense of this interpretation, the only time the CIA could become 
involved in the preparation of any clandestine activity would be when 
"directed" by the NSC and not before. 

Under the erosion process used by the ST, this idea of "direction" 
became "approval". Once the CIA had become involved in a series of 
clandestine operations, it then would make a practice of going back to the 
NSC, to the Special Group 5412/2 as it was in those days, and 
ostentatiously brief the next operation as a series. As they hoped, after a 
while the important and very busy members of the NSC or of the NSC 
subcommittee would plead other duties and designate someone else to act 
for them at the meetings. This diluted the control mechanism appreciably. 
Further, the CIA saw to it that men who would always go along with them 
were the designated alternates. 

This is another part of the special expertise of the ST. The CIA 
would use secrecy and need-to-know control to arrange with a Cabinet- 
level officer for the cover assignment of an Agency employee to that 
organization, for example to the Federal Aviation Administration. The 
Cabinet officer would agree without too much concern and quietly tip off 



his manpower officer to arrange a "slot" (personnel space) for someone 
who would be coming into a certain office. He would simply say that the 
"slot would be reimbursed", and this would permit the FAA to carry a one- 
man overage in its manning tables. Soon the man would arrive to work in 
that position. As far as his associates would know, he would be on some 
special project, and in a short time he would have worked so well into the 
staff that they would not know that he was not really one of them. 
Turnover being what it is in bureaucratic Washington, it would not be too 
long before everyone around that position would have forgotten that it was 
still there as a special slot. It would be a normal FAA- as signed job with a 
CIA man in it. 

Then the CIA would work to beef up the power of that position until 
the man was in a situation that could be used for membership on various 
committees, boards, and so on. In the case of the FAA, the actual CIA 
slotted men are in places where they can assist the ST with its many 
requirements in the field of commercial aviation, both transport and 
aircraft maintenance and supply companies. 

This same procedure works for slots in the Departments of State, 
Defense, and even in the White House. By patient and determined 
exploitation and maneuvering of these positions, the Agency is able to get 
key men into places where they are ready for the time when the ST wishes 
to pull the strings to have a certain man made the alternate, or to designate 
someone for a role such as that of the NSC 5412/2 Special Group. This is 
intricate and long-range work but it pays off, and the ST is adept at the use 
of these tactics. Of course, there are many variations of the ways in which 
this can be done. The main thing is that it is done skillfully and under the 
heavy veil of secrecy. Many key CIA career men have served in such slots 
as agents operating within the United States Government. There is no 
question about the fact that some of these agents have been the most 
influential and productive agents in the CIA, and there is no doubt that the 
security measures utilized to cover these agents within our own 
government have been heavier than those used between the United States 
and other governments. 

Thus the CIA has been able to evolve a change in the meaning of 
and the use of the control word "direct" and then to get its own people into 
key positions so that when they do present operations for approval they 
are often presenting these critical clandestine schemes to their own people. 
The Pentagon Papers detail much of this, and we shall discuss it later. One 
reason why Bill Bundy appears so frequently in the Pentagon Papers is 
because he was a long-time career CIA man, and he was used as a conduit 
by the CIA to get its schemes for Vietnam to and past such men as 
McNamara and Rusk. 

In this manner Allen Dulles worked to create a role for the army 
"black sheep", Maxwell Taylor. It was in Dulles' interest to get Taylor into 
the White House, and it was very much in Taylor's personal interest to get 
back into a position where he expected to be able to press some of his old 
ideas, or what was more likely, where he would be useful as the front man 



for some of his former staffers. Taylor's approach, when confronted with 
an explanation or a proposal that varied from his own, was usually a 
brusque, "Get on the team." In other words, if you were not with him, you 
were against him, and if you were not on the "team" you would be 
dropped summarily. Many a good Army Officer of that era was brushed 
aside simply because he tried to point out other views than those held by 
Taylor. 

In Taylor's book, The Uncertain Trumpet, he cites his method of 
operation when he was in opposition to the chairman of the JCS and the 
other Chiefs: "I arrived carefully prepared with a written rebuttal drawn up 
with the help of some of my ablest staff officers. I took the offensive at the 
start of the session, attacking the unsoundness of the proposal from all 
points of view — military, political, and fiscal." On the face of it there is 
nothing wrong with such a method, and all of the Chiefs do that, but 
General Taylor made a career of charging into meetings with the "written 
rebuttal" of some of his firebrand of officers and of getting knocked flat on 
his face. This would not be so unimportant an observation if I had not 
witnessed JCS meetings with and without General Taylor present at the 
time when he was the chairman himself. And it would not have become so 
public a bit of information if some of these written works that he cites had 
not been published in all their unbelievable candor in the Pentagon Papers. 
Goethe's statement that "There is nothing more frightful than ignorance in 
action" may be very true, and we have the war in Vietnam to prove it; but 
that statement can be topped. There is nothing so frightful and so self- 
righteous as an otherwise intelligent and experienced man who, to serve 
his own ends, will champion the cause of the ignorant in action. 

Allen Dulles was able to get Maxwell Taylor into the White House 
as personal military adviser to President Kennedy. There was much public 
discussion about the propriety of placing a general in such a capacity in 
the White House, ostensibly overseeing and perhaps second-guessing the 
lawful chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CIA had its cake to keep 
and to eat on this point because not only did it gain Maxwell Taylor as a 
principal ally at the seat of power, but it finessed a good share of the Bay 
of Pigs blame upon the JCS without so much as saying so. Most people 
were willing to read into this key appointment what they thought was the 
President's own view that there must be something to the allegations that 
the JCS botched up the Bay of Pigs if Kennedy himself, with all he knew 
after that investigation, brought General Maxwell Taylor into the White 
House to keep an eye on the military. 

It must have delighted General Taylor to let the rumors and the 
conjecture fly. He could play it either way. He could second-guess the 
chairman, General Lyman Lemnitzer — as capable a chairman as there has 
ever been - or he could settle down to his new role of advancing ST 
schemes, along with his newly-won friends, the U.S. Army Special 
Forces, the Green Berets. This sort of Army was much to his liking, and 
this sort of Army was already up to its neck in operations with the CIA. 
Maxwell Taylor was not the White House military adviser in the regular 
sense; he was the CIA's man at the White House, and he was the 



paramilitary adviser. 

Through all of this board of inquiry investigation, Allen Dulles 
orchestrated the rest of the committee members into his plan. Admiral 
Arleigh Burke, without question the ablest admiral to serve as Chief of 
Naval Operations since World War II, had chaired many JCS meetings 
during the period when the Bay of Pigs operation was being developed, 
and since much of the planning involved the Navy and the Marines Corps 
(the top military man on the CIA staff was a most able and experienced 
Marine colonel) he was the logical member of the JCS to sit on the 
committee. His position on the committee, however, must have caused 
him quite a bit of concern, because as he witnessed the unfolding of the 
operation as Dulles unwound the scheme he must have wondered if what 
he was hearing in that room could possibly have had anything to do with 
the operational information that he had heard during briefings. 

One of the really secret techniques of the ST is to cellularize and 
play by ear the development of some scheme. It would be hard to say that 
they planned it that way, because one of the things that the Team 
understands and practices the least is planning. But as an operation 
develops they assign one part of it to one group and another part to 
another group. At certain levels of the hierarchy these come together. It 
would be nice if such things were done with PERT chart or Network 
Charting precision and effectiveness; but they are not. So as an operation 
develops, it grows haphazardly. When the CIA needs something from the 
Navy it will have a certain man call upon the Naval Focal Point Office and 
request the item. Depending upon how easy this detail is put over, the 
briefer may or may not tell the Navy what he plans to do with it. The Navy 
may press him and say, in effect, 'We cannot send two Navy doctors on 
temporary duty to Panama for Project XYZ unless you tell us exactly what 
Project XYZ is and why you need two Navy doctors." The Navy knows 
that if the doctors were to be used on an Army post this would not look 
right, even in Panama, and the Navy might be left holding the bag in the 
event the operation were to be compromised. At this point the CIA man 
might tell the Navy the real story, or he might tell them a cover story (a 
lie) and see if he can get away with it. In either case, if the Focal Point 
officer is doing his job, he will gain sufficient time to call upon the office 
of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to mention this request to the 
"cleared" executive officer there. At this point, the executive officer may 
or may not choose to inform the CNO. 

In this rather hit-and-miss manner, the CNO, in this case Admiral 
Burke, may or may not have ever gotten a thorough briefing on the whole 
Bay of Pigs operation. Since no one else did, it would be surprising if 
Admiral Burke did. Furthermore, as he filled in for General Lemnitzer 
only from time to time, he could not possibly have ever received a full and 
comprehensive Bay of Pigs briefing in his capacity as a member of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. 

This is not to say that the JCS may not have demanded and then 
have received a formal briefing. The JCS did have a briefing of sorts 



during January 1961, just before the Kennedy inauguration. It was their 
one-time introduction to what the CIA was doing. But such briefings are 
themselves not comprehensive. They suffer first of all from the limitations 
of the briefing officers, who may not know all that is being done, and who 
for their own parts, have not been told all that is under way. 

Therefore, even though someone as important as a member of the 
JCS may insist upon a briefing in full, the very fact that he is so important 
will embolden the ST to endeavor to give as little information as they are 
pressed to serve up, because they can be sure he has been too busy to 
become familiar with all prior activity. 

As a result, it would be surprising if Admiral Burke could have 
recognized little more than one-third of what he heard during the 
committee meetings in those hectic days in the Pentagon of April and May 
1961. 

Furthermore, Allen Dulles had other trump cards. No one on the 
committee and few people, if any, anywhere really knew who all the 
responsible men were at the core of this operation. In his very excellent 
book, The Bay of Pigs, Haynes Johnson tells of his interviews with the 
Cubans to find out what they were asked at these meetings and what they 
said at these meetings. But he found no one else with whom he could 
discuss the operation. He did not know whom to ask, and no one else 
would know the right ones either. Allen Dulles was not at all interested in 
bringing to the committee hearings the men responsible for and most 
familiar with the operation. As a matter of fact, as far as he was 
concerned, that operation was over, it was a mess, it was not to be 
resurrected. He arranged these hearings so that Maxwell Taylor and 
Bobby Kennedy could hear as much as possible about the ways and means 
of the ST, not in the past, but in the future. As a result, Allen Dulles 
marched an endless column of men in and out of the committee rooms 
who had either nothing or very little to do with the real Bay of Pigs 
operation. The most important thing was that a whole host of men who 
had a lot to do with the operation were completely ignored. Again using 
the need-to-know principle, Dulles could do more by excluding 
knowledgeable men from the meetings than he could by parading platoons 
of men who knew only one phase or another. 

Typical of the style of questioning was that in which General Taylor 
discussed with certain Cubans the tactics they had used on the beach. This 
led to a wider discussion of Green Berets and paramilitary-type tactics and 
of the military role in civic action programs, all of this away from the 
main subject. Mr. Dulles found in his patient hands some putty in the form 
of Bobby Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor. 

No one should underestimate the role played by Bobby Kennedy. 
Nothing in his strenuous career had prepared him to become a military 
strategist or battlefield tactician; but few men in this country were more 
experienced in the ways of the Government, and few men were tougher 
than Bobby Kennedy. He may have been won over on the Green Berets' 



side because at that stage of development their doctrine was uncluttered by 
later horrible events in Vietnam and because this doctrine was an idealistic 
mix of Boy Scouts, military government, and Red Cross. But the evidence 
is that Bobby Kennedy was not misled in his appraisal of the real 
problems underlying the serious and tragic failure of the Bay of Pigs 
operation. He came very close to seeing how terribly significant the real 
meaning of clandestine operations is and how gross an impact the failure 
of such operations can have upon national prestige and credibility. It is 
entirely possible that had John Kennedy lived to serve until re-elected, 
sometime during his Administration the genie of clandestine operations 
would have been put back into the bottle and the CIA might have been 
returned to its legally authorized role of an intelligence agency and no 
more. 

The committee hearings ended in May 1961. No report of these 
hearings has ever been published. It is possible that if it were to be 
published it would be a most misleading document. It would contain all 
manner of irrelevant testimony, and it would be devoid of solid inside 
information. However, somewhere in the inner sanctum of the Kennedy 
White House there were some very hard-hitting and valuable meetings 
concerning the future of clandestine operations by the United States 
Government. These meetings must have been attended only by the 
Kennedy "family team", not by the President's official staff. Out of these 
meetings came three most interesting and remarkable documents. 

Kennedy did not utilize the structured NSC he inherited from 
Eisenhower; yet, from time to time he had to issue very important 
directives that affected the national security. Thus he issued what were 
called National Security Action Memoranda (NSAM). By June of 1961, 
some fifty or more such memoranda had been published, and the 
Department of Defense had established procedures for the processing and 
implementation of these major directives. Then, shortly after the Bay of 
Pigs committee had completed its hearings, the White House issued three 
NSAM of a most unusual and revolutionary nature. They prescribed vastly 
limiting stipulations upon the conduct of clandestine operations. NSAM 
#55 was addressed to the chairman of the JCS, and its principle theme was 
to instruct the chairman that the President of the United States held him 
responsible for all "military-type" operations in peacetime as he would be 
responsible for them in time of war. Because of the semantic problems 
inherent in dealing with this subject, it is not always possible to be as 
precise in writing about clandestine operations as one might like to be; but 
there was no misunderstanding the full intent and weight of this document. 
Peacetime operations, as used in that context, were always clandestine 
operations. The radical turn of this memorandum came from the fact that 
the President was charging the chairman with this responsibility. It did not 
say that the chairman should develop such operations. In fact, 
accompanying directives clarified that issue to mean that clandestine 
operations were to cease, or at least to be much restricted. What it did do 
was to charge the chairman with providing the President with advice and 
counsel on any such developments. This NSAM therefore put into the 
chairman's hands the authority to demand full and comprehensive 



briefings and an inside role during the development of any clandestine 
operation in which the U.S. Government might become involved. 

The usual NSAM was signed by one of the senior members of the 
White House staff, and this changed from time to time depending upon the 
subject matter of the directive and the addressee. NSAM #55 was most 
singular in that it was addressed only to the chairman of the JCS with an 
information addressee notation for the DCI, the Secretary of State, and the 
Secretary of Defense; and this order was signed personally by President 
John F. Kennedy. There was to be no doubt in the minds of any of the 
inner group of the Kennedy Administration concerning the President's 
meaning and intentions. The fact that the DCI received his copy as 
"information" was alone sufficient to heavily underscore the President's 
message. 

Coming as it did on the heels of the committee's intensive though 
inconclusive and somewhat misleading investigations, this document more 
than any other emphatically underlined the importance of the role of 
Bobby Kennedy. He may have been the passive member of the committee 
as he soaked up the action but if nothing more came out of the hearings 
than this one directive, his presence on that committee would have been 
well worthwhile. It had become clear to the Kennedys and to their inner 
"family" that CIA lack of leadership in the Bay of Pigs had been the cause 
of its failure. The total lack of on-the-spot tactical leadership was the first 
element Kennedy attacked once the hearings had concluded. This 
document more than anything else sealed the fate of Dick Bissell and 
Allen Dulles. When the chips were down, they had not been there, nor had 
they made their presence felt. 

NSAM #56 was not a significant document and was more intended 
to fill a small chink in the leaking dam than to reroute the whole stream of 
events. But what it lacked in thunder was more than made up in NSAM # 
57. We have been saying much about clandestine operations and of the 
very peculiar nature of this type of business. When it has all been 
reviewed, one of the principal conclusions must be that the United States 
Government is inherently and operationally incapable of developing and 
successfully carrying out clandestine operations, primarily because they 
run at total opposites to our basic way of life. Americanism means an open 
society, and clandestine operations are the desperate efforts of a closed 
society. 

Fletcher Knebel, in his excellent and very popular book, Vanished, 
has his principal character, President Roudebush, say after a heated 
session with his DCI, Arthur Ingram, "We've been over this ground 
before. He can't see that if we adopt Communist methods in our zeal to 
contain them, we wind up defeating ourselves, war or no war. What is left 
of our open society if every man has to fear a secret government agent at 
his elbow? Who can respect us or believe us. . . ?" We have no way of 
knowing whether or not Knebel had Kennedy in mind as his fictional 
president; but if he had been a member of the inner Kennedy team at that 
time he could not have come up with a more topical comment. Kennedy 



knew that he had been badly burned by the Bay of Pigs incident, and by 
June 1961 he and Bobby knew that he had been let down by the ST. (I 
carefully switch to the ST label here, because in all fairness to the CIA, it 
was more than the CIA that really created the unfortunate operation. For 
example, the overeager blind participation of certain military elements 
gave the whole operation a weird and unbalanced character, which 
doomed it before it got off the ground. Then the lack of leadership, which 
really is the name of the game in clandestine operations, provided the coup 
de grace. It was the whole ST that built a totally unexpected and totally 
unplanned operation out of the smaller, more nearly clandestine units that 
might have had some measure of success.) Therefore, Kennedy did feel 
and did know that such clandestine operations had no place in the U.S. 
Government. This led him to direct the publication of the most important 
of these three memoranda, NSAM #57. 

NSAM #57 was a long paper as those things go, and we shall make 
no attempt to recall it in great detail. When "The Pentagon Papers" series 
was published by The New York Times, it was noticeable for its omission. 
It is this sort of "educated" omission that makes the Pentagon Papers 
suspect in the eyes of those who have been most intimately connected 
with that type of work. Any gross batch of documents can be made to 
mean one thing or quite another, not only by what the news media 
publishes but by what they delete from publication. NSAM #57 is a 
controversial document that has not been released to date. 

The principle behind NSAM #57 is absolutely fundamental to the 
whole concept of clandestine operations. It not only restates the idea that 
clandestine operations should be secret and deniable, but it goes beyond 
that to state that they should be small. It plays on the meaning of "small", 
in two areas of interest: First, unless they are very small they should not be 
assigned to the CIA; and second, if they are not as small as possible they 
have no chance of remaining secret and therefore have no chance, by 
definition, of being successful clandestine operations. 

This latter issue flies right in the face of the CIA, which had been 
working for years to define all sorts of operations, large and small, secret 
or not, as clandestine in order that they would then, by arbitrary definition, 
be assigned to the CIA. This was an erosion of the principle, but it had 
been going on for so long and the CIA had used the game so blatantly for 
so long that it had become almost a matter of course. The CIA managed to 
declare in 1962 that the training of the border patrol police on the India- 
China border was a clandestine activity; then, because it was 
"clandestine", the whole job was assigned to the CIA. 

The CIA got itself deeply involved in the Katangese side of the 
Congo venture, and defined its work as clandestine to keep it under 
Agency control, whereas everyone in Africa and most of the world knew 
that the Katangese did not have the clout to operate huge C-97 four-engine 
Boeing transport aircraft and all the other airlift that became immediately 
and mysteriously available to Tshombe. 



It becomes ridiculous to equate activities in Indochina to any useful 
definition of clandestine; yet the CIA continued to clamp high-security 
classification on what it was doing there simply so that the Agency could 
remain in control of the things it had stirred up. In Vietnam this became so 
blatant and such big business that the United States Government has 
always had to retain an operational ambassador there, not because an 
ambassador could add anything to the situation, and not that the 
Government wished to depart so far from historical administration in time 
of war, but because there have always been two equal commanding 
officers in Vietnam. There has always been the CIA commanding officer 
and since 1964 there has been an Armed Forces commanding officer. 
Those generals who served there before 1964 were simply figureheads, 
although some of them may not have fully realized that themselves, even 
to the end. The role of the ambassador has been to referee and arbitrate 
between the Armed Forces and the CIA. For anyone who may find this 
idea a bit new or rash we would propose that he search for a precedent for 
the retention of a full and active ambassador in the battle zone in time of 
full war — and recall, this is by many counts the second most costly war in 
all of our history. 

Thus, by the very size of its activities in so many areas, the CIA had 
exceeded all reasonable definitions of clandestine. This new Kennedy 
directive hit right at the most vulnerable point in the ST game at that time. 
No sooner had this directive been received in the Pentagon than heated 
arguments sprang up, wherever this order was seen, as to what was "large" 
and what was "small" in clandestine activities. Oddly enough the rather 
large and fast-growing contingent of DOD officials and personnel who 
had found a most promising and interesting niche in the special operations 
business were the loudest in support of "small" being "large". In other 
words, they were much in support of more Bay of Pigs operations, and 
even by June 1961 there had been really significant moves of Bay of Pigs 
men and equipment from Latin America and the bases in the States to 
Vietnam. For them, it was onward and upward. What was a small Cuban 
failure or two? Indochina offered new horizons. 

There is no point in pursuing the argument further. It was never 
really settled, anyhow. Allen Dulles and his quietly skillful team had 
foreseen this possibility and had laid the groundwork to circumvent it. 
Opposing Dulles was like fighting your adversary on the brink of a cliff. 
He was willing to go over as long as he brought his opponents with him. 
He believed the handwriting on the wall, and he had sounded out the 
Kennedys. He knew that they had learned a lot from the Bay of Pigs; and 
he now knew where the Kennedys' Achilles' tendon was, and he had hold 
of that vital spot. 

It would be worth a full chapter or perhaps a full book to be able to 
recount in detail what really happened to NSAM #55 and NSAM #57. For 
the purposes of this account we can discount NSAM #56. I was 
responsible for the action on NSAM #55 and for whatever use it might be 
put to. Thus its briefing to certain "eyes only" selected senior officers can 
be accounted for. NSAM #55 was briefed and in detail (it was a very short 



paper) to the chairman of the JCS. It was "Red Striped", as the JCS 
terminology goes, meaning that it was read and noted by the Chiefs of 
Staff. 

While General Lemnitzer was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and while John F. Kennedy was President, NSAM #55 provided a 
strong safeguard against such things as the Bay of Pigs. If Lemnitzer was 
going to be responsible to the President for "operations in peacetime in the 
same manner as in war time", the best way to fulfill that responsibility in 
the eyes of General Lemnitzer would be to have no peacetime operations. 

Then, President Kennedy made a most significant move, one 
perhaps that has had more impact upon events during the past ten years 
than any other that can be attributed to him or to his successors. He 
decided to transfer General Lemnitzer to Paris to replace General Lauris 
Norstad as Allied commander of NATO troops. Lemnitzer was eminently 
qualified for this task, and it was a good assignment. To replace Lemnitzer 
as chairman of the JCS, Kennedy moved Maxwell Taylor from the White 
House to the Pentagon. By that time the Kennedys had espoused the new 
doctrine of counterinsurgency and had become thoroughly wrapped up in 
the activities of the Special Group Counterinsurgency (CI) as the new 
clandestine operations group was called. Although it had not totally 
replaced the old Special Group (5412) in scope and function as the 
authorizing body for all clandestine affairs, it had created quite a niche for 
itself in the new counterinsurgency game. It used to be that anti- 
Communist activity was carried out against Communist countries, 
governments, and territory. There had been a gradual drift away from that. 
The new counterinsurgency philosophy and doctrine meant that anti- 
Communism would now be waged in non-Communist countries. 

Shortly after the Bay of Pigs investigation, Secretary of Defense 
McNamara, in conjunction with General Earle Wheeler, who at that time 
was the director of the Joint Staff, agreed to establish in the Joint Staff an 
office of the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special 
Activities. This office, among other things, worked directly with the CIA 
and the White House. The incumbent, Marine Major General Victor H. 
Krulak, became the most important and most dominant man on the staff. 
He carried more weight with Secretary of Defense McNamara than any 
other general and was always welcomed by the White House, where he 
frequently and most eloquently preached the new doctrine of 
counterinsurgency. 

This created an ideal platform for General Taylor. He was by that 
time the chief proponent of counterinsurgency, the Army's Green Berets, 
and the CIA. In a most fortuitous assignment for the CIA and the ST, he 
became the chairman of the JCS, and all of the pieces fell into place. With 
McGeorge Bundy in Taylor's old job in the White House, responsible for 
all clandestine activity; with Bill Bundy as the principle conduit from the 
CIA to McNamara (later in State), and with Taylor on top of the military 
establishment, the ST had emerged from its nadir on the beaches of Cuba 
and was ready for whatever might develop in Vietnam. 



And to further assure this success, Kennedy's own strict directive, 
NSAM #55, was now in the hands of the very man who would want to use 
it the most and who would have the most reason to use it, Maxwell Taylor. 
In the hands of Lemnitzer, NSAM #55 meant no more clandestine 
operations, or at least no more unless there were most compelling reasons. 
In the hands of Maxwell Taylor, this meant that he was most willing to 
take full advantage of the situation and to be the President's key adviser 
during "peacetime operations as he would be during time of war". 

One further factor played into this situation. It is quite apparent that 
Kennedy did not fully realize the situation he had unintentionally created. 
To him and to his brother, Maxwell Taylor was the model of the down-to- 
earth soldier. He looked like Lemnitzer, like Bradley, maybe even like 
Patton — only better. He was their man. They did not realize that even in 
his recent book, The Uncertain Trumpet, he had turned his back on the 
conventional military doctrine and had become a leader of the new 
military force of response, of reaction and of undercover activity — all 
summed up in the newly coined word "counterinsurgency". Kennedy was 
not getting an old soldier in the Pentagon. He was getting one of the new 
breed. Taylor's tenure would mark the end of the day of the old soldier and 
the beginning of the Special Forces, the peacetime operator, the response- 
motivated counterinsurgency warrior who has been so abundantly 
uncovered in the conflict of the past ten years in Vietnam. 

This was the climax of a long bit of maneuvering within the 
Government by the ST and its supporters. To accomplish their ends, they 
did not have to shoot down the Kennedy directives, NSAM #55 and #57, 
in flames like the Red Baron; they simply took these memoranda over for 
their own ends, and ignored them when they were in conflict with 
whatever it was they wanted. They buried any opposition in security and 
need-to know and in highly classified "eyes-only" rules. Then, with all the 
top positions covered, they were in charge, they were ready to move out to 
wherever secret intelligence input would find a soft or intriguing spot. 
Historians will be amazed when and if they are ever able to find some of 
those basic papers. They will discover that the "access lists", meaning the 
cover-lists of all those who have read the document, and which are so 
closely guarded, will on some of these most important papers list only a 
few people, most of whom were no more than the clerks who processed 
the classified inventories. So very few people have ever seen the real 
documents, and fewer have acted on them. 

More real control can be put on the Government from the inside by 
not doing and not permitting to be done those things which had been 
instructed and directed to be done than by other more conventional means. 
One of the best examples of this is what happened to this most important 
document, NSAM #55. Nowhere else was Kennedy's strong desire for 
control more in evidence that in that paper and the ones that followed it, 
like NSAM #55. Thus it was that events marched relentlessly on toward 
Vietnam. The only ones who stood in the way were the President and his 
closest intimates — and they had been neatly outmaneuvered. 



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Chapter 5 

"Defense" as a National Military Philosophy, 
the Natural Prey of the Intelligence Community 



FOLLOWING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE National 
Intelligence Authority, about eighteen months passed in which the DCI 
was deeply involved in setting up some organizations that could 
effectively coordinate national intelligence. This was easier said than 
done. The old scars of the war period had not healed, and nothing Admiral 
Souers could do would heal them. At the same time, the subordinate 
organizations were undergoing their own postwar organizational 
problems. The Department of State had set up an intelligence section 
under Colonel McCormick, and then, when Congress severely cut his 
funds in favor of the new Central Intelligence Group, he resigned and left 
things in bad shape. But some headway was made, and important 
legislation was pending that if passed would provide for the creation of an 
agency of some merit. 

At this point, the in-fighting got pretty heavy. It would be hard to 
recreate the hopes and the very real fears of those postwar years. It is one 
thing to win a major war and to end up victorious as the greatest military 
power ever created, it is an entirely different thing to realize that this great 
military force had been suddenly made obsolete by a totally new weapon 
of major proportions. During the long evolution of warfare, changes in the 
art of war had come about rather slowly. A thrown rock extended the 
range of hostility over the bare fist; then the sling gave the rock thrower 
more range. The sword made the right arm more lethal, and then the spear 
gave more range to the sword. Changes in weapons and changes in tactics 
were generally matters of degree. During World War I, the advent of the 
armored tank vehicle ushered in mechanized warfare, and the utilization of 
massed rapid-fire weapons made the proximate lines of the hostile 
perimeter between two powers a veritable and literal no-man's-land. 
Before the end of World War I, the airplane had extended the range of 
reconnaissance and air battles, and aerial bombardment gave evidence of 
the path of the future for aviation and for warfare in three dimensions. 
During the years between World War I and World War II, the greatest 
debates on military strategy and tactics were fought over the use of the 
new air weapon system. It was typical that the land and sea arms wished to 
cling to tradition and felt it necessary to play down the role of aviation. 
World War II cleared up these arguments, and by the end of that global 



encounter the airplane had become, if not the primary weapon of warfare, 
at least the major weapon of the war arsenal of the nation. Then, just as a 
quarter-century of sometimes violent argument over the establishment of 
an independent air force came to an end and the whole world became 
accustomed to conventional warfare, the atomic bomb threw a new 
dimension into the picture. No longer could any major warfare be 
conventional in the sense of that which had taken place during World War 
EE. If all of warfare, if all of the techniques, weapons, and tactics of the 
ages were to be arranged into one spectrum of forces and then this total 
force matched against the atomic bomb alone, the bomb would have made 
all prior weaponry seem like a rock and a club. World War II ended 
unknowable, and the unthinkable, or so it seemed to many. 

In this climate, the postwar years were not relaxing. The aging men 
who had brought the country through the Great Depression and then who 
had led it through the greatest of wars were now weary and suddenly old. 
They had hoped to leave to the world a legacy of peace and prosperity. 
Many years earlier Wendell Willkie had preached the concept of one 
world. He, like Charles A. Lindbergh, had traveled the world and had seen 
that if there was to be lasting peace, men would have to think and practice 
one world. But that dream faded into the dawn of the war as the world was 
broken into two armed camps representing the Western world and the 
Axis powers. And in this case the Western world included the Soviet 
Union, which the Roosevelt Government had recognized back in 1933, 
and which it had joined during World War II in the total struggle against 
Italy, Germany, and Japan. 

With the war over and with Harry Truman wearing the mantle of 
peacemaker, his Secretary of State, James Byrnes, was again preaching 
one world and was trying to convince the world that the United States 
would never divide it and the day would never be seen again when 
mankind would have to resort to war. He was not only echoing the 
feelings of the prewar dreamers but he was attempting realistically to face 
the Nuclear Age. Nothing that had occurred before throughout the history 
of mankind had ever overhung the entire human race as portentously as 
did the atom bomb. There could be no letdown from the global 
responsibility, which had become as heavy a burden in peacetime as it bad 
been during the war. 

During 1946, the United States was grimly aware of the fact that it 
was the sole possessor of the bomb, and that this was to be for only a 
fleeting time. Scientists knew, even if the statesmen and politicians did not 
wish to know, that the secret of the bomb had already ended on the day it 
had been exploded over Hiroshima and that it was inevitable that Russia 
and other countries would have the bomb within a few years. Therefore, 
on the one hand there was a great rush to establish and structure the in as 
man's last best hope for peace. At the same time there was the beginning 
of a great and growing witch hunt in the United States concerning the 
protection of the secrets of the atomic bomb. Related to this was a demand 
for information from all over the world to make it possible for the United 
States to know the exact status of the development of the bomb by other 



powers. And related to all of these problems was the growing awareness 
of the danger that would arise from the growth and spread of Communism. 
Some of these concerns were real, and many were imagined. 

I recall having been in the Soviet Union during World War II. I had 
entered the country by way of Tehran, Iran, and flown mountains near 
Baku. Then our course took us further north over Makhachkala and 
northwesterly along the Manych River to Rostov. Although I had seen 
many bombed and burned cities during the war - from Italy to Manila and 
Tokyo — I had never seen anything to compare with the absolute 
devastation of Rostov. From there we flew toward Kiev to the city of 
Poltava, where we landed and remained for a few days. Our return was 
over essentially the same route. Since I had been free to fly a varied 
course, I flew at about five hundred feet above the ground for the entire 
trip and wandered off course right and left as random cities and towns 
came into view. 

The major lesson from such a flight was that the war areas of Russia 
had been terribly destroyed by the German onslaught and by the Russian 
scorched-earth policy. The other outstanding factor was that over this 
fifteen-hundred-mile area of the Russian heartland there were absolutely 
no roads. There were trails and horse or farm-vehicle paths, but no roads 
of any kind. There were a major railroad and the great Manych Canal. In 
1944, one could observe that Russia was going to have to recover from a 
devastating war and was going to have to make a major effort to develop 
its backward economic base, which without modern road transportation 
would certainly be limited in its growth. 

It was clear that when the great anti-Communist hue and cry began 
only two years later, it was founded more on the potential danger of 
Russia as a developer of an atom bomb capability than it was on Russia's 
potential threat to the United States. The result of the "Communist threat" 
emotionalism was to create in the minds of Americans and others in the 
Western world the image of a Soviet monster, which was only part flesh 
and mostly fantasy. However, it was just this sort of thing that played into 
the hands of those alarmists who supported a movement to create a strong 
central intelligence authority with clandestine operational powers. 

There were then several factors that came together in support of the 
creation of a central intelligence agency. The Administration had seen the 
woeful deficiencies of uncoordinated intelligence as practiced during 
World War II. Also, the Administration saw the real importance and 
necessity for a strong intelligence arm of the President as a result of the 
new pressures of the Nuclear Age. However, the early Truman 
Administration was trying to provide leadership for the one world defined 
by Secretary of State James Byrnes and to keep the world from being torn 
into armed camps again so shortly after the war. In spite of their efforts, 
the resounding warning issued by the great wartime orator, Winston 
Churchill, took its toll, and within one year after he had delivered his "Iron 
Curtain" speech, lines had been drawn, and the issue became one of 
Communism versus anti-Communism. The events that turned all of this 



around during 1946 and 1947 are not the subject of this book; but certainly 
the British notification to the United States that it was going to withdraw 
its support of the Greeks and Turks "in their struggle for survival against 
Communism" did as much as Churchill's speech to raise the banner of the 
Truman Doctrine and to extend Churchill's wall from the Balkans across 
the Northern Tier. By 1948 the Truman Administration was no longer 
advocating what it had preached in early 1946. 

All of these pressures — and they were great pressures at that crucial 
time — played a major part in the decision to create the Central 
Intelligence Agency and in the behind-the-scenes battles that were 
incidental to the passage of the law. By the time the lines had hardened, 
few would deny the necessity for central coordinated intelligence, and 
nearly everyone was convinced that the quality of national intelligence 
must be improved. However, as strongly as these measures were 
supported, the majority also denied the proposals that would have given 
the Intelligence Authority its own clandestine branch and the means to 
support such activities. General Donovan, Allen Dulles, and others took to 
the rostrum and spoke publicly and privately of the need, as they saw it, 
for an agency with special "operations" powers. To confirm this need and 
to inflame the public with this issue, the supporters of the clandestine 
operations proposition became the greatest firebrands of the anti- 
Communism theme. It was this same group that picked up the banner 
hurled by Winston Churchill and that saw Communists under every rock. 
It was during these crucial days that the opposition, no matter who the 
opposition was, was painted pink or red with the label of Communist. A 
beginning of this form of public and political blackmail was made during 
these debates, and it reached its zenith less than a decade later in the 
infamous days of Senator Joseph McCarthy. 

In the quarter-century that has followed this debate, this country and 
the world have become somewhat accustomed to the polemics of this 
terrible issue. What began perhaps as an honest effort to alert this country 
to the fact that the Soviet Government did in fact have the potential to 
unleash the secrets of the atom and thus to build atomic bombs, gradually 
became a powerful tool in the hands of the irresponsible and the agitators. 
All opposition for whatever reason was branded as Communist or pro- 
Communist. Gradually, this dogma of anti-Communism was extended into 
the entire world, and by the time of the publication of the Truman 
Doctrine, the entire world had been divided into Communist and anti- 
Communist along the lines of the Iron Curtain, the Northern Tier, and the 
Bamboo Curtain. Once these Lines had been drawn, it remained only for 
time to run its course and for the Soviet Union to follow natural growth 
and scientific achievement to obtain not only the atomic bomb, but the 
hydrogen bomb and then the intercontinental ballistic missile. As many 
have said, these decisions and pressures, which first appeared during the 
years immediately following the end of World War II, have contained 
some of the most serious and grievous mistakes of this quarter-century. 
Certainly this blind anti-Communism can be listed as one of the most 
costly, especially when reviewed in terms of the waste and senselessness 
of the action in Indochina. 



The first great fault with the drift of opinion at that time became 
evident in the very shift of emphasis with regard to the national military 
establishment. Throughout our history the idea of war had been treated as 
a positive action. War was that last resort of a nation, after all means of 
diplomacy had failed, to impress its might and its will upon another. And 
throughout our proud history we never had faced war as something 
passive or re-active. But somehow in that postwar era this nation began to 
think of war as defense and then as defense alone. In other words, in this 
defense philosophy we were not telling the world that the most powerful 
nation in the world was showing its magnanimity and restraint; we were 
saying that we would defend only. And to the rest of the world that meant 
that we were going to play a passive role in world affairs and that we were 
passing the active role, and with it the initiative, to others — in this case to 
the men in the Kremlin. We not only said this as we disestablished our 
traditional War Department but we have done it throughout the 
intervening twenty-five years by developing the capability to search out 
the action of an enemy and then by responding. This defensive posture of 
our military and foreign policy has been a terrible mistake, and it opened 
the doors for the newborn intelligence community to move in and take 
over the control of U.S. foreign and military policy. 

Despite the heat and pressure of the intelligence lobby in 1946 and 
1947, the National Security Act of 1947 did not contain specific 
authorization for the new agency to become involved in clandestine 
operations. In July of 1947 Congress passed the National Security Act, 
and when President Truman signed it into law, this Act became effective 
on September 18, 1947. It was the most important piece of legislation to 
have been passed since World War II. More money has been spent, more 
lives influenced, and more national prestige and tradition affected by this 
one law than anything that has been done since that date - and all in the 
futile and passive name of defense. In this single Act, Congress 
established the Department of Defense with its single civilian secretary, 
and it established a new military organization joining the old Army and 
Navy, with an independent Air Force and a Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also set 
up the National Security Council, which consisted of the President, the 
Vice President, the Secretaries of State and of Defense, and the director of 
the Office of Emergency Planning. It provided for the Operations 
Coordinating Board to assure that decisions arrived at within the NSC 
were carried out as planned and directed. And not to be overlooked, this 
same act created the Central Intelligence Agency and very specifically 
placed it, "for the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the 
several Government departments and agencies in the interest of national 
security... under the direction of the National Security Council..." 

In a law that already invited the creation of some power center to 
arise and take over the direction of the military establishment, because that 
organization was by definition passive, the Congress left the door wide 
open, by placing the precocious new baby under the direction of a 
committee. In the context of the period, there could have been no doubt 
that it was the intention of the Congress and of the Administration that this 
new central intelligence authority was to perform as its primary function 



the role of coordinator of information, and no more. Agency protagonists, 
many of whom have made a career of stretching the language of the law, 
have always attempted to belittle the significance of the restrictive and 
delineating language. 

Lyman Kirkpatrick, the long-time very able executive director of the 
CIA, speaks for this very parochial school of thought in his excellent 
book, The Real CIA, as follows: "Many of those who believe that the CIA 
has too much power, or does things that it should not do, claim that this 
clause shows the intent of Congress that the CIA should only coordinate 
the activities of the other agencies and should not be engaged in collection 
or action itself." This is a shrewd way to put it. He would have his readers 
believe that only "those who believe that the CIA has too much power..." 
are the ones who read the law properly. The truth of the matter is that 
anyone who reads the law and who also takes the trouble to research the 
development of the language of the law will see that Congress meant just 
what it said, that the CIA was created "for the purpose of coordinating the 
intelligence activities of the several Government departments and 
agencies..." And no more! When the greatest proponent of a central 
intelligence authority, General William J. Donovan, prevailed upon 
President Roosevelt to establish such an organization in 1941, the office 
that was established with General Donovan as its head was no more than 
the Office of Coordinator of Information. This office paved the way for 
the wartime Office of Strategic Services. At the end of the war, President 
Truman abolished that office and shortly thereafter set up another National 
Intelligence Authority in January 1946, again for the purpose of 
coordinating intelligence. It will be noted that the specific duties assigned 
to the new agency (CIA) specifically itemized most of the standard tasks 
of Intelligence, with the exception of "collection". It would seem that a 
Congress that had debated the subject so long and so thoroughly would 
not have overlooked the function of collection. It is more likely that 
Congress fully intended what it stated ~ that the task of the CIA was that 
of "coordinating" intelligence. 

The duties of the CIA were set forth in the law as follows: 

1. to advise the National Security Council in matters 
concerning such intelligence activities of the government 
departments and agencies as relate to national security; 

2. to make recommendations to the NSC for the 
coordination of such intelligence activities....; 

3. to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the 
national security, and provide for the appropriate 
dissemination of such intelligence within the government... 
provided that the Agency shall have no police, subpoena, law- 
enforcement powers, or internal security functions....; 

4. to perform, for the benefit of the existing intelligence 
agencies, such additional services of common concern as the 



NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished 
centrally; 

5. to perform such other functions and duties related to 
intelligence affecting the national security as the NSC may 
from time to time direct. 

For those familiar with that language used in legislative writing, it 
should be very clear that Congress knew exactly what it was doing when it 
set up a central authority to coordinate intelligence and when it further 
delineated the responsibilities into those five brief and explicit paragraphs 
shown above. Yet few such uncomplicated and simple lines defining the 
law of the land have ever been subject to so much misinterpretation, 
intentional and accidental, as have these. 

Anyone who has read the books of Allen Dulles and of his 
executive director, Lyman Kirkpatrick, will find that they just cannot bring 
themselves to quote these simple lines verbatim. They have to paraphrase 
them and cite them with brief but absolutely essential omissions of key 
words, or add to them explanations that are certainly not in the language of 
the law. 

Let us look at a few of these important details. The law established 
the Department of Defense as a full and permanent part of the 
Government, with a continuing corporate existence and full power and 
authority to budget for its own funds and to expend them for its own use 
year after year. The law very specifically placed the CIA under the 
direction of a committee, the NSC, to serve at its direction. In this sense 
the NSC was to be the operating body and the CIA was to serve it. This 
may appear to be a small distinction, but had things worked out this way 
and had strong and continuing leadership come from the NSC, including 
the Office of the President, the Agency would not have become what 
Harry Truman has called, "a symbol of sinister and mysterious foreign 
intrigue." 

The distinction is one of leadership. It may have seemed in 1947 
that a committee consisting of the President, Vice President, Secretary of 
State, and Secretary of Defense would be strong enough to keep the 
fledgling Agency under control. But no committee is stronger than its 
weakest, or in this case its busiest, member(s). As planned, the Agency 
was supposed to become involved in clandestine activity only at the 
direction of the NSC, if ever. It was not considered that the Agency would 
get involved in clandestine activity "by approval of" the NSC. However, 
as the Agency found this weakness and began to probe it, it remained for 
the members of the NSC to have the strength of their convictions and the 
courage to say NO. The record shows that this was the case on several 
occasions in the late forties; but as the Agency grew in size, power, and 
wiliness it found its way around the committee's horse-collar. 

If the Congress had any intention of permitting the CIA to evolve 
into a major operational agency, it certainly would not have placed it 



under the direction of a Committee. It is not enough to say that its choice 
of the NSC was made because this would mean that the CIA would then 
be safely under the eye of the President. This is what General Donovan 
wanted; but he and the other strong operational CIA proponents did not 
want even the NSC (Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense) between 
the CIA and the President. By assigning the CIA to the NSC, Congress 
was attempting to make of the NSC itself an operational organization for 
this limited purpose. It may not have intended this, since we feel strongly 
that Congress did not visualize any clandestine operations under any 
setup, but when it gave the NSC the responsibility to direct the CIA it left 
the NSC with the task of directing the Agency if the time ever arose when 
clandestine operations were to be mounted. And as history reveals, that 
time was not far away. The Agency saw to that itself. 

Later events underscored the major significance of the NSC 
responsibility for the CIA. Truman and Eisenhower utilized the NSC as a 
personal staff. The uses these Presidents made of it were individual and 
distinct from each other; but they did utilize it along the general 
conceptual lines inherent in the National Security Act of 1947. 
Eisenhower used it as a strong military-type staff and then leaned upon the 
Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) to see that directives were carried 
out in accordance with his desires. When Kennedy became President he 
almost totally ignored the NSC and abandoned the OCB. Either he threw 
aside the NSC because he thought of it as an Eisenhower-era antiquity or 
he simply may not have completely understood the function of that kind of 
staff operation. 

Whatever his reasons, he certainly left the door wide open for the 
CIA. With no NSC, there was a major reason why Kennedy never 
received the kind of staff support he should have had before the Bay of 
Pigs and why he was unable to get proper control afterwards. It even 
explains why Kissinger's role has become so dominant in the Nixon 
Administration after the long years of the unfettered Maxwell Taylor and 
McGeorge Bundy residency in the White House as key men for the CIA, 
operating almost without an NSC in control. As time and events have 
eroded and shaped the application of the interpretations of this law, the 
Agency has tended to be decreasingly effective in the area of coordinating 
national intelligence, especially since the emergence of its greatest rival 
and counterpart, the Defense Intelligence Agency; and it has become 
increasingly operational as it has succeeded in working itself out from 
under the strictures of the NSC. 

The success or failure of the next four listed duties of the CIA as set 
forth in the Act are related (often inversely) to the activity of the Agency 
under whatever type of NSC existed during the administrations of the 
several Presidents. According to Harry Howe Ransom in his book, Can 
American Democracy Survive the Cold War?, within the Act itself 
Congress specified that the NSC should "advise the President with respect 
to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies..." among the 
various government departments and agencies, including the military; and 
"to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments and risks of the 



United States in relation to our actual and potential military power..." To 
show how the NSC was created within the atmosphere of that time, 
Ransomm states, "...the principle role specified for NSC in the statute was 
not to make final decisions, but to advise the President; to make his 
national security policy and administrative task more efficient. But 
whenever the bureaucracy is institutionalized and centralized, there is the 
risk of minimizing the discretion and flexible maneuverability of the 
Presidency. And this in turn can adversely affect both the common defense 
and the fulfillment of the democratic ideal. Many see too much unchecked 
Presidential power as the main threat to freedom, but this does not appear 
to be the real danger in modern American government, with the important 
possible exception of Executive control over the flow of information. It is 
the President's inability to rise above the decision-making machinery and 
to exert responsible leadership in the national interest — perceived from 
the highest level — that places the basic democratic idea in doubt." 

As Ransom points out, "At the first meeting of the NSC in 1947, 
President Truman indicated that he regarded it as 'his council', that is to 
say, as a purely advisory body. Later President Eisenhower, although 
inclined to regard it as 'the council', made clear nonetheless that NSC was 
absolved of any responsibility per se for national decisions." The NSC 
advises; the responsibility for decision is the President's, insisted 
Eisenhower. President Kennedy came to office with an apparent bias 
against the kind of use Eisenhower made of NSC. Borne into office on a 
great chorus of rhetoric about the need for purposeful, energetic 
Presidential leadership, Kennedy "at first made little use of the Council" as 
a formal advisory body. Following the 1961 Cuban fiasco, however, "the 
NSC was restored somewhat". 

In a very prescient paragraph, Ransom shows how important this 
grasp for power by an inner secret team was becoming as far back as 
1952. Even as the NSC was getting started, a struggle for control of that 
body was under way; and the control was to be elected by gradually 
making that advisory committee into an operating power center. Ransom's 
comment is worth repeating here: 

"Early in NSC's life, according to President Truman, 'one or two of 
its members tried to change it into an operating super-cabinet on the 
British model.' Truman identifies the members as his first two Secretaries 
of Defense, James Forrestal and Louis Johnson, who would sometimes, 
Truman recounts, put pressures on NSC's executive secretary to use NSC 
authority to see that various governmental agencies were following NSC 
policy. The executive secretary declined to do this, on the ground that his 
was an advisory staff rather than an executing 'line' function. Truman 
fought to keep the subordinate nature of NSC clear to all, emphasizing that 
Congress had in fact changed the title of NSC 'Director' to Executive 
Secretary'. Forrestal had, Truman notes, advocated using the British 
cabinet system as a model for the operation of postwar American 
government. To change to this system, wrote Truman, "we would have to 
change the Constitution, and I think we have been doing very well under 
our Constitution." 



Nowhere was this behind-the-scenes struggle more significant than 
it was in the attempt to make of the "quiet intelligence arm of the 
President" an operational and extremely powerful secret agency. During 
the Eisenhower years the NSC, which at times was a large and unwieldy 
body, was reduced for special functions and responsibilities to smaller 
staffs. For purposes of administering the CIA among others, the NSC 
Planing Board was established. The men who actually sat as working 
members of this smaller group were not the Secretaries themselves. These 
men are heads of vast organizations and have many demands upon their 
time. This means that even if they could attend most meetings, the 
essential criteria for leadership and continuity of the decision-making 
process simply could not be guaranteed. Thus the subcommittee or special 
group idea was born, and these groups were made up of men especially 
designated for the task. In the case of the Special Group, called by many 
codes during the years, such as "Special Group 5412/2", it consists of a 
designated representative of the President, of the Secretary of State, the 
Secretary of Defense, and the DCI in person. This dilution of the level of 
responsibility made it possible for the CIA to assume more and more 
power as the years went by, as new administrations established their own 
operating procedures, and as the control intended by the law became 
changed. 

As the years passed, the basic concept of the NSC's role in the 
direction of the Agency became reversed, or at least greatly diverted. 
Whereas the law charged the Council with the direction of the CIA and 
would account for consideration of such things as clandestine operations 
from "time to time" and then only by Council direction it became the 
practice of the DCI not only to deliver essential intelligence briefings to 
the NSC, but to request a limited audience in order that he might inform 
them of and seek approval for some operation he felt might be derived 
from his intelligence data. 

In the earliest of such instances we may be quite certain that the 
operations so presented were reasonably modest. The NSC undoubtedly 
overlooked the variance in procedure and felt that its approval of such 
minor requests was tantamount to "direction" of the Agency. As time 
passed and as the DCI exploited his position, it might have seemed to be 
rather reasonable to suggest the establishment of a small special group to 
take this "burden" from these senior officials and to provide men who 
could more readily attend to such matters, minor as they were, in the place 
of the busy Council principals. Thus the establishment of the first Special 
Group. 

As things progressed, the Special Croup 5412/2 became not just the 
working group of the NSC but rather a select group that had assumed the 
responsibility for clandestine activity. Certainly, each designated Special 
Group member reported back to his principal, but by that time it was not 
so much for direction as it was for "informational approval"; in the 
language of bureaucracy this meant, "If he doesn't say a clear NO, it's 
O.K." 



By that time in the course of events, a new process had evolved, and 
the DCI felt perfectly at liberty to prepare all the clandestine operations his 
intelligence sources would support and to present them to the Special 
Group for nothing more than approval. But even this was not enough. The 
next step was to have Agency-affiliated men in the Special Group itself, or 
at least to have them working with the Group as special advisers. This is 
why the President's appointee has always been so important to the DCI. 
Since the appointment of Maxwell Taylor in that position after the Bay of 
Pigs, the DCI has had men in that position whom he could count upon as a 
two-way conduit. When the DCI wanted to get information to the 
President he would use this man, and when he wanted the President's 
approval on something, he would use him for that, too. The same has been 
true with the representatives in State and Defense. During much of the 
crucial build-up years in Indochina, men such as Bill Bundy and Ed 
Lansdale have represented State and Defense on this committee. Of 
course, both of these men were CIA alumni, and as a result the DCI could 
always count upon them to grease the way for any of his proposals to the 
NSC. 

This has been a significant evolution away from the language and 
the intent of the law. It has meant that the sole authority established as a 
final resort to oversee and control the CIA has become no more than a 
rubber stamp for all clandestine operations. And throughout all of this the 
ST has been able to carry out its desires under a cloak of secrecy that has 
kept its moves shielded from the highest officials of this Government. For 
example, in those crucial early years of Vietnam, did McNamara and Rusk 
look upon Lansdale and Bill Bundy as Defense and State men under their 
command and control, or did they recognize them as CIA agents under the 
direction of the DCI? Or when the Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities from the Joint Staff was called 
to the White House, did President Kennedy and others look upon this man, 
General Krulak, as a member of the military establishment because he was 
wearing a uniform, or did they recognize him as a key spokesman for the 
interests and activities of the CIA? 

This shift of command control over the Agency from under the 
direction of the NSC was undoubtedly as important a move as has 
occurred in any part of the Government since the passage of the National 
Security Act of 1947. It explains why the CIA has operated so free of 
effective and ironclad control during the past ten to twelve years. 

The CIA, even working within the limits of the 1947 Act, has a 
distinct advantage. It is a true "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde" agency. The CIA 
has the responsibility to advise the NSC on matters of intelligence 
affecting the national security. It therefore is in a position to demand the 
time and attention of the NSC, including the President, to present its views 
on every situation facing the nation on a regular and frequent basis. It 
performs these functions in the name of Intelligence. Thus it is in a 
position to make the President and his principal advisers virtually its 
prisoners, in the sense that it has a legal claim to their valuable time. Day 
by day the CIA tells these men what it wants them to hear, what it thinks 



they should hear. At the same time, its select audience is in the position of 
never knowing whether the information it is hearing is no more than 
Intelligence or whether it may be some special Secret Intelligence primed 
to prepare the Special Group for another clandestine activity. Certainly, 
this is a matter of judgment for both factions concerned; but the Agency 
would be less than human if it did not consider those choice bits of 
Intelligence, which it thought worthy of clandestine support, to be more 
important than others. Thus the CIA as an intelligence agency on the one 
hand, can and does take one position, and as an operational and policy- 
making organization on the other hand, may benefit from the 
representations of its other half. Note how this shows up repeatedly in the 
Pentagon Papers. 

Nothing bears this out better than the transition from the 
Eisenhower Administration to the Kennedy team. Kennedy had his own 
way of operating within the organizational staff of the Government. He 
placed friends and long-time associates all over Washington in all sections 
of the Executive Branch who were unquestionably loyal to him and who 
worked for him first and for their new organization second. This resulted 
in a sudden degradation of the value and importance of the NSC, as has 
been stated in the remarks quoted earlier of Harry Howe Ransom. Since 
the law requires the NSC to direct the CIA, this meant that the CIA 
direction was almost nonexistent. It followed then that it was during the 
Kennedy Administration that the CIA, with the ST opening doors for it 
everywhere, began its runaway move into special operations with the Bay 
of Pigs operation and climaxed it with the conflict in Indochina. 

This situation might not have been so abrupt and of such magnitude 
had it not been for the fact that Allen Dulles was one of the few holdovers 
from the Eisenhower Administration. Had the DCI been a Kennedy 
appointee, it is possible that he could have provided an element of control 
over the operational agency. However, Dulles' drive and zeal, given this 
recognition by Kennedy, accelerated into full speed and power; and 
unfettered by the NSC, he used it. Great problems arose from this 
situation, because he used this power without limit both from the point of 
view of his personal actions, and more importantly, from the fact that the 
ST was unleashed. Whereas Allen Dulles can be called a responsible 
official, there were many who were not, as a reading of the Pentagon 
Papers will demonstrate and confirm. 

The best evidence of how unrestrained the ST became lies in the 
record of the great proliferation of the concept of counterinsurgency (CI). 
Almost as soon as the Kennedy Administration got under way — certainly 
as it entered its second year — the CIA, the White House, and certain 
elements of the DOD added one country after the other to the 
counterinsurgency list. To the believer in the blind anti-Communist 
doctrine, it sounded almost preordained that he should search for and then 
route out all "Communist-inspired subversive insurgency" wherever it was 
found. In rapid succession, one country after another was added to the 
long list of counterinsurgency countries, and a new special group was 
formed, the Special Group CI (Counterinsurgency), which was simply a 



front within the U.S. Government, to make it possible for the ST to 
operate in almost any country. The old restraints of a traditional awareness 
of the meaning of national sovereignty and of the absolute importance of 
this inviolable principle fell away as if they were of no merit in the zeal of 
the Cl-breed to wipe out so-called Communist-inspired subversive 
insurgency wherever they thought they saw it. 

This flimsy disguise for clandestine operations brought together 
men who had little experience in the type of operation being developed 
and even less idea of the political situation in the countries involved. It 
was a shattering experience to attend some of these meetings and to hear 
men, some high in the councils of government, not even-able to locate 
some of these countries and to pronounce their names. The CIA, reveling 
in this situation, would work up a proposal practically from a 
mimeographed boiler-plate of other exercises and forward it to some 
friend, perhaps an Agency man on assignment outside of the Agency, who 
was working in a think-tank group such as the Institute of Defense 
Analysis (IDA). The man in the Institute would then make copies of this 
"operational concept". In normal times this concept would have been 
highly classified and revealed to a very few cleared officials; but during 
this Kennedy-inspired CI period it was not necessary to bother with that 
bit of detail. 

To carry on our example, the IDA official would then convene a 
meeting with representatives of the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(OSD), the JCS, State Department, the White House, and even some of the 
same CIA officials who had initiated the idea and sent it to IDA in the first 
place. The others would not know that this proposal had begun with the 
CIA. The main purpose of their meeting would be to discuss this 
operation, designed to combat the influence of "Communist inspired 
subversive insurgency" in the country listed. After such a meeting, this ad 
hoc group would propose that either the CIA or OSD work up the 
operational concept and present it to the NSC Special Group CI for 
approval. The Special Group CI, noting that this idea had already been 
well staffed and that it was just about the same thing as others already 
under way, would rubber stamp its approval and assign the project to the 
CIA for accomplishment.At this point in the evolution of the ST it would 
not occur to anyone that such an operation that violated the sovereignty of 
another country or that was patently a case of "interference in the internal 
affairs of another nation" should not be carried out without some formal 
sanction from the host government. The idea of fighting Communism had 
become so blindly accepted that they began to forget that such activity was 
properly a "clandestine operation" and should not be performed lightly. 
The feeling of urgency and of an almost missionary zeal to combat and 
root out real or imagined subversive insurgency anywhere was such that 
the great importance of national sovereignty was all but overlooked. 
"Subversive insurgency" meant third-nation involvement; so the Secret 
Team just assumed the right to become a party to the action in any country 
without even asking. What had been covert operations only a few years 
earlier were then considered perfectly acceptable under the definition of 
counterinsurgency. This did not mean that they were not concerned with 



the need for secrecy in the United States to keep the knowledge of what 
they were doing elsewhere from the public and Congress; it only meant 
that they worked openly and almost unrestrictedly in the host CI country. 

The Army, Navy, and Air Force all had developed many units of 
Special Forces, Special Air Warfare squadrons and SEAL (Sea, Air, Land) 
teams, and these were sent into any country that would accept them. These 
teams were heavily sprinkled with CIA agents, and most of their direction 
in the field was the operational responsibility of the CIA. 

As we develop this further, it will be seen how the CIA was able to 
work around and out from under the law, which at first saw the Agency as 
only a coordinating authority and secondly had provided that the NSC 
would at times have the authority to direct the CIA into other activities in 
the national interest. The Congress had been so certain that the Agency 
would not become operational and policy-making that it was content to 
place it under the control of a committee. Congress knew that the Agency 
would never be permitted to become involved in clandestine operations 
and therefore that the NSC would never have to direct it in an operational 
sense. 



Before we leave the subject of the Agency development, we should 
look at one more aspect of the subject. Much of what the CIA is today, it 
has become because of Allen Dulles. From the days of World War II, 
when he was active with the Office of Strategic Service until he left the 
Agency as it moved to its magnificent new headquarters building in 
Langley, Virginia, in the fall of 1961, this kindly looking gentleman did 
little else than devote his life to the cause of the Central Intelligence 
Agency. Whether one met him in the old office building overlooking 
Foggy Bottom, glasses in his hand, pipe nearby, settled comfortably in his 
big leather chair with his feet informally shod in old slippers; or at his 
Georgetown mansion to find him dressed in white tennis shorts and vee- 
necked sweater, Allen Dulles always had that quiet yet alert look of a man 
who knew exactly what he was doing. He may not have known at all times 
what some of the boys in the back room were doing; but don't let anyone 
ever tell you that he did not know precisely what he as doing and what his 
plans were. 

Thus, when Congress enacted the National Security Act of 1947, he 
accepted it as a major milestone on the road which he knew he would 
follow. It was not a barrier to him and it was not a handicap. It was simply 
a place to start. Typical of his method is the way in which he organized his 
book in 1962. The only intelligence function of general significance not 
covered in the language of the National Security Act of 1947 was that of 
collection. Characteristically, the only intelligence function given any 
chapter heading emphasis — and it is given two chapters - in his book, 
The Craft of Intelligence, is collection. This was so typical of the man. He 
would have everyone believe that if he repeated something often enough 
and if he pounded something out often enough, sooner or later everyone 
else would give up, and he would have what he wanted. His book would 



convince anyone that the most important Congressional mandate to the 
CIA was that of collection; yet that function was not named and was 
specifically omitted in the law. The CIA most certainly did get into the 
collection business and has augmented the collection capability of the 
military and of the State Department. 

It was this same bulldog ability of Allen Dulles that brought the 
CIA into the clandestine operations business, and once in, that made it the 
primary business of the Agency. Here he was, working against all of the 
constraints that had been set up against him. He simply worked like the 
Colorado River in the Grand Canyon; he eroded all opposition. We shall 
find more to say about this in later chapters. The other regular duties of the 
CIA were spelled out in the law and have generally been clear and 
noncontroversial, until we get to the provisions of subparagraph 5, which 
are discussed in detail later. 



1. Harry Howe Ransom teaches political science at Vanderbilt University and is one of the Foremost authors on 
the subject of the Intelligence Community. He has taught at Harvard, Princeton, Vassar, and Michigan State 
University. He is author of Central Intelligence and National Security. 



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Chapter 6 

"It Shall Be the Duty of the Agency: 
to Advise, to Coordinate, 
to Correlate and Evaluate and Disseminate 
and to Perform Services of Common Concern... "m 



ADMIRAL LUTHER H. FROST, FORMER DIRECTOR of Naval 
Intelligence, paid a very open and informal visit to Indonesia in 1958, at 
the same time that his boss, Chief of Naval Operations Arleigh A. Burke, 
found himself in a most ambiguous position. U.S. Navy submarines were 
operating clandestinely close to the southern coast of Sumatra, the main 
island of Indonesia, putting over-the -beach parties ashore and providing 
certain supplies and communications for the CIA-led operation against the 
Government of Prime Minister Sukarno. At the same time, Admiral Burke 
balanced his unenthusiastic support of the CIA by putting his close 
confidant and able intelligence chief on an informal and social temporary 
assignment to Jakarta. 

Then to further bracket the situation, Admiral Burke assured for the 
Navy the chairmanship of a high echelon committee set up by the 
Secretary of Defense for the purpose of providing support to the CIA 
during this special operation by placing a three- star admiral on the 
committee, while the other services were represented by officers several 
grades junior to him. The Air Force had a retired general working with the 
CIA as a coordinator of all air action in this operation, and the Army had a 
number of generals, some on active duty and others either on assignment 
with the CIA of called up from retirement for similar reasons. But no 
service so ably circumscribed the moves of the CIA as did the Navy under 
its most able CNO, Admiral Burke. 

Although this was an operational activity carried out in deep 
secrecy, it may be used as an example of how the intelligence community 
functions. Over the years it has become customary to speak of the various 
intelligence organizations within the Government as members of "the 
community". This word is quite proper, because there is little cohesion and 
homogeneity within this vast infrastructure which has cost so much and 
which performs so many varied and separate functions. The members of 
the community are the CIA, the Army, Navy, and Air Force as separate 
divisions; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the FBI; the Atomic Energy 



Commission; the State Department; and the National Security Agency. All 
are by law brought together by the Director of Central Intelligence, or 
DCI. His title is not "the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency" — 
although he does head that Agency for the purpose "of advising the NSC 
in matters concerning such intelligence activities of the Government 
departments and agencies as relate to National Security. "[21 This is the 
DCI's first duty as prescribed by law. He is to advise the NSC of the 
activities of the other departments and agencies. 

Partisans may take sides as they wish, but it is quite clear that it was 
the intention of Congress that the role of the CIA was to coordinate all of 
this intelligence and then to advise the NSC, including the President. 
There is nothing in this language that would suggest that the Agency 
should become operational or that it should enter the collection business 
itself. Although the CIA has, during the past quarter-century, usurped 
powers that are not included in the law, it is this literal interpretation of the 
law that permits all of these disparate intelligence sections to operate with 
a high degree of independence. Thus we find strong leaders such as 
Admiral Burke using his own intelligence arm his own way, while at the 
same time the Navy was rendering support to the CIA in an operation that 
was very much on the other side of the coin. It was not in the interest of 
the Navy to become covertly engaged in Indonesia. 

In addition to its independence, the intelligence community does not 
have its own pecking order. Much has been written about the behind-the- 
scenes friction and massive power struggle between the CIA and the DIA 
(Defense Intelligence Agency). The director of the DIA sits on the board 
with the rest of the community under the chairmanship of the DCI; but this 
does not in any manner mean that he works for and is subservient to the 
DCI or to any part of the CIA. The DCI serves at the direction of the NSC 
and the President, and the director of the DIA is responsible to the 
Secretary of Defense, who is by law one of the members of the NSC and 
in that capacity is also one of the DCI's bosses. 

As recently as September 1971, during a meeting with a prominent 
and important member of the House of Representatives, I was asked, 
"What is the chain of command to the director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency?" From this man, who serves as chairman of a key unit of 
Congress, this was no artless or idle question. And other than citing the 
obvious, that the director of the DIA serves the Secretary of Defense, there 
is no other way to answer that question, if anyone would try to find a 
niche for that director under a hierarchy headed by the DCI, he would be 
wasting his time. We find then, nearly twenty-five years after the creation 
of the CIA, that it has remained as the coordinator of information and little 
more — as long as we are talking about intelligence as an advisory and 
staff function. When we come into the field of clandestine operations and 
the inner and more secret pecking order of the ST, we find a totally 
different situation. This is as Allen Dulles planned it. His biggest cover 
story of all was the fact that he served as the DCI and that his most able 
agents were not in the field waging an active campaign against the 
enemies of the United States but were serving inside the Government of 



the United States and inside of many greatly influential non-government 
areas, to create a ST that dominated the entire operational activity of the 
U.S. Government in peacetime. 

The use of the word "peacetime" in this context is fraught with 
danger and does not mean what might be expected. There are those who 
say that we have been "at war" since 1945 in a great worldwide cold war 
struggle against Communism and other enemies of this nation. But that is 
not the way the term peacetime is used in the ST's clandestine activity 
dictionary. The rules of war are traditional and are quite clear and 
uncontroversial. When the nation goes to war legally by Act of Congress 
and in accordance with these rules, there can be no question about the 
pecking order and who is in charge of things. The President is the 
Commander in Chief, and everyone else from the President on down to the 
private in the uniformed services and the industrial and civilian defense 
worker has his neat role and position in the chain of command as the 
emergency law may prescribe. But when this nation is not at war, there are 
no such rules. Historically, if the nation is not at war, it is enjoying 
peacetime. Therefore, in time of peace, all foreign planning, foreign 
policy, and foreign operations are supposed to be the responsibility of the 
Secretary of State and are managed in accordance with overt political and 
diplomatic guidelines. To avoid complications on this theme, we shall 
accept that there are many other departments of the Government that have 
strong and vital international roles during peacetime, such as the 
Department of Transportation in the areas of world aviation and 
commerce, the Department of Labor, the Department of Agriculture, 
Treasury, and so on. But at the heart of the matter, the Secretary of State is 
the single Government official primarily responsible for the foreign policy 
of this nation, and the ambassador who serves under the Secretary of State 
is the single senior official and head of the country-team in each country 
throughout the world. 

In accordance with custom, International Law, and social tradition, 
when a country is not at war it is at peace, and the rules of war, which 
include certain considerations of the necessity for clandestine operations, 
do not apply. However, in the Cold War era that has persisted since the 
end of World War II, there is the feeling that we are engaged in a life-and- 
death struggle with world Communism that verges on real war. At least 
this is the doctrine of those activists who make a career of promoting anti- 
Communism. Before World War II there was a wave of anti-Communism, 
but it was more an expression of choice between the Fascism of Italy, 
Germany, and Japan or the Communism of Russia. It was fanned to a 
strong flame during the Spanish Civil War, when the loyalists were for the 
most part on the side of Communism and the rebels were the supporters of 
General Franco's version of one-man rule. Since World War II, 
Communism has become a term that is often applied to almost anything, 
anyone, and any nation, which in the eyes of the zealous pro-American, is 
opposed to his views of what is American. Thus "anti-Communism" is an 
epithet hurled at all kinds of opponents, real and imagined, and at all kinds 
of targets, from groups of people to individual political foes. Thus, to 
these activists, we are living in a special state of war. 



Inside the ST this kind of thinking has created the phrase, 
"peacetime operations", which has its own meaning. A peacetime 
operation is almost always what anyone else would call a "peacetime 
military operation", or since this is an obvious anachronism, a clandestine 
operation. By using this special term, the ST keeps the command and 
direction of such operations from the military, where it would be if it were 
a real and not a covert operation; and keeps it from the State Department 
by putting it in the classification of a military activity, even though calling 
an operation in peacetime a "military operation" does not make sense. 

All of this explanation may sound to the uninitiated like a lot of 
muddy logic or contrived magic. But in spite of the difficulty that exists in 
trying to explain how the ST rationalizes itself into a position of power, 
this narrative would be less than honest and less than complete if an effort 
were not made to delineate the unusual and very contrived paths of 
reasoning that have been built up through the years. 

Perhaps this can best be described by an example. Since the early 
post- World War I days, the king of Jordan had been served by an elite 
guard, usually trained by the British. Several years ago, the few remaining 
British departed and King Hussein found himself in the precarious 
position of having to trust a close in personal palace guard, not only to 
protect himself but also to assure compliance with his orders and 
commands to his military and government officials. In a manner quite 
normal in many other countries since the end of World War II, King 
Hussein accepted military aid from the United States, and with it he had in 
Amman a small number of U.S. military officers whose task was to see 
that his men were properly trained on the equipment that was given to 
him. These men worked to raise the standards of competency of his elite 
troops and recommended that they be given paratroop training so that they 
could be used anywhere in the country quickly in an emergency. The King 
was pleased with this proposal, and some U.S. Air Force C-130 transport 
aircraft were detached from the European Command to support the 
training program. Selected American Army and Air Force officers arrived 
to set up the training that would be required. They worked closely with the 
King, who is a good pilot, and especially with his trusted palace guard. 

In Washington, the State Department was informed of this program 
and approved it as a worthwhile project to increase understanding between 
the two countries, especially at a time when United States and Arab 
relations were badly strained. The Department of Defense was pleased to 
promote this program, because it provided a much-needed contact in the 
Arab world that might bolster the sagging Middle East defense structure. 
But neither the State Department nor the Department of Defense, except in 
very limited offices, knew that among the "military" training personnel 
were a number of CIA military and paramilitary experts. 

As recent history has proven, this high-caliber training for the 
palace guard has paid off, and undoubtedly was responsible for saving the 
life of King Hussein, or at least for making it possible for him to remain in 
the country and in command of his armed forces during the critical refugee 



uprisings of 1970. 



In the case of such operations, the State Department is told that this 
special training program is part of the Military Aid Program, and unless 
the ambassador happens to have his suspicions aroused by something 
unusual, nothing more will be said of it. Most ambassadors never attempt 
to look into any of these things. They take the view that what they don't 
know won't hurt them, and even if someone did try to brief the 
ambassador, he would probably ask not to be told anything covert because 
that would not be his responsibility; it would be the responsibility of 
Washington. This usually results in Washington's thinking the ambassador 
knows what is going on; so it does nothing. And the ambassador thinks the 
Washington desk knows what the CIA is doing, so he does nothing. The 
covert activity takes place, then, with no awareness on the part of the 
Department of State, in spite of what some DCIs have said. 

In the Defense Department, the CIA will have asked for support of a 
training project in Jordan, without much elaboration. Then they will go to 
the Air Force for planes and to the Army for men and perhaps to both for 
the equipment they plan to use. In this manner, the CIA gets involved in a 
peacetime operation that really is not clandestine in the regular sense of 
the word, because the King will know that this was not part of his regular 
Military Aid Program, and he will have been contacted by a man who 
identifies himself as being from the CIA. In most cases, this pleases the 
King or other principal, because he knows he will be getting something 
special and usually a lot better and a lot easier than what a comparable 
Military Aid Program would cost him if it were to be done in the normal 
manner. So this project is not covert in Jordan. The King will not tell his 
military leaders what he has agreed to, but that part of the project would 
not be clandestine anyhow. 

This project could be covert to keep it from the Israelis, from other 
Arabs, or from the Russians. But when considered realistically, this is not 
so, because aircraft like the C-130 are too big and too peculiar to be seen 
operating in Jordan for months without giving away the fact that 
something special was under way. Anyone observing their coming and 
going would know that the U.S. Air Force was involved in something in 
Jordan. So the usual classification criteria do not apply. This is where the 
term "peacetime operation" is most aptly employed. It is simply a device 
used within the U.S. Government itself to make something appear more 
highly classified than it really is, in order that it may be directed by the ST 
and not by State or Defense, where it might normally be assigned. 

Of course, to give itself a reason for getting into such activities, the 
CIA will state that the men it has in Jordan on such an exercise are really 
there on intelligence business and that their activities as training personnel 
are simply their cover arrangement. Thus the CIA is always able to 
provide a story for any exercise it wishes, once it has obtained the charter 
to collect intelligence and to enter into secret intelligence operations. This 
example serves to show the unusual nature and usage of the term 
"peacetime operations". This is no smalltime business, and though this 



example pertains to the kingdom of Jordan, there have been similar 
projects in countless other nations. 

Any attempt to unravel the chain of command of the Secret Team 
and more explicitly, of the intelligence community, must take into 
consideration that it is not what it seems to be and it is not what it was 
supposed to be. Certain of the most important activities which occur are so 
concealed within security wraps and so disguised within the intricacies of 
the special usage of language, such as "peacetime operations", that the 
uninitiated and inexperienced person has no way to interpret what he 
finds. Only the dominant elite know what they mean, and what their 
objectives are when they talk about foreign military training programs, or 
what they mean by a reconnaissance project or a satellite activity. Beneath 
all of this, the sinews and nervous system of the whole system run through 
the entire government almost effortlessly. 

So while the intelligence community continues to function as a 
loosely knit group with each component serving its own master, it does 
come together at the top and does provide the DCI, and through him the 
NSC and the President, with advice in matters pertaining to the national 
security. Under this cover arrangement, the CIA gives lip-service to this 
mechanism while it goes along a channel it has carved out for itself in the 
direction of the peacetime operations of the Government. The CIA has an 
unsurpassed group of dedicated and devoted intelligence experts within its 
Directorate of Intelligence (DD/I). However, even these men and women 
feel sometimes that they are not part of the real CIA, so remote is their 
attachment to the major part of their own organization. 

I have spoken to DD/I men many times about certain areas of 
interest ~ careful to protect the security boundaries set by their DD/P 
(Clandestine Operations) brothers — to find that the men in DD/I knew 
nothing at all about things that were under way in another wing of the 
building. Nothing has underscored this distinction more than the chance 
release of the Pentagon Papers. 

Coordination of Intelligence, the Major Assigned Role of the CIA 

The second major duty of the CIA as prescribed by the law is to 
make recommendations to the NSC for the coordination of intelligence 
activities. This has been a continuing concern of the Presidents who have 
been in office since the passage of this act, including President Truman. 
And it has been a major concern of most of the other members of the NSC 
since that time. It has also been the subject of many special committees 
and other groups assigned to study the intelligence community and to 
come up with such recommendations themselves. However, even to this 
day there has been little real coordination of intelligence activities, and it 
seems that at this late date there is going to be less coordination instead of 
more. In 1948, President Truman asked Allen Dulles to head up a 
committee of three to report to the President on the effectiveness of the 
CIA as organized under the 1947 Act and the relationship of CIA activities 
to those of other intelligence organs of the Government. The other two 



members of this committee were William H. Jackson, who had served in 
wartime military intelligence, and Mathias F. Correa, who had been a 
special assistant to the Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. The Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa report was dated January 1, 1949, and was submitted to 
President Truman upon his re-election. No report on the broad subject of 
intelligence in this country has ever been more important than this one 
was. The report itself was published and bound in either ten or twelve 
copies. (Not too many years after its publication, efforts were made to 
collect the few copies that were not then in the CIA, and they were 
destroyed.) One copy remained in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 
for many years; but it was typical of such important and such controlled 
documents that the access sheet that had been with it since its initial 
distribution contained only the names of various administrative personnel 
who had handled it during top secret inventory reviews and of a very few 
others, none of whom were really in top level decision-making offices. It 
is interesting to note that William H. Jackson was appointed deputy 
director of Central Intelligence after his work on this report and that Allen 
Dulles followed him as deputy DCI in 1950. Mr. Dulles remained with the 
CIA for the next eleven years. It is much more interesting and pertinent to 
note that this report, which was originally chartered to study the 
"effectiveness" of the CIA and the "relationship of CIA activities to those 
of other" members of the community, really did not waste much time on 
those mundane subjects. This report laid the groundwork for the entrance 
of the CIA into the "fun and games" of special operations, peacetime 
operations, and all the rest. And in leaving this brief discussion of the 
second duty of the CIA, one may come away with the distinct impression 
that the CIA has never made a very high score for its recommendations to 
the NSC for the coordination of intelligence activities. 

Correlation, Evaluation and Dissemination of Intelligence: 
Heart of the Profession 

The third duty of the Agency is one that has been done well and 
which, if it had received the priority that has been given to the "fun and 
games", would have provided the President at all times with the best 
intelligence in the world and would have made the CIA of great 
importance and of real value to the other members of the Security Council. 
The law charged the CIA with the duty "to correlate and evaluate 
intelligence relating to the National Security and to provide for the 
appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within the government... 
provided that the agency shall have no police, subpoena, law enforcement 
powers or internal security functions". 

There is no questioning the fact that this country has the best 
intelligence capability in the world. It also has the best collection system 
in the world, and all members of the community span the scope of 
information-gathering to such an extent that we ought never fear the 
existence of an intelligence void. Yet there have been gross oversights, 
and there have been many poor estimates and analyses of situations. With 
all that the intelligence community has going for it, it is remiss in not 
applying itself more to intelligence, to coordination, and less to special 



operations. Here also, the community's preoccupation with senseless 
security measures has reduced the area of study and review of many 
subjects to small groups that do not represent the most qualified men 
available. Furthermore, these small groups are shot through with 
irresponsible individuals whose primary interests are not related to the 
production of quality Intelligence. On top of all this, the Intelligence 
professionals have to cope with monumental masses of raw product, much 
of which is excellent. As a result, vast quantities of this material are buried 
in security-locked warehouses and have never been looked at and never 
will be. 

During the past twenty years there have been many times when the 
Secretary of Defense or other military official has stated that the United 
States needed to go ahead with the development of a new bomber, a new 
submarine, or even a new missile system, because Intelligence had 
acquired information which indicated that the Russians had such a 
bomber, submarine, or missile and that if we did not get moving to stay 
ahead or to close the gap, our defenses would be less than the best. Such a 
comment has recently been made by Secretary of Defense Laird with 
respect to a new supersonic bomber the Russians have. Since Mr. Laird 
believes that the Soviets have such a bomber, he believes that Congress 
should authorize the Department of Defense to go ahead with a new B-l 
supersonic bomber for the U.S. Armed Forces. Years ago, some of these 
estimates were found, upon review, to have been somewhat premature. 
(Critics have pointed out that the military often gave the appearance of 
working up some story attributed to intelligence in support of a weapons 
system they wanted or to support the annual budget, which may have been 
under consideration at the time of the release of the new information.) 

This whole area is one in which billions of dollars are involved, and 
in the final analysis, our very defense posture is involved. Yet the facts are 
seldom revealed, even to Congressional committees, and huge 
expenditures have been made on partial information. In the past this may 
have been necessary, but at the present time there can be no excuse for the 
withholding of such vital information. Any objective and practical 
reflection upon this subject would confirm the conclusion that such secrets 
either were not really secret in the first place or that they cannot be kept 
for very long if they had been secret. 

Since Gary Powers went down in the Soviet Union in 1960 the 
whole world knows that we have been operating high altitude 
photographic aircraft. The follow-on XR-1 has been photographed and 
shown to the public many times. At various times U-2 photographs that 
have been shown reveal the capability of the cameras of these planes. 

It is no secret that the United States has been launching satellite 
observatories for many years and that one of the primary purposes of these 
missiles has been to take real, not television, photographs of the earth's 
surface. We know that the film capsules are regularly recovered, usually in 
the Pacific Ocean areas. We also know that the Russians are doing the 
same thing, although their photography may be limited to television-type 



transmittal and reception. But in any event, there can be little in such a 
mechanical process that warrants the withholding of this vital information 
from Congress and from the public for alleged security reasons. If Mr. 
Laird says that the Russians have a supersonic bomber and that it has been 
observed, then he should show actual, incontrovertible pictures and 
evidence of such a plane. Certainly, a development project that will cost 
$11 billion is so important that it should be initiated on real and valid facts 
and not on some estimate alone. 

This is one area where the ST has held to itself and its own devices, 
information that should be made public, when there is no actual need for 
the control of such information. The problem is even deeper than this. The 
information that is obtained by the many intelligence organizations of the 
United States is so voluminous that not even a small portion of it is 
properly evaluated. It is possible to read-out mountains of information by 
a computer scanning process, and most of the photographic material that 
does see the light of day, from that which was originally obtained by 
aircraft or satellites, has been so processed. But there is so much more that 
never even gets looked at. 

Satellite pictures are very good, and yet they have some very real 
limitations. For example, the big Chinese nuclear plant up in north central 
China has huge open drying flats south of the plant. When the plant is in 
full operation, most of these large areas are wet and in a photograph can 
be seen darkened by water. When the plant is shut down or operating at a 
reduced rate, fewer drying areas are wet, and the change can be observed. 
Thus, a programmed pattern of satellites scheduled to orbit over this 
nuclear plant at regular intervals can produce accurate information about 
the operation of the facility. The photographs themselves are much more 
accurate than this. It is possible to enlarge these pictures in such a way that 
small areas no bigger than a bridge table can be identified. For a camera 
operating in an observatory 110 miles over the target area, this is good 
photography. Since this photography is so good and since it is easily and 
abundantly available, there can be little excuse for not making it available 
to Congress and to the public in order that an informed public — and 
especially an informed Congress — may know better how to deal with the 
real facts of the modern world. The law does say that the CIA is 
responsible "for the appropriate dissemination of such intelligence within 
the government". If more time and much more money and effort were 
spent in correlating and evaluating this type of information and then in 
making proper distribution of the product, we would know a lot more 
about the rest of the world than we do now, and what we know would be 
based upon solid supportable fact and not someone's estimate. The work 
of Intelligence professionals, although hindered by the misplaced 
emphasis on special operations, has accomplished remarkable things. The 
diversion of operating funds to clandestine activities has been serious but 
it is almost insignificant when weighed against the losses which have 
taken place because of overemphasis on security. If the legislators of this 
country, and if the general public could only know the things which 
Intelligence has learned, and which could be used to keep the Free World 
versus Communist World struggle in proper perspective, we could be 



confident in our achievements, proud of our successes and understanding 
of international affairs. One of the best examples of how much we have 
been able to accomplish in this field of Intelligence is the field of aerial 
reconnaissance. 

The Iron Curtain doctrine played right into the hands of the aerial 
reconnaissance intelligence system. Not long after Churchill had sealed off 
Europe, the curtain was extended all the way from the Arctic Sea on the 
one end across Europe, thence across Greece and Turkey over the 
Northern Tier, including Iran, Pakistan, and India and on to the Pacific 
Ocean, skirting the Bamboo Curtain south of China. With the Communist 
world thus neatly hemmed in, the intelligence community was given the 
task of penetrating this curtain as much and as far as they could. One of 
the first things done was the establishment of a perimeter flying capability. 

At a busy airport just outside of Frankfurt, Germany, and on the 
nearby Weisbaden Airport, an assorted fleet of planes was accumulated; 
these planes had the ability to fly for miles along the border of the Iron 
Curtain, taking pictures of the denied areas by slant-range or oblique 
photography. These planes were also equipped with electronic intelligence 
equipment designed to listen to as many wavebands of information as 
possible. All of this was taped and read-out when the plane landed. At that 
time, there was a close relationship between the intelligence units in the 
field and the Psychological Warfare Offices that were spread through the 
European Command. The psychological warfare folks wanted to use these 
same planes to drop leaflets into the denied areas. They would get together 
with the CIA units and with the meteorological offices along the routes to 
be flown and study wind currents. When they found a favorable wind they 
would send out a plane that was going to take pictures and listen for 
electronic information (ELINT), and then piggy-back their equipment and 
leaflets aboard. Sometimes they would carry these leaflets for very long 
distances into the Communist world and at other times the fickle currents 
would swirl around and drop them in all the wrong places. 

In this world of gray secrecy one idea begets another, and soon the 
Psychological Warfare people were tying leaflets to small balloons and 
letting them fly deep into the denied areas, wafted by the winds and a 
small amount of hydrogen in each balloon. The small-balloon-phase did 
not last long. The weathermen with whom these psychological warriors 
were working told them about the huge weather balloons they sent up 
regularly for high altitude weather analysis. This opened new vistas, and 
the potential of huge balloons carrying thousands of leaflets deep into the 
heart of Russia captured the imagination of these clandestine operators. 
Soon the CIA was using more weather balloons than the weather services, 
and they were launching them with every turn of the winds, hoping to 
sprinkle all sorts of leaflets behind the Iron Curtain. 

Meanwhile, border flying was getting more sophisticated, and some 
of the most modern planes in the Air Force and the Navy had been 
converted to do this legal border snooping. These aircraft, modified for 
long flights and equipped with electronic sensing equipment and other 



gear, would leave primary bases in Germany or England, fly to forward 
bases in Norway, Greece, and Turkey for refueling, and then fly border- 
skirting routes to gather information. Some of the most bizarre headlines 
of the 1950s were made by the loss of some of these planes, which strayed 
too close to Soviet territory or became lost in a wind shift that took place 
in bad weather and then were shot down by Soviet fighters. 

Although border flying, if properly carried out, was perfectly legal, 
attempts were made to keep these flights secret, and all kinds of cover 
stories were created to attempt to explain the missions of these units. At 
times, a marginal penetration was flown in an attempt to photograph some 
target or to get a rise out of some suspected radar that was known to be in 
the area but had not been pinpointed. Other flights were flown in the 
Berlin Corridor, utilizing hidden cameras and concealed electronic 
equipment. But none of these efforts were really big game. 

The balloon projects led to a strange development. It was learned 
that the very high altitude winds over the Soviet Union blew from east to 
west and that they were reasonably predictable. Very large high altitude 
sounding-balloons were tested on launches from the Pacific areas and then 
were relocated over the Atlantic and even over North America after 
having drifted across Asia. 

The next step was to equip these huge balloons with cameras and 
other sensing devices. This whole project was an extension of the other 
border sounding projects and seemed to offer potentialities not found 
before. A large number of these very large balloons were launched, 
carrying cameras and other devices. Some of them made the trip and were 
recovered, others fell in the Soviet Union, and others just circled around, 
coming down almost anywhere. The information gathered by such 
unpredictable devices was at best of very little use. No one knew ahead of 
time when to activate the cameras, and even if they could have been 
activated on some predictable schedule, the weather was a serious factor. 
But these strange spy balloons did serve a real and most meaningful 
purpose. They had softened up the authorities to whom the ST would turn 
to make the next requests by laying a foundation for covert border 
crossing. 

Once border crossing had become accepted, even though it had been 
accomplished on the wings of the unpredictable winds of the upper 
altitudes, it was not as difficult to present a program for a better upper 
altitude information-gathering system. Thus, all that had been done with 
aircraft, leaflets, psychological warfare, electronic equipment, and 
cameras came together in the U-2 project. Like so many things that the ST 
has done, there was not a plan so much as it was that opportunity knocked 
and the team took it from there. 

The Air Force had a very successful early jet fighter called the F-80. 
As the F-80 got older, other types of planes and newer equipment 
seriously outdated it. The Lockheed Corporation, manufacturer of the F- 
80, came up with an F-90 — a more advanced version of the tried and true 



F-80. But as so often happens, the timing was not just right, and the Air 
Force did not order the F-90. There were several other planes in the air at 
the time, and the newer Century Series planes were on the way. However, 
Lockheed had done well with the F-90 and had made a trainer from that 
plane known as the T-33, which outsold all others of the time. At the same 
time, Lockheed had been successful in selling an F-94 interceptor to the 
Air Force for the Air Defense Command. So Lockheed dropped the F-90; 
but Kelly Johnson, the shrewd vice president of Lockheed, hated to see all 
that work and development effort go by the wayside. He made one more 
pitch to the Air Force. He proposed that a highly modified "glider" version 
of the F-90, with a new high altitude engine, would make a superior high 
altitude reconnaissance aircraft. He brought his high-powered, very 
successful briefing team to the Pentagon and gave his pitch to Air Force 
Operations. 

The Air Force was sold on this idea, and its reconnaissance 
personnel were delighted at the prospect of having a special all- 
reconnaissance plane developed for once, rather than having to convert 
other types of planes for that purpose. But as this "hot" briefing worked its 
way up through channels, it became apparent that the Air Force could not 
locate the funds to purchase a reconnaissance plane, because the Air Force 
did not have anything it could do with the plane at that time. It was one 
thing to take a strategic bomber B-47 from the Strategic Air Command 
and fly it along a border in the "open skies" for the purpose of getting 
some electronic information input; but it was an entirely different deal to 
develop a brand new plane for a mission which at best would be 
clandestine, except in time of war, and even then would be most 
hazardous. 

However, many of the reconnaissance officers of the Air Force had 
been working closely with the CIA on these border flights, and they knew 
men in the CIA who might want to hear about Kelly Johnson's proposed 
new "glider". A top-level Air Force team gave the CIA a briefing on the 
plane, and during this briefing it was brought out that this ultra-high- 
altitude plane had the capability to fly across Russia at an altitude that 
would most likely be above the ability of the Russians to do anything 
about, even if they did happen to find out it was there. The rest is history. 
The Air Force agreed to develop the plane, and the CIA agreed to operate 
it. As a result, most of the money, the people, and the facilities that went 
into the project were contributed by the Air Force. The CIA operated the 
project as a "peacetime operation". This was a classic example of how a 
project that should have been military, because it was too large to be 
clandestine, became covert simply as an expedient. The reasoning was that 
in peacetime it could not be military, because it was clandestine, so it was 
to be directed by the CIA, the typical Secret Team tautology. 

A really magnificent camera capability was developed for this 
plane, along with an entirely new engine, and before too long the U-2 was 
operational. The Air Force and the CIA went through all the motions of 
keeping the whole project a secret; but all over the world, wherever it was 
seen, this strange plane with the big drooping wing attracted attention. The 



minute something new in the field of advanced aviation is discovered, all 
the experts — intelligence, military, and manufacturing — go after it; it 
would have been most unlikely that anyone who wanted to know about the 
U-2 did not know all he needed to know by 1955 at the very latest. 

Sometimes, little things turn out to have a big and unexpected 
impact on such a project. It was known that a plane that flew so high 
would have a most difficult time if the engine should ever flame out, i.e., 
if the flame, which continually burns the fuel, should be extinguished for 
any one of several reasons. Since "flame-out" was such a major concern, it 
was then most important that every effort be made to keep the flame 
burning. It was discovered that if a small quantity of pure hydrogen was 
trickled through the engine's burners at all times, this would keep it 
burning, and the danger of flame-out would be much reduced. This meant, 
then, that everywhere the U-2 operated, provision would have to be made 
for the availability of liquid hydrogen. This gas, which is so common in its 
natural state, is most uncommon when liquid, and to remain liquid, it must 
be kept in a cryogenic state at some 240° Centigrade below zero. As a 
result, it is not easy to provide liquid hydrogen wherever in the world one 
might wish to fly a U-2 or two. 

The Air Force had the job of provisioning the U-2, and it went to 
elaborate measures to assure the availability of liquid hydrogen. Although 
the movement of these planes and of their crews and other special 
paraphernalia was most highly classified, no one had thought to classify 
the movement of these special quantities of liquid hydrogen. Not too many 
people were actively involved in the movement of this most volatile 
material, but it did require the special efforts of a good number, and they 
soon realized that every time they were asked to deliver some liquid 
hydrogen to a certain remote area, the U-2s would be operating there. To a 
lesser degree, the same was true of the crews. They were a special breed of 
Air Force personnel who had agreed to be sheep-dipped and then had 
taken "civilian" jobs in the program. This altered status — from military 
pilot to civilian pilot — made them stand out everywhere they went, 
because nowhere is there a more closely knit clan than that of the fighter 
pilot. Once others saw them in Germany or in Japan, the fact that they 
must be flying something special could scarcely be hidden. Their old 
buddies knew they were not about to be flying some charter airline's slow 
transport. Thus it was that even the pilot situation made concealment of 
this project very difficult. 

At this point, the U-2 project, under the very capable Richard 
Bissell, became a very large, very active, and really global program. 
However, it was still maintained as a small clandestine operation, because 
if it were not a controlled clandestine operation it would have had to have 
been a military program, and everyone knew that the military could not 
operate such a military program in peacetime. By this time, the ST was 
getting powerful enough to control major projects, even though there was 
no chance of calling them truly clandestine and "plausibly deniable", as 
the old directives had said. 



In spite of all this, the U-2s did gather some of the best information 
ever acquired on a gross basis. The photography obtained by the U-2 
camera system is in many ways still unmatched. When some really good 
pictures are needed anywhere in the world even today, it is probable that 
the U-2 will be given the mission. 

I had attended a meeting in the old headquarters of the CIA one day 
shortly after I had returned from a special Rand Corporation presentation 
on missiles. Not long after the "missile-gap period", the Rand Corporation 
had been asked to put on a full missile orientation course for top echelon 
officials of the Government. There was so much about this new age of 
missiles that was not known. With all the emphasis the Government 
brought to bear in that field, it was realized that not too many top military 
officers and other high officials knew much about these new weapons and 
the new technology involved in their manufacture and operation. When 
Rand had this course ready to go, that excellent organization decided to 
give it a dry run for the benefit of the instructors and administrative staff 
who would support it. A list of officers was made for the purpose of 
attending this dry run, and I happened to be one of those selected. The 
course was excellent, and later was given to a great number of people; 
then the whole curriculum, properly censored, was entered into the 
Congressional Record. Many unusual things happened during those 
missile-gap days. 

Having just returned from this course and having attended a meeting 
with the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, who at that time was 
General Cabell, I got into a discussion with him about the advisability of 
having certain high level CIA officials take that course. In the discussion, 
and more or less to make my point, I suggested that the CIA ought to 
move their cameras from the cockpit of the U-2 into the nose cone of a 
missile in order to place them in a surveillance orbit. I doubt that I could 
claim to have originated the idea, but only a few days later he called me 
and asked that I see about getting some spaces in the course for officials 
from the CIA. Not too many years later, the satellite observatories were a 
fact. 

Because of the height at which they orbit the earth, their pictures 
require very special treatment, but they do have the advantage of taking 
pictures through very clear space until they reach the heavier layers of the 
atmosphere and weather below. However, on that score they have no more 
trouble than high altitude aircraft, because most of the obstructions are no 
higher than sixty thousand feet. The principal problem with the use of 
satellites is that they enter a fixed orbit as soon as they are launched, and 
they transit certain predetermined sites on a rather random schedule. 
Nothing can be done to change this orbit and the schedule they fly once 
they are put in orbit. (There could be some limited repositioning by using 
additional burst of rocket power to accelerate or decelerate the satellite.) 
As a result, satellite observation from any given platform will not suffice 
to take a picture of any target at any time. The pictures must be taken at a 
time determined by the prearranged orbit and the time of day or night, and 
with some consideration of the weather. But these problems are being 



overcome, and it may be possible to get some information from almost 
any part of the earth at any time, day or night, weather or no weather, as 
the canopy of observation platforms increases in size, scope, numbers, and 
versatility. 

Missile technology places a great responsibility upon the Agency to 
collate all information from so many sources and capabilities. The read- 
out problem is massive, and once these data are put in some readable form 
they must be indexed and made accessible through some form of retrieval 
system. As we pass from an era of agent activity into the newer era of 
machine technology, there should be little information we need that is not 
available to us at all times. With this as a firm prospect, the responsibility 
falls upon the system to prepare the data properly and to disseminate it as 
broadly as possible. There is a tendency within the intelligence community 
to over classify and to hold information from all but a few readers. As a 
result, much that would be useful to many is never known in time or at all. 
This tendency must be corrected and put to work for the country as a 
whole. A free society cannot remain free if information is locked from it 
by its own government. 

Services of Common Concern: An Attempt at Efficiency 

The fourth duty of the Agency is "to perform for the benefit of the 
existing intelligence agencies, such additional services of common 
concern as the NSC determines can be more efficiently accomplished 
centrally". These are the functions that serve all the components of the 
intelligence community and can best be undertaken centrally. To more or 
less sum this up, the principal responsibility of the Agency is to gather 
information that relates directly to national security. The distinction is 
made between information and intelligence: "Intelligence" refers to 
information that has been carefully evaluated for accuracy and 
significance. The difference between information and intelligence is the 
important process of evaluating the accuracy and assessing the 
significance of such information in terms of national security. In this 
context, when a raw report has been checked for accuracy, and analyzed 
and integrated with all other available information of the same subject by 
competent experts in that particular field, it is "finished intelligence". 
When, in addition, it represents the conclusions of the entire intelligence 
community, then it is "national intelligence. "T31 



1. Composite quote from the National Security Act of 1947. 



2. The National Security Act of 1947. 

3. Extracted from a typical USNWR question and answer review, July 18, 1966, Adm. Raborn, interviewee. 



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Chapter 7 

From the Pines of Maine to the Birches of Russia: 
The Nature of Clandestine Operations 



A LIGHT PLANE SKIMMED THE TREE-TOPS OF THE dense 
hardwood forest of northern Maine. It dipped from view, and was gone. 
To anyone who might have been watching, the lake where the plane 
landed was too small for any pontoon equipped plane. However, the 
landing was safe, and the plane taxied toward two men sitting in a small 
inflated boat. One of them had been winding the hand crank of a small 
generator. The other was tuning a transceiver. As the plane approached, 
the pilot cut the throttle, and the men paddled to the nearest float and 
climbed aboard. 

The pilot reported that he had picked up the homing beacon several 
times at distances of from thirty to sixty miles. He could have gotten more 
range, but the flight plan called for a low altitude flight, so he had to do 
the best he could from tree-top height. The beacon, newly modified to give 
a stronger signal, satisfied them. Further testing would take place at 
Norfolk. The men stowed the gear aboard the plane and deflated the raft. 
The co-pilot, who spoke no English, helped them up. The pilot restarted 
the engine and gunned the throttle to take them to the far side of the pond. 

With everything ready for take-off and the plane heavy with four 
men aboard, the pilot waited for a slight breeze, which would put ripples 
on the water and help them get off more quickly. A technician would have 
noted that large leading-edge slats on this plane were extended before 
take-off and that the large trailing flaps were also down for maximum lift. 
With the breeze, some steady ripples, and a full throttle, the pilot let the 
plane accelerate for about twelve seconds and then lifted it clear. Once off 
the water, he began an easy spiral climb to get up and out of the tree-lined 
valley. 

A month of special training had paid off. The new Helio "Courier" 
had proven itself to be the best and most rugged short-field plane 
available. The floats were not too heavy, and the plane handled well on the 
water. Most important, the new co-pilot had transitioned quickly and had 
handled the plane like an old pro. He needed more instrument work for 
weather flying, and he needed some navigational experience. He would 



get that training at Norfolk. He had liked flying in Maine, and he reported 
that "it looked like my homeland". After a short hop, the plane landed on 
Moosehead Lake, and everyone went back to Greenville to prepare to 
close the camp. 

In Germany, hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and 
repatriated refugees had been interrogated and debriefed as they came 
through the military processing centers. A small fraction of this horde of 
people, fleeing the Communists and the reprisals of their own countrymen, 
possessed information that was useful intelligence. This select group was 
turned over to professional interrogators who worked for military 
intelligence and the CIA. Only the very best were reserved for CIA 
questioning; and these were screened carefully to assure accuracy and 
integrity and to spot the inevitable planted agent. Among this group, the 
Agency had found several who had given evidence of a military buildup 
by the early 1950s, of a very special nature far north of Moscow. This 
intelligence had been screened, evaluated, and analyzed to see what it 
meant. About the best that the refugees and defectors could provide was 
that new interceptor fighter bases were being built farther north than ever 
seen before and a vast array of radars, indicating the development of a 
sophisticated air defense network, was being installed. 

One day, a young Polish defector, who claimed to have been a pilot, 
turned himself in, and after careful screening and background checking, he 
was brought to the "safe house" not far from the I. G. Farben building in 
Frankfurt for further interrogation. In the course of this work, he said he 
had made several trips as a co-pilot delivering cargo to the new 
construction sites at these fighter bases in the Soviet northwest. As if to 
prove his point, he said he could find his way back there anytime. 

Clandestine operations take form through such small and 
unexpected leads. The agent who had been working with this pilot was not 
on the Directorate of Intelligence side. He was a member of the Central 
European staff of DD/P, the special operations staff of the Agency. Up to 
the time of that last statement he had been interested only in a secret 
intelligence project designed to obtain all the information it could get on 
Soviet air defenses. That evening when he stopped at the officers club in 
Frankfurt, he met a few other agents who were visiting from Washington. 
He mentioned the chance remark of the Polish pilot. 

A few months earlier, there had been a meeting in the Pentagon in 
the Air Force Plans offices, where the vast Air Resupply and 
Communications program was managed. These special Air Force units, 
called ARC Wings, were stationed in strategic locations all over the world. 
Included among their special classified missions was the task of providing 
wartime support of the CIA. Several CIA men attended the meeting in the 
Pentagon, and when it broke up, one of them stayed behind to ask the Air 
Force pilots what they thought was the best light plane for rugged, special- 
operations-type business. One of the officers reported that a small 
company, consisting for the most part of ex-Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology aeronautical engineering men, was building and flying a plane 



called the Helio Courier. If it was really as good as it was reported to be, it 
might be the plane the CIA wanted. 

About one week later, a man reported to the Helio Aircraft 
Corporation in Norwood, Massachusetts, to learn more about this plane. 
He gave his true name, showed the identification of a U.S. Air Force 
civilian employee, and said he worked in Air Force headquarters. He spent 
several days with the Helio company and returned with an enthusiastic 
report. He actually worked for the Air Division of the DD/P in the CIA, 
and his boss at that time was an Air Force colonel on duty with the CIA. 

After proper testing and evaluation, the CIA decided to purchase 
several of these aircraft. However, the Air Force had none of these planes, 
and the plane could not be purchased by the Air Force for the CIA because 
it could not be "covered" unless there were others like it in the Air Force. 
The CIA decided to buy these planes anyway and set up a civilian cover 
unit for them putting them under commercial cover. At the same time the 
agent in Frankfurt was talking with the Polish pilot, these same aircraft 
had just been delivered to the CIA and were being shaken down for 
special operations work. 

Thus it happened quite by chance that this agent told his friends in 
Germany that the CIA had just the plane that could make the flight, if they 
could get the Polish pilot sufficiently trained for it and if they could get 
the operation approved "through the Old Man". They knew "Air Division" 
would back them. It wanted more action than border flying and training 
exercises. They counted on the approval of Richard Helms and Frank 
Wisner (both men at that time were in DD/P; Wisner was the chief) and 
felt sure General Cabell would go along with the idea, since the Air Force 
could use any information it could get about the Russian air defenses, to 
support the growing B-52 strategic bomber flight budget. They knew the 
ultimate decision would be up to Allen Dulles. 

During the next weeks the agent in Frankfurt worked very hard with 
the young Pole to see just how much he knew, whether he really knew the 
Soviet Union, and whether he really could fly an airplane. Everything 
seemed to work out, the information the Pole gave him checked out with 
everything the Frankfurt station could get. 

With this under way, the Frankfurt station agent kept a friend in 
Washington informed of all developments. Between them, they kept 
feeding "business" messages, designed to heat up the subject of "new 
Soviet air defenses", into intelligence channels. Everything possible was 
done to increase intelligence communications traffic on this subject. The 
Air Force intelligence office at U.S. Air Forces, Europe headquarters 
(USAFE), in Weisbaden was put on the task. It quite willingly picked up 
the ball because that headquarters had a very active border flying activity, 
and this would give them something to do besides dropping leaflets and 
furnishing tens of thousands of weather balloons. USAFE increased its 
traffic on this subject to the U.S. Air Defense Command in Colorado 
Springs and to the Strategic Air Command headquarters in Omaha. 



At the same time, the Frankfurt station agent arranged to have the 
Air Force group at the Weisbaden air base set up a light-plane flight 
reorientation course for the Polish pilot. An Air Force light plane was 
made available and to the relief of everyone, the Pole proved to be a good 
pilot. It was easier get him through the refresher course than it had been to 
get the plane for him. 

If this mission were to operate into the Soviet Union, the pilot must 
never know who was supporting him. Therefore, he was told that a 
German air operator had a Polish pilot and a plane and that they would 
give him some refresher flying so that he could seek employment. He was 
never told that he was being prepared to fly to the Soviet Union. The Air 
Force plane was put into the hangar and stripped of all USAF identity. 
Then German instrument decals were put in the cockpit and a Polish pilot, 
one whom the Agency had ready at a special billet in Greece, was 
transferred to the Frankfurt station. 

Every day, the Polish defector would be driven to the airfield for his 
lesson. The older, CIA "stateless" pilot, not only gave him transition flying 
but tried in every way to test the newer man and to break his story. But the 
facts held up, and the young pilot proved to be sincere and reliable. 

With this success, the idea of the project had begun to take shape. 
Air Division plotted several flight plans from a secret location in Norway 
into the Soviet Union. Because the Courier performed so well on water, 
and a water landing at an "unknown" destination seemed to offer the most 
chance for success, it had been decided to operate from a water departure 
point to a water destination. Also, each flight plan called for a low "under 
radar canopy" tree-top level pattern. 

Long-range, low-level navigation is difficult because visibility 
pilotage purposes is reduced to a narrow track. This was doubly true for 
this flight, because any radio aid that might exist was limited and hostile. 
Border electronic information flights had pinpointed some radio fixes that 
could be used; but even at best these were quite unreliable. A Loran 
navigation fix would be ideal; but none was in operation that far north. 
This was overcome by having the U.S. Navy agree to put a Loran-carrying 
ship in the far north as part of a "NATO exercise". This would give a 
good, reliable, and secret navigational and code signal system for most of 
the flight. The mission plane would not be required to make any 
transmissions in order to use Loran for navigational purposes. It would 
simply receive the signals it needed. 

Meanwhile, Air Division did not wish to pin all of its hopes on the 
young Pole. He would fly the plane, but an agent would be trained to help 
him navigate and to serve as a helper for the two-man team that would be 
infiltrated into Russia. A series of long-range navigation missions was set 
up and all systems thoroughly tested. 

By this time DD/P had accepted the proposal and had become its 
sponsor. The U.S. Air Force and Navy had been fully sounded out, and 



they went along with the idea. At that point, a meeting was set up in the 
OSO/OSDm office to soften up any possible opposition and to prepare for 
the crucial vote of the Secretary of Defense in the NSC Special Group 
meeting. Since the operation would have a vital military intelligence tie-in, 
the OSD vote was just about assured. This was the period of the Allen W. 
Dulles-John Foster Dulles partnership; so no meeting was scheduled at the 
Department of State. "The Old Man will handle that" was sufficient to 
assure that vote at the NSC. With all of this preparation, it was no problem 
for DD/P Wisner to sell the idea to General Cabell. The way was cleared 
for the meeting with Allen Dulles. 

The agent from the Frankfurt station flew into Washington on a 
"deep water" flight — a clandestine flight with a cover flight plan and no 
customs intervention — on a CIA-owned U.S. Air Force C-118 transport, 
with the Polish pilot as a passenger. The Pole was kept at a "safe house" 
near Andrews Air Force Base, just a few miles from Washington. The 
Frankfurt station agent attended the meeting with Dulles, as did General 
Cabell, Wisner, and a few others. The idea was accepted by Mr. Dulles, 
and he asked his executive to put it on the agenda for the next Special 
Group meeting. That evening, before his usual tennis game on his 
backyard court, Allen Dulles dropped by his brothers secluded house just 
off Massachusetts Avenue and discussed the operation with him. Foster 
agreed that Eisenhower would go along with it. He walked over to the wall 
lined with book shelves and picked up the special white telephone that 
connected directly with the White House operator. All he said was, "Is the 
man busy?" 

Foster Dulles opened with, "Boss, how did you do at Burning Tree 
today? . . . well, six holes is better than nothing . . . Yes, I've been talking 
here with Allen. He has a proposal he wants to clear with you. He feels it 
is very important, and it will lift the morale of Franks [Wisner] boys. You 
know, since Korea and Guatemala you havent had them doing much. Will 
you see him tomorrow morning? Fine. Hows Mamie, O.K. boss, I'll speak 
to Allen... 9:30... Thank you; good night." There was not much left to do. 
The flight would be scheduled. 

First, the Polish pilot was given a briefing on his cover story. He 
was "being employed by a foreign company to do some bush-flying, and 
he would get some training with one of their men in the United States". 
The "company" man was the CIA agent from Air Division; he would be 
the mission commander. Shortly after their first meeting they were flown 
to Maine, where they met the pilot — also an Agency employee — of the 
Courier. The plane had a cover company name on it and a special FAA 
registry number, which would never show on official FAA records if it 
were to be challenged. The flight indoctrination concentrated on float 
techniques, short-field landing and take-off, and low-level, long-range 
navigation. The Agency mission commander had been trained to take the 
Loran fixes for navigation. 

When the pilot had passed all of his flying tests, he was introduced 
to the two-man "stay-behind" team. These men would be infiltrated on one 



flight and then recovered on another. These "passengers" went about their 
business by themselves and were always, except on the flights, 
accompanied by a case officer. It seemed that they did not speak English, 
and they made no attempt to speak to the Polish pilot. If this mission failed 
and any of them were interrogated, they would know nothing about one 
another. 

At Norfolk, the final phase of training took place. A secluded cove 
near the mouth of the York River on Chesapeake Bay had a very small 
section roped off to simulate the tiny landing area they expected to find in 
Russia as target of this infiltration mission. Day after day, the pilot 
practiced from that tree-bordered cove so that he would be instinctively 
used to flying that way. Short take-off and landing (STOL) flying is a real 
high order skill, and he needed all the training he could get. The next thing 
he needed was long-range navigation experience — much of it over water 
and out of sight of land. Flight plans, as much as possible like the one he 
would fly from Norway into Russia, were set up. He flew these at 
extended range day after day until he could hit his target accurately. The 
Agency man helped him with Loran navigation and taught him how to fly 
in such a manner that he would conserve his fuel. On the real flight he 
would have to get in and out of Russia without refueling, and he would 
have very little reserve. The next step was to ask the Frankfurt station 
liaison officer, who had contact with the British intelligence service, to set 
up a meeting somewhere in England for the Polish pilot and a very 
reliable, high-level Russian defector who was being debriefed secretly at 
that time. The British agreed to the meeting and suggested it be held at the 
CIA sub-base near the U.S. Air Force base of the Air Resupply and 
Communications Wing stationed in England. Thus the meeting would be 
very secret and could be covered adequately by the Royal Air Force and 
the U.S. Air Force. 

Finally, everything was ready. The Courier was left at Norfolk 
because another new plane had been built for this flight, one with 
absolutely no identification markings of any kind ~ no paint, no decals, no 
serial numbers. Even the tires, battery, radio parts, etc., were either 
stripped clean or had been purchased from various foreign sources. If this 
plane were lost in Russia, no matter what the Russians might try to charge, 
this Government would say nothing at all, and if pressed, would deny 
everything. The plane had been totally sanitized from the start. 

The new plane had its wings removed and was placed aboard a U.S. 
Air Force transport plane. All of the mission personnel were placed aboard 
the same plane and flown from Andrews Field on a black flight to 
England. There, at the same base where the pilot had first met the Soviet 
defector, a final briefing was held. At this time the pilot was told what he 
was really going to do. He agreed to go ahead and was briefed by the 
Russian, along with Agency personnel. Later, the same Russian briefed 
the two passengers separately. They knew what to do. 

A few days later, the whole team was flown to an airfield in 
northern Norway. The Oslo CIA station chief had cleared the operation 



with the contact man in the Norwegian Government. He was told about 
the flight and given only a cover story about the real reason for it. Foster 
Dulles had told the American ambassador as little as possible; he had 
simply been "informed". If by some chance any of the stateless personnel 
were compromised by a take-off crash or other incident, the ambassador 
would be prepared to act. Otherwise, he had no role to play. 

The mission commander led the whole team through the entire 
exercise on several dry runs until they all knew their roles perfectly. The 
U.S. Navy, British Navy, and a Norwegian ship or two were participating 
in a NATO northern exercise. Fleets of transport aircraft flew from various 
northern bases back and forth over the Arctic, making obvious use of the 
Loran network. All was in readiness. Border reconnaissance flights were 
intensified out of Athens and Weisbaden. RB-47 high altitude flights were 
stepped up off Murmansk. Then, with a report of good weather and clear 
skies, the Courier left Norway with its four occupants and secret 
equipment. 

For hours the plane skimmed the waves, staying below radar 
surveillance. U.S. ELINT monitors listened for increased "alert level" 
activities. All were silent. Suddenly in the Loran carrier wave, a final "all 
clear" signal was given. It was a simple code flashed in microseconds and 
unintelligible to all but the most sophisticated equipment. Then the 
Courier turned to the southeast and toward landfall. The barren coastline 
rose quickly. A heavy, dark forest grew right to the sea. The horizon was 
low and rolling as the plane sped on its way. Although the plane lands at a 
very slow speed, it cruises at a relatively high speed, even with floats. Just 
as dawn broke gray and heavy, they neared the destination. The only 
identifiable landmark they had passed was a single-track railroad cutting a 
long straight furrow through the forest. After the railroad there was a 
stream that led to the pond where they would land. The pilot made only 
the slightest half-turn pattern, cut the power, dropped full flaps, and 
slipped over some pine trees and landed with an easy splash. They were 
down. The Maine short-landing techniques had paid off. 

With the engine off they paddled the plane to the shore, where they 
hastily concealed it with netting and evergreen branches. The stay -behind 
team unloaded all of its gear and moved well into the woods. The pilot and 
the mission commander slept. Later in the twilight of the brief northern 
day, the crew waved to the men on shore, and the Courier flashed across 
the pond, up over the trees, and away into the darkness. An hour after 
crossing the coastline, the M/C flashed a simple signal on the carrier wave. 
Right away, a "welcome" flash came back on Loran and an "all clear" 
radio signal, which meant destination weather was all right. A few hours 
later, the plane landed in Norway. 

The training had paid off. Ten days later, the stay-behind team was 
recovered. This time they had helped the pilot by using the hand-cranked 
generator to put out a signal to guide him to the pond. All four men 
returned to the base in Norway. The M/C was debriefed in England, with 
certain British agents present. Then he flew back to Washington. The two 



infiltrated team men were not seen again by anyone of the early group, and 
the young Pole was transferred to his new civilian job in Athens. 

The instrument team made their secret intelligence report to the 
appropriate staff sections of DD/I in the old CIA buildings near the 
reflecting pool beside the Mall in Washington. Their report was properly 
evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated to the military. They had heard, 
aurally and electronically, much fighter aircraft traffic and had picked up 
radar signals, which they had recorded. This team and the M/C received — 
silently — the highest award the CIA can give. In their profession the fact 
of the award was known; but elsewhere, even the award itself was a 
classified subject. 

Meanwhile, certain very closed and select meetings were being held 
in the Agencys inner sanctum in a nondescript office building in the "H" 
Street NW area of downtown Washington. Designated need-to-know staff 
members from the CIA, the White House, Defense, State, the NSA, and 
the AEC (Atomic Energy Commission) had a number of sessions with the 
men who had been in the USSR. Their report was of great value. This 
whole fighter-base-radar-defense operation was real. But it was itself all 
part of another layer of cover story. These two men of the stay -behind 
team had recorded a Soviet nuclear explosion. They had, by unexpectedly 
lucky timing, actually witnessed the faraway glow of that tremendous 
explosion, and they had left in Russia very sensitive earth- sounding 
sensors, which would give limited but valuable signals whenever they 
were activated by further Soviet nuclear tests. 

As in the case of other CIA undercover missions, most of what was 
known, even by those who knew that a plane had been flown into and 
back from Russia, was a cover story. State and Defense had benefited 
from the Air Defense intelligence. The real story, all of the facts, were 
reserved for the inner team of the CIA and for their co-workers secreted 
throughout the Government. This flight into Russia was for them simply a 
step on the road to Indonesia, to Cuba, to Tibet, and ultimately to 
Vietnam. 

This had been a well-rehearsed and well-developed small operation, 
in the style and manner of true covert intelligence work. When the leaders 
of the U.S. Government use such operations for positive purposes, they 
may be expected to do some good. When they are repeated too frequently, 
when they grow too large, and when they are poorly developed and 
directed, they are harmful and they destroy any good that might ever come 
from them. 

The operation described was real; but it was not a single operation 
and it did not happen exactly as described. Even though it took place 
many years ago and the significance of that project has been lost in time, 
some of the people involved are still in the business and some of the 
places used may still be used from time to time. It serves to demonstrate 
how a really professional special operation can be done, as contrasted with 
some of the haphazard and careless missions that are often carried out by 



some of the irresponsible non-professionals who so easily slip under the 
cloak of secrecy. 

For example, we have said that the country involved was Norway. 
This was selected because the U-2 did not use Norway on certain flights 
over the Soviet Union. In most cases, the host country is told the truth, or 
at least all the truth that is known at the time of the first briefing. In a case 
such as this one, the station chief in Norway would tell his counterpart that 
we were preparing an operation in which a plane would be sent into 
Russia with a team and then would return there ten days later to pick them 
up. 

Since the Norwegians share NATO secrets, it is possible they would 
be promised some of the data acquired. In this case, where the flight had 
more than ordinary significance, the Norwegians might only be told about 
the Air Defense mission and not about the nuclear weapons test. The host 
country might wish to have a representative at the scene before departure 
to satisfy itself that should the plane crash in Russia and be found there, 
nothing on it should give evidence that it had taken off from Norway. 

The Norwegian Government would be asked to participate in the 
NATO exercise that was laid on to provide cover for the use of LORAN 
navigation equipment and generally to soften up the Soviet attention to 
activity in the area. For this the Norwegians would be permitted to bill the 
United States for all out-of-pocket costs incident to such activity. In other 
words, the United States would pay for any part of the exercise that the 
Norwegians could not have paid for had they not participated in it. This 
can run into an appreciable amount of money and equipment. 

Norway might ask for and could expect to be granted assurances 
that in the event the exercise was uncovered for any reason, the United 
States would positively ignore and if necessary deny any participation in it 
and would guarantee that no mention be made of Norway in any event. 
(This did not happen in the case of the Powers U-2 flight, and Norway and 
Pakistan were forced to make their own embarrassing public statements.) 
It might also require that, in the event the plane was detected and had to 
flee the area, it would fly away from Norway to an alternate landing near a 
U.S. ship or submarine. In other words, Norway or any other host country 
would have a lot to say about their own involvement. 

This, of course, varies a lot with the country and the situation. If by 
some chance we were helping one country against a traditional enemy and 
our special operation was inadvertently discovered, the country being 
helped would be glad to have its enemy know that the United States was 
helping it. As a matter of fact, such a situation usually leads to a so-called 
"inadvertent" disclosure, so anxious is the first country to let the second 
country know that the United States is on its side. But this would not have 
been the case in our example. 

There would also be some arrangements that involved the minor 
participation of the West German Government and the British. Each of 



these countries would be handled separately, if possible, to keep the 
primary mission from being exposed. This is not possible sometimes, and 
the responsible agent may have to brief his counterpart in West Germany 
and in England. 

None of these matters alone seems too important. The ST usually 
briefs the higher staffs of the Government piecemeal, and so they rarely 
get to see the whole picture as it accumulates. The opposite is true 
overseas. In this rather modest exercise, three foreign countries plus the 
Soviet Union were involved — and we perhaps should add a fourth, 
because certain crewmen had been kept in security isolation in Greece. In 
many ways knowledge by other countries is as important a consideration 
as any other. From that date on which they become involved on, each of 
those countries will know that the United States is actively involved in 
clandestine operations and that it is willing to involve other countries with 
it in these endeavors. From that day on, it will be impossible to convince 
any one of those countries again that the United States does not become 
engaged regularly in such actions. 

As time went on, and other countries were involved in other minor 
events, such as the use of a seemingly clean national commercial airline to 
do some camera spying or other clandestine project, the list grew, until by 
1971 there were very few countries anywhere in the world that had not at 
one time or other been somehow engaged in clandestine operations with 
this Government. The significant thing here is that though all these other 
countries know this, and the Soviet Union and its community of nations 
know it too, the shield of secrecy spun by the ST here in the United States 
keeps much of this information from our own eyes, ears, and minds. Then, 
when we hear other nations speaking quite openly of the things this 
Government does that are not exactly aboveboard, there are those who 
would say, "Those foreigners are always saying untrue and malicious 
things about us." In reality, they are doing nothing more than referring to 
things that each of them knows we have done, because each of them has at 
one time or other been involved with us. 

This brings up another facet of this kind of operation. In many of 
these countries, governments are overthrown in fast succession and quite 
unpredictably. What happens to the members of the inner circle of a 
government that was once in power and shared secrets with us, now that it 
has been overthrown, and these same men are in exile or at least powerless 
in their own country? Do they just forget all these past events? They not 
only remember those events, but they capitalize on their knowledge in 
many ways. Some are quite sophisticated, and they bide their time until 
they have a chance to contact the man who used to contact them when 
they were in power. Now they whisper that the new "in" government is 
"Communist-oriented" and that with a little help they can get back in 
power. 

Others are less sophisticated and more direct. They make deals 
where they can to uncover other actions and networks in what they think is 
a loyal effort to help their old cause against the current government, not 



caring about the exposure of the United States, whether that matters to 
them at all or not. And there are others who use their information for open 
blackmail. Some collect, and some disappear. 

The same is true of those who are voted out of office. They have 
known the inner workings of government. When someone tries to say that 
things were not quite as they were, many of these men, hoping to make a 
political comeback, are forced to reveal things that they have known. 

There have been a number of cases where this information about 
third government participation with the United States in special operations 
has led to subtle, legal blackmail. Each government gets foreign military 
aid according to a carefully worked out schedule. A number of 
governments have used the CIA relationships they have established to 
plead for and to gain by heavy-handed methods hundreds of millions of 
dollars worth of equipment that they could not have gotten otherwise. 

In summary, there are few if any men in government, from the NSC 
on down through the executive branch, or in the Congress, who have had 
the opportunity to put enough of these events together to see how heavy 
and oppressive twenty or more years of accumulated clandestine 
operations can be. When a new Assistant Secretary of Defense or 
Assistant Secretary of State can say in public something like, "The United 
States has no combat troops in Laos, and it has not had any there, and it 
will not have any there," at least fifteen or twenty other nations can listen 
and recall that they have at one time or other directly participated in 
actions that involved American combat troops in Laos; or, since this is 
intended as an example only, in some other country. In many such cases 
the person who makes such a statement is known either to be uninformed 
or lying. 

There is a good story about American Army troops in Laos. About 
fifteen years ago an agreement had been reached whereby the U.S. 
Government would take over certain training functions and the French 
would leave. Some French were to remain as advisers in government and 
as a training cadre with the armed forces of Laos. By a local agreement 
worked out with the Government of Laos and with the senior French 
officials there, a Military Aid Program was established, calling for the 
delivery of large quantities of U.S. -manufactured military weapons. 
However, the use of many of these weapons was dependent upon a degree 
of training and sophistication beyond the ability of the Laotian army. The 
American ambassador volunteered that he could arrange for American 
civilian training personnel to come to Laos for the sole purpose of training 
the armed forces of that country on American equipment. This offer was 
accepted, and it was broadened to include military matters, which at that 
time were included in the general concept of civic action. This gave these 
U.S. training personnel broader responsibilities, to include such things as 
irrigation, village hygiene and sanitation, rudimentary school-building 
construction, and related tasks, all in addition to the regular weapons 
orientation. It also included basic electronics work and communications 
indoctrination of a low order of skill. By the time this whole program had 



been packaged, the requirement for instructors had grown to several 
hundred. Although this entire endeavor had the appearance of being 
entirely overt and coming under the responsibility of the ambassador, it 
was his invisible staff of CIA men who had worked up the idea to 
counteract French influence, which was admittedly at a low ebb following 
the defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In those days there was as much animosity 
between the CIA and the French as between the CIA and the Pathet Lao. 
The CIA team got the military assistance program approved and the 
equipment destined for Laos. The next thing was to get the civilian 
instructors. To accomplish this task, they beefed up their own staff with a 
number of new men and then turned to the Army for volunteers, who 
would be sheep-dipped and sent to Laos as "civilians". 

(The term "sheep-dipped" appears in The New York Times version 
of the Pentagon Papers without clarification. It is an intricate Army- 
devised process by which a man who is in the service as a full career 
soldier or officer agrees to go through all the legal and official motions of 
resigning from the service. Then, rather than actually being released, his 
records are pulled from the Army personnel files and transferred to a 
special Army intelligence file. Substitute but nonetheless real-appearing 
records are then processed, and the man "leaves" the service. He is 
encouraged to write to friends and give a cover reason why he got out. He 
goes to his bank and charge card services and changes his status to 
civilian, and does the hundreds of other official and personal things that 
any man would do if he really had gotten out of the service. Meanwhile, 
his real Army records are kept in secrecy, but not forgotten. If his 
contemporaries get promoted, he gets promoted. All of the things that can 
be done for his hidden records to keep him even with his peers are done. 
Some very real problems arise in the event he gets killed or captured as a 
prisoner. There are problems with insurance and with benefits his wife 
would receive had he remained in the service. At this point, sheep-dipping 
gets really complicated, and each case is handled quite separately.) 

In this instance the Army readied several hundred sheep-dipped 
officers and enlisted men for duty in Laos. They were hired by a private 
company created by the CIA, and they were called "White Star" teams. 
The total number of men involved was kept a secret from all parties, and 
the teams were infiltrated and entered the country at the airport in 
Vietiane. Others came in overland by other points of entry. Some came in 
on clandestine cargo flights. Finally, the last group made a ceremonial 
entrance into Laos by commercial air, most likely on the prime ministers 
own airline, Air Laos. They were met at the airport by an official party 
from the American embassy and were accompanied by Laotian and French 
officials. This small overt party contained all of the higher ranking White 
Star party. In customary order of precedence — reverse order of rank — 
everyone had disembarked from the plane except the senior official who, 
of course, was known simply as a civilian. Then he appeared at the door of 
the plane and looked out over the scene and at the welcoming party at the 
foot of the stairs. His eyes rested on American officials he had known 
before, during the long days of his special training and indoctrination, 
upon Laotians he had heard of by name but whom he was to meet for the 



first time, and upon French officials whom he had not expected to see at 
the plane. He expected that the White Star teams under his leadership 
would replace the French in the favor of the host Laotians in a short time. 
And then he saw the figure of a ranking French officer. Their eyes met for 
the first time in more than a decade. Of all the men, this sheep-dipped 
Army colonel, John A. Heintges, could have met at the steps of a plane in 
Vietiane, Laos, the one whom he saw was the same French officer with 
whom he had spent years in a German prisoner-of-war camp. Months of 
preparatory cover work went up in smoke. French intelligence there were 
able to match the cover story "official record" of this "civilian" with his 
known true role with the U.S. Army Special Forces once they discovered 
his identity. The White Star team bubble burst even before it got started. 

Here again is an example that adds up, along with so many others, 
to prove that what may be called clandestine and what may be treated with 
deep secrecy in the never-never land of "Secret Team Washington" is 
really not so secret and so undercover out in the cold factual world. There 
have been so many generals and admirals from the U.S. Army, Navy, and 
Air Force who have either been serving on assignment with the CIA, or 
who were really CIA career men serving on a cover military assignment, 
or mixes of both, and who have worked in Southeast Asia during the past 
twenty years, all as a primary duty with the CIA, that it would be no 
wonder at all that the officials of governments from Korea to Pakistan 
could certainly be excused for not knowing whom or what they were 
dealing with every time they came upon a senior-grade military man. 

This is no place to name their names, but even a quick scan of the 
Pentagon Papers will fill a whole page with these names. For example, Air 
Marshall Ky of Vietnam may not know to this day that some of his closest 
early friends in the U.S. Air Force were not really with the USAF; and 
Colonel Thieu, now President Thieu, could be excused if he never really 
knew whether most of the generals who were closest to him were really 
Agency men or U.S. military men on Agency assignments. The record is 
now so public about Ngo Dinh Diems tutelage at the hands of Magsaysays 
creator Edward G. Lansdale that it certainly may be redundant to point out 
that Lansdale was serving the CIA in the Philippines and in South 
Vietnam. His case was quite special even in that role, because he served a 
special inner sanctum of the Agency and not the regular Agent section. 
Some of his greatest problems in Southeast Asia were the result of mix- 
ups, not with Communists or with the French, whom he detested and who 
had similar feelings for him, but with other members of the Agencys 
clandestine staff, who either did not know who he was at first, or if they 
did know, would not accept him. The little "White-Star" team episode was 
very modest with respect to its attempt at the big game of clandestine 
operations. 

Two former Commanders in Chief, Pacific Armed Forces 
(CINCPAC), have served with or are now serving as directors of Air 
America. This huge overt/covert airline is properly listed in Dun and 
Bradstreet and in many public telephone books; so it is not unusual to find 
high-ranking admirals serving on its board of directors. However, when 



some of these directors call on old friends in the DOD at times when Air 
America is bidding on a U.S. Air Force aircraft maintenance contract or on 
a Navy air transport contract carrier contract in the Pacific, they attend the 
meeting as Admiral this or Admiral that, but when the chips are down 
someone adeptly slips the word that the "CIA is asking no favors, 
remember, but all it does ask is a fair competitive position." These 
admirals do their job for the CIA like any other agent. By the same token, 
when ranking officers travel throughout the Pacific on what appears to 
everyone, and of course especially to officials of the host countries, to be 
U.S. defense establishment business, no one should be surprised if, in later 
years, these same host countries begin to wise up and think that almost 
everyone they meet must be CIA. 

This is not a sometime thing; it involves a large number of senior 
officers up to and including those wearing four stars. It certainly prime 
exponent stretches credulity not to expect that in this whole string of 
Asian nations, not one of which can ever be faulted on the grounds of 
being both clever and wily, someone would take advantage of the CIA- 
versus-the-overt- military-establishment-routine for his own ends. Chiang 
Kai-Shek has been the prime exponent and recipient of the many 
advantages of this game. Marshall Sarit of Thailand was not far behind, 
and Ngo Dinh Diem knew how to play both sides against each other for 
his own ends, until finally even his own creators let go of the string, and 
he fell. 

The example of the small flight operation into Russia shows 
something else that enters into peacetime special operations as carried out 
by the ST. The law and the NSC directives that followed did not authorize 
the CIA to build up forces sufficient to carry out such operations. 
However, when the NSC did direct an operation, there were no such 
limitations on that senior authority concerning money, manpower, and 
materials. The NSC could stipulate that the Agency perform such tasks 
with civilian resources. It could further stipulate that the CIA perform the 
operation with civilian mercenary non-U. S. personnel. Or it could permit 
the Agency to utilize the obvious resources of the U.S. military 
establishment up to the point of the actual flight. This became a customary 
procedure, at least in the days up to about 1955 or 1956. 

During these fledgling days, the precocious Agency made good use 
of the military. As in this flight, it gave them all kinds of tasks as 
enumerated. Not only would the CIA enlist direct assistance with the 
words that "NSC 5412/2 has directed this exercise and its support by the 
military"; but it would convene meetings in the Pentagon, in the Paris 
headquarters of U.S. Forces in Europe, in Army headquarters at 
Heidelburg, Air Force headquarters in Weisbaden, and Navy headquarters 
in London, all to churn up the idea and let these headquarters vie with 
each other in seeing how far they could go out of their way to "support" 
this exercise, which they knew only as a code name or at best as a 
plausible cover story. In response to the magic of the CIA relationship, the 
services would come up with all kinds of support, often beyond the 
dreams and expectations of the Agency. This had a double-barreled effect. 



It made a given clandestine operation much larger in its overt supporting 
areas than originally visualized. It led also within all of the services to a 
growing capability, often overlapping, which had the effect of creating a 
very large submerged infrastructure, ready, willing, and eager to become 
involved again and again with the glamorous CIA. We shall go into this in 
more detail later. 

There are things in every really clandestine exercise that must be 
done in an expert manner. In the example, we saw that the Agency used 
non-U. S. nationals for certain hard-core assignments. One man, the pilot, 
was in a sense fortunate. The CIA happened to find him among thousands 
of displaced persons. However, one of the pilots who trained him was a 
real stateless or "multi-national" person. Also, the two infiltrated 
instrumentation experts were non-nationals. This type of person places a 
real burden on the Agency, and special attention is given to them and to 
their welfare and maintenance. It is one thing to use a young Polish pilot 
for one air mission; but what does the Agency do with such a man year in 
and year out? Such people do exist, and such people do some important 
and very specialized work. It may not be "James Bond" all the time; but it 
has its moments. In between these moments, there are many problems to 
be solved — among them such things as a place to live, marriage, family, 
schools, vacations. Saying that they exist is sufficient for the purposes of 
this book. What is done with them both during operations and during the 
dull intervals in between would take another book. 

Another area of activity that lies underneath much of the 
commonplace activity of the Agency has to do with the interminable 
processing, evaluating, analyzing, and utilization of intelligence of all 
kinds. It is important to query hundreds of thousands of displaced persons 
and to get warehouses full of information, only if that information can be 
used. There are times when the Agency is nonplused by its own cleverness 
and resources. 

There are countless other facets of clandestine operations. It is 
ridiculous for the Agency and for the rest of the Government to deny 
them, and it is equally erroneous for those who know nothing about them 
to speculate about their real character and meaning. 

It may appear to be an oversimplification to say it; but an Agency 
career develops a thick skin, which is occupational, and this thick skin 
includes an extra set of eyelids which pop over the eyeball of the mind 
when the man discovers himself in a situation where he finds he should 
not be. 

It is said that the tens of thousands of Japanese who live on one 
block in a city such as Tokyo develop the ability to live in close proximity, 
separated one house from the other, usually by no more than a few scant 
inches and by rice-paper walls and windows. Without question, families in 
a given area hear each other and all the usual household noises; yet they 
all maintain that they hear nothing of what goes on in the neighbors house. 
The idea is that they are supposed to hear nothing; so they hear nothing. 



This same mental process that permits the disciplined brain to separate out 
sounds one from another is not unusual in many other cases. It applies in a 
sense to people who spend their lives in highly classified work. They 
actually learn to shut out and to avoid seeking out what the other person is 
doing. As a result, many of the real agent careerists and the staff personnel 
who support them really do not know what other offices are doing, and 
they dont care to know. 

This blocking-out process may not apply in a majority of cases, but 
it is true in many. In other cases, there are men who have spent their lives 
in the Agency who have never really had any direct contact with actual 
missions because of the nature of their work and because those who were 
involved in operations kept such information from them. Therefore, some 
of these old-timers really do not know what is going on. They may think 
that they do because they have always been aware of activity of one kind 
or other, and they have heard the usual rumors of what has been taking 
place. This is often more of a handicap than a help, because if the man has 
not actually gotten out on the operation he may have heard a very well laid 
out cover story and thought it was real. He would have no way to know 
otherwise. Examples of this in other walks of life are not hard to find. 
When Ford changes its model lines and is introducing some really new 
design or engineering feature that it wants to keep secret, it will put 
several teams at work designing the next model car. At certain check 
points of development, these teams are told, "Fine, now go ahead with 
what you are doing, to the next stage." Thus, unknown to each other and to 
the fairly large staffs who support them, more than one team believes its 
new model is the one that the company has selected. Only at the last 
moment, when it is too late for them to continue the bluff and too late for a 
competitor to gain from discovery of the new design or feature, is the 
unneeded team told that their model has not been selected and that their 
work was necessary cover to conceal the real design. It is better to have 
some teams actually living and believing the cover story than to have 
some just play-acting the cover story. This leaves the final operational go- 
ahead options open until the very last moment and assures that if there are 
leaks, the other side will have the problem of finding out whether the 
operation they have discovered is real or planned deception. 

This situation was practiced quite widely during the Bay of Pigs 
operation. Some units thought they were going to be involved in the 
exercise, but they never were. This had one odd result right in the office of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. A team of ranking officers thought that they were 
working on part of the Cuban operation. They were very active and 
thought that the things they were doing were really happening and that 
their work was being used by the CIA. It turned out that all the things they 
did were dummy activities and that the Agency never even intended to use 
them. It was a sort of Agency cover and deception operation against a part 
of our own forces. The military were never told that what they had been 
working on was not used, and later during the review of the Bay of Pigs 
operation, the senior officers of that task actually appeared before the 
Presidents Review Board and testified concerning what they had done. 
Their testimony was so realistic that it was taken as the real thing, and no 



one ever spoke up to clarify the matter. Apparently, it was in the best 
interest of the ST to let it go as it did; it only served further to implicate 
the military in the Bay of Pigs, when in reality they had very little to do 
with any part of it. This was a very strange turn of events, and exposes 
another aspect of the strange ways of clandestine operations. When this 
country permits itself to enter the dream world of covert operations, it 
creates a national Frankenstein of such proportions that major factions 
within the Government do not know how something happened, who 
authorized it, and why it was done. The system begins to run itself from 
the moment of data input. From the agents first bit of information to the 
emergence of a clandestine operation, everything is constructed entirely 
out of response-mechanisms to the ever-claimed threat of Communism. 
Therefore, the system must do something anti-Communist. Nowhere was 
there anything built in to say "Stop". 

Lyman Kirkpatrick[21 writing so intelligently and from an inside 
position of real administrative experience said that "President Kennedy 
paid for the abandoning of the NSC at the Bay of Pigs. He had allowed 
himself and his principal advisors to be made the captives of the 
proponents of the plan.... If the President had insisted that the deliberations 
on the operation be conducted within the framework of an NSC system, 
with appropriate staff work and review, there would have been a much 
greater chance that he would have received a more realistic appraisal of its 
chances for success [or failure]." 

This could not have been set in words with more truth and impact. 
Again we see the bugaboo of CIA secrecy — it precludes the employment 
of normal and experienced supporting staff action. In the area of covert 
operations it is especially important to have someone of high authority in 
the position to say "No" when "No" is called for. President Kennedy did 
not convene the Security Council, which might have helped him, and 
President Johnsons greatest failing was that even though he may have 
from time to time convened the Council, it was by that time made up of 
few responsible men and several irresponsible people who more than 
frequently tended to go along with the ST on everything and left the final 
decision up to the President who could not and did not say "No". 

The discussion in this chapter is intended to serve as an introduction 
to the world of clandestine operations. We have discussed at some length 
the first four duties of the CIA as spelled out in the language of the 
National Security Act of 1947. It remains to look at the fifth duty, the one 
that the Agency and the ST use to establish that it was the intention of the 
Congress and of the President to permit the Agency to become involved in 
the area of clandestine operations as a regular function. 



1. Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense 

2. The Real CIA, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968 



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Chapter 8 

CIA: The "Cover Story" Intelligence Agency 
and the Real-Life Clandestine Operator 



THE CIA LIKES TO PUBLICIZE ITSELF AS IT WISHES TO be 
seen; it tries consistently to maintain its cover story. These facts would not 
be publicly admitted by the agency; but they are facts. It is only fitting to 
note that when Allen Dulles died, he was writing a book about 
"Communism and Subversion". This was his first love, as it was J. Edgar 
Hoover's. This was his occupation. Intelligence was his avocation. When 
he was writing about Communism and subversion, he was writing, of 
course, about the real work of the CIA. He liked to write about the CIA 
and he liked to see that others wrote about the CIA. 

After his retirement from the Agency in the fall of 1961, he wrote a 
very interesting book entitled The Craft of Intelligence . This book is good 
reading. It contains a lot of folklore about the peripheral world of 
intelligence; but it says almost nothing useful about the CIA. In fact, as he 
intended it, it tells a great many things about the CIA that were designed 
to create the picture of a noble CIA, one that really does not exist. This 
was typical of Allen Dulles. 

Other CIA men have written about the CIA. The most able Lyman 
B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., long-time career Intelligence stalwart and Executive 
Director of the CIA, wrote a book, too, which he called The Real CIA. 
This is unquestionably the best book written by a CIA man about the CIA. 
It is as forthright and as honest a book as any career man has written or 
may ever write. Later authors will have missed the great pressures and 
inner violence of the early struggles, from the days of the OSS and its 
internecine battles with the Navy and with MacArthur, through the days of 
the post- World War II hiatus, and then to the struggles from 1947 to the 
Korean War. This was the truly formative period, and this was the time 
which spawned the giants. 

Lyman Kirkpatrick has written an elegant book; but it leaves much 
to be said. This is not to suggest that considerations of security have 
intervened, it is rather to suggest that those career professionals who have 
devoted their lives to this cause and who have totally lived the party line 
just cannot bring themselves to see some things as they appear to others, 



and then admit it even if they should. There is much about a life in the 
Agency that is like a religious order or a secret fraternity. 

After these men, numberless others have written about the CIA. A 
great percentage of this latter group has written about the CIA at the 
bidding and urging of the Agency. An organization such as the CIA, 
which exists in a true never-never land, needs to have someone write 
about it so that there will always be a plethora of material available and so 
that this vast stew-pot of material will be what the Agency wants the 
world to believe about it. The Agency does not answer writers, whether 
they attack it or not. But it works doggedly and brilliantly at times to bury 
anything not the party line that is written about it. Thus the Agency has a 
whole stable of writers, its favorite magazines and newspapers, its 
publishing houses, and its "backgrounders" ready to go at all times. 

Allen Dulles had twelve or thirteen regular members of the news 
media who would be invited to join him frequently for lunch in the 
beautiful old dining room he maintained in East Building across from his 
office. Many an agent or military officer who had been invited to his 
offices to meet with him or with his deputy, General Cabell, to discuss 
matters of utmost secrecy, would be astounded at lunch with them to find 
the room filled with these well known writers and commentators. And 
then, as lunch proceeded, the same subjects that on the other side of the 
hall had been so carefully shrouded in secrecy would become table gossip 
with these men of the press. Dulles believed that if he kept these men well 
informed, they would then be able to draw that fine line between the CIA 
party line and its security limits. 

Even as Dulles regularly placed himself at the mercy of the lions, he 
played a bigger game. If he gave them a bit of insight into the workings of 
the Agency, he also gave them a heavy mixture of that special brew, 
which he was so good at concocting. He fed them the CIA point of view 
all the time, just as he fed so many others, from Presidents on down, and 
as he has fed the readers of his book. 

His greatest bit of writing in this special field is regrettably hidden 
away under heavy security wraps, although by now there cannot be a thing 
in it that would warrant classification. The report written by Allen Dulles, 
Mathias Correa, and William Jackson in the latter part of 1948 was a small 
masterpiece. It clearly and precisely outlined what Allen Dulles was going 
to do; and to his credit, he did just that and more. During that busy 
summer of election year, 1948, Allen Dulles was officially the speech- 
writer for the Republican candidate, Governor Thomas E. Dewey of New 
York. All through the campaign it had been generally accepted that Dewey 
would defeat President Truman. Allen Dulles, his brother, John Foster 
Dulles, and the others of that Dewey team fully expected to move into 
Washington on the crest of a wave with the inauguration of their 
candidate. 

In this context then, the Dulles-Correa-Jackson report takes on a 
special meaning. Although this select committee had been established by 



President Truman, they had timed their work for delivery to the President 
during his — they expected — "Lame Duck" period. Then they planned to 
use it as their own plan of action in the new Dewey administration. In one 
of the greatest political upsets of all time, Truman beat Dewey, and the 
Republicans were forced to wait another four years. Thus it happened that 
this crucial report on the national intelligence community was reluctantly 
delivered into Truman's more than hostile hands on January 1, 1949. Due 
to other circumstances, Allen Dulles did spend eleven years in the service 
of the CIA, and at least ten years prior to that in endeavors directly related 
to intelligence. It was not until he left government service in late 1961 that 
he began his book, published in 1963, The Craft of Intelligence . This 
book, which he was to leave to the world as his public definition of the 
agency, says very little that is real about the Agency and very little that is 
real about intelligence. It contains all manner of contrived concepts 
designed over the years to make people believe that the CIA was what he 
was saying it was and that all of the authority he said it had did exist. Any 
reader who thought the CIA was anything like the description contained in 
the book will be excused for his thoughts, because if ever a subject was 
painted in camouflage and in words of guile, this was it. This really is not 
a light matter. Not only did Allen Dulles portray the CIA in public as 
something that it most certainly was not; but he had done so for many 
years within the U.S. Government. Let us see how Allen Dulles presents 
the subject of secret intelligence and clandestine operations. 

He opens the book with a "Personal Note". He wants to take the 
uninitiated reader into his confidence at once. (Those who have seen him 
operating with such public figures as Joseph Alsop have seen the same 
approach. The fatherly figure couldn't possibly be weaving a web of 
connivance around the unsuspecting fly, whether he be a well-known 
writer or an unknown reader.) By the time he gets to page 6 he says, "CIA 
is not an underground operation. All one needs to do is to read the law — 
the National Security Act of 1947 — to get a general idea of what it is set 
up to do. It has, of course, a secret side and the law permits the NSC, 
which in effect means the President, to assign to the CIA certain duties 
and functions in the intelligence field in addition to those specifically 
enumerated in the law. These functions are not disclosed." 

Without delay, Mr. Dulles begins to soften up the innocent reader. 
First the blunt statement, which means nothing: "The CIA is not an 
underground operation." The trick here is that he is saying bluntly what is 
fact. It is not an operation. But he intends to lard the book with as much 
justification as he can muster to support the contention that the CIA is 
entitled to operate underground. 

Then he neatly says that in reading the law a person will get a 
"general idea" of what the Agency is supposed to do. Right away he has 
the reader thinking that if the law only sets forth the "general idea" of what 
the Agency "is set up to do", then there must be some other "law" that 
gives it other powers. Of course, there is no such other law. 

Next he says, "It [CIA] has, of course, a secret side ..." True again, 



like the opening statement; but that is not because of the law, although he 
hopes the reader thinks that the law provides for the "secret side". Then, as 
if to lift the edge of the curtain to let the uninitiated see a bit of the 
promised land, he adds, "... the law permits the NSC ... to assign [note 
the use of the word 'assign' rather than the word which is in the law, 
'direct' to the CIA certain duties and functions in the intelligence field in 
addition to those specifically enumerated in the law." Here, he has set up 
the idea, "secret side", in the mind of the reader and then proceeded to 
weakly paraphrase subparagraph 5 of the list of duties, quoted above. 
Notice also that he says, "... the NSC, which in effect means the 
President ..." This is a subtle and most meaningful suggestion when one 
recalls that this book was written in the Kennedy era, from 1961 to 1963. 
It is true that President Kennedy did all but abandon the NSC, and that in 
doing so, the NSC became only the President, nearly in fact. This reveals 
much more than it says when one recalls that the young President had 
selected only two of the Eisenhower appointees to remain in his 
Administration. One of them was Allen Dulles. Thus we see that if Allen 
Dulles had personally briefed the new President on the way the CIA 
worked, he might very well have done it just as he is doing in his book. He 
is the one who most probably put the cap on the views of the new man that 
really the NSC was simply an Eisenhower idiosyncrasy, carried over from 
the Truman years, and that he might as well abandon it. As Dulles' own 
Executive Director, Lyman Kirkpatrick, has ably pointed out, this 
"abandonment of the NSC" by Kennedy led directly to the Bay of Pigs and 
its great failure, and most likely, to other things that followed, including 
the Vietnam initiatives. 

It is not hollow word play to read into the Dulles book these deeper, 
almost sinister, meanings. Anyone who has had the privilege of having 
read both publications, the 1948 report and this book, will be able to 
confirm the subtle and premeditated structuring of Dulles's powerful 
course of action. Dulles was an able disciple of the Goebbels school of 
propaganda. Mr. Dulles's enlightening paraphrase of the fifth duty from 
the National Security Act is as close as he gets to that bit of the law 
through the whole course of the book, until six pages from the end. Then 
he cleverly runs the fourth duty and the fifth duty together in such a way 
that the reader will most likely not even recognize them for what they are, 
and Allen Dulles will have purged his conscience by being able to say that 
he covered all of the law "verbatim". That he did; but it was a masterful 
job of obfuscation and of mind-bending. If ever the technique of 
brainwashing has been put to good use, it has been done by Allen Dulles 
and others of his ilk. 

Having used this much mind-bending at the start of his book, he 
then follows with forty pages of interesting anecdotes and history, after 
which he comes right back to the same brainwashing, saying, "A 
Republican Congress agreed [with General Donovan — which in fact it did 
not] and, with complete bipartisan approval, the CIA was established in 
the National Security Act of 1947. It was an openly acknowledged arm of 
the executive branch of the government, although, of course, it had many 
duties of a secret nature." 



Here again, he used the techniques of the ST by associating the 
public language of the law, quite incorrectly, with the idea that "it had 
many duties of a secret nature". As we know from our review of the law, 
above, it did not have duties of a "secret nature". At least it did not have 
them in the law. He went on to say: "President Truman saw to it that the 
new agency was equipped to support our government's effort to meet 
Communist tactics ..." This is at variance with Truman's own words 
about this quiet intelligence arm of the President. What Truman himself 
said was, "I never had any thought when I set up the CIA that it would be 
injected into peacetime cloak and dagger operations." Truman, the man 
who signed the bill into law, says that it was never his intention that the 
CIA would have such duties. Again Allen Dulles brushes such things 
aside to make a case for the Agency he did so much to change from the 
"quiet intelligence arm" into the most powerful peacetime operational 
force ever created. 

Dulles continued with his ritualistic chant by adding, "Its [CIA] 
broad scheme was in a sense unique in that it combined under one 
leadership the overt task of intelligence analysis and coordination with the 
work of secret intelligence operations of the various types I shall 
describe." He employs the technique of beginning with a thought that is 
correct ~ intelligence analysis and coordination ~ and then, when the 
reader is trapped, he continues into an area he wants the reader to think is 
equally correct — the work of secret intelligence operations. 
Characteristically, he has not bothered to define "secret intelligence 
operations". Even inside the Government, where such terms are used with 
some frequency, there is much controversy about the real meaning of that 
phrase, "secret intelligence operations". As a further clue to where Mr. 
Dulles is planning to take the reader, notice his use of the word 
"operations", and then recall his blunt, though meaningless early 
statement, "the CIA is not an underground operation." He is already back 
at that theme and beginning to work it around so that the reader will 
believe that the CIA and operations are wedded. 

Only a few times farther on, he says; "CIA was given the mandate 
to develop its own secret collection arm, which was to be quite distinct 
from that part of the organization that had been set up to assemble and 
evaluate intelligence from other parts of the government." He continues 
his clever intertwining of fact with fact to create a pattern that, when 
woven further with his own contrived designs, is totally at variance with 
the original. The only mandate he had mentioned to this point in the book 
was the law of 1947. The "mandate" to which he is making reference in 
this context, however, was contained in a National Security Council 
Intelligence Directive (NSCID) 10/2 of August 1948. This directive did 
authorize the CIA to develop a secret division to perform certain secret 
activities; but it was a far cry from what Allen Dulles is describing. 

The law did not authorize secret or clandestine activities. However, 
Agency protagonists continued to put pressure on the Executive Branch to 
permit the CIA to collect "secret intelligence". The argument most 
frequently given was that since the United States had always been lily 



white in the area of foreign policy, there was no organization that could 
"fight the Communists in their own dirty way". It was proposed that since 
the CIA, which had re-assembled some of the former OSS operators, 
possessed the demonstrated know-how to carry out secret intelligence 
operations, it should be permitted to form a unit for that purpose. In the 
beginning, this idea was avowedly limited to secret intelligence. The CIA 
disclaimed any intention of using secret intelligence as a bridge to secret 
operations. 

Finally, the NSC consented and published its directive 10/2. 
However, anyone who had had the opportunity to have read the directive 
would have been amazed to find what lengths the NSC went to in order to 
restrain the CIA from going too far in this direction. Absolutely contrary 
to Mr. Dulles' contention that the CIA was given many duties of a secret 
nature and then equipped to perform these duties, the NSC directive did 
authorize the CIA to set up an Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), 
which would be prepared to engage in secret intelligence activities. 
However, the director of that office had to be selected by the Secretary of 
State and approved by the Secretary of Defense. The personnel of that 
office was to be CIA employees, but their boss was hired and fired by the 
Secretaries of State and Defense. This was done to keep the DCI from 
having control over him and thus over the clandestine activity of that 
office. 

This was a partial victory for the clandestine operations activists, 
but it was an unhappy solution. At that time, the Secretary of Defense was 
Louis Johnson. He had embarked upon a rigid budget-cutting program by 
direction of President Truman. Another part of this NSC directive 
prohibited the CIA from having the funds to carry out clandestine 
activities. It stated that if and when the NSC directed such action, it 
would, as a function of its directive, state how the activity would be 
manned, equipped, and paid for. In the beginning, Congress had not found 
it necessary to put any special restraints upon the CIA for budgeted and 
approved funds. Since Congress intended that the CIA would be an overt 
coordinator of intelligence, it made no plans to hide CIA money in various 
secret accounts. However, the NSC provided that the CIA was not to use 
intelligence funds for clandestine activities, but was to be allocated funds 
from other sources whenever such operations were directed. In this 
manner, the custom of having CIA funds buried and hidden in the 
allocations to other departments and agencies began. The intent at first 
was for this to be a control device over the Agency's activities and not a 
full flood tide of money pouring without check or constraint into a horn of 
plenty to support CIA clandestine operations. 

Again, there are few who had the opportunity to see these working 
papers; but in 1949 a most excellent bit of staff work produced a long 
letter to the DCI over the signature of Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson. 
It contained a full outline of how such funding would operate, how it 
could be moved unseen from one department and agency to another in 
accordance with the provisions of a little noticed law, the National 
Economy Act of 1932, as amended in the Legislative Branch 



Appropriation Act 1933, of June 30,1932. It also stipulated how the 
gaining agency would be required to reimburse the losing agency for all 
expenses and especially for those that were clearly out-of-pocket. This 
control was much more effective in those days because the CIA had very 
little money it could put into costly clandestine operations. As a result, the 
CIA was very restricted in what it could do as long as the Secretary of 
Defense required that the DOD be reimbursed. In later years, this 
stipulation was reversed, and there occasionally were hints from the CIA 
that it would seek compensation from the DOD for the intelligence it 
provided. 

Another factor of importance was that at that time there were a 
number of qualified, competent, and top-echelon men who were familiar 
with the provisions of the National Security Act of 1947 with the NSCIDs, 
and with the implementing directives derived from all of them. They knew 
very well that all of this was being done to keep the CIA under control and 
to prohibit it from going ahead with any clandestine operation or secret 
intelligence without clear and specific authority. But no one would ever 
know this from reading Allen Dulles' book. (In a later chapter more will 
be said about the financial arrangements to include the Central Intelligence 
Agency Act of 1949.) 

Just a few lines after his statement about the CIA's "mandate", Mr. 
Dulles makes another point designed to have the reader believe that 
clandestine operations were a very matter of fact thing: "One of the unique 
features of CIA was that its evaluation and coordinating side was to treat 
the intelligence produced by its clandestine arm in the same fashion that 
information from other government agencies was treated." That sentence 
really does not mean a thing pertinent to what he had been saying in his 
book, with the one big exception. He is including the clandestine arm idea 
again with an otherwise true and correct statement — its evaluating and 
coordinating side — to make the reader believe that because one statement 
has the ring of truth, the other must be true also. Then he continues with 
one of his boldest and most brazen statements. There would be no reason 
to call it "bold and brazen" except for the fact that he is making all of these 
remarks in the part of the book he calls the "Evolution of American 
Intelligence". The use of the word "evolution" connotes a theme of 
chronological development by sequence. He has been manipulating the 
chronology to make what he is saying appear to be a part of the law or of 
other true directives, when in fact they did not develop in quite that order. 
Thus the next statement is most significant: "Another feature of CIA's 
structure, which did not come about all at once but was the result of 
gradual mergers which experience showed to be practical and efficient, 
was the incorporation of all clandestine activities under one roof and one 
management." The statement is not untrue as it stands; but it is true not 
because of the law, or of directives which created the CIA as it is today. 
The final roll-over of the evolutionary process was a runaway situation 
created more by the ST itself, in which even the Agency was one of the 
tools in the greater action, than it was by law and design of the normal 
channels of the Government. 



This whole issue has been made needlessly complex by those who 
have been unwilling to submit to and comply with the law and to NSC 
directives as they have been written. We have said earlier that one of the 
most important facts of the law is that the CIA was created "under the 
direction of the NSC". We see again that the fifth duty says that the CIA 
will "perform such other functions and duties ... as the NSC may from 
time to time direct." There is a world of difference in saying that the CIA 
will do what the NSC directs from saying that the CIA may do what the 
NSC authorizes. It is one thing to take a proposal to a committee and win 
their approval and thereby to gain the authority to perform the requested 
activity. It is an entirely different thing to be called to a meeting of so 
eminent a body as the NSC and to be "directed" to perform an activity. 

On this simple and clear point the CIA protagonists have rebelled 
and argued and connived for almost twenty-five years. Through a 
succession of skillful internecine maneuvers the CIA, working within the 
ST and shielded by secrecy and the systems and pressures that heavy 
secrecy make it possible to utilize, has been able to either plant people in 
the NSC who are really CIA agents or men who will work at their bidding, 
or to so brief and brainwash the NSC representative or his designated 
alternate so that he will believe the CIA explanation of what the law and 
the directives mean. 

This is why it has been important to read the Dulles book line by 
line. This book is no more nor less than a final compilation of all of the 
soothing syrup and old wives' tales Allen Dulles concocted and poured 
over the fevered brows of men in high office and high public and private 
position for twenty-five years. The book shows how the CIA has been 
"sold" to the inner staff of the Government and to others, such as writers 
and commentators, businessmen and educators, both in this country and 
all over the world. 

One would like to speak as kindly as possible and to say that these 
misinterpretations that cropped up in this book were no more than 
mistakes and that they can be attributed in part perhaps to ignorance of all 
the facts; but this could not possibly apply here. This cover story and fairy 
tale about the "evolution of American intelligence" had been fabricated by 
highly intelligent men and has been honed to a fine edge through years of 
skillful manipulation and practice. It is not the result of ignorance or lack 
of comprehension. This cover story is the planned scheme of a team of 
men who wish to present the CIA as a benign and well-controlled 
organization operating under law and directive, and doing nothing except 
intelligence, when for the most part and in actual practice it is not. 

The Agency is very much aware, too, that it cannot look back, 
because fate is creeping up on it. The tremendous pressures in this country 
that have built up during the long tragic years of the conflict in Indochina 
are driving researchers, politicians, and other concerned Americans to 
search for the origins and sources of responsibility for that disaster. This is 
bringing them closer and closer each day to the curtain of secrecy that has 
effectively veiled these areas from sight for more than a decade. This 



pressure is now forcing Agency and ST supporters to begin a serious 
program of rewriting history, in a massive effort to protect and shield the 
Agency while shifting the search into other avenues. We have already said 
that the work of Daniel Ellsberg and the number of people who helped 
him may have been the first major step in this effort. The released 
Pentagon Papers do much to portray the CIA as it is supposed to be, while 
doing all it can to shift any censure of the CIA as an organization 
primarily concerned with clandestine operations, to the military, the 
National Security Council, and the White House. 

Now a second salvo has been favored in an attempt to go further 
along this same road for the purpose of whitewashing the Agency. As the 
sometimes prestigious Foreign Affairs, the quarterly review of the Council 
on Foreign Relations, enters its fiftieth year, it has published an article 
entitled "The CIA and Decision-Making", by Chester L. Cooper. The 
author is listed as the "Director of the International and Social Studies 
Division, Institute of Defense Analysis; Special Assistant to Averill 
Harriman in planning the U.S. negotiating position on Vietnam, 1966- 
1967; Senior Staff Member, National Security Council, 

1964-1966; author of The Last Crusade: America in Vietnam." The 
review does not add that he was and may still be a member of the CIA. 
This contribution to current history is a most astounding bit of writing and 
reweaving of events. It appears to be Phase II, or at least a part of Phase II, 
of the whitewashing of the CIA in Indochina. This article is a most expert 
and ideal example of what is meant by saying that the CIA likes to see 
itself in front, as long as it can control the pen. 

It begins most suitably by pointing out that Allen Dulles selected the 
motto, which is chiseled into the marble at the entrance to the new CIA 
building in Langley, Virginia, from the words of St. John: "The truth shall 
make you free." And with this fresh in mind, the article goes on to say, " . . 
. one of his [Allen Dulles's] greatest contributions in nurturing the frail 
arrangements he helped to create [was] to provide intelligence support to 
Washington's top-level foreign-policy-makers." Then it gets down to the 
serious business of trying to show how ardently the CIA (Intelligence) has 
worked during the Indochina conflict, wholly ignoring the other, and 
major side of the house, CIA (Clandestine Operations) and CIA (senior 
member of the Secret Team). 

To set the stage, it dwells upon the responsibility of the CIA to turn 
out the National Intelligence Estimates. "When PRAVDA has been 
scanned, the road-watchers' reports from Laos checked, the economic 
research completed, Pham van Dong's recent speeches dissected, radar 
signals examined, satellite observations analyzed and embassy cables read, 
the estimators set about their task ... it is likely to be the best-informed 
and most objective view the decision-makers can get . . . [they] brood 
about the world's problems and project their views about how these 
problems are likely to affect America's national security interests." All of 
this is to laud the intelligence side of the house, and this praise is most 
deserved. However, the intelligence staff has had its problems, and in 



mentioning some, this article attempts to use them as a means of shifting 
some blame to other parties, as in the following: "... the Office of 
National Estimates had a thin audience during the Johnson 
Administration." In other words, if the Johnson Administration did not 
take advantage of this excellent intelligence, then certainly the CIA can't 
be blamed for what befell that Administration; or at least this is what this 
author would like his readers to believe. 

Then to enlarge the scope of his case he adds, "Nixon's 
Administration . . . relegated the National Intelligence Estimates to but a 
tiny fraction of the studies, analyses, position papers, contingency plans, 
research reports and memoranda generated by the large new NSC staff . . . 
" Again he implies that if the Nixon Administration failed to heed the 
National Estimates, it was its own fault and not that of the CIA. 

Having set the stage and prepared his case, he goes directly to the 
heart of the matter: "Most Americans concerned about foreign affairs have 
long had to accept on blind faith that our government takes pains to 
provide its highest officials with the best possible intelligence guidance — 
and then to squirm under our private suspicions that this advice is, all too 
often, regarded with indifference. Thanks to Daniel Ellsberg, those of us 
who have not seen a National Intelligence Estimate for many years, or 
who have never seen one, can address the matter with somewhat more 
confidence than we could have a few months ago. Although it probably 
did not cross Ellsberg's mind when he released the Pentagon Papers to The 
New York Times, he succeeded in doing what the Agency, on its own, has 
rarely been able to do for more than twenty years: he made the CIA 'look 
good' through what inhabitants of the Pickle Factory themselves would 
call a 'highly credible source'." 

To those well steeped in the ways of the real CIA, and unfortunately 
there are too few who are, the above statement fits the pattern. Here is an 
Agency partisan praising Daniel Ellsberg. This does much to support our 
earlier contention that one of the real reasons these papers were delivered 
to the public was really on behalf of the CIA and the ST and not the other 
way around. Then the article goes on to say "... the Pentagon Papers tell 
us little about what actually happened in the White House Cabinet room, 
they do reveal much about the intelligence guidance made available to the 
policy-makers." He is still working on the major premise in an attempt to 
show that everything the CIA did was right, by showing from the included 
extracts how excellent its intelligence product was during those trying 
years. Let's look further into this propaganda, as an example is selected 
from among the many available. 

"By mid-summer, the issue of American support for Diem's 
fledgling and untried government was high on the NSC's agenda. The CIA 
was requested to prepare an Estimate on the viability of a Western- 
supported, anti-Communist government in Vietnam. According to the 
Pentagon Papers, the National Intelligence Estimate of August 3 (1954) 
warned that 'even with American support it was unlikely that the French or 
Vietnamese would be able to establish a strong government and that the 



situation would probably continue to deteriorate!' The NSC, nevertheless, 
recommended American aid for the frail and untried Vietnamese 
government, a recommendation that was soon followed by President 
Eisenhower's fateful letter to Diem offering American support. 

"This estimate had long since been validated and it seems clear that 
the United States would now be better off if President Eisenhower had 
paid more heed to that warning and less to the strong pressures that were 
being exerted by his Secretary of State and hard line members of 
Congress." 

This voice of the CIA is saying that the CIA National Intelligence 
Estimate "has long since been validated" and "the United States would 
now be better off" if the President had listened to it and not to John Foster 
Dulles and "hard-line members of Congress". Remember, as we review 
the record further, that this NIE, as reported by Foreign Affairs, was dated 
August 3, 1954. 

During this very same period when such NIE were establishing a 
cover story for the clandestine side of the CIA, the record shows that the 
Director of Intelligence, Allen Dulles, was working through his 
clandestine channels to keep knowledge of his activities from other 
officials of the Government and at the same time to establish a vast 
clandestine operational presence in Indochina. To compound this 
deception, the Foreign Affairs article of January 1972 presents a bold 
attempt to further conceal the duplicity of the CIA by hiding these facts 
and at the same time blaming members of Congress, John Foster Dulles, 
and President Eisenhower for things that were being done, not by them at 
all, but by Allen Dulles and his clandestine staff. There can be no other 
way to interpret this action to cover up the role of the Agency during the 
early and formative years of the Indochina conflict than to expose it as a 
premeditated effort to rewrite and restructure history by hiding the 
operational role of the CIA under its Intelligence cover. 

This is one of the most compelling reasons why "secret intelligence" 
and "secret operations" should not be placed under the authority of one 
agency. 

In spite of what the Office of National Estimates was saying during 
1954, on January 30, 1954, during a meeting of the President's Special 
Committee on Indochina, Allen W. Dulles inquired if an unconventional 
warfare officer, specifically Colonel Lansdale, could not be added to the 
group of five liaison officers to which General Navarre had agreed. In 
other words, as early as January 1954, Allen Dulles was moving into the 
action in Indochina with his crack team of agents, among them Ed 
Lansdale. 

Then, by April 5, 1954, the conclusions of the report of this same 
Presidential Committee included the following: "The United States should, 
in all prudence, take the following courses of action ... to give vitality in 
Southeast Asia to the concept that Communist imperialism is a 



transcending threat to each of the Southeastern Asian States. These efforts 
should be so undertaken as to appear through local initiative rather than as 
a result of U.S. or U.K. or French instigation. "This action was assigned to 
USIA, (United States Information Agency), the State Department, and the 
CIA. 

It was to be the job of the CIA, among others, to see that the 
"concept" of the "threat to each of the Southeast Asian States" was to be 
made to appear to be "Communist imperialism". This was the direct 
charge of a committee on which Allen Dulles served and is a blunt 
definition of how anti-Communism is hoisted to the top of the mast 
whenever it is needed as a rallying symbol. As the theme of the 
"transcending threat" in Indochina, it was in the direct line to the later 
Communist-supported-war-of-national-liberation theme and then to the 
Communist-inspired-subversive-insurgency theme of the Kennedy era. 
There can be little wonder why, in the minds of most Americans, South 
Vietnam is so intricately tied to the idea of Communist subversion. Words 
such as the above show clearly the role of the initiative taken by the CIA 
in Indochina as far back as 1954, even while the Office of National 
Estimates was saying otherwise. 

And while all this was going on, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, the 
chairman of the JCS, gave a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense 
which included the following extract: "The JCS desire to point out their 
belief that, from the point of view of the USA, with reference to the Far 
East as a whole, Indochina is devoid of decisive military objectives, and 
the allocation of more than token U.S. armed forces in Indochina would be 
a serious diversion of limited U.S. capabilities." This was the view of the 
top military man as presented at the same time Dulles was sending his 
teams into action there, under the cover of military men. 

While this was happening, the Geneva Conference was under way. 
Although the Foreign Affairs article chooses to heap blame on John Foster 
Dulles, we should recall that Dulles had not attended that conference since 
its organizational meetings. In his place he had sent his Under Secretary, 
Walter Bedell Smith, who had been the DCI before he went to the 
Department of State. Certainly John Foster Dulles, whose brother was the 
DCI and whose principal assistant was a former DCI, was well aware of 
the views of the Office of National Estimates on the one hand, and of the 
actions of the clandestine side of the house on the other. 

Then the Saigon Military Mission (SMM) ("military" only in the 
sense that it was a cover arrangement) entered Vietnam on June 1, 1954. 
This mission "was to enter into Vietnam quietly and assist the Vietnamese, 
rather than the French, in unconventional warfare. The French were to be 
kept as friendly allies in the process, as far as possible. The broad mission 
for the team was to undertake paramilitary operations against the enemy 
and to wage political-psychological warfare. Later, after Geneva, the 
mission was modified to prepare means for undertaking paramilitary 
operations in Communist areas rather than to wage unconventional 
warfare . . . "OJ By its own statement of mission this team was not to aid 



the French and was to wage a paramilitary campaign against the "enemy". 
This left it with only one real mission, "to assist the new government of 
Ngo Dinh Diem". And Allen Dulles sent this clandestine team into South 
Vietnam in August of 1954, exactly the same month of the NIE, which the 
Foreign Affairs article says the CIA published as guidance for this 
country. Dulles' covert actions and his overt NIE were in direct conflict. 
He was saying one thing and doing another. 

There is only one conclusion that can be drawn from such writing, 
and it is derived from one of two alternatives: Either the author did not 
know about the existence of and the mission of the Dulles directed 
Lansdale SMM team; or if he did, he was attempting to cover up the CIA 
role in such activity, which had more to do with the course of events in 
Indochina since that time than anything else done by any of the other 
participants. 

Here again we see the ST at work. It is most interested in covering 
up its role in Indochina during the past twenty years, and in so doing it is 
skillfully working to shift the blame wherever it can. It is trying to charge 
that if the military, the diplomats, President Eisenhower, President 
Johnson, and President Nixon all had heeded its advice as contained in the 
National Estimates, they would not have gotten this country into such 
trouble. Their efforts even go so far as to attempt to hide behind their 
intelligence position by using the "transparent" Pentagon Papers. The 
Foreign Affairs article would have its readers believe that the NIE is the 
only real CIA and that such things as the Saigon Military Mission, because 
it was called a "military" mission, will be discovered not to be the CIA at 
all. 

We have been saying that the release of the Pentagon Papers by the 
former CIA agent and long-time associate of Edward G. Lansdale, Daniel 
Ellsberg, may have been the opening attack by the CIA to cover its 
disengagement not only from the physical conflict in Indochina, but also 
from the historical record of that disastrous event. In this effort, the CIA 
appears to be trying to hide behind its own best cover story, that it is only 
an intelligence agency and that its fine intelligence work during the past 
twenty years on the subject of Southeast Asia is all that we should 
remember. 

Now we find in Cooper another CIA apologist using the Foreign 
Affairs review to follow up and to praise Ellsberg. In fact, Cooper's 
exhilaration in his task gets the better of him when he says, "Thanks to 
Daniel Ellsberg ..." he means it! This near-endorsement of Ellsberg by a 
CIA writer in the publication of the Council on Foreign Relations is all the 
more significant when one learns that this Council is supported by 
foundations which are in turn directed by men from the Bechtel 
Corporation, Chese Manhattan Bank, Cummins Engine, Corning Glass, 
Kimberly-Clark, Monsanto Chemical, and dozens of others. Not long ago, 
the political scientist Lester Milbraith noted that "the Council on Foreign 
Relations, while not financed by government, works so closely with it that 
it is difficult to distinguish Council actions stimulated by government 



from autonomous actions." And while we appreciate that Foreign Affairs 
states clearly that "It does not accept responsibility for the views expressed 
in any articles, signed or unsigned, which appear on [its] pages", its record 
and especially its list of authors over the years, from John Foster Dulles in 
its first issue, speaks for itself. 

This whole plot thickens to the point of near-hypocrisy when 
Cooper cites the August 3, 1954, National Intelligence Estimate. The same 
Pentagon Paper from which he quotes also contains a report on the year- 
long activity of the Saigon Military Mission. This report, written by 
Edward G. Lansdale of the CIA, began in that same month of August 

1954. While the NIE was speaking disparagingly of Ngo Dunh Diem, the 
SMM was supporting the Diem regime during the days after the French 
defeat at Dien Bien Phu. This team and all of its efforts were CIA 
originated, CIA supported, CIA manned, and CIA directed. From 1954 
through 1963, all American activity in Vietnam was dominated by the 
CIA. Although Lansdale and his key men, such as Charles Bohanon, 
Lucien Conein (the U.S. go between at the time of the Diem coup d'etat, 
Bill Rosson, Arthur Arundel, Rufus Phillips, and others were listed in the 
Pentagon Papers with military rank, they were all in the employ of the 
CIA and were operating as CIA agents. 

This is what the Pentagon Papers reveal as happening in 1954 and 

1955. Now the CIA would have us believe that it was an objective and 
blameless intelligence agency all through those horrible years of the 
Vietnam build-up. However, it was the CIA that hid behind its own cover 
and that of State and Defense to fan the flames of a smoldering conflict. 
To add insult to injury, the CIA would have us believe that Eisenhower's 
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, the DOD, Lyndon B. Johnson, and 
Richard M. Nixon were all to blame because they would not read and heed 
their NIE. Where were the CIA officials of the clandestine sector when 
their own men were writing these National Intelligence Estimates? 

The big question is, If the National Estimates produced by the 
intelligence side of the CIA were so good, then why didn't the men in the 
clandestine operations office read and follow the advice of their own 
estimates? Yes, the CIA likes to write about itself, and the CIA likes to 
have others write about it, as long as what they write is laudatory and 
skillful propaganda. 

How can the CIA rationalize the fact that at the very same time it 
was sending its most powerful and experienced team of agents into action 
in Indochina, after its successes with Magsaysay in the Philippines, it was 
writing NIE for the President saying exactly the opposite? It is alarming 
enough today to put the Ellsberg releases and the Cooper tales together, 
but what did the CIA have in mind in 1954 when it was doing such 
disparate things? What did the CIA expect President Eisenhower and John 
Foster Dulles to believe: The NIE that said we couldn't win with the "frail 
Diem regime", or the SMM clandestine operation that was designed to 
support the same Diem regime? Or could it have been that they either did 
not know about the secret operation or were improperly briefed? This is 



the very heart of the matter. This is what this book is all about. 

To put this in another context, when Eisenhower was planning for 
the ultimate summit meeting in May 1960, did the NIE say that all was 
going well and nothing should be done to upset the chances of success of 
that most important mission; and did the DD/P come in with his briefing 
for the U-2 flight at the same time? Or perhaps was there an NIE and no 
briefing about the U-2? How did the ST handle that one? 

Or to carry this same theme over to early 1961, did the NIE 
correctly foretell that the Cubans would not rise up and support an 
invasion of so few troops without United States troops and air cover; and 
how did the DD/P brief the secret operation to President Kennedy to 
perform an invasion operation that was patently diametrically opposed to 
the NIE? 

To drive home the point of this duality farther, Cooper states: "In 
November 1961, shortly after General Taylor|2l and Walt Rostow returned 
from their trip to Vietnam recommending, inter alia, that the U.S. 'offer to 
introduce into South Vietnam a military task force', an NIE warned that 
any escalation of American military activity in Vietnam would be matched 
by similar escalation by Hanoi . . . the North Vietnamese would respond to 
an increased U.S. commitment with an offsetting increase in infiltrated 
support for the Viet Cong." 

Again the Intelligence Directorate of the CIA plays the lily white 
role. At about the same time, July 1961, the Pentagon Papers show that a 
report, again by Edward C. Lansdale, at that time a brigadier general 
assigned to McNamara's staff and still, as ever, a strong supporter of the 
CIA, lists the very considerable amount of unconventional warfare 
resources in Southeast Asia, which were supported by and operating under 
the CIA. These military and paramilitary forces added into the tens of 
thousands of armed men and were liberally supported by American men, 
American money, and American equipment, all put in place under the 
direction of the CIA. The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General 
Cabell, had just ordered the CIA-operated United States Marine Corps|31 
helicopter squadron from Laos, where things had turned from bad to 
worse, into South Vietnam, where things were going to turn from bad to 
worse. They were flown into the Camau Peninsula by Americans, and they 
were supported by Americans for the purpose of airlifting the Special 
Forces Elite troops of Ngo Dinh Nhu for action against the citizens of that 
terrorized area. This was another example of what was going on in the 
covert field at the same time that Intelligence was putting out an Estimate 
to the contrary. We have Cooper to thank for the "nice" story and Ellsberg 
to thank for the "not-so-nice" story. Who was President Kennedy to 
believe — the man who came in with the NIE, or the man who came in to 
brief him about the tremendous clandestine and paramilitary operations? 
Or did they tell the President about both? 

Today, the CIA would like us to believe that it had challenged the 
validity of the hallowed Domino Theory by advising Lyndon B. Johnson 



that, with the possible exception of Cambodia, it is likely that no nation in 
the area would quickly succumb to Communism as a result of the fall of 
Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore, a continuation of the spread of 
Communism in the area would not be irreparable. 

In 1961, the same time as this quote, Maxwell Taylor, the White 
House spokesman of the clandestine side of the CIA, informed President 
Kennedy that "the fall of South Vietnam to Communism would lead to the 
fairly rapid extension of Communist control, or complete accommodation 
to Communism, in the rest of the mainland of South East Asia and in 
Indonesia. The strategic implications worldwide, particularly in the Orient, 
would be extremely serious. "[41 In those days, Maxwell Taylor expressed 
more properly the views of the CIA (DD/P) than those of the DOD where 
he was held in awe and suspicion after his return from retirement to 
become a member of the Kennedy "inside" staff. 

General Taylor continued to espouse this view even after he moved 
to the Pentagon as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On January 22, 
1964, in a memo to Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, he said, 
"A loss of South Vietnam to the Communists will presage an early erosion 
of the remainder of our position in that subcontinent." Even though he had 
moved to the Pentagon, Taylor's memoranda on South Vietnam were 
written by the Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special 
Activity, an office within the confines of the Pentagon, but an office that 
had been created to work with the CIA, and which by that date had 
become a regular conduit for CIA thought and action. 

Then, McNamara picked up this same "party line" in his memo to 
President Johnson (at that time his memoranda on this subject were 
written either by Lansdale or Bill Bundy, both CIA men) of March 16, 
1967 "... Southeast Asia will probably fall under Communist dominance, 
all of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia . . . Burma . . . Indonesia . . . 
Malaysia . . . Thailand . . . Philippines . . . India . . . Australia . . . New 
Zealand . . . Taiwan . . . Korea and Japan . ..." By now, everyone was 
putting all pressure possible on Johnson, and as noted, they used all of the 
dominoes. Yet the CIA today would have us believe they were only the 
voice of the DD/I and not the DD/P speaking, through SACSA, to 
Maxwell Taylor, thence to McNamara, with input from Bundy and 
Lansdale, and on to Rusk and Johnson. No wonder the CIA wants men 
like Cooper and Ellsberg writing for them. 

The final irony is discovered when the Cooper story begins to pit 
the National Estimates against other Ellsberg data in 1964-1965. He states 
that the NIE of late 1964 claimed that, "... we do not believe that such 
actions [against the North] would have crucial effect in the daily lives of 
the overwhelming majority of the North Vietnamese population. We do 
not believe that attacks on industrial targets would so exacerbate current 
economic difficulties as to create unmanageable control problems [for the 
Hanoi regime] . . . would probably be willing to suffer some damage to the 
country in the course of a test of wills with the U.S. over the course of 
events in South Vietnam. "[51 Then, as if to place the blame on the military, 



he adds, "As the Pentagon historians note, this view had little influence on 
the contingency papers which emerged." 

The most remarkable thing about this paragraph from Foreign 
Affairs is that it is directly the opposite of the views presented in the 
Pentagon Papers as the "William Bundy memo" on "Actions Available to 
the United States after Tonkin", which is dated August 11, 1964. Bill 
Bundy was at that time no longer sitting in the Pentagon; he was working 
for the ST as Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. 
However, overriding that position, Bill Bundy was always the ready 
spokesman and puppet, in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, 
for the CIA. He had been with the CIA for ten years, was the son-in-law of 
Dean Acheson, and has been reported, as of this writing, to be in line for 
the position of editor of Foreign Affairs. 

In this utterly fantastic memo, CIA spokesman Bill Bundy listed 
pages of "dirty tricks" and increasing pressures that were to be brought to 
bear against Hanoi, including the Rostow favorite, "tit for tat" actions. By 
late 1964, military escalation had begun, and the role of the CIA did not 
diminish — it was just overshadowed by the greater military magnitude. 
The flames that the CIA and the greater ST had ignited were faced by the 
military. However, even this huge force was never able to snuff them out; 
it just had to stand there and let them burn themselves out. 

Then the Cooper account presents Dr. Sherman Kent, the long-time 
chief of the Board of National Estimates saying: "The nature of our calling 
requires that we pretend as hard as we are able that the wish is indeed the 
fact and that the policy-maker will invariably defer to our findings ..." 
He feels that his associates' concern about their influence is misplaced: " . 
. . no matter what we tell the policymaker, and no matter how right we are 
and how convincing, he will upon occasion disregard the thrust of our 
findings for reasons beyond our ken. If influence cannot be our goal, what 
should it be? ... It should be to be relevant within the area of your 
competence, and above all it should be to be credible." 

Sherman Kent is an old pro. He knows his business and is one of the 
very best in his field; but how strange the context of this Foreign Affairs 
essay must seem to him. While he did prepare these NIE, his own 
associates in clandestine operations and his own boss, the DCI, were 
fanning out all over Southeast Asia under the cover of his professional 
expertise, not only oblivious and unheeding of his work, but making 
mockery of it. Such are the ways of the ST. 

When a National Estimate is presented by the same house that 
presents the collateral and usually opposite view of Special Operations, 
the Agency pulls the rug from under the feet of its own best achievements 
and the men responsible for them. Allen Dulles was wrong when he wrote 
in 1948, along with Jackson and Correa, that the two broad functions of 
Intelligence and Special Operations should be under the same man and in 
the same agency. There is nothing wrong with the NIE system and with 
men like Sherman Kent, Ray Cline, and Bob Amory. The evil is on the 



other side; and in spite of the vigorous efforts of Agency zealots, who 
have attempted to rewrite the history of the past quarter-century, we 
cannot but take some faith in those words of Saint John, that Allen Dulles 
chose for the entrance way of the new CIA building: "The truth shall make 
you free." This attempt to warp the truth will not. 

It might also have been well if the Agency and its disciples had 
reconsidered their own "more appropriate choice" for a motto: "Look 
before you leap." The American public and the world for which Arnold 
Toynbee speaks, prefer Truth. 



1. The Pentagon Papers (New York Times ed.) 1971. 

2. At that time, General Taylor was Special Military Advisor to President Kennedy — that was the overt title. He 
was the CIA clandestine operations man closer to Allen Dulles than to anyone in the Pentagon. He was in the 
office later held by McGeorge Bundy and currently by Henry Kissinger, who by the way has long been a key 
spokesman for the Council of Foreign Relations. 

3. The helicopters had been obtained from the USMC but there were no Marines in the organization flying them, 
or on the ground. The New York Times report of The Pentagon Papers, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 148. 

4. The New York Times report of The Pentagon Papers, Nov. 8, 1961, p. 148. 

5. Ibid. p. 148. 



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Chapter 9 
The Coincidence of Crises 



The National Security Act of 1947 was brewed in a cauldron under 
great heat and pressure, with the flavoring of spices from many sources. 
The year 1947 was one of great pressures that simmered and smoldered 
below the surface of national events. 1946, so close to the end of the great 
war, had begun as the year of "one world", with faith in the charter of the 
United Nations. On the first day of March 1946, barely six months after 
the end of World War II, Truman's Secretary of State, James Byrnes, had 
said, "So far as the United States is concerned we will gang up against no 
state. We will do nothing to break the world into exclusive blocks or 
spheres of influence in this atomic age. We will not seek to divide a world 
which is one." 

Then, only four days later, the great hero of Britain's war days and 
the leader of the Loyal Opposition in the British House of Commons, Sir 
Winston Churchill, speaking in Fulton, Missouri, with President Truman 
at his side, said: "Beware . . . the time may be short . . . From Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic an Iron Curtain has descended across the 
continent." At about the same time, George F. Kennan, one of the Russian 
authorities of the U.S. Department of State said, "If Europe was to be 
divided, the blame should be placed on the Russians and not ourselves." 

Under the pressures brewing at that time, it took only a short time to 
depart from the dream of one world at peace and to plant the seeds of 
rupture and divisiveness. The one world had in a brief span become 
bipolar, with the atom bomb hanging as the sword over the heads of 
mankind, and Communism as the dread enemy of the Western world. 

Following quickly upon the dismemberment of the victorious 
military might of the U.S. and upon the dissolution of the OSS came the 
transfer in January 1947 of the great nuclear weapon technology to the 
new Atomic Energy Commission. This momentous project had no sooner 
been set up than a great tumult arose in Congress about the loyalty of two 
of the leaders of this program, David E. Lilienthal and J. Robert 
Oppenheimer. Already, Communism, or more properly, a new banner and 
call-to-arms, "anti-Communism", had raised its head. This issue played an 
important part in the philosophy behind the development of the CIA. 



The United States had a nuclear monopoly in 1947. At least, it was 
the only country in the world with weapons on hand, with the means of 
delivering them, and with the production know-how and capacity to 
increase the nuclear stockpile. Therefore, it became a matter of great 
national interest first of all to protect those weapons, the delivery system, 
and the production techniques from other nations, from their spies, and 
from those who might aid those nations by giving away our secret. And 
secondly, it became most important that we have the intelligence 
capability to learn, without delay, the status of the state-of-the-art in any 
other nation that might be attempting to build nuclear weapons. Our 
scientists and other practical men knew that once we had exploded a bomb 
over the sands of New Mexico and over Japan, other scientists would be 
well on their way toward duplicating this feat, since they now knew that 
such a thing was possible. Thus, development of the atomic bomb by 
another nation would be no more than a matter of time and intention; it 
would not be helped too much by either the activity of spies or interested 
parties from within our own country. 

The interplay of these most important factors created great pressures 
for the realization of a central intelligence capability of much greater 
capacity and effectiveness than anything that had existed before World 
War II. 

To add more fuel to this raging conflagration, the British announced 
on February 21, 1947, that they could no longer provide financial support 
to the weak governments of Greece and Turkey to enable them to continue 
their battles against Communist aggression and subversion in the form of 
strong rebel activity. The sudden departure of the British from this crucial 
portion of Eastern Europe left a serious vacuum that had to be filled by 
someone else without delay. Only three weeks after the unexpected British 
announcement, on March 12, 1947, President Truman proclaimed the 
Truman Doctrine, which in effect established a stout barrier between the 
world of Communism and the Western world along the northern borders 
of Greece and Turkey. 

Churchill had specifically drawn the line from "Stettin in the Baltic 
to Trieste in the Adriatic". Now Harry Truman had extended that line from 
the Adriatic to the borders of Iran. It had not taken long to totally reverse 
course from Secretary of State Byrnes's, "We will not seek to divide the 
world which is one" to the lasting division which continues even today, 
after twenty-five Cold War years. To strengthen this position and to drive 
home the full intentions of the United States, the new Secretary of State, 
George C. Marshall, announced in July of 1947, the plan for all of Europe, 
designed to help those countries that had been ravaged by war and were 
"threatened by the onslaught of Communism" to recover sufficiently to 
stand upon their own feet. 

In this test of history, while charges of "Communism" were being 
hurled back and forth among adversaries who in the great majority of 
cases had nothing whatsoever to do with real Communism, Congress was 
debating and writing the National Security Act, which on the surface was 



primarily concerned with the military establishment, but was beneath the 
surface, where the real pressures were most at work, fundamentally 
concerned with the creation of a central intelligence agency. It was in this 
highly charged atmosphere that the philosophy of the military posture of 
"defense" emerged. Throughout the history of this country, there had been 
a great respect for and tradition of the honorable resort to arms in time of 
war. As a result, this country had a long and proud heritage, which 
supported the existence of a Department of War and a Department of the 
Navy with its proud Marine Corps. All men knew that the United States 
would resort to war only when diplomacy and all other efforts had failed. 
Yet no one misunderstood the full meaning of such a tradition. The heart 
of war and its only sure way to victory lies in the concept of the "offense", 
carried out in pursuit of clear national military objectives, under superior 
leadership both in uniform on the field of battle and in mufti in the White 
House. Somehow, under the pressures of the great debates during 1947, 
this tradition and heritage broke down, and in the face of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon this country in the Nuclear Age and in the 
face of a growing "Communist menace", the American military posture 
became one of defense. 

This was a significant mutation in the dominant cell structure of the 
life blood and soul of this nation. The very word "offense" connotes action 
and the existence of a plan of such action. A country that is in command of 
all of its facilities and has the vigor to shape its own destiny does so in 
accordance with a plan, a great national plan, and with the sense of action 
that is the very essence of life and liberty. Liberty itself is a difficult word 
to encompass within a single definition. But certainly there can be no 
liberty if there is no action, because one is not free to act if frozen in the 
posture of defense, waiting to counteract the free action of his adversaries, 
real and imagined. For the greatest nation in the world suddenly to assume 
the role of a defensive power is a certain signal of some major change in 
national character. One would hope to discover that this was to be 
interpreted as a symbol of magnanimity and understanding while the 
nation was in sole and undisputed possession of the atomic bomb; but 
events of the past twenty-five years make it difficult to accept that 
position. 

This national defense posture places even greater emphasis upon the 
role of intelligence. If any nation goes on the defensive, then by its very 
nature it must be — it is forced to be — totally dependent upon intelligence. 
If a man is adequately armed, and he is hiding behind a wall reasonably 
secure from his adversary, the one thing he needs most is information to 
tell him where his adversary is, what he is doing, whether he is armed, and 
even what his intentions are. In that unusual year, 1947, the great 
pressures upon Congress and the Administration somehow impressed 
upon the Government of this country the beginnings of a belief in reliance 
upon a major intelligence structure to be backed up by a powerful 
Department of Defense. 

It takes a long time, as Darwin made very clear, for an evolutionary 
process to make itself known. For many years, this nation of veterans, and 



mothers and fathers of veterans, along with the sisters and brothers of 
veterans, has looked upon the post- 1947 Army, Navy, and Air Force, not 
as they were becoming, but as they had known them at first hand at 
Normandy and Iwo Jima, at the Battle of Midway and the undersea 
services, in the Eighth Air Force over Fortress Germany, and with the B- 
29s of the Twentieth Air Force flying back from a fire-ravaged Tokyo. 

Thus it was that while the country was caught up in the great debate 
about "unification", about the new role of nuclear weapons and about anti- 
Communism, it failed to note that our military establishment was being 
diverted from an active role as an essential element of national planning to 
a response position of re-action to the inputs of intelligence. This was not 
evident during the remaining years of the forties. Its first indication 
became apparent at the time of the Korean War, and what was not 
prominently apparent in the more open and overt military establishment 
certainly was scarcely noticed in the early days of the CIA. 

In support of this low-key first blush of a defense posture, the CIA 
was placed under the direction of an admiral who had as his deputy a 
general. Both of them supported the idea that for the new CIA, intelligence 
was to be business as usual. As had been expected, and in strict 
compliance with the language of the law, the CIA was developed along 
military lines. In fact, little thought was given to organizing it any other 
way by those who were given the responsibility of getting things started. 
As Lyman Kirkpatrick wrote, "... most of the senior positions in the 
Agency at that time were held by military personnel who had been 
detailed for a tour of duty. Some of these were well qualified, but many 
were not. In any event they were in key positions ..." 

These were the type of men who believed that intelligence was a 
supporting staff function only and that the object of an intelligence 
organization, whether it was in the field with a fighting outfit or at the seat 
of government serving as the "quiet intelligence arm of the President", was 
simply to coordinate, evaluate, and analyze information and to provide it 
to the President and his Cabinet members for their own use as they saw fit. 
They did not view their job as secret operations, to be set in motion by the 
intelligence agency itself. Not only was this the outlook of men in the key 
positions of the Agency; but this was also the way the President saw it. 
President Truman looked upon this new agency as his staff section for 
information, and no more; and there were many others in Washington who 
wanted it that way too. 

Although a central intelligence agency had been created, under law, 
and had been accepted within the already existent community as essential 
for the purpose of coordinating national intelligence, there were many who 
wished to keep its role to a minimum. None of the traditional intelligence 
organizations wanted to give up anything to the CIA. They agreed to share 
with it the role of formulating "national intelligence", but that was it, as far 
as they were concerned. As a result, they all participated, more or less 
evenly, in manning the fledgling agency and in seeing that it got under 
way in a manner sufficient to accomplish its primary assigned task, and no 



more. Within this group there was little desire to make the CIA into the 
agency it is today, nor was there any desire to see the Agency enter into 
clandestine activity of any kind. They believed that if such a task was 
required by higher authority and in support of a national plan of supreme 
importance, then the new NSC would, with approval of the President, 
direct that it be performed by any of several possible organizations, one of 
which might be the CIA. This was a more or less routine assumption, and 
it was about as far as any of those officials at that time wanted to go. 

It should also be noted that among the early military assignees to the 
Agency there were those who had personal ambition and plans to work up 
in this new organization, bypassing the conventions of their old units to 
achieve some personal goal, which in some cases included the desire for a 
"fun and games" career. As the years passed, many of these men were able 
to do just that, and they formed a nucleus within the Agency, which for a 
variety of reasons, strove to exploit the covert side of the house. 

It was from among this group that the first activists emerged to 
begin the covert process of using the Agency to utilize and later to 
dominate the military. We shall see beginnings of this in this chapter; it 
will be more fully developed later. These agents employed covert methods 
not always to conceal their actions from the "enemy", but more often to 
keep the inroads they were making in the actual exploitation and use of 
our own military from being discovered. One of the better examples of 
such activity has been the "mutual" development of a method of 
operations between the CIA and the U.S. Army Special Forces. 

There were other men in Washington at that time who opposed the 
way military men in key positions were developing the Agency. They 
were actively and vociferously opposed to the Agency development as it 
was being performed by the military men in the key positions. Chief 
among these critics and self-interested agitators was the former head of the 
OSS, General "Wild Bill" Donovan. He went up and down the country, 
preaching the doctrine of active anti-Communism and demanding that the 
CIA be made the first line of defense of the country in the Cold War. 
General Donovan was always clamoring for "civilian control" of the 
intelligence establishment — an unusual stipulation, considering his long 
military background; but more importantly, he spoke of the CIA role as an 
active and operational role. He was less interested in intelligence than he 
was in clandestine operations. This, even though he did not link up the two 
conditions at any one time, he would, if he had had his way, have used the 
CIA to develop and direct operations that would have been fleshed out by 
the military establishment. 

At the same time, Allen Dulles and John Foster Dulles were actively 
engaged in international affairs of a somewhat chameleon-like nature, with 
religious groups, international societies, the Council of Foreign Relations, 
and others. After one special Council meeting in early 1947, the Under 
Secretary of State, Robert Lovett, said that he had been convinced that " . . 
. it would be our principal task at State to awaken the nation to the dangers 
of Communist aggression." Of course, there are various ways in which a 



statement such as this may be interpreted. There can be the straightforward 
approach, which takes such action as a result of bona fide Communism 
aggression and to awaken the country to such a danger; or there may be 
the interpretation, more properly borne out by the events of the past 
twenty-five years, that "the task ... to awaken the nation" would be one 
akin to the operation of a propaganda machine. When we recall some of 
the comments made in earlier chapters about stirring up such visions in 
Indochina and omens like that, the real intentions of such words bear close 
scrutiny. In any event, the men of whom mention has been made above, 
were among the most ardent advocates of a stronger CIA, one to be 
developed as a bulwark against Communism and to be prepared for 
operational tasks of secret intelligence collection and clandestine 
operational activities. 

The pressures in public and upon the Administration were so great 
that even before the CIA had been in existence for one year, the President 
was persuaded to appoint a select committee to "report on the 
effectiveness of the CIA as organized under the 1947 Act and the 
relationship of CIA activities to those other intelligence organs of the 
government, "m It was quite unusual to have so new an organization so 
suddenly on the carpet. But 1948 was an election year, and the Governor 
of New York, Thomas E. Dewey, had been selected by the Republicans to 
carry their standard against the old and war-weary Roosevelt team, which 
had the doughty Harry Truman at its helm. While Truman declared he 
would "Give 'em Hell," Dewey calmly and with great assurance and 
confidence told the country that it was time for a "new rudder on the Ship 
of State" and for "a new man at the helm". The country believed that 
Dewey would be elected easily. He had been a renowned crime-fighter, 
and his campaign was built on the idea that he would be a superior 
Communist-fighter. Meanwhile, the issue of Communists in government 
plagued the Democratic party incumbents as a result of campaign tactics 
attributable to Allen Dulles and his clan. 

It was, then, most surprising to learn that the men whom Harry 
Truman chose to put on the Intelligence Review Committee were none 
other than Dewey's chief speech-writer during the campaign, Allen W. 
Dulles, along with William H. Jackson and Mathias Correa. There is no 
doubt that these men were qualified and competent, but they could hardly 
have been accused of being objective. Certainly, the President must have 
known that Dulles was strongly committed to the Dewey campaign, which 
was in action at the same time that he was to be working with Jackson and 
Correa. And he also knew that Dulles had been opposed to the provisions 
of the National Security Act of 1947 since the beginning. 

William H. Jackson's career in Military Intelligence dated back into 
the early days of World War II, and he was known to favor the "military" 
side of the issues that confronted the committee; but he had been very 
active in the "new intelligence" picture, in spite of this parochial 
background. The other member of the committee, Mathias Correa, was 
also experienced in intelligence and had worked closely with the former 
Secretary of the Navy and first Secretary of Defense, James Forrestal. 



However, there can be no question about the fact that this committee was 
dominated by Allen Dulles. 

Another factor that did much to shape the course of these events was 
the fact that by the summer of 1948 the NSC itself had published certain 
directives that delineated the functions of the Agency. One of these, 
published in August 1948, was NSC Intelligence Directive 10/2 (NSCID, 
commonly known as "Non-skids"). This regulation authorized the CIA to 
create a small section that would have the ability to carry out secret 
intelligence operations, and that at some point might contemplate the 
pursuit of secret operations. 

The issuance of this directive did not mean that the NSC was 
encouraging the CIA to enter into the world of secret operations. In fact, 
the real language of the NSCID was so restrictive that had it been 
faithfully followed there would have been few such operations under any 
conditions. The Council took this first step with extreme caution. The new 
section, which was to be called the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) 
was to be a part of the Agency. However, its director was not to be under 
the control of the DCI. The NSC directed that he would be selected by the 
Secretary of State and seconded by the Secretary of Defense. The first 
man appointed to be director of the OPC was Frank Wisner, a former OSS 
agent and at that time an official of the State Department. Although 
Wisner had been with State, his assignment there was a matter of 
convenience for him, as it was for several other old OSS hands while they 
awaited the creation of the CIA. While they were with State, these men 
took care of certain records and other valuable assets of the OSS, which 
had been handed down from World War II. 

As a result of this NSC action, by the end of 1948 the DCI did have 
a secret operations potential, but it was so rigged that he did not have full 
control of that office, and he could not take things into his own hands if he 
wanted to. He had to await directions from the NSC. This was unwieldy; 
but it was the only way the Council would agree to the establishment of 
such a function. It was a small first step which led to others. It was another 
part of the pressures building up under the surface while the Agency was 
busying itself with organizational matters and the task of coordinating 
national intelligence. 

This was the background that led up to the time of the Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa report. No single report on the subject of intelligence, and 
perhaps even on any subject, has had a greater impact upon the past 
twenty years in this country than that work of Allen Dulles. Throughout 
the closing months of the 1948 election campaign, John Foster Dulles was 
acting as personal liaison representative between Thomas E. Dewey and 
the State Department. Not a word appeared in the press about the Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa report, although the principals were busy reviewing drafts 
and working on the broad subject before them. One can imagine with 
some interest the position Allen Dulles found himself in, writing for 
Dewey as he campaigned all over the country and then busily engaging 
himself in his real labor of love — the intelligence report. Undoubtedly he 



saw this report, which he expected to complete just after the election, as 
the stepping stone to reaching the office of the DCI. It is inconceivable to 
imagine that he worked so hard on a report that would be submitted to 
Harry Truman as President for a new term. He fully expected to hand it in 
to a lame duck president. As it happened, Truman surprised the entire 
country by being re-elected. 

The Dulles clan had to wait another four years before they rode into 
power with General Eisenhower. But this very delay may have made 
things much easier for Allen Dulles when he did become the DCI. Dulles 
wanted to expand the Agency and so stated in his report; yet the years 
following the 1948 election were years of government austerity. He could 
not have done it then. Dulles was not a strong administrator, and he would 
have had real problems getting all of his plans into operation. But he was 
an expert at getting things done by a special kind of secrecy- shrouded 
wheeling and dealing. This would not have worked during Truman's 
administration, with Louis Johnson as the Secretary of Defense. 

There was in the official files of that time a long and very detailed 
letter to the DCI signed by Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson, which 
stated that the Agency should not become involved in any operational 
activities that involved any part of the DOD unless the Agency was fully 
prepared to be able to disclaim the role of the military and unless the 
Agency was prepared to reimburse the Defense Department for all actual 
and out-of-pocket expenses it might incur. Asking the CIA to be prepared 
to disclaim the role of someone else who gets caught in a CIA operation is 
one thing; but asking the Agency to pay for what it uses and expends is 
entirely different. The Agency gives lip-service to the former and cringes 
at the latter. The latter is the only effective control there is over the 
Agency, and this is something the Congress should do more thinking 
about today. 

In 1949 and 1950 this letter from the Secretary of Defense to the 
DCI was the normal way of handling such matters. Staff officers in the 
late sixties and early seventies would be shocked at such language from 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense in an official letter to the DCI. 
Allen Dulles could not have attained his goals under that type of 
"cooperation" from his biggest benefactor. The time was just not ripe. 
Thus it may have been another one of those favoring coincidences, which 
have always seemed to crop up at the right time for the CIA to pave the 
way for later developments. 

With the surprise election of Truman, there was nothing to do but to 
turn in the report to those in charge of the Agency. It is inexcusable that 
security impediments can bury such letters and reports as we have 
mentioned, for so many years. The Dulles- Jackson-Correa report was the 
CIA Mein Kampf. In this study, Dulles described exactly how he would 
lead the Agency from a low-key intelligence coordination center to a 
major power center in the U.S. Government, and in the process, how he 
would become the closest adviser to the President. He foretold the 
existence of a vast secret intelligence organization, a top echelon 



clandestine operations facility at White House level, a hidden 
infrastructure throughout other departments and agencies of the 
Government, and the greatest clandestine operational capability the world 
had ever known primarily based upon the exploitation of military 
manpower, money, and facilities all over the world. 

For all the dynamite contained within its pages, the report was 
practically ignored when it was given to President Truman early in 
January 1949. (It was dated January 1, 1949.) The major elements of the 
report were so arranged within its chapters that the military men who were 
at that time in command of the Agency would not notice them for what 
they were. What caught their eyes were the page after page of charges 
against their stewardship of the Agency. There were few things being done 
in the Agency that this three-man committee had approved. Therefore, all 
the men in the Agency glanced at when they received the report was that 
portion that concerned them directly. As Lyman Kirkpatrick has said in 
his book, "... most of the senior positions in the Agency at that time were 
held by military personnel who had been detailed for a tour of duty . . . 
they wrote the reply to the report, which, needless to say, was not very 
responsive." And no one should know that better than Kirkpatrick. [21 

For about a year this report remained in the files, and nothing was 
done about it. As a piece of information and as a working document, the 
report never was the center of action. It was so cloaked in security that few 
people have ever seen it, and fewer have read and studied it; but because 
Allen Dulles spent eleven years with the CIA, nine of them as its director, 
the report is most important as evidence of his thought and techniques and 
because it so comprehensively records his thoughts from the 1947-48 
period. It is an essential document of government lore and subsurface 
action for the years from 1951 to 1961. 

Dulles was not a planner. He was not the type of man who would be 
a great chess player, seeing his objective clearly, planning his own tactics, 
and weighing all of that against his opponent's options. He was a 
counterpuncher and a missionary. He was a meddler. He thought that he 
had the right and the duty to bring his pet schemes into the minds and 
homes of others, whether they were wanted or not. 

His system was like a maze full of mousetraps all set to snap and 
placed side by side carefully over every inch of his domain. When he 
heard a trap snap, and then another, he would quickly sense that 
something was happening and would know where the activity was. 
Because his sounding devices were mousetraps, he would have already 
prepared his defenses for mice and would throw his anti-mice operations 
into action immediately. He would not maintain a force of mice-fighting 
equipment himself but he would get his organization to throw all of its 
force into the fray in response to his mousetrap information. His trap 
sensors were the catalytic activators of the greater resources of his entire 
organization ... his country. 

Dulles was the personification of the intelligence operator, as 



contrasted with the intelligence staff officer. He created systems that 
would respond to inputs from intelligence sources. He did not work with 
others to establish objectives; he did not make plans to achieve those 
objectives and then to drive toward the achievement of those goals without 
permitting himself to be diverted by other irrelevant influences. Rather, he 
would create a vast mechanism that would sound out bits of data which 
could then be used to activate response operations, all in the name of the 
common enemy, Communism. He was proud, and he was proud for his 
agency. He did not like being the low man on the totem pole, as he was 
when he first became DCI. As a matter of fact, Lyman Kirkpatrick reports, 
"The U.S. News and World Report of October 18, 1957, ranked Allen 
Dulles thirty-fourth on the Protocol List." He goes on to report that after 
John McCone had been made DCI, his position was raised to the level just 
under the Cabinet officers. Allen Dulles had always thought that he should 
work directly for the President and that the Agency should be responsible 
only to the President. He did not enjoy the position assigned to him by law 
under the "direction of the NSC", which meant that he was well below a 
committee of Cabinet officers and a relative thirty-fourth in rank. Such 
things were very important to him not just as a personal matter but 
because of the ranking it gave to the Agency. 

We shall see the impact of this report further as we continue with 
this account. Another event of these times was having a great impact upon 
the Agency and would be fundamental to its role in Indochina many years 
later. In Greece, a civil war was under way, and it was evident that the 
Communist neighbors of Greece ~ Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Romania — 
were providing safe haven for the Greek rebels and, on their own part, 
were assisting the rebels with supplies and arms. At the end of World War 
II, the United States had a strong force in Greece, which had been there 
since the Germans had been driven out in 1944. The Americans, mostly 
Army but with a number of CIA personnel, played an active role in 
assisting the Greek Government against these rebels. A good number of 
the CIA men, and U.S. military men who worked with the CIA or on 
assignment to the CIA, became a closely knit cadre of Communist rebel 
fighters. They learned their trade on the proving ground of Greece and 
later went on to play the same role in other countries such as Iran, 
Guatemala, Thailand, and especially Vietnam. If one were able to discover 
the real names of the CIA personnel, including the U.S. military personnel 
on assignment to the CIA who served first in Greece and then years later 
in Southeast Asia, he would find some very striking and significant 
parallels. This Greek experience was very influential on the fledgling 
agency. Men like John Richardson, who was the station chief in Saigon 
during some very crucial times, was also station chief in Athens. 
Ambassador Puerifoy played an important role in Greece and then went on 
to Thailand, where he died in an automobile accident. General Marshall 
Carter, at the time aide to Secretary of State George Marshall, served 
briefly but importantly in Greece and later was the DDCI. Henry Cabot 
Lodge, while Ambassador to the UN, became much involved in the Greek 
rebellion and of course played a most important role in Vietnam, where he 
was Ambassador on two different occasions. The list is long and most 
significant. The Agency obtained some of its first field experience, much 



on the wartime OSS pattern, in Greece and then applied the same formula 
to many other countries, using the same paramilitary-trained men. 

By 1950, the DOD had reached its lowest ebb since World War II, 
and it looked as though the Agency would do likewise. Then two most 
important things happened. Again the coincidence that saved the Agency 
when all looked like a lost cause came to the rescue. First of all, the 
Korean War snapped the military out of its lethargy and provided the 
impetus for a major build up and rebuilding of forces. This gave the CIA a 
chance to play an active role, along with the military, as sort of a wartime 
"Fourth Force" during the Korean War. The other event that had a great 
impact upon the Agency was the assignment of General Walter Beedle 
Smith as DCI following Admiral Hillenkoetter. This dramatic change took 
place in October 1950, four months after the start of the Korean War. 

The "Fourth Force" concept was influential in the expansion of the 
CIA in a way that was never intended and which has been quite unnoticed, 
even to this day. As we have mentioned, one of the dominant forces 
behind the requirement for a national intelligence authority was the 
existence of the atom bomb and all that it meant. It goes without saying 
that the atomic weapons system totally obsoleted most of the concepts of 
World War II. There may never have been a time in all of the evolution of 
warfare when the introduction of one weapon had so suddenly and so 
totally overwhelmed all other weapons and all other tactics and strategy. 
World War II was the major war of all time, and the weapons systems and 
the tactics and strategy employed by the U.S. military forces during this 
war were the supreme high water mark of battle effectiveness. Whether we 
credit the massive system of over-the-beach invasions, or strategic 
bombardment or carrier task forces, or armored blitz warfare, or others for 
the supremacy of U.S. forces is not the point. The remarkable thing is that 
even before that great war ended, a new weapon that completely changed 
the whole concept of warfare with one great big bang came into being. 

This change was so dynamic that even though the United States and 
its allies were victors by virtue of the unconditional surrender of the 
vanquished, and thus were total masters of the field, they could not rest 
upon their laurels once another country had unlocked the secret of nuclear 
weapons systems. The great fact in this realization was that there could be 
no peacetime relaxation and no resting upon the fruits of victory, secure in 
the knowledge that we were masters of the world. 

As a result, in the dim halls of the Pentagon and in the many major 
and overseas commands of the U.S. and allied military forces, the war 
planners worked long hours to rewrite basic war plans. This is well worth 
a story by itself. No two groups agreed exactly on what warfare in the 
future would be, and no two groups were willing to admit that their 
services were not made obsolete by the nuclear weapons system. As a 
matter of fact, as late as 1955, the new Joint Staff school, the Armed 
Forces Staff College, was just beginning to include a nuclear weapons 
system annex in its classical War Plan. Even up to 1955, they had not 
agreed sufficiently upon nuclear weapons and how to use them to permit 



the inclusion of such weapons in war games and school exercises. 

In spite of all this, it was generally accepted that World War III 
would be a nuclear war, that it would be a brief war during the nuclear 
exchange period, and that it would be followed by a long, protracted, and 
very complex post-strike campaign in which the least devastated nation 
would try to mount forces sufficient to occupy the territory of most of the 
damaged nation and to bring about some order in what would most 
certainly be a totally devastated area. Such plans visualized that there 
might very well be strong cells of more or less conventional forces and 
other cells of varying degrees of local political power that would have to 
be taken over and organized in the enemy's homeland. 

During World War II, the military had developed a most useful 
Civil Affairs and Military Government Command (CAMG). It had done 
an exemplary job in moving in behind the advancing army and getting the 
civilian population back on its feet, as well as in assisting local political 
leaders to begin the process of setting up some form of basic government. 
The new war plans began to expand this role and to see a major task for 
the CAMG forces. As a result, the CAMG school at Fort Gordon, Georgia, 
was kept in operation, even though many others had been closed, and a 
number of CAMG reserve units were kept active throughout the country to 
retain the experience that had been so laboriously created during World 
War II. A major issue facing President Truman during the 1948 campaign 
year was the attack upon the lack of preparedness of the Armed Forces, 
particularly the reserve forces, which had been allowed to reach a low ebb. 
In spite of this, the CAMG program had been kept very much alive. 

What had kept it alive was the increasing responsibility of its role in 
war plans. At the same time, a number of the military men who were 
serving with the CIA also recognized that if CAMG work was to succeed 
and if it was to have any chance to even begin to operate, something must 
be done during peacetime to prepare for this exigency during wartime. 
This brought about some serious studies of what could be done in eastern 
Europe and even in the Soviet Union to establish contacts, agents, and 
stay-behind networks, which would help to form the essential cadres for 
the CAMG troops who would be parachuted into certain selected areas 
immediately following a nuclear exchange. Such plans required that 
certain areas of any potentially hostile country must be left untouched by 
atomic warfare in order that radioactivity from direct hits and from the 
much more unpredictable fallout patterns would not become a retarding 
factor. Various studies were made of meteorological patterns and other 
known physical factors in order that war plans could be drawn that would 
leave certain selected uncontaminated pockets in the target countries. 

With this basic work under way, the next thing to do was to see 
what might be done about building up the number of agents and cadre 
personnel in those areas. For one thing, the vast refugee and displaced 
personnel programs, which resulted in a flood of millions of persons from 
the eastern European countries into western Europe, provided a great 
opportunity to ferret out certain people who knew about these areas and 



perhaps knew individuals who were still there and might be contacted and 
trained to be cadre personnel, on the promise that in the event of such an 
all out nuclear war they would be saved. This was a most appealing 
prospect to certain selected individuals who had loved ones remaining in 
some of these pocket zones. (In this connection it is interesting to note that 
in the intelligence business people leaving one area to take up residence in 
another are called defectors, displaced persons, refugees and the like. In 
other times and other places, these people have simply been called 
emigrants.) 

The military and the CIA were working together on the refugee and 
displaced person program. The military then asked the CIA to participate 
in top-level war planning. This was a foot in the door for the CIA, and it 
was a most logical move on the part of the military. After all, the military 
and the OSS had worked together, although precariously, during World 
War EE. During the late forties and early fifties many of the key personnel 
of the CIA were active military personnel or veterans of World War II 
who had converted to civilian status and had become career employees of 
the new agency. They were well qualified for service with the military in 
these top-level war planning assignments. To do this, the CIA went 
through paperwork cover assignments with the military department to 
have these men called back on active duty in their reserve grades and then 
assigned to the headquarters concerned. 

Few of the officers of the commands involved knew that these men 
were CIA agents, and most thought that they were routine military 
assignees. Care was taken to see that the personnel manning tables of 
these headquarters were increased by the two or three spaces necessary to 
cover these men. As a result of this precautionary step, personnel 
administrators and others such as the finance department personnel had no 
way of knowing that the men in these positions were not real military 
personnel. In time, these jobs bred their own supporting requirements, to 
the extent that civilian secretaries and other staff were added by the same 
or similar means. Only in some Focal Point offices would the true identity 
of these personnel be known, and then more for the purpose of protecting 
their identity and assisting them than for any military considerations of the 
role they were playing. 

These war-planning military and pseudo-military agents worked on 
the post-strike part of the war plan, and more specifically, on that part 
which pertained to the development of safe areas, agents and agent lines, 
and other CAMC-type matters. At that phase in the development of the 
war-planning philosophy and strategy, this was a new role for the military 
and one they quite willingly turned over to these hard-working men who 
seemed so dedicated to the task. Their offices were usually identified by 
such titles as Subsidiary Plans, Special Plans, or even the more normal 
Psychological Warfare and Unconventional Warfare designations. 

Once these annexes of the war plans had been accepted by the 
remainder of the staff and approved by the commanding general, they 
became officially part of the war-planning structure of that command and 



then of its day-to-day mission for operational and supporting logistics 
functions. If the command was expected to provide forces for the 
immediate post-strike task, it would have such forces earmarked and 
trained for that job. They not only had to be ready but they had to have 
equipment, vehicles, communications, printing presses, aircraft, and all the 
rest of the tools of their very special trade. 

Here again, the CIA men became prime movers. They drew upon 
the World War II experience of men in their Washington staff and worked 
out elaborate tables of equipment and tables of organization, in the best 
World War II fashion, and presented these to the local command for their 
guidance. Since most of the real military staff officers had done little work 
in this special area, and most of them had more than enough work to do in 
their own fields of specialization, they were delighted to have these 
helpful members of the staff come to them with such finely drawn staff 
work. Without too much red tape and delay their figures and tactical 
proposals were accepted as part of the requirement of that command and 
were inserted into the new budget planning. This is a slow process 
covering years of prodigious effort, but once this level of accomplishment 
has been achieved, the rest is practically automatic, and the opportunity to 
increase such figures from year to year is almost equally automatic. 

The timing for this sort of skillful surgery was just right, and the 
CIA made the most of it. The military, too, was getting swept up in this 
kind of thinking. It matched with some of the Cold War ideas, generally 
new to war planning, that derived from new thinking about the role of 
nuclear weapons and from the urgent pressures of the new anti- 
Communism. In the eloquent words of Adlai Stevenson, this was the time 
of "... a coincidence of crises . . . that brought together the flames of war, 
the atom's unlocking, and the emergence of aggressive Communism . . . ." 
It was the time of a world torn by the predominance of military thought, 
not only by professional military men but by scientists, professors, and 
other amateurs and by the high emphasis placed on secrecy. In this turmoil 
the issue of secrecy was ultimately related to the issue of military control. 
This was the external mix of issues into which the CIA and later the ST 
maneuvered, under the cloak of secrecy, to enhance and greatly enlarge its 
control over elements of the military establishment — elements that with 
the growth of the ideas summed up best by the word "counterinsurgency", 
became dominant over the rest of the establishment. Who in the years 
from 1949 to 1955 would ever have visualized the use of the hydrogen 
bomb-carrying strategic bombers and the Navy's nuclear carriers in a war 
in which the principal adversary was the little, terrorized brown man in the 
forests of his wasted homeland. Yet this type of war was all but 
preordained as the CIA gained increasing control over the military during 
the fifties and early sixties through the tactics described above. A whole 
generation of military men trained, hardened, and honed by World War II 
experience believed in the principles of Clauswitz and others who stated 
that when diplomacy failed, it was time to go to war; but on the other 
hand, while diplomacy was being tested and while diplomacy was the 
name of the game, the military should do no more than plan and train for 
the possibility of war. The most warlike action that the military would be 



prepared to take during peacetime would be a show of force or an 
emergency relief action in some ravaged country. 

This was the convention; this is what was overthrown by the new 
coincidence of crises. Throughout the late forties a new wave of ideas 
began to spread, and some of these involved military plans and military 
utilization in peacetime. The idea of the Cold War was making peacetime 
seem more like a kind of warfare than previous conventional military 
planning had ever envisaged. For example, at Mitchel Field on Long 
Island, New York, in 1949, a new commanding general, directly returned 
from the postwar staff of General MacArthur in the Far East, General 
Ennis C. Whitehead, called together the staff of his new command, the 
Continental Air Command, and in a brief but hard-hitting speech told 
them that they might have thought that the world was at peace; but they 
were wrong. Every day, he said, the Russians were sending bombers into 
the skies of the Arctic, and every day they were coming closer and closer 
to North America in waves that, if not a direct threat, were at least a 
symbol of the threat that was always present. And day by day, American 
interceptor fighter pilots were being sent aloft to investigate these targets 
that appeared on radar. Some day, he said, and not too far in the future, 
one of those young lieutenants is going to have to make a major decision. 
He is going to have to decide on his own, up there in his lonely cockpit, 
whether the bomber he has in his gun sights has made a hostile act or an 
act of hostile intent, or whether he is only carrying out an acceptable 
training mission. Should the lieutenant decide that the Russian is hostile, 
he will be under standing orders to shoot, and he will knock down a Soviet 
bomber over North America. At that time World War III will not have 
begun; it will simply have reached its climax. In the words of General 
Whitehead, one of the outstanding air combat leaders of World War II, 
World War III was already under way, and none of those officers 
assembled to hear him should ever forget that. 

For those officers trained in the history of war and experienced in 
the fires of World War II, this was strong talk. Only a few months later 
about half of those men present that day transferred with General 
Whitehead from Mitchel Field to Colorado Springs to set up the new Air 
Defense Command. In so doing every one of them knew that he was a 
member of an elite military unit that was already committed to victory in 
World War III. They knew that they were at war every day; all they were 
waiting for was the day when the Strategic Air Command (SAC) would be 
given the same orders which they already had received and would join the 
war actively against the Soviet Union. 

Of course, there was a tremendous difference between the missions 
of the two commands. The battlefield of the Air Defense Command was 
limited to the skies over North America. The battlefield of the SAC was in 
foreign skies, but this type of thinking was changing ideas about the 
conventional role of the military in the Nuclear Age. And into this 
evolutionary period came the CIA and those of the military who 
specialized in what came to be called the "unconventional war" or the war 
against Communist-inspired subversive insurgency. 



High over Italy in a plushed-up old World War II B-17 Flying 
Fortress, the man who was the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force, the 
same man who had been Director of Central Intelligence just prior to the 
appointment of Admiral Hillenkoetter in May 1947, General Hoyt S. 
Vandenberg, wrote to his second in command a most significant letter. It 
has been preserved in Air Force files; it is quite distinctive because it is on 
plain white paper and in the handwriting of General Vandenberg. 

Vandenberg, recalling his Intelligence experience, and thinking 
about the new area of unconventional warfare and of the heated-up Cold 
War, wrote to General Thomas D. White that the Air Force should have a 
full- sized Psychological Warfare Air Command to be the equal of the Air 
Defense Command, the Tactical Air Command, and the Strategic Air 
Command. He proposed that the problems of the Cold War were such that 
they should not be left to the normal forces, but should be dealt with by 
experts and by highly skilled men who would be in a position to apply and 
to utilize military strength and influence during the Cold War. He had 
particularly in mind psychological activities, but he also took into 
consideration the role of reconnaissance and other technological 
developments that are commonplace today. In other words, General 
Vandenberg was proposing that the military should get into the business 
which the CIA was working its way into and is in today to a considerable 
degree — in fact to a degree that even General Vandenberg would have 
been appalled to witness now. 

The Air Force was not the only service thinking along these lines at 
that time. At Fort Gordon, Georgia, the Army was still very active with its 
Civil Affairs and Military Government school. Later, we shall look into 
some of the language of their doctrine and training manuals to see how 
influential this material became later in the hands of the ST. Not only at 
Fort Gordon but at Fort Bragg the Army was nursing along the tiny 
detachment of Special Forces, which had all but gone out of existence. 
However, by late 1949 and into the 1950s these small first stirrings 
became major forces. 

Thus, these three things played into the hands of the CIA as it began 
to move into areas which it knew best and in which it could make moves 
unseen and unobserved by others in the Government. The CIA was 
moving like spilled water. It was not exactly sure of its course and 
direction but it was following the line of least resistance, aided by its own 
law of gravity, which in this case was its banner-waving allegiance to the 
cause of anti-Communism of any kind. 

By the late forties the Air Force had established by General 
Psychological Warfare Air Command visualized by General Vandenberg, 
but other units known as Air Re-Supply and Communications Wings 
(ARC Wings). These were very large organizations. They consisted of a 
variety of aircraft, all the way from small specialized light planes to the 
super-bombers of World War II — the B-29, or the later version, the B-50. 
These mixed units had everything from flying capability on a global scale 
to printing presses and leaflet dispersal units. Once they had been created 



and shaken down during training exercises, they were deployed all over 
the world at such places as Clark Field near Manila, at Okinawa, Great 
Britain, and Libya. Elements of these units became heavily involved in the 
Korean War, and specialized sections worked with the CIA all over 
Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia. 

In accordance with war-planning practice, these Wings had a 
wartime mission that was highly classified and infrequently discussed, 
save by those few who knew what it was. Because of the high 
classification of the mission of these units, something had to be said for 
their existence and why they seemed to be so busy when they had nothing 
"officially" to do. As a result, they became actively involved in a whole 
array of peacetime missions. They engaged in frequent military maneuvers 
and training exercises, and if there was an earthquake somewhere and a 
backward nation found itself with a major tragedy on its hands, a 
detachment from the Wing would show up and begin the process of 
bringing in as much aid and assistance as could be arranged. Such 
activities became the cover for the Wing and more or less explained its 
existence for those who did not know and did not need to know about the 
war plan requirement. 

The same was true of the Army Special Forces components. Their 
wartime mission was highly classified, yet they were a large organization, 
and they had to have some cover reason to exist that would more closely 
tie them in with the rest of the parts and they took part in other exercises 
with NATO forces, from Norway south to Greece, Turkey, Iran, and 
Pakistan. They added experienced manpower to disaster relief and to other 
underdeveloped "nation building" work. 

All of these things resulted in a large, active, and consuming 
military organization. These big units all had to be funded, manned, and 
maintained by the military. In the days of real austerity this created many 
problems, but because these units existed under heavy cover and secrecy, 
no one in the apparent parent services knew how to get to them to cut 
them back. Thus, they were sustained. Behind the scenes the CIA 
smoothed out many of these problems, and this vast organization grew. 
The Korean War saved the day for all of these activities, and for several 
years in the early fifties there was money, manpower, and plenty to go 
around for all such units. 

It was in this manner, through the innocent- appearing device of 
working with the military war planning staffs, that the Agency acquired a 
vast quantity of equipment, men, and base facilities all over the world, 
even to the extent of major aircraft and other heavy equipment. Though 
the NSC directives stated that the CIA could not create an organization to 
accomplish clandestine activities, and even though the President had said 
that the CIA must come to the Council for any such equipment, the CIA 
managed to create a huge capability that cost them nothing and that was 
ready to do its bidding at the drop of a hat. 

Many have wondered how a small agency, such as the CIA was in 



the late forties, could have grown so fast and have had so much physical 
influence and impact upon foreign and military policies. It was this great 
military war plan-earmarked organization in all of the services which was 
used by the CIA quite innocently and which gave it its great unsuspected 
strength. As a matter of fact, the servicemen who became involved in this 
pseudo-military work enjoyed their special freedoms and the inevitable 
"fun and games". Even if they did not participate in them, they at least 
worked close to and in the aura of the big game. There were many like 
General Vandenberg, the former DCI, who thought that the peacetime 
military forces should become much more proficient in this type of 
operation. And once they got into these organizations, they actively and 
eagerly supported their CIA counterparts. Many of these men accepted 
duty assignments with the CIA. These units all over the world became the 
havens for a large number of CIA cover assignment men. These CIA 
people served as military personnel easily in the pseudo-military units. 

This, too, was a significant departure from the original plans. It was 
early agreed that military intelligence experts would serve freely and 
voluntarily with the CIA, and from the beginning a great number of jobs, 
including many top-level key jobs, were assigned to active duty military 
personnel, and as we have shown, CIA men served in the military by 
agreement in the war planning spaces. But it had never been visualized 
that hundreds of military men would serve with the CIA in its clandestine 
sections in order to work in support of such units as the Army Special 
Forces and the Air Force ARC Wings. Nor was it ever envisioned that 
hundreds of CIA men would cross over into the military to serve with the 
line military units, such as these were supposed to be. 

Thus it was that while the fledgling agency was getting itself 
organized, and while it was beginning to be able to perform some of its 
assigned functions, it was also laying the ground-work, skillfully and in a 
major effort, for the future when it would use thousands of men in huge 
clandestine operations such as the Bay of Pigs, the Indonesian support 
project, and eventually, the prelude to South Vietnam. 

What had begun as a simple central intelligence organization 
charged with the responsibility of coordinating all elements of the national 
intelligence community had become the center of a power system. 

This system, through secret and covert channels within the Federal 
Government's structure — and beyond that into industry and the academic 
world, and the world of the media and publishing houses — had developed 
a tremendous unseen infrastructure consisting primarily of the vast 
resources of the national military establishment all over the world. The 
central intelligence idea that had been born in the realization of the failures 
of World War II and in the postwar "one world" era became the 
precocious fledgling of the "Communist threat" protagonists. Then the 
Central Intelligence Agency, which was more or less the caboose of the 
National Security Act of 1947, began gradually to work itself around to 
becoming the hand at the throttle on the greatest peacetime military power 
ever maintained by any great nation ... a military force that had been 



emasculated and reduced to one of response, ever on the defensive, and 
therefore ready for manipulation and control by an action group such as 
the ST. 



1. Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, New York: Harper & Row, 1963. 

2. The Real CIA, New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968. 



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Chapter 10 

The Dulles-Jackson-Correa Report in Action 



THE GREAT SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THOUGHT AND content 
of the National Security Act of 1947 can only be understood after a careful 
review of the emerging events of that period. We have already mentioned 
many of those great and growing pressures. One that was fundamental to 
that time was the idea of "cybernetics", as propounded by the great 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology mathematician, Norbert Wiener, in 
his book of that name, published in 1948. Wiener, along with many others, 
had worked during World War II to develop radar, projectiles, and 
methods of solving problems of fire control, principally in the 
employment of massed anti-aircraft weapons. 

Another segment of the scientific community was involved in the 
development of nuclear weapons and related activity. These two 
pioneering groups became greatly involved in the developing age of the 
computer. It is quite possible that the move from development of the 
atomic bomb to the creation of the thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb would 
not have been achieved without the assistance of the advanced MANIAC 
computer and others that were being assembled. 

As a result of the strategic role played by so many brilliant, though 
perhaps overly specialized men, there was a great overlap in the field of 
strategic planning, involving the conventional military professionals, 
political leaders, and these advanced scientists. The military men of that 
time believed that they held the key to the control or neutralization of the 
world because they had just completed the destruction of the forces of 
Japan and Germany in the greatest of all wars and because they had sole 
possession of the atomic bomb and of its means of delivery over great 
distances, as had been demonstrated at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. 

On the other hand, the politicians, recognizing the unmatched power 
of this country, looked ahead with a certain magnanimity upon the long- 
sought era of world peace, which seemed to be within reach if they could 
but continue the One World postwar climate of exhausted euphoria which 
any great victory brings. 

Meanwhile, the scientists, who were much closer to a true 
realization of the facts of the situation, saw that this was no time to relax. 



They knew, if others were unwilling to admit it to themselves, that nuclear 
supremacy was not permanent and that there was no way to make it so 
unless the United States was willing to dedicate itself to the difficult, 
costly, and massive task of moving ahead. 

One group of scientists felt very strongly that the atomic bomb was 
a sufficient "ultimate" weapon and that this country should dedicate itself 
to the manufacture of more and better atomic weapons until a stockpile of 
incontestable superiority had been obtained. This goal, positively and 
technically attainable, meant that this country would have to continue its 
nuclear production at a wartime pace or face the chance that Russia or 
some other country might surpass it within the next critical decade. 
Although the goal of these scientists was the lesser of the two general 
proposals, it was not an easy one, and supremacy was not assured without 
great effort. 

Other scientists insisted that the only way in which this country 
could maintain its leadership in the great nuclear race was to drive directly 
at the mysteries of the thermonuclear weapon. These scientists, who could 
not guarantee ultimate success in a venture so difficult, maintained that 
even the shreds of hope which their experience held out to them were so 
important that if some other country solved the secrets of the fusion 
explosion before we did, it would from that time on wrest world power 
leadership from us. 

The thought of doing both simultaneously was almost beyond 
comprehension, and a great struggle raged within all three worlds — 
political, scientific, and military. Needless to say, with such grave matters 
under consideration the traditionally normal concepts of diplomacy and 
military policy had been outmoded almost overnight. Diplomats long 
accustomed to the fine points of balance of power and to the value of 
alliances were faced with the fact that there was no such thing as a balance 
of power, even if all of the rest of the world's nations were to be balanced 
against the nuclear superpower. In the years 1946 and 1947 the world- 
power pecking order began with the United States; number two on the list 
was almost immaterial. 

The same situation of shattered tradition faced the military. Army 
generals who had just driven their forces over the remnants of the once 
great German army refused even to think of how they would deploy forces 
against an enemy equipped with nuclear weapons. It was years before the 
senior war colleges would even permit a nuclear annex to be included in 
their master war plans. 

Somewhere in the flux of all of these ideas and great conflicts there 
began to grow a fear, a real national dread, of the potential of that "enemy" 
who would gain the atomic bomb first. In those early days it was not even 
necessary to put a name on the country that might loom up over the 
horizon armed with the bomb. That was the "enemy" and that nation 
would be the ultimate enemy of all enemies of all time. And along with 
this idea came the play on the threat. Those who believed that our only 



road to salvation lay in greater stockpiling of atomic bombs, those who 
argued that it must be the hydrogen bomb, and those few who said it must 
be both, all perhaps without common intent, began to create the idea of the 
"enemy threat". It was coming. It was inevitable. The things that have 
been done since that period in the name of "anti-enemy" would make a list 
that in dollars alone would have paid for all of the costs of civilization up 
to that time, with money to spare. 

Such an enemy is not unknown. Man has feared this type of enemy 
before. It is a human, and more than that, it is a social trait, to dread the 
unknown enemy. This enemy is defined in one context as the Manichaean 
Devil. Norbert Wiener says, "The Manichaean devil is an opponent, like 
any other opponent, who is determined on victory and will use any trick of 
craftiness or dissimulation to obtain this victory. In particular, he will keep 
his policy of confusion secret, and if we show any signs of beginning to 
discover his policy, he will change it in order to keep us in the "dark". The 
great truth about this type of enemy is that he is stronger when he is 
imagined and feared than when he is real. One of man's greatest sources of 
fear is lack of information. To live effectively one must have adequate 
information. 

It was in this great conflict that the National Security Act of 1947 
was brewed. And man's demand for information pervaded and surmounted 
almost every other move he made. Thus a great machine was created. All 
of the resources of this country were poured unto a single Department of 
Defense ~ defense against the great Manichaean Devil which was looming 
up over the steppes of Russia with the formula of the atomic bomb in one 
hand and the policy of World Communism in the other. Our statesmen 
foresaw the Russian detonation of the atomic bomb in 1949 and the 
concurrent acceleration toward the hydrogen bomb as soon thereafter as 
possible; so they created the Atomic Energy Commission in January 1947 
and then the Defense Department in September 1947, and gave them both 
the eyes and ears of the CIA to provide the essential information that at 
that time was really the paramount and highest priority. The CIA was 
ordered to achieve both goals — the second-to-none atomic bomb stockpile 
and the hydrogen bomb, and the DOD was ordered to create the global 
force that would defend this country against the giant of the Soviet Union 
and all other nuclear powers. 

This then created its own great machinery. To fight this great, and 
mostly unknown devil, it was necessary to create a truly defense 
establishment, which would have the ability to spring up against attack of 
any kind, of any nature, and from any place. It was to be truly a massive 
machine. "Defense" was no social or polite term to be held up like a 
banner in order that the rest of the world might believe that the United 
States was forever denouncing the use of force and was therefore forever 
denouncing that paramount doctrine of military strategy, the power of the 
offensive. This was the real thing. Defense was to be defense; and the 
national defense establishment was to be the greatest force we could create 
and maintain for just that purpose. 



This meant that the military policy of the United States was to 
become more like the concept of the chess player than that of the brilliant 
tactician. Everything was done to guard against making a mistake that 
would give the alert adversary that advantage that would enable him to 
defeat the defender. Thus the chess player is governed more by his worst 
moments than by his best moments. The worst calamities of defense 
policy since 1947 have been those resulting from being caught off guard, 
such as the Korean War and the Sputnik period, when the entire nation felt 
endangered by the stark realization that the Soviet Union had launched an 
orbiting body before we had. 

This realization resulted in the creation of a defense establishment 
machine much like that proposed by Dr. W. Ross Ashby and recounted by 
Wiener. It was a great, "unpurposeful random mechanism which seeks for 
its own purpose through a process of learning ..." Such a machine is 
designed "to avoid certain pitfalls of breakdown [and will] look for 
purposes which it can fulfill." These brief quotes taken from men who 
were writing and lecturing during this period are now most prophetic. Not 
only was this monstrous machine created for the defense of the United 
States; but it was so established that it was looking for purposes it could 
fulfill. 

In other words, this great defense establishment was ready to go, 
looking for opportunity, and all it needed was to have someone throw the 
switch and give it a little direction. 

Evidence of this exists in the beginnings made by the Agency with 
the participation it volunteered in the war-planning functions of the major 
overseas military commands, especially in Europe. This war-planning 
work led to the stockpiling of considerable amounts of war-making 
materiel earmarked for the CIA and stored in military warehouses, both 
real and cover units, all over the world. These supplies could be called out 
then whenever the CIA had any requirement, even at a time when the NSC 
thought that it had the CIA well under control because they had prohibited 
it from having men, equipment, and facilities for operational purposes. 
This was the start. The Agency worked itself into key positions within the 
defense establishment, and then orchestrating its data inputs to create 
highly classified requirements, it began to develop great power within the 
U.S. government and around the world. 

The year 1950 was an important one for the CIA. Again all of the 
pieces began to fall into all of the right slots. First of all, the war in Korea 
began on June 25, 1950, and although the intelligence community — CIA 
and all — was caught unprepared for the attack just as it had been years 
before at Pearl Harbor, the failure of national intelligence to assist with 
such a major prediction spotlighted what must be done if the United States 
were ever to have a worthwhile intelligence capability. While the war was 
getting under way and the U.S. armed forces were picking themselves up 
off the mat, almost as they had had to do after the attacks on Pearl Harbor, 
Truman looked around for a stronger man to pull the Agency together and 
to give it a sense of mission. Meanwhile, strong-agency proponents argued 



that the fault had not been the CIA's. On the contrary they attempted to 
show, if the President had been briefed properly, on a daily basis by the 
CIA as the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report had recommended, he would 
have known that an attack was imminent. 

This was an important recommendation of the Dulles-Jackson- 
Correa report, and these activists took this opportunity to promote the 
issue at the cost of the incumbent DCI and his military-dominated staff. 

It should be recalled that it was Truman's refusal to deal directly 
with the intelligence arm but to have them instead brief the NSC, and then 
to make his Cabinet members responsible for keeping him informed, that 
stirred up this issue in the first place. 

This was continuing evidence of the old fight between those who 
saw Intelligence as the primary force in the Government, responsible only 
to the President, and those who believed the function of Intelligence was 
to keep the President and his Cabinet informed in the true staff sense. Both 
of these views were made more at odds with each other by the pressures 
generated by the Manichaean Devil syndrome. 

The U.S. Ambassador to Moscow for several years preceding the 
Korean War had been General Eisenhower's old Chief of Staff, the 
brilliant and tough Walter Beedle Smith. He was very well qualified, by 
his World War II experience with Eisenhower, for a major assignment; 
and in a special sense he was well qualified to become the new DCI by 
virtue of the fact that he had been in Moscow for so long. So many of the 
intelligence clan had been exploiting the cause of anti-Communism for so 
long that it seemed that bringing in the one man who really ought to know 
at first hand what Communism was all about would be the best move to 
counteract those who were saying that the Administration was soft on 
Communism. As we look back at this appointment, we may have forgotten 
the great crisis which had been stirred up by Senator Joe McCarthy over 
the issue of Communists being everywhere. This was no small issue, and 
the appointment of a man as highly regarded as General Smith was an 
ideal choice. 

In spite of this, the McCarthy movement swept him up in its fervor. 
Soon after his appointment he was called to appear before McCarthy's 
committee, and in response to a question as to whether he thought there 
were Communists in government, specifically in the CIA, he replied to the 
effect that he thought it was quite possible that there were Communists in 
the CIA. This statement was a real shocker, and it made instant headlines. 
At that time and in the special context of those days this was a most 
amazing statement whether it was factual or not. The general had been the 
DCI for only a brief time and he was more or less excused for the 
statement on the grounds that he had not had time to really know the 
Agency. For any other man but General Smith, in that position and at that 
time, to have given a similar reply would have resulted in having him 
ridden out of town by the rabid McCarthyists. 



Smith replaced Admiral Hillenkoetter who had been DCI since the 
days of the central intelligence group, before the Agency had been created. 
The failure of the CIA to give proper warning of the probable or at least 
highly possible North Korean attacks, and its failure to evaluate the nature 
and strength of that attack may well have been contributing factors in 
hurrying President Truman's decision to replace Hillenkoetter. He had 
done his duty and played his role as the script was written. He had been 
charged with running a military-type CIA, and he did just that. The brief 
encounters the Agency had in such places as Greece, Iran, and along the 
perimeter of the Iron Curtain were simply postwar OSS-type games, and 
they never amounted to very much. 

However, there was one major characteristic of CIA operational 
efforts during Hillenkoetter' s time that began to change with the Smith era. 
During its first years, when the CIA did something anti-Communist it was 
something done against the real Communists. For example, the fighting in 
Greece also involved Bulgarians, Yugoslavians, and Romanians. All of 
the work the CIA did along the Iron Curtain and in Greece and Iran was 
directly concerned with close and tangible Russian influence. In those 
days the CIA did not go to the Congo or to the Philippines to seek out the 
subversive influences they then called Communist. The CIA worked nose- 
to-nose against the Russians wherever they found them in reality. This 
point cannot be underscored too heavily. Most of the CIA clandestine 
effort since 1955 had been against supposed Communists or subversive 
Communism or some such third country target. In other words, the 
"Communism" the CIA finds and goes after in its operational efforts 
during more recent years has been that which it finds on the soil of non- 
Communist countries. In the beginning the skirmishes of the Cold War 
were fought on or near real Communist territory. Since that time 
Communism had been fought on the soil of our own circle of friends, in 
such countries as Vietnam, Laos, India, the Congo, and the Dominican 
Republic, to name a few. This change in the focus and direction of the 
pursuit of Communism is important. 

At the time General Smith became the Director of Central 
Intelligence in October 1950, events in Korea looked very bad. The 
greatest military power in the world only five years earlier was being 
pushed into the sea near the southern tip of the Korean peninsula, and the 
CIA shared a certain amount of the blame with the military establishment. 
Smith moved suddenly to put an end to the bad image of the Agency. 

One of the first things he found in his files was the Dulles-Jackson- 
Correa report of January 1, 1949. It had been gathering dust and had 
resulted in very little effective change. This had not been because of the 
language of the report. It was tremendous. It attacked what it thought was 
wrong without hesitation; it made firm recommendations for the changes 
it sponsored. However, because the men it had attacked so vehemently had 
been in a position to bottle it up, nothing it recommended had been 
accomplished. General Smith took the report out, and when he had read it, 
he got on the phone and called William H. Jackson. He asked him to leave 
his business and come to Washington at once. Jackson, who had already 



devoted much of his life to intelligence service, came immediately and 
was appointed the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Smith dialed 
the phone again and called the prestigious law firm of Sullivan and 
Cromwell in New York City and asked for Allen Dulles. In short order he 
had Dulles in the fold as chief of foreign operations. There is no official 
explanation of what the duties of the foreign operations section were, but 
it would take little imagination to figure them out. Then he called another 
old friend, Murray McConnell, and asked him to come to Washington to 
be his Deputy Director for Administration. 

In a busy six months the CIA had become reasonably well- 
organized and sported four strong deputies: Deputy Director intelligence, 
Deputy Director Administration, Deputy Director Support (Logistics — in 
the broadest sense), and Deputy Director Plans (Clandestine Operations — 
the "fun and games" side of the house.) 

Meanwhile, Smith began to put into effect the functional proposals 
of the Dulles' "Mein Kampf. He was amazed to learn that the director of 
OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) was not "his" man but was tied up in 
that bureaucratic red-tape device prescribed by NSCID 10/2 and intended 
by the council to keep him from running free into the arena of clandestine 
operations. When General Smith learned that this important deputy was 
appointed by the Secretary of State and seconded by the Secretary of 
Defense, he went right to the root of the problem. He called the Secretary 
of State and then the Secretary of Defense and informed them that from 
that date on the director of OPC was to be under his own control and that 
if they had any objections they were welcome to talk with him about them. 
If either one had objections in the heat of a messy war in Korea, he kept 
them to himself. 

From that date on the CIA had its own clandestine operations 
division, although it was still required by law to remain out of that 
business until directed by the NSC to develop an operation. 

The CIA had made various minor incursions into the special 
operations field during the late forties, but all of them were carefully 
phrased and gingerly submitted to the NSC for approval in strict 
compliance with the law and with the provisions of NSCID 10/2. Now that 
the DCI was in control of the special operations section, he felt that it was 
his to use as he saw fit. 

This move was very timely. It would have done little good for him 
to have gained the clandestine staff if he had possessed no resources in the 
form of the military men, equipment, and facilities that had gradually been 
laid at his disposal as a result of the tedious years of war planning. 
However, just as he took over the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination) he 
found that the CIA had access to a vast military organization in the Army 
and Air Force and that he would have very little trouble using the 
exigencies of the war in Korea as an excuse to put into motion certain 
large and important special operations in that country. These operations 
were directed at Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Philippines, in addition to 



Japan and Korea, and led to the development of Agency interests in all of 
Southeast Asia.Ul 

There were other similar moves made during this period as the 
emerging ST began to make itself felt in Asia as it had been in Europe. All 
of this was done initially under the cover of the Korean War, and 
significantly, most of these events took place after the removal of General 
Douglas MacArthur, who among others had always been a foe of Donovan 
and the hard-core Intelligence clan. 

As the Korean War drew to a close, the French were heavily 
engaged in a losing battle in Indochina. The CIA was operating there in 
both the north and south of Vietnam during that time. When the 
Government of the United States finally permitted large twin-engine 
transport aircraft to operate in Indochina and to fly to the besieged 
battlefield of Dien Bien Phu, a hearty band of civilian pilots who worked 
for the CAT Airline (precursor of Air America, Incorporated) did the 
flying — not military pilots. They had been hastily trained by the Air Force 
to fly the C-119 aircraft. The actual flights into Indochina, culminating in 
heavy air-drops at Dien Bien Phu, were made by these civilian CIA 
contract pilots. Even at this early date the CIA was well inside the door of 
Indochina. 

Back in Washington the election campaign of 1952 had been heated 
with the unpopular war as a major issue. General Eisenhower had agreed 
to run on the Republican ticket against Adlai Stevenson, who had picked 
up the mantle of the Democratic party from the gallant old warrior, Harry 
Truman. 

After Eisenhower won the election, he kept his promise to visit 
Korea and to bring the war to an end. He also found himself heir to many 
of the old stalwarts of the Thomas E. Dewey team from the campaign of 
1948. He appointed John Foster Dulles to be his Secretary of State, and 
because Allen Dulles wanted the job of DCI. Ike prevailed upon his old 
crony and longtime Army companion, Walter Beedle Smith, to accept the 
post of Under Secretary of State and to give up his Intelligence chair to 
Allen. William Jackson had stayed in the Agency as Smith's deputy for 
less than a year, and in August of 1951, General Smith had appointed 
Allen Dulles to be his deputy director in Bill Jackson's place. The trip to 
Washington, which Allen Dulles had made back in October 1950, and 
which was supposed to have lasted for no more than a week or two, now 
was on its way to becoming an unbroken eleven-year stint for the Agency 
to which he had already given so much of himself. 

Dulles found many of the things that he had hoped to get done well 
under way. General Smith had taken another hurdle for him after he had 
gotten the director of the OPC into the fold. As we have said many times, 
President Truman had a firm policy concerning what the intelligence staff 
meant to him. He looked upon the Agency as his "quiet intelligence arm" 
and no more. Having this interpretation, he felt that the Agency should 
evaluate and analyze information and disseminate it to the staff, primarily 



to his Cabinet, and that they should all use it in the formulation of national 
plans and policy. This meant that unless he called for some specific 
matter, he did not expect intelligence to be brought to him daily, weekly, 
or at any fixed time. He was content to know that it was there, that it was 
available equally to his Cabinet and to him when needed. 

This did not satisfy Allen Dulles, and he had so stated in his report. 
He felt that it was the responsibility of the DCI to brief the President daily, 
if not oftener when the subject warranted a special or an emergency 
meeting. General Smith agreed with this approach. General Smith was 
accustomed to the military staff procedure whereby a smoothly oiled staff 
meets daily and briefly with the commanding general and keeps him 
informed. This is a good system during a war because the General has 
nothing else to do but to get on with the war, and he needs the current 
inputs from all of his staff. But for a President with countless other 
demands upon his time, any fixed schedule such as that visualized by the 
Dulles report would result in a gross imposition upon his time and with the 
burden of certain responsibilities and decisions that he might best attend to 
after his Cabinet and other special staff members had had the chance to 
come up with their own decisions. 

However, Smith moved in with the Dulles proposal and got it 
accepted. It always seems to work out that when the Agency has fallen 
down on one job it gains strength from the resultant adversity and pops up 
somewhere else stronger than before. The Agency had failed to give a 
proper warning and evaluation of the Korean attack. They now turned this 
failure into a maneuver to get their foot into the office of the President on 
a regular and daily basis. Linked with the acquisition of (1) special 
operations, old OPC and new DD/P, and (2) the massive special military 
strength in the Special Army and Air Force forces, this third step was most 
significant, and should be discussed in some detail. 

This third major development was the establishment of an office 
and a system designed especially to handle current intelligence. General 
Smith felt that his most important job was to keep the President fully and 
promptly informed of everything going on in the world that affected 
United States interests. He made arrangements with the President for such 
briefings, and he wanted the best support possible for this task. As much 
as anything else done during these formative years of the CIA, this was a 
most important step that has been best described by Lyman Kirkpatrick, 
who took part in all phases of this change. In his book, The Real CIA, he 
says: 

"This [establishment of the Current Intelligence Office] 
requires explanation. Not even all of the policy-makers of the 
government understand the current intelligence process and 
consequently fail to use its product as it should be used. I 
know that the American people, who should appreciate what 
they have in Washington — and want to know about it — have 
no realization of this aspect of intelligence work. . . . 



"General Smith . . . wanted a daily intelligence report 
that he could hand to the President which would succinctly 
summarize in a very few pages the important developments in 
the world that affected U.S. interests . . . this report to be all- 
source . . . press reports and radio broadcasts to the most 
secret information from the most sensitive sources available 
to the government ... the report to be carefully analyzed and 
evaluated by the most competent experts on the subject or 
area ... to be done immediately upon receipt of the 
information, right around the clock, twenty-four hours a day, 
and seven days a week. If the information was urgent it 
should go forward to the policy level immediately upon 
evaluation. If it was important, but not critical, it could go 
into a regular daily report ... so well written and attractively 
presented that the recipients would be sure to read it. 

"The office . . . would have as many experts as could be 
recruited or trained and persuaded to make a career in current 
intelligence. And it would have all of the production facilities 
necessary for a publication designed for the President of the 
United States. . . . 

"The production facilities and the people required to 
man them constitute an important aspect of the success of any 
such office. Working under intense pressure that at times 
makes the wire desk of a major newspaper during a national 
catastrophe calm by comparison, the experts need top-flight 
help at every level. If the girl who types the final copy doesn't 
know Danang from Nhatrang or Ouagadougou from Bamako, 
and doesn't care, errors can creep in that could help destroy 
the credibility of the entire item or even of the publication. 
Maps, charts, and other graphics have to be produced quickly 
and accurately, and the document must be printed and 
delivered at dawn. Of course everybody touching it has to 
have the highest security clearance, and every sheet of paper 
must be accounted for. Everybody in the office from the typist 
to the top supervisor realizes full well that hundreds of large- 
eyed officials at the top of the government will catch the 
slightest mistake. . . . An intelligence report has nothing to 
sell it but consistent credibility. Anything that tends to lessen 
this credibility means that the report will not receive the 
attention it should . . . 

"Unfortunately, intelligence is a very uncertain 
profession. It is never possible to have all of the information 
on any subject that one would like to have before telling the 
President of the United States about it. On some occasions 
one could assume that 90 percent of all the facts would be on 
hand, and the balance would be obvious. On other occasions 
the percentage would be much smaller, diminishing at times 
to only a hint or a clue. On both of these occasions it is the 



expert analyst who makes the difference and insures that the 
information presented is the best available. 

"There are two ingredients that go into this expert 
analysis. The first is the quality of the analyst, and the second 
is the availability of the necessary information. The first is 
attainable. The second may not always be possible. 

"Some have likened the current intelligence process to 
the production of a daily newspaper, but the analogy is 
inaccurate. With all due respect to our excellent press, it is not 
composed of specialists who are experts on the areas on 
which they report, with of course some well known 
exceptions. The current intelligence analyst is a man or 
woman who starts with a good academic background, 
including advanced degrees on the area of responsibility, 
spends years studying every scrap of information received in 
Washington on that country, and becomes increasingly expert 
with the passage of time. What is not generally understood 
even inside the government is that when an intelligence report 
is received and before it is passed on to the policy level it is 
analyzed and evaluated against every bit of information 
available on the same subject that has ever been received by 
the U.S. Government. 

"This process is one of the best safety valves against the 
government's acting on inadequate information or a false 
report that perhaps had been deliberately planted as a 
deception measure. One of the truly great dangers in passing 
intelligence to the policy level is that somebody will start 
pressing buttons based on partial information, and in my 
opinion the passage of unevaluated reports to the top of 
government is always unwise. When it happens, an inevitable 
flap occurs and a lot of government time and money is 
wasted. ..." 

This statement is an accurate reflection of exactly what was taking 
place and was written by a man, who but for physical impairment brought 
about by infantile paralysis, which struck him at the peak of his career, 
might well have been appointed DCI. Among the inner group of top 
Agency careerists, he was a moderate and a most dedicated man. As a 
result, his statement takes on a very special meaning. It is an example of 
the blind statement of faith found in a religious order. The great error and 
the great damage, however, from this kind of thinking arises in the fact 
that it is predicated upon the belief that the leaders of the Agency can do 
no wrong. 

When the same organization is given the authority to develop and 
control all foreign Secret Intelligence and to take its findings, based upon 
the inputs of this secret intelligence, directly to the last authority, the 
President — not only to take it to him regularly but to preempt his time, 



attention, and energies, almost to the point of making him their captive — 
and then also is given the authority and the vast means to carry out 
peacetime clandestine operations, that agency has been given the power to 
control the foreign operations of the Government on a continuing day to 
day basis. 

Note carefully in this calm and apparently objective account by 
Lyman Kirkpatrick the germ of ridicule and distrust of the press. It is said 
explicitly nowhere in the statement, yet it conveys the thought when it 
says, "There are two ingredients that go into this expert analysis. The first 
is the quality of the analyst, and the second is the availability of the 
necessary information. The first is attainable. The second may not always 
be possible. 

"Some have likened the current intelligence process to the 
production of a daily newspaper, but the analogy is inaccurate. With all 
due respect to our excellent press, it is not composed of specialists who are 
experts on the areas on which they report, with of course some well known 
exceptions. The current intelligence analyst is a man or woman who starts 
with a good academic background, including advanced degrees on the area 
of responsibility, spends years studying every scrap of information 
received in Washington on that country, and becomes increasingly expert 
with the passage of time." 

Note that the reference to the press is sandwiched between two 
strong paragraphs that laud the intelligence analyst, and then by loaded 
inference downgrade the press. 

It is not the statement by Kirkpatrick which is so much in contention 
as it is that the ST has used this kind of damning with faint praise to 
downgrade any outsider, whether he be press or, at times, Cabinet 
member. When such downgrading is done behind the cloak of secrecy, the 
person and persons so attacked are silently slandered and surely destroyed. 
They have no way of finding out that they have been the object of such 
attacks, because they have been quietly left out from a circle where 
exclusion means extinction. 

This has been no idle example. The New York Times had a most able 
and knowledgeable young correspondent, David Halberstam, in South 
Vietnam during the earlier days of the fighting there. He had devoted 
himself to the problems of Indochina and knew the area, the people, the 
history, and almost everything else about Indochina as well as or better 
than nearly anyone else, including what we might call the "intelligence 
analysts". At that time his crisp reporting frequently came up with items 
that went at cross purposes with most of the men who are mentioned so 
frequently in the Pentagon Papers. At first his reports were given the usual 
treatment. They were said to be inaccurate and slanted. Then they were 
ignored. But as they became more and more popular among those readers 
who found in them the stark ring of truth, an element of the ST caused a 
small office to be set up in a remote corner of the Pentagon where 
"information" could be fed to a staff who had nothing else to do but 



crucify this writer every day for the "eyes only" of the President of the 
United States. 

It was the function of this small staff to clip that author's column 
from the paper each day it appeared and to paste it on one side of an open 
scrapbook-type of album. Then they would create a carefully worded 
rebuttal column of their own, which would be pasted on the other side of 
the open album. The rebuttal data arrived from many sources and usually 
was the subject of urgent telegrams from Washington to Saigon and back, 
in order to find every possible way of attacking the works of that author. 
Not too many weeks passed before the President was reported to have 
called the publisher of The New York Times and made a suggestion to the 
effect that it might be better for that newspaper to change its 
correspondents in Indochina. In due time that young and skilled reporter, 
easily superior in terms of knowledge of his subject to most intelligence 
analysts, many of whom had not ever been to Indochina, was transferred 
to Poland so that he might no longer offer competition with the production 
of the analysts. 

This is an example of the real significance of the Kirkpatrick 
statement — not so much his statement, which is honest and realistic, but 
what his statement means in practice. When the powers within the ST 
believe that the President is better informed, every single day and without 
the cushioning intervention of other able staff members, such as his 
Cabinet officers and their top-level staff personnel, by the product of their 
own parochial analysts, they fall victim to two unpardonable sins. First 
and most obvious, these analysts may not be actually as experienced as 
they are perhaps educated. Their research may turn up the material all 
right; but they have not experienced it. Oftentimes they are not in a 
position to interpret it adequately, and their research falls short. One of 
their greatest and most obvious weaknesses is that their motivation is 
derived from random input. Their input is more or less a mechanical 
process whereby the intelligence data is acquired randomly and in many 
cases unexpectedly, and it is not the result of a plan or of a planned 
objective. They are simply responding to something that came into their 
hands from any of numberless sources. The force that drives them is not 
their own. 

Even with the most able and experienced analyst it would always be 
best to put him into the heart of the staff, as an intelligence expert should 
be, and then to permit the rest of the staff to work with him so that his 
analysis might benefit from their varied and considerable experience in all 
other staff areas. 

The second and most portentous danger that lies within the system 
outlined by Kirkpatrick is that such a procedure is susceptible to 
influences and even malevolent abuses. Again, if one believes that the 
Agency leaders can do no wrong, one grants to these leaders an element of 
infallibility and rests his whole system on faith in their honor and total 
integrity. One may not question honor and honesty in any public official 
but one may properly show considerable interest in shades of influence. If 



the President of the Unites States is to open his eyes each day upon a 
world painted by an artist who is a realist, he may get a fair picture of the 
affairs of the world as seen by that artist sometime during the deep hours 
of the preceding night. However, if he is to open his eyes upon the work of 
other artists who during the same long night have created a scene that in 
their eyes was honest and true but still may have been very much 
influenced by the sources of the intelligence data, then who is to tell the 
President that what he has viewed is not really the shape of the world that 
morning? Once access has been gained through the portals of the office of 
the President, there is no other authority to visit. However, if the final 
authority remains one echelon aloof from the day-to-day processes, he 
then has the option to work his way through a selection of views in his 
lonely search for truth. 

We opened this accounting of the ways of the ST with a look at the 
first report The New York Times selected to publish in its presentation of 
the Pentagon Papers. Let us emphasize once more that even though 99.9 
percent of the people who have read that newspaper account or the 
subsequent book of the same name have been led to believe that the report 
cited was really a McNamara trip report, the facts are otherwise. The 
report was actually another ST — directed staff production created right in 
Washington, D.C. Isn't this just what we are talking about? This report 
created by trained analysts was given to President Johnson. Is there any 
record that anyone at all had an opportunity to explain to and clarify for 
President Johnson that he was really being briefed on a homespun staff 
report, and not a trip report made on the spot in Vietnam? 

Even as we point out the way this report was written, we are very 
much aware of the fact that it would be entirely possible for trained and 
experienced men in Washington to turn out a report as good as one that 
McNamara and his party could have done from Saigon. And it is also 
recognized that with the excellence of communications as it is in this day, 
such a report can be written in Washington as easily and as adequately, 
from a substantive point of view, as it could be in Saigon or on the official 
airplane on the way back. The content of the report and the intent of the 
authors in writing it as they did is significant in this place and in the 
context of the subject of this chapter. There is great power in the hands of 
those who can develop and utilize secret foreign intelligence, interpret it 
daily, and present it by standard procedure directly to the President each 
day, and who at the same time possess the authority to carry out secret 
clandestine operations either in pursuit of more intelligence or in response 
to the data inputs of that intelligence. 

As Kirkpatrick reports, a huge current intelligence organization was 
established by General Smith, and it was manned and supported without 
regard to budget. It soon became a major interest of the Agency. Whereas 
the General began with the idea of publishing daily current intelligence in 
a publication, the process has since become even more direct and refined. 
The daily intelligence has become a daily briefing that is second to none in 
perfection. The same care and perfection planned for the publication go 
into this truly superior presentation. It may very well be that new Cabinet 



members and the President and Vice President themselves are awed at this 
most elaborate presentation; and that they begin to find it easy to 
downgrade the Huntleys, Brinkleys, and Cronkites if for no other reason 
than their familiarity with the sheer excellence and the superior content 
and quality of the daily intelligence briefing. 

We have seen otherwise sophisticated men attend these briefings 
regularly, and for the first few times come away with a look of awe and 
wonder. It is very heady stuff to look at the world from a satellite or U-2, 
or to see the whole world laid out before you in the unscrambled maze of 
global electronics deciphering. [21 

When a reporter can casually step to the podium and say that the 
Russians said this or that to one another down the missile range, or that 
traffic analysis from China shows such and such, all this is most eye- 
opening. At this point, even the top-echelon men in Government, who 
after all find this as new during their first days and weeks in office as 
would anyone else, are so awestruck by this fabulous display that few 
question it at all. These first impressions set the tone for the months and 
years that follow. There can be no question that Robert McNamara's first 
daily briefings during those December and January days before Kennedy's 
inauguration did a lot to shape his thinking on Indochina, thinking that he 
could never break away from it. Similarly, skilled experts planned the 
brisk briefings and the concomitant global traveling to which John 
McCone was immediately subjected upon his taking over as DCI. He too 
got a lasting and most powerful impression of Indochina, which stayed 
with him throughout his tenure. These are the things the ST is good at. 
And much of this process began with the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report 
and with the fortuitous implementation of its key features by the skilled 
administrative expeditor, General Walter Beedle Smith. 

Allen Dulles inherited the fruits of his own cultivation, harvested for 
him by a most able man who at the time he was performing these tasks 
was doing them honestly and objectively simply because he 
unquestioningly thought that it was for the good of the cause. 

When elder statesman Harry S. Truman looked back upon those 
years and said that the CIA had been "diverted", if he had been in a 
position to have seen what really happened as a result of the Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa report he had commissioned, he might have felt some 
inner surprise at the realization that it was his own pen that gave authority 
to a good bit of that diversion. Then when President Eisenhower came 
upon the scene, he had no reason whatsoever to question the work of his 
own closest military assistant or to question the position of two brothers 
who had for the most part played no active role in the Truman 
Administration. As a result, when Allen Dulles became the DCI he had 
everything going for him, and he just turned to the next pages of his report 
to maintain the momentum. 



1. It should be recalled that General Donovan of OSS fame had been the Ambassador to Thailand and that he was 
followed by the former Ambassador to Greece, John Puerifoy. Both men were, of course, CIA-type operators, 
and it was their expertise that accounts for so much of the relationship that has existed in Thailand during the 
past twenty years. 

2. Deciphering performed by computers from material picked up by global listening posts. 



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PART III 
The CIA: How It Is Organized 

Chapter 11 
The Dulles Era Begins 



The old, pastel yellow brick east building on a hill overlooking 
Foggy Bottom, on what is now the site of the Kennedy Center for the 
Performing Arts and the Watergate Buildings, was just the place for the 
scent of pipe tobacco and the quiet shuffle of worn leather slippers. The 
high-backed chair and elongated office were also right for its new tenant. 
Allen Dulles moved into a place that already seemed to bear his 
trademarks and characteristics. Unpretentious as the East Building was, it 
seemed right for a daily stream of jet-black, chauffeur-driven limousines 
to pull up the hill, over the winding narrow driveway, and then down into 
the garden circle where no more than three or four cars could stop at any 
one time. Typically, the VIP cars pulled over onto the grass to permit the 
little old bottle-green buses to shuttle from one hidden CIA building to 
another. All these buses seemed at some part of their wanderings to find 
their way past the home of Mr. Dulles, as though anyone who worked for 
him should be kept aware of the fact that he was sequestered somewhere 
up there on the dim second floor overlooking the Potomac. 

The Agency had a good chance of being secret without making 
much effort. Either by design or by a hand-me-down procedure, the CIA 
inherited the most motley group of buildings imaginable. Someone in the 
General Services Administration with a real sense of humor must have 
made out the CIA allocation in the Greater Washington area. At the north 
end of the Fourteenth Street (Rochambeau) Bridge and to the north of the 
Bureau of Engraving and Printing, where not less than 70 — 80 percent of 
all tourists who scramble through Washington each year find their way, 
there is a red brick building that looks like part of a converted stable. The 
Agency was in there. Further north on Sixteenth Street, across from the 



Statler-Hilton Hotel and next door to Washington's own Gaslight Club, is 
another nondescript building, not too far from the Soviet Embassy. CIA 
was there. On Connecticut Avenue, in what is now the heart of the 
business district, there used to be a building that had floors that sagged so 
much that tenants shuddered each time a big truck went by down below. 
CIA was in there. CIA was crammed into every one of the fairly well kept, 
but seriously overcrowded World War II Tempo Buildings along the south 
side of the Reflecting Pool east of the Lincoln Memorial Across the 
parkway, near the cherry tree Tidal Basin, in buildings named "Alcott" 
and "Barton" for their World War II Army WAAC tenants, the CIA was 
tucked in too. In fact, the CIA was so scattered that there was scarcely a 
part of Washington that did not have CIA offices hidden away. And of 
course, it was very simple for anyone who wished to find out where the 
Agency was to follow the little green buses, which trundled all day long in 
never-ending circles, some clockwise and some counter-clockwise, from 
building to building. 

Things like this did not bother Allen Dulles. It is entirely possible 
that he never found out where all of his agency was anyhow. Such details 
were not for him. As a matter of fact, one of the first things he did when 
he became the Director was to abolish the office of the Deputy Director of 
Administration. In a city renowned for its bureaucratic administration and 
its penchant chant for proving how right C. Northcote Parkinson was, Mr. 
Dulles' first act was more heretical to most Washingtonians than one of 
Walter Beedle Smith's first actions — the one in which he told the 
McCarthy hearings that he thought there might well be Communists in the 
Agency Washington ~ was not as upset about the Communists as it was to 
learn that a major agency of the Government had abolished 
Administration. Mr. Dulles took the view of the intelligence professional, 
that it was much more dangerous and therefore undesirable to have all 
kinds of administrators acquiring more information than they should have, 
than it was to find some way to get along without the administrators. 

While the public was mulling over that tidbit from the CIA, the real 
moves were being made inside the organization, where no one could see 
what was going on. The Deputy Director of Intelligence, strengthened by 
the addition of the current Intelligence organization and other such tasks, 
was to be responsible for everything to do with intelligence, and more 
importantly, was to be encumbered by nothing that had to do with logistics 
and administration. This was the theory. In practice, the DD/I has a lot of 
administrative and support matters to contend with as does any other large 
office. However, as much of the routine and continuing load as could be 
was set upon the Deputy Director of Support. 

At the same time, the new and growing DD/P (the special 
operations shop) was similarly stripped of all encumbrances and freed to 
do the operational work that Dulles saw developing as his task. This left 
the DD/S (Support) with a major task. He was responsible for the entire 
support of the Agency, support of all kinds, at all times, and in all places. 
At the head of this directorate for many, many years has been the most 
unsung hero of the Agency and perhaps its ablest deputy, L. K. White. He 



is better known as "Red" White, a former Army colonel and a most able 
manager and administrator. He has made things work. [11 

The CIA as an intelligence agency offers no unusual elements on 
most counts. It is pretty much what it seems to be. Special operations has 
been exposed one way or another so many times that there is not too much 
guesswork about its role. But researchers have been unable to work their 
way into what it really is that makes the Agency what it is today. This 
distinctive characteristic is its superior logistics support. If an agent 
working in Greece needs some Soviet-built rifles of a certain vintage to 
equip some agents for a border or cross-border assignment, all he has to do 
is get his request to the station chief. He will in turn put it on the Agency 
line direct to Washington, where DD/S will process it. Within hours, one 
of their men, posing as an Air Force man in "X" country, will leave his 
office and drive out with an Air Force pickup truck to a small building on 
the far side of the base. There he will unlock a wire-anchor fence, then 
step unto a "go-down" storage tunnel until he comes to a row of heavy 
boxes. There he will look for a special mark that describes the guns he 
wants. 

He will drive, with the nondescript box, across the field to another 
building, where a normal-looking Air Force supply office is located. In 
what looks like the usual supply room and storage area, he will find a shop 
filled with special tools and machinery. In short order, he will have the 
guns unpacked, removed from the heavy coatings of cosmolene and lead 
foil, and in an hour or so these guns will have been repackaged and 
labeled "P-84 Wing Tank" or some such cover name. Then an Air Force 
transport plane on its way to Naples and Athens will take this boxed 
"Wing Tank" to the Air Force Military Assistance Advisory Group section 
at the military airfield outside of Athens. There an Air Force MA AG man 
will take the box and see that it gets to its destination. That same day a 
small single engine plane will fly low over a remote, mountainous site and 
gently airdrop that box onto a set of camouflaged panels that mark the site 
for the trained pilot. 

Nothing is difficult for the DD/S. The above order and action are 
examples of the routine. What was not routine was the establishment and 
maintenance of the system that made that possible. Someone had to get 
those special guns into the hands of the CIA in the first place. Then an 
elaborate global network of supply and support bases had to be 
established, not only as functional bases, but also with the double role of 
looking like one kind of facility and doing the important task of another. 

A closed World War II airfield in England, once the home of an 
American fighter wing, was found to be an ideal site for DD/S operations. 
The Navy is "Prime" (the U.S. military department assigned the task of 
working with the British on all matters pertaining to the support and 
housing of Americans on the British Isles) in England. The Agency asked 
the Navy to establish some reason for asking the British to permit the 
limited reopening of this base. The CIA and the Navy agreed on their 
cover story and then met with the British, who of course were told the real 



reason for the request, but also were expected to maintain the cover story. 

With some small show of normalcy, the British reopened the base. 
The most obvious evidence that the base had been reopened in that 
country neighborhood was the appearance of British uniformed guards at 
the gates on a twenty-four-hour basis. The Navy set up a "supply facility". 
It had a real U.S. Navy base designation. The base commander arrived in 
uniform, and his staff and enlisted men followed soon after. The base 
hired local British people, some as secretaries and others to run the kitchen 
and other facilities. In actual practice, the base had not a single real Navy 
man. All of those at the base were CIA men carefully accredited to the 
Navy and sent overseas as naval personnel. 

The base gradually was loaded with "Navy" equipment, and at the 
proper time it was announced that the Navy was going to maintain some 
highly classified gear at the base in addition to the regular items and that 
certain buildings would be off-limits to all unauthorized personnel, British 
and American. By that time DD/S had a major storage and maintenance 
site in a most convenient and secure location. 

If anyone knew that this site had been created for more than met the 
eye, he might note that it was not far from the huge operating base of the 
U.S. Air Force Air Resupply and Communications Wing that was 
assigned to England. The Agency site would actually be a satellite base to 
the huge Air Force operation with which it was linked. It is this formula 
that has made it possible for the CIA, with the appearance of only a little 
in the way of support and logistics on its own, actually to command 
boundless equipment, manpower, and facilities, including aircraft from the 
ever ready and always eager Air Force sister unit. The law and the 
directives and the other limits that have been put upon the Agency in an 
attempt to keep it out of major operations seemed to most observers — and 
in this business there were few witting observers — to be working well; but 
for the knowledgeable, the Agency was fast becoming, by the mid-fifties, 
a major peacetime power. 

It was in 1955 that the then new Senator Mansfield, among others, 
attempted to get a law through the Congress that would establish a strong 
watchdog committee to oversee the CIA. One of the principal reasons this 
law did not pass was that such CIA stalwarts as Senator Russell and 
Senator Saltonstall affirmed that there was no need for such committees. 
The Congress, in their words, needed no more committees than it had at 
that time. They went on to say that they were always informed about 
everything the Agency was doing and that they could see no reason why 
the whole Congress should be brought in on such things when there was 
no need whatsoever for such action. 

I have worked closely with Senator Saltonstall, and many others 
who were on those committees, and except in rare instances, they never 
knew that the CIA was so huge. They knew how big the CIA was within 
the bounds of the "real" or intelligence organization; but none of them 
knew about its tremendous global base capability, and what is much more 



important, none of them knew the intricacies of the Agency's supporting 
system that existed in the name of the Army Special Forces and the Air 
Force Air Supply and Communications Wings. Again there will be some 
who say, "Oh yes, Senator John Doe visited that base, and he saw this, and 
he was told that the whole business was highly classified. He said he knew 
what it was." Such things usually can be said, and such things may have 
happened; but no one man or no one group of knowledgeable men had 
ever had the opportunity to see the whole picture. As I have heard Senator 
Saltonstall say, "Now don't tell me about that classified material. What I 
don't know about it won't hurt me." That has been a general attitude on 
Capitol Hill. In discussions I have had with responsible committeemen on 
the Hill, I have found this to exist as recently as September 1971. This 
situation has not changed much. There are no Congressmen and no 
Senators who really know about the Agency and about what the Agency is 
doing. 

As a result of the war planning role of the CIA, it was easy for the 
CIA planners to enter in the plans of all armed forces, requirements for 
wartime equipment, vehicles, aircraft, and facilities that had to be 
earmarked and stockpiled for use by the Agency in the event of war. Once 
such requirements were listed in the war plans they could be requisitioned 
along with all the other war-plan material. This meant that the cost of this 
equipment would be worked into the military budget, and then in due time 
each item would be purchased and delivered to the advance base site 
where war plan material was stockpiled. Warehouse after warehouse of 
"military equipment" is stored in the Far East, in Europe, and throughout 
the United States for the eventual use of the CIA. The cost of this material 
and of its storage, care, and conditioning is inestimable. 

To handle all of this material the Agency has large bases in Europe, 
Africa, Southeast Asia, Okinawa, Japan, Panama, and the United States. 
These supplies are kept in good shape, and reconditioned and rotated in 
stock with those that are used. Thus, whenever a requirement arises, the 
Agency has what it needs or can get what it needs from other sources. 

Some of the war-plan equipment has a brief shelf-life, which 
requires that it be exchanged, used, or at least rotated with items in 
service. The Agency does not have sufficient demand for some of these 
things to permit it to keep up with such practices, so it has worked out 
rotation schedules with the services to let them have what it has in storage 
and then to get new replacement equipment when it is available. Also, the 
Agency has become a stopgap source of supply when something is needed 
as for a military assistance project or some other such emergency. As the 
years passed and as the Agency's "military" role became more a matter of 
custom and generally accepted, Agency military cover units became so 
deeply covered that their neighboring military units did not know, or 
forgot, that the unit near them was not a regular military unit. By that time, 
requisitions from these CIA units were as readily acceptable as any others 
and the units became easily self-supporting without any Agency funding 
input. 



There are so many CIA cover units in the military that no 
accounting system can keep up with all of them. The military System also 
permits easy requisitioning between the services. As a result, an Army unit 
may requisition from a nearby Navy or Air Force unit and vice versa. A 
Navy CIA cover unit, for example, will requisition from an army or Air 
Force unit that will never question the right of that unit to draw the 
supplies it wants, but will simply make out cross- servicing accounting 
tickets and file them. The service that gave up the material will gather the 
supply tickets at its supply centers and then, depending upon how 
sophisticated its accounting system is and upon the instructions it may 
have received from its CIA Focal Point Office, it will either turn them in 
for reimbursement or pay them itself and forget about it. At all staff 
meetings on the subject, the CIA will protest that it pays all bills that are 
presented for reimbursement by the DOD and other agencies of the 
Government. This may be true, but the important thing is that few of the 
other government offices ever sort out all of these cats and dogs to the 
point where they are able to tally them up and render meaningful 
statements. As a result, the CIA gets millions of dollars of equipment each 
year without any attempt to collect on the part of the losing organization. 

After World War II and, more importantly, after the Korean War, 
the military services had counted millions of dollars worth of surplus 
equipment in storage. One of the biggest tasks of the military logistics 
branches was to find some legal way to get rid of this surplus, most of 
which was new and unused. The laws that governed the disposal of such 
material required that it be made available first to the other services. 
Materials not wanted by the other services would then be offered on the 
basis of a priority list to other government agencies and departments, to 
state and local governments, colleges and universities, and so on, until any 
remaining surplus would be put up for public sale or auction. 

The CIA found that it could beat this system easily by setting up 
certain cover units that appeared to be military units. These cover units 
would requisition copies of the surplus lists, would go over them carefully, 
and then would claim the items in the quantities desired and take delivery 
of them at some service base, where they would be prepared for 
transshipment to a military facility under CIA control. In this manner, or 
through variations of this method, the CIA was able to stockpile 
mountains of equipment. 

Some of the variations on this system were rather subtle. For 
example: If a country that had certain elements who were working with a 
U.S. military unit that was really a CIA organization wanted certain items 
of military equipment not authorized by the mutual aid program or other 
such assistance plans, it might in the normal course of business ask the 
men in the unit what they could do to help. The unit would pass this word 
on to the CIA station chief, who would contact the DD/S staff to see if the 
equipment desired could be obtained, perhaps through surplus. 

The DD/S would alert one of its cover units, and they would screen 
the surplus lists to find the items. In most cases, they would find them or 



they would find that the Army could be persuaded to list the needed 
number of those items as surplus, as long as they knew that they were 
going to be cross-requisitioned by the "Air Force", and as long as they had 
thus been assured that the items would not slip past the surplus lists and 
reach public sale. Thus the CIA would get what it wanted, free and in the 
quantity it wanted. They would be delivered to the CIA's own military 
cover supply depot and from there they would be processed to the 
overseas unit. All packaging, crating, and shipping would be kept within 
military channels and would be paid for in most instances by the military, 
since it would not know that the two units, the gaming one and the 
shipping one, were both cover units. In due time, the equipment the 
foreign government wanted would arrive at the "military" unit there, and 
that government would either have the use of the equipment or would be 
given the equipment as soon as transfer arrangements could be made. 

It takes a lot of study of these processes and a lot of familiarity with 
the system to clarify how it works and how these things can happen 
without an exchange of funds. However, it would be incorrect and unwise 
to attribute to the CIA the idea that the Agency improperly uses the cover 
system to acquire valuable equipment without properly paying for it. It 
would be equally incorrect and unwise to create the idea that the military 
services do not account properly for the equipment they have on their 
inventory rosters. In normal cases, the military is quite precise about 
transfer of property, and there is seldom more than an occasional 
malfunction in the supply system. Also, the CIA has been scrupulous 
when it has been possible for it to pay for, by reimbursement, any 
equipment that the military services have furnished and for which it has 
been billed. The breakdown comes in the application of secrecy. Few 
supply people in the huge defense supply organizations know that the CIA 
has military units, and most of them, if they thought that the CIA was 
involved with some shipment, would never say a word to anyone about it. 
Then when the statement drawn upon a cover unit that was unfunded was 
not paid properly by the transfer of funded sums, the supply agency would 
simply pay it off from some available account rather than break security. 
They may be wrong to do this; but they choose this rather than taking a 
chance on exposing a CIA activity that might be important. 

On the other hand, the CIA will state at the time they requisition 
items of equipment that they will pay all bills rendered. In some cases, 
they have put money in what amounts to an escrow account so that the 
DOD may draw against it. However, again the existence of such funds is 
usually cloaked in security, and it is seldom that the account is drawn 
upon. I knew of millions of dollars in such accounts that were never used, 
and they were lost to both organizations as they returned unclaimed to the 
general treasury. There is a feeling that "it is all for the Uncle anyhow", so 
why account for such transactions. 

This may be all very well and may be a suitable reply; but when one 
reflects that the President and the Congress had taken great precautions to 
preclude the growth of an operational agency and to do this by prohibiting 
the Agency from building up just such supplies of equipment, this whole 



process becomes more important on that score than it does from the point 
of view of the money involved. The CIA was not supposed to have 
money, men, materials, or global facilities. The ease with which the 
Agency got around these restraints was remarkable, and it explains why so 
few knew at the time it was being done. One of the only tried and tested 
methods by which any government can control its subordinate 
organizations is through the purse-strings. When an organization finds 
ways to get around the restraints of money control and grows from within 
in a parasitic manner, it becomes very difficult for the usual controls to 
operate. Add to this the thick screen of security that has kept most of the 
other normal review authorities from seeing what the Agency was doing, 
and it is not too surprising to find that neither Congress, the President, nor 
the American people had realized that by 1955 the CIA had become, right 
before their eyes, the largest and most active peacetime operational force 
in the country. 

Some of these actions worked in strange ways. And some of these 
actions were subject to the same irregularities that plagued the rest of the 
operations that were kept from the eyes of the public and from the controls 
normal to an open government. The irresponsible step in from time to time 
and get away with things that would be discovered in normal activities. 

At one overseas base heavily involved in air activities in support of 
the Agency and of the foreign nationals the Agency was assisting, there 
were a number of aircraft of doubtful ownership commingled with other 
aircraft that were on "loan" from the Air Force. These aircraft were flown 
and maintained for the most part by a civilian facility that had the 
appearance of being a civilian contract carrier; but there were also a 
number of Air Force and Navy personnel with the unit in various 
capacities. The primary base unit was under Navy cover and had been for 
years, as a result of an earlier mission. With such a mix of personnel and 
equipment it was all but impossible, and certainly impractical, to attempt 
rigid controls in the manner customary on a real military base. 

One of the planes assigned to this unit was a small transport aircraft 
common to all three services and built by the Beech Aircraft Corporation. 
This plane was flown by the officers of the staff and was used for shorter 
administrative flights. One of the pilots who flew it regularly came in to 
land in a bad crosswind one day and momentarily lost control of the plane 
after it had touched the ground during landing, in what is called a "ground 
loop". He recovered in time to keep from doing very much damage and no 
one was hurt. The plane needed minor repairs to be as good as new. 
However, this pilot, who also had maintenance authority at this 
conglomerate base, ordered that the plane be hauled out behind the main 
hangar and covered with a large protective tarpaulin. It was left there for 
months, and unknown to others on the base, a report was filed to 
Washington that it would cost more to fix the plane than it was worth; so 
the plane was scheduled for what the military calls "salvage". This means 
it is put up for sale to the highest bidder for scrap, or whatever. 

No one on this base, which was primarily managed by the CIA, 



gave this a thought, and after a while the plane was not even missed. 
During this time the pilot, a major who was actually a career CIA 
employee serving in his Air Force reserve grade, was transferred back to 
an assignment in Washington at CIA headquarters. He had not been there 
long when he located the paperwork on that plane and made a bid in his 
own name and that of a friend to purchase the plane for scrap prices. Since 
no one else even knew where the plane was (and even if they had they 
would not have wanted to go to that remote place to get it) and of course, 
since any other bidder would have believed that the plane was a total loss, 
there were no other bidders. The major bought the plane in a perfectly 
legal maneuver. 

He then applied for a brief vacation. Dashing back to the overseas 
station, where he was well known, he arranged with the local maintenance 
crews to have the plane fixed at very little expense to himself, and in no 
time he and his friend shipped it back to the United States. Their profit on 
the deal was many times more than the actual money they had invested, 
and no one ever knew about it because all of the records had been kept in 
highly classified channels. Secrecy can be used for many purposes, and 
this was just one of the uses to which it can be put by those of the team 
who know how to get away with it. 

Emboldened by this success, the same man arranged a few years 
later to be the project officer on a rather large air operation in Antarctica. 
He and his companions worked up a team that was going to accomplish 
some very special work on that remote continent. They had two Air Force 
twin-engined transport aircraft heavily modified and modernized, and then 
got together millions of dollars' worth of special electronic and 
photographic equipment. They filled the planes with equipment and still 
had so much left over that they had to have the Air Force fly it to Panama, 
where it caught up with the Navys regular shipments on the way to 
McMurdo Sound. They had this priority-classed equipment put aboard, 
even at the cost of off-loading some of the Navy's own equipment. 

Everything was brought to Antarctica, where these men established 
their own base satellited upon the Navy from McMurdo Sound. Whereas 
most of the Navy's supplies for Antarctica are either ship-borne via the 
Panama Canal or airborne from Christchurch, New Zealand, this group 
flew down the coast of South America to Argentina, and then took off 
from there, with elaborate assistance from the Argentine navy. 

After their project had been completed for the year, they reported 
that one of the planes could not operate because of some sort of engine 
trouble, and that since the dangerous trip back with only one plane would 
be too hazardous, they planned to leave both aircraft and all of their 
equipment cached in the Antarctic. All personnel were flown out by the 
Navy and returned to the United States. It just happened by coincidence 
nearly one year later that a U.S. military officer stationed in Argentina 
reported the arrival of a civilian who was working with contacts in the 
Argentine navy to see if arrangements could be made, privately, to bring 
those planes out of Antarctica. This chance tip was followed up, and it was 



learned that the same man had decided that if he could get away with one 
plane, he might as well try to get away with two much larger aircraft and 
with the millions of dollars' worth of equipment, which was, in his mind, 
fair salvage somewhere on the ice cap of Antarctica. With the excellent 
cooperation of the Antarctic project officers on the White House staff and 
with the support of the Navy, all of this equipment and the planes were 
recovered and returned to service. 

These are special cases and do not reflect upon the system so much 
as they do upon the actions of a few individuals. The problem is that the 
U.S. Government is not properly constituted to deal with such actions 
when they are cloaked in heavy security wraps, and the incidence of such 
happenings is far greater than it need be, since in most cases there should 
not have been any security over any of the projects. The cost of allowing 
the ST to operate in secrecy is high. 

There are a number of aircraft that have been completely scrubbed 
of all usual identification, and they are operated by the services for the 
CIA. For those unfamiliar with the complexities involved in maintaining 
aircraft, it will be worth a partial explanation to show what problems arise. 
The huge radial engines on these large transports are all carefully marked 
with serial numbers, decals, and other special identifications, which are so 
coded and catalogued that the men who do the heavy maintenance on them 
in the major depots of the services can work from drawings and 
instructions that are in turn coded to match the engine series involved. 
When engines are made non-attributable, for CIA use, all of these 
markings are removed or changed. This means then that only certain crews 
can work on these engines, and they have to be cleared to know that the 
aircraft are special. 

Sometimes, something will happen to an engine when the plane is 
far from its regular base. In such instances, a message is sent to the nearest 
Air Force base commander, and he is told to fly a maintenance crew there 
to get the engine and to "melt", or destroy it. Instead of working on the 
engine and revealing that the plane and its intended mission were 
classified, a costly engine is destroyed. Then that engine must be replaced 
by another identical non- attributable engine before the plane can continue 
its flight. 

Sometimes things will happen to the plane itself. The Air Force had 
a number of special aircraft in Europe that had been converted to use for 
certain classified projects, although from outward appearances they were 
perfectly normal four-engine transports. One time, one of these aircraft 
had a simple nose-wheel problem. It should have been an easy thing to 
have it worked on at the base and returned to fight operations. However, 
some of the simpler maintenance work had been turned over to native 
teams. One such activity was the repair of nose wheels. To keep this 
problem from the natives, a CIA crew chief took a torch and cut several of 
the main electric cables in the plane, then grounded it for serious 
maintenance problems. He thought that this would get him the authority to 
hire an American contract crew that could work on the nose wheel as well 



as on the cables. 



Since the inspection report showed very severe damage to the plane, 
the reviewing authority in the United States would not authorize a team to 
fix the plane, and instead ordered it to be salvaged. In the salvaging 
process, the alert CIA had one of its civilian units bid for the plane, and in 
a short time it was back in the air, in good shape, as the property of a 
civilian airline, which put it to work in its own interest and incidentally for 
the CIA whenever requested. This could be called an inadvertent windfall. 
But in any event, it was very costly and had it not been for the security 
measures that made the whole thing unwieldy, the damage could have 
been repaired easily and the Air Force would still be flying that plane. 

By the late nineteen-fifties, the CIA logistics system had all it could 
handle all over the world. It could deliver such unit shipments as forty 
thousand arms by airdrop in the period of a few days or it could send 
aircraft and helicopters into Laos and move tens of thousands of Meo 
tribesmen from one part of the country to another with ease. By that time, 
the CIA had no less than eight hundred to one thousand units, all cover 
units within the DOD. This was a huge and intricate system. 

The Agency did not man all of the units. Many of them were no 
more than a telephone number with someone to answer the phone and give 
information or receive calls. If, for example, a group of military personnel 
from a foreign country were passing through Washington on their way 
home after a school on a Military Aid Program quota, and they had been 
told to get in touch with a certain contact, they could call a number in 
Washington and their contact would answer the phone and tell them where 
to meet him, where they were to stay, and so on. If a defector had been 
flown to the States, was living in some safe house, and was not permitted 
to leave unless he was escorted for his own safety, he could call a certain 
number in Washington and ask for a certain military officer, who would 
give him instructions of one kind or other. 

Some of these "phone-drop" organizations were used for nothing 
more than to requisition supplies from another service. The supplying 
service would never know that the requisitioning outfit did not really exist. 
Of course, the Agency would go through the details of making certain that 
the units it was using were listed in the supply catalogues, in the regular 
military postal catalogues, and in other normal references. 

Other units were manned with many people and served as active 
training units, storage sites, or operational facilities of one kind or another. 
In such cases, the manning would be either all Agency in the cover of 
military, or Agency and military blended together, or it might be all 
military supporting the Agency. In the latter case, the unit might be an Air 
Force Squadron that had aircraft and other equipment maintained in 
readiness complete with well-trained crews ready to fly out for the Agency 
on any of a great number of special missions. Everything possible would 
be done to make it appear to be a real Air Force unit. 



Few people, even among those who are supposed to know all about 
the Agency's relationship with the DOD, have ever known exactly how 
many such units exist, and what is more important, what these units really 
do. 

One day back in 1960 or 1961, it was necessary for me to brief the 
chairman of the JCS on a matter that had come up involving the CIA and 
the military. Such briefings, when they have been put on the regular 
agenda of the day, take place in a sort of reverse pecking order. Each item 
that comes before the Chiefs is briefed by its staff- supporting office from 
the least sensitive to the most highly classified. On this day there were a 
number of briefings on all sorts of subjects. The room where the Chiefs 
met was full and the anterooms were packed with briefing teams. One by 
one the teams were called in to give their briefings. As they finished, they 
would be dismissed, and if the Chief of any given service had any of his 
top-level staff there with him, he might dismiss that officer along with the 
briefers. (Sometimes, when one service is briefing, a Chief of another 
service will want to have one or more of his senior assistants there to hear 
the briefing with him.) As a result, as the briefings progress from least 
classified to most highly classified, the whole group begins to thin out. 
This is done with a very precise control, verging on the ritualistic. 

Finally, the briefings on atomic energy matters, missiles and space, 
and other highly classified matters took place. Then the Chiefs began to 
hear some of the more closely held intelligence matters. The last item was 
the one that pertained to the CIA operational information. As I was 
ushered into the room I noted that everyone was leaving except the 
chairman and the commandant of the Marine Corps. The chairman was 
General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, and the commandant was General David M. 
Shoup. They were close friends and had known each other for years. 

When the primary subject of the briefing had ended, General 
Lemnitzer asked me about the Army cover unit that was involved in the 
operation. I explained what its role was and more or less added that this 
was a rather routine matter. Then he said, "Prouty, if this is routine, yet 
General Shoup and I have never heard of it before, can you tell me in 
round numbers how many Army units there are that exist as "cover" for 
the CIA?" I replied that to my knowledge at that time there were about 
605 such units, some real, some mixed, and some that were simply 
telephone drops. When he heard that he turned to General Shoup and said, 
"You know, I realized that we provided cover for the Agency from time to 
time; but I never knew that we had anywhere near so many permanent 
cover units and that they existed all over the world." 

I then asked General Lemnitzer if I might ask him a question. He 
said I could. "General," I said, "during all of my military career I have 
done one thing or another at the direction of a senior officer. In all of those 
years and in all of those circumstances I have always believed that 
someone, either at the level of the officer who told me to do what I was 
doing or further up the chain of command, knew why I was doing what I 
had been directed to do and that he knew what the reason for doing it was. 



Now I am speaking to the senior military officer in the armed forces and I 
have just found out that some things I have been doing for years in support 
of the CIA have not been known and that they have been done, most 
likely, in response to other authority. Is this correct?" 

This started a friendly, informal, and most enlightening 
conversation, more or less to the effect that where the CIA was concerned 
there were a lot of things no one seemed to know. It ended with those two 
generals asking me about matters that they had unwittingly participated in 
during earlier years that they had never been told about. 

It was amazing, very basic, and very true that a great number of 
operations, some of them quite important in terms of foreign policy, and 
usually involving one or more foreign nations, had taken place in the guise 
of military activities when in reality they were not. Since the military had 
been used for support purposes, first in the context of war planning and 
later for more open and more active roles, as the CIA and the ST became 
more powerful and bold, the military had continued to believe that 
whatever it had been asked to do must have been sanctioned from above 
by someone. 

This brings us back to the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report. One of the 
major undertakings of that report was to place the CIA quietly within the 
structure of the entire U.S. Government, ostensibly to obtain more 
complete secrecy when necessary. For example: It was necessary for the 
CIA to arrange for aircraft to enter the country quite frequently without the 
usual customs check that all military aircraft must undergo. In the earlier 
years the CIA would arrange directly or through State or Defense to have 
customs waive inspection of a plane with classified cargo or carrying a 
defector or on some other highly classified mission. Then, when such 
things had become more or less commonplace, the CIA would politely 
offer to provide a few men to work with the regular customs personnel to 
take the burden for such activity from them. This was the way it was put 
in the first place, and the customs office would gratefully accept the 
assistance. The CIA would go through all the necessary steps to get 
authorization for increasing the manpower allocations in the customs 
service by the number of men it planned to put there and then to make 
arrangements to reimburse the customs office for the payroll and other 
costs of the office. 

This latter step would always be taken, because it would be best for 
the customs office to go through all of the normal motions of paying these 
men, including promoting them and paying for their travel or other usual 
expenses, so that their assignment would appear to be completely normal 
to all others in the office. Then, by special accounting procedures that 
would take place in the main office, the CIA would reimburse the 
Treasury Department for the money involved. 

In the beginning this would all be done with elaborate open- 
handedness, even to the point where the new agency men would receive 
training and other prerequisites of the job. However, as the years passed, 



most of this procedure would be forgotten, and few would recall that those 
special assignments had even originated with the Agency. Accountants 
who had known how to transfer the funds would have been transferred 
themselves, and the Treasury Department might no longer bill for the costs 
involved. But the Agency men would stay on, their replacements would be 
carefully fitted into the manning tables, and few would even notice that 
they were there. 

This has happened quite extensively in a great many places all 
throughout the Government. There are CIA men in the Federal Aviation 
Administration, in State, all over the DOD, and in most other offices 
where the CIA has wanted to place them. Few top officials, if any, would 
ever deny the Agency such a service; and as the appointive official 
departed, and his staffs came and went, the whole device would be lost 
with only the CIA remembering that they were still there. 

Many of these people have reached positions of great responsibility. 
I believe that the most powerful and certainly the most useful agent the 
CIA has ever had operates in just such a capacity within another branch of 
the Government, and he has been there for so long that few have any idea 
that he is a long-term career agent of the CIA. Through his most excellent 
and skillful services, more CIA operations have been enabled to take place 
than can be laid at the feet of any other, more "legitimate", agent. 

This was the plan and the wisdom of the Dulles idea from the 
beginning. On the basis of security he would place people in all areas of 
the Government, and then he would move them up and deeper into their 
cover jobs, until they began to take a very active part in the role of their 
own cover organizations. This is how the ST was born. Today, the role of 
the CIA is performed by an ad hoc organization that is much greater in 
size, strength, and resources than the CIA has ever been visualized to be. 

There is another facet to this type of organization that has had a 
major impact upon the role of secret operations in this Government. With 
the spread of the influence of the CIA into so many other branches of the 
Federal Government, the agents found it very easy to make friends and 
win willing disciples in their new surroundings. There is a glamour and 
allure to the "fun and games" of Agency work that appeals to many 
people, and they go out of their way to provide support above and beyond 
what the CIA has ever asked for — or thought to ask for. 

As a case in point, consider the U-2 project. The Lockheed 
Company came up with the plane, but the Air Force knew it could not use 
it in peacetime and thought that it might be able to get it into use by 
offering it to the CIA. The CIA picked up the idea and operated the whole 
project, provided — and this was a major "provided" — the Air Force paid 
for it and actively supported it with men, material, and facilities. A 
proposal that began as a plan to get a new aircraft on the production line 
for Air Force reconnaissance purposes thus became a project to get the 
plane flying for CIA photographic intelligence purposes. As the 
photographs began to come in, the input data from them began to dictate 



new operations that arose not from some foreign policy or national 
planning staff, but from intelligence sources. Intelligence input began a 
cycle that supported intelligence itself. A new machine, which required 
more and more support of its own actions, was born within the 
Government. 

By the time of the Bay of Pigs operations, the CIA was part of a 
greater team, which used the Agency and other parts of the Government to 
carry out almost any secret operation it wanted. By that time this 
organization had the equipment, the facilities, the men, and the funds to 
carry out clandestine operations that were so vast that even on the basis of 
simple definition they were no longer truly secret, nor could anyone hope 
that they might be. 

The availability of supplies and facilities made it possible for all of 
this to come about. The growth of the CIA and of the greater ST has 
resulted more from the huge success of the DD/S side of the Agency than 
from either the DD/P or the DD/I. When Allen Dulles had abolished the 
DD/A (Administration) he had put nearly everything that was not 
intelligence and that was not secret operations into the DD/S division. The 
DD/S became responsible for the function of budget and comptrollers hip; 
for personnel and for the special personnel function that is most important 
in the Agency, personnel cover; for communications; for research and 
development including that very special Agency shop that is responsible 
for the development of all of the very special gadgets and other devices so 
important to the trade of intelligence; for transportation; for facilities ~ a 
special resource so vast that few people even know 50 percent of what 
exists; for supply, and for maintenance. 

Many of these functions, which are normal to any major enterprise, 
take on special meaning in the CIA. In fact every one of these general 
headings has buried somewhere deep in its staff special arrangements that 
make the Agency what it is. 

Research and development is a most interesting enterprise as carried 
on by the CIA. For example, let us say that the CIA has a modified aircraft 
that it flies along the border of the Iron Curtain, or for that matter 
anywhere it wants to listen to electronic traffic. This monitoring airborne 
system is as sophisticated as the military can make it, and in many 
instances the CIA has been able to have even the newest military system 
modified to give it some special characteristics of particular use to the 
Agency. 

In the normal pursuit of its mission, the plane cruises at altitude on a 
prearranged course and listens to every thing that it hears on all 
wavebands. After the flight, the plane lands at its Air Force home base, 
and the tapes it made during flight are immediately taken from the racks 
on the plane, sealed in shipping containers, and put on the first jet to 
Washington. Within twenty-four hours these tapes are processed in a 
special readout laboratory that might involve computerized read-out as 
well as human listening. As a result of this process, there might be found a 



certain signal that appeared as perhaps no more than a bit of static on some 
normal- appearing carrier wave. More detailed study of this signal reveals 
that it is unlike the usual static and that there is a chance that this split- 
second blip is something special; but there is no known system for 
interpreting such a signal. 

A review of other tapes made in the same area might reveal that 
similar blips have been occurring on some of them. The CIA takes this up 
with the Air Force experts who designed the system and through them 
learns that the equipment was designed by a certain team working for a 
well-known manufacturer of electronic equipment. The Air Force, of 
course, has a contract with this manufacturer. The CIA goes to the 
manufacturer under the guise of the Air Force and asks what might be 
done to identify and if possible to read out the blips. 

The manufacturer agrees to take on the problem as an overrun to the 
original development contract with the Air Force. The Agency people, 
known to the manufacturer only as Air Force people, agree. In due course, 
the manufacturer finds a scientist at Stanford who has experimented with a 
remarkable tube that seemed to promise some solutions to the problems 
involved. A subcontract is let, and further work is done on the tube. 
Finally, the manufacturer is able to demonstrate a receiver that is able to 
find these blips, which are actually hidden at all wave channels, and to get 
them recorded on tape. They are now able to get this new equipment to 
stretch these blips to the right length in terms of sound waves, and before 
long these blips are shown to contain decipherable data. 

Now the development contract is terminated, and the receivers are 
put into production, also on the Air Force contract. As things turned out, 
the Air Force is able to use some of these fabulous sets itself, and it 
increases the production order. By this time, a small development project 
to which the CIA had agreed to contribute about sixty thousand dollars 
had grown into a total development project of more than one million 
dollars, with a long manufacturing and procurement contract on top of 
that. 

The important thing in situations like this is that through this 
method, even when it was used honestly and properly, the services can pay 
out millions for the Agency without realizing it. Most of the Air Force 
intelligence and electronics technicians involved in this case — which 
though hypothetical, has its basis in fact — were not also procurement 
experts and had no experience in the intricacies of such financial matters. 
As a result, they went along thinking someone else was taking care of the 
money. The Agency went along, protesting that if someone sent them the 
bill, they would pay it. The bills were rarely if ever sent. 

Such actions soon became known, and others who want work done 
for other reasons find the way to use this same technique. To cite a case: 
An Army project officer who had trouble getting his service to approve a 
new gun that he had been shown by a manufacturer found that a fellow 
officer, on a classified project, was interested in it. They demonstrated the 



new gun to a group, much as if it were a real Army demonstration. The 
manufacturer, willing to do anything to sell his new weapon, participated 
fully in these demonstrations and tests. He may have thought it odd that 
the tests had been scheduled at the Army Chemical Warfare station at Fort 
Detrick instead of at the Aberdeen Proving Ground where most tests are 
usually held; but he was selling, not asking questions, so he eagerly went 
along. After the tests at Detrick, there were meetings in a special section 
of the office of the Secretary of Defense, located near the office of the 
Deputy Director for Research and Engineering (DDR&E). The DDR&E 
representative was a prominent career civilian who had recently been 
made head of that office after a long tour of duty in the Office of Special 
Operations, where CIA matters were usually processed. In other words, 
this man was less an engineer than a special operations man; and he was 
less an Army or military counterpart than he was an Agency collaborator. 

At this meeting, there were many Army officers, and there were Air 
Force officers. There may have been Marine and Navy officers, and there 
were many civilians. The manufacturer's representatives could not be 
faulted if they believed that they were selling their new weapon to a most 
highly qualified group. In fact, the main sponsor of the weapon, an Army 
Lieutenant Colonel in uniform, gave all appearances of being the Army 
representative, which he was not. The meeting ended with a consensus 
that the gun should be purchased in trial numbers by the Air Force for 
security reasons "for use by the Air Force Air Police units". Later, the Air 
Force did purchase tens of thousands of the new weapons, and they 
disappeared into the security-covered inventory of the CIA. This is a part 
of the story of the M-16 rifle of questionable repute in the Vietnam 
operations. 

With the passage of time, the Agency has become more adept at 
getting any supplies and support it needs and in getting them supported, 
stored, and transported. (The story of the Agency transportation capability 
will be told later.) All military equipment is controlled by an elaborate 
supply system, and the funds that are required to develop, procure, and 
maintain this vast store of equipment all over the world are detailed in the 
budget. Anyone can easily make a case for occasional errors in such a vast 
system. There have been those who, along about budget time every year, 
show how the Air Force has purchased $.15 nuts and bolts for $28 each, 
how the Navy has procured 5,400,000 shrimp forks, and how the Army 
has been paying three times as much as the Navy for a common hospital 
blanket. In spite of all of this, the logistics services of the military 
establishment do an amazing job, and no military services in the world 
have ever had the support that they have provided. It is within this 
fabulous system that the CIA logistics experts, most of whom are retired 
military personnel themselves, have learned to create miracles. 

There is on the books of Congress and in the Law of this country an 
old bit of legislation called the Economy Act of 1932. It remains in force, 
as amended. In theory, it is simple and important. During the early years 
of the depression it was found that a considerable amount of money could 
be saved if the Congress would permit the various departments and 



agencies of the Government to trade among themselves when one had a 
surplus that the other wanted. It used to be that each department had to 
keep rigid accounting of what it had and that it could not transfer what it 
had to another department. This Economy Act, among other things 
permits one department, say Agriculture, to let the Army, for example, 
buy desks that it may have in excess for a price to be agreed upon by both 
departments. This law has worked well, and it has permitted savings 
among all parts of the Government. 

Early in its history, the CIA looked at this law and found that it 
could be used for some interesting purposes. The CIA might like to 
purchase some equipment that it could not afford or more likely, that it did 
not want anyone in the Government to know it had acquired. It would 
have one of its people, most likely "covered" in some other department, 
meet with the owning department and sound it out about the purchase, "in 
accordance with the provisions of the Economy Act of 1932, as amended". 
Usually, the Agency would know beforehand that the equipment was 
available and that the selling department would practically give it away. 
The Agency would then conclude the action and buy this material with 
funds of the department under whose cover it had entered into the 
agreement. 

In certain cases, the buying department would require the Agency to 
reimburse it for the cost of the transaction; but increasingly this became a 
doubtful process. At other times, the CIA would approach another 
department, through a cover cut-out, to an office where it also had another 
cover arrangement.iH These offices, bickering with each other as separate 
departments, would arrive at an agreement that they would actually staff 
through other sections to make it appear to be scrupulously legal and 
authentic, and then the CIA would end up with what it wanted without the 
expenditure of any funds. 

Even the retelling of some of these arrangements sounds ridiculous, 
and the reader may be excused for wanting to believe that this could not 
have happened. Not only have things like this happened; but some that are 
even more portentous. The Agency will go to any ends when it has 
convinced itself that it is doing so on the grounds of security. The Agency, 
at the constant reminder and conditioning of Allen Dulles, always believed 
that anything it did was all right as long as it was carrying out the will of 
Congress to protect its secret sources and methods. 

After decades of logistical endeavors of all kinds and of all types, 
the Agency has acquired more than enough in hardware, in facilities, in 
transport and warehousing to perform all the peacetime operations it could 
ever dream of. And if it should come up with a specially large project, it 
would easily supply itself from within the hoards of other departments and 
agencies. To the Agency, cost is no barrier. When things can be delivered 
by air, they are delivered by air, regardless of cost differential. When 
equipment can be obtained new, it is purchased new rather than surplus, 
when new is available. It is not so much that the Agency was always that 
way; but it became spoiled, because since Louis Johnson's time, just 



before the Korean War, there has not been a Secretary of Defense who 
really concerned himself with the cost of supporting the CIA. There has 
not been a Secretary who knew enough about what the CIA was really 
doing to believe that the volume of material warranted concern over the 
cost. So the Agency found its pipe attached to the boundless sea, and it 
learned to make the most of just letting it flow in. 

The same can be said of the Congress. There are no members of the 
House or the Senate who have ever contemplated in anywhere near exact 
amounts the great volume of men, money, and materials the Agency has 
been able to acquire and to expend without observation by those normally 
charged with that responsibility. The Agency excuses its own actions on 
the basis that it employs these methods secretly for the good of the 
country; thus, it does not have to expose its sources and methods as it 
requests men, money, and supplies in the usual manner. Once the Agency 
has become accustomed to this form of rationalization, there are no limits 
to what it and its peripheral operators will be perfectly willing to do "for 
the good of the country" and for the cause, always unquestioned, of anti- 
Communism. 



1 . The Agency makes a specialty of covering its people with code names as they travel around the world. Thus the 
message traffic will he gibberish to most people when a list of names of the Agency's key men appear. Many 
years ago, "Red" White and another executive from Mr. Dulles' office made an extended trip through the 
Pacific. They were given code names just before they left. Some genius in the cover department gave "Red" 
White the code name "Ballew". As he traveled from station to station it was "Red, White, and Ballew", like the 
flag. 

2. A cover cutout is some device or process that has been set up to circumvent or otherwise bypass normal 
procedure so that the connection with the CIA cannot be discovered in the normal course of business. 



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Chapter 12 
Personnel: The Chameleon Game 



An Australian scientist waiting at the counter of the Military Air 
Transport Service passenger service desk at 3: 00am felt ill at ease in these 
unfamiliar surroundings. He had been assured that his travel through to 
Washington had been arranged and that he would be met when his plane 
arrived from Manila at Travis Air Force Base in California. All he had in 
the way of instructions was a small note that said, "Major Adams will 
meet you upon arrival at Travis. If he should not be there, call him by base 
telephone, number 12-1234." The WAF on the other side of the counter 
could find no Major Adams listed anywhere in the Travis telephone book; 
but she volunteered to ring that number anyhow. A sleepy voice answered, 
"Special Support Squadron, Airman Jones speaking." The contact was 
made. "Airman Jones" appeared shortly at the passenger service desk in 
civilian attire and announced himself as Major Adams. The Australian had 
met his contact and would soon be on his way to South San Francisco 
airport for his commercial flight connection to Washington. 

In Washington he was met again by another contact and spent two 
or three days at a hotel where from time to time he met various scientists 
and their companions. They discussed with him the meetings he would 
attend in Rotterdam, then later in Moscow, to join with the world's top 
radio astronomers in observing the latest massive antennas that were being 
used in Europe and in the Soviet Union. Nothing in the United States 
approached the sophistication of the Soviet equipment, and the Australians 
were far ahead with their own work. After a few days with his new friends 
in the scientific world, with whom he met on the basis that they were from 
the National Science Foundation, the Australian flew to Europe and thence 
to Moscow. In Europe he had more meetings with American scientists, 
and after the Moscow meetings he willingly discussed the advanced 
equipment and techniques he had seen and worked with there. He even 
talked about a totally new antenna concept of his own for which he hoped 
to get funds in Australia and which had been enthusiastically accepted by 
the scientists in Europe and Russia as a great advance over present fixed- 
parabola technology. 

In return for free air travel and other amenities, this Australian had 
been willing to spend time with American scientists whom he knew or 
knew of and with certain of their friends and fellow workers. He was 



unaware of the fact that among those "fellow workers" were CIA 
personnel eager to learn all they could about the technology of the 
Russians. Advanced radio antenna work used in astronomical observations 
could, with minor changes, also be used in radar antennas for an advanced 
air defense system. 

The recruitment of personnel for such special and fleeting 
requirements is one of the many skills of the Personnel Division of the 
CIA under the leadership of the DDIS. It is another of the logistics 
functions of that Directorate that performs major miracles for the CIA and 
even for the ST. 

In the beginning, when a new organization is formed in the 
Government, such as HEW (Health, Education and Welfare), HUD 
(Housing and Urban Development), and others, it is customary to flesh out 
the unit with staff and resources from other organizations assembled for 
that purpose. Since the CIA was a totally new organization, this normal 
process could not be relied upon to build a professional staff in the period 
of time required for the Agency to become effective. Former OSS alumni 
from World War II were pulled in from wherever they were at the time 
and they were augmented as rapidly as possible by personnel from other 
units within the Government who had the special training for intelligence 
type of work. This meant that the FBI was "raided" to the point that its 
director called upon the DCI to ask that such raids be halted. Many other 
early personnel came from World War II military resources of all kinds. 
The straight-line intelligence personnel went into DD/I and a large number 
of logistics specialists went directly into the DD/S. 

It was startling to see them take on new life as they began to realize 
that they no longer worked under the routinered tape and restraints of the 
military service in which they had been trained. Men who had fought to 
keep supply levels up to authorized quotas now found that they could 
exceed quotas with abandon. Men who had watched budget figures year 
after year to build little caches to take care of essential needs found that 
they could draw upon funds that never seemed to run out. The same was 
true for personnel needs, for transportation, and for communications. It 
was not long before the Agency was quite adequately manned, and 
wherever there were shortages, it was able quite easily to find military 
personnel who would voluntarily accept an assignment. As a result, 
thousands of military men served with the Agency from its inception. 

This turned out to be fortunate. No long range organization can 
prosper with most of its employees in the same general age bracket. The 
Agency, having been born in the immediate postwar era, inherited people 
who were generally in the same age group. The men at the top and the 
men in lesser jobs all were about the same age. This meant that as the 
years rolled on, the openings at the top would be few and the log jam of 
those in lower grades would be terrific, stifling career development. The 
overhead of "disposable" military personnel helped clear up this problem. 
Therefore as all personnel, military and civilian, rose to higher positions, 
there became fewer of these higher positions. The military could be 



returned to their services and the overhead easily weeded out, leaving 
room for the more senior careerists. This helped, but it was not a total 
solution. 

The Agency put into operation a Junior Officer Training program 
(JOT) something like an ROTC program. In fact, JOT drew many of its 
men from the college ROTC resources. As these men filtered into regular 
jobs they replaced military men who went back to their parent services. 
Meanwhile, the Agency pushed an "early-out" retirement program and 
other projects to clear up the age-bound overhead. 

This had an interesting and perhaps unintentional bonus effect. A 
large number of men who had served with the Agency as volunteers had 
rotated back to their own military services, and in some cases, back to 
other government departments to pursue other tasks. However, the lure of 
"fun and games" is great, and most of these men still retained much of the 
old desire to play the intelligence game. The Agency found itself with 
willing alumni in all parts of the Government, and they made use of these 
men in every way possible. 

This can be illustrated in the Pentagon Papers since that is an 
available source of names and other statistics. A quick survey of the 
Pentagon Papers as published by The New York Times reveals a random 
listing of military officers of general and admiral rank, all of whom in one 
way or other took part in the early activities in Vietnam. Some of them 
served with the Agency for a number of years and went back and forth 
from Agency assignments to military assignments. And in most cases the 
military assignment was simply an Agency cover assignment under which 
they served at the direction of CIA superiors. It is a most important fact 
that most of the political and military leaders of Asian countries from 
Korea to Pakistan could easily be sympathized with for not being able to 
discover whether the "military" officers with whom they were dealing 
were military or were CIA. Most of the generals mentioned in the 
Pentagon Papers were involved in CIA activities while they were in 
Southeast Asia and were not under the operational control and direction of 
the DOD. 

When Marshall Sarit of Thailand met with an American Army 
general to discuss the buildup of the Thailand border patrols on the Laos 
border, he may have believed that he was talking with a U.S. Military 
officer and that the results of their talks were going to be achieved with the 
direct assistance of the U.S. military. He had no way of knowing that the 
results of his talks were going to be carried out by "U.S. military" under 
cover who were working under the direction and operational control of the 
CIA. The same can be said for such talks with Somanna Phouma and 
Phoumi Nosavan in Laos and for Generals Thieu and Ky in Vietnam. The 
Diem regime, far back in those early and formative days of the Vietnam 
operations, never did know who they were talking with, and Ngo Dinh 
Diem had to rely upon the few real American friends he had, such as Ed 
Lansdale, a bona fide U.S. Air Force general, but also a man who worked 
solely for the CIA for more than a decade. Diem could unravel some of 



the deals he became involved in by calling his friend Lansdale in 
Washington; but he could not get similar help from the contacts he had in 
Saigon. The string of generals who appeared in Saigon from 1954 through 
1964 — who were really not generals - would have been enough to confuse 
anyone. In fact, real generals stayed away from Saigon for fear of being 
labeled "CIA" by their contemporaries back in Honolulu or Washington. 

The other side of the coin was equally significant. Military men 
found the CIA an easy means to promotion. As a result, they longed to get 
more of that valuable duty. Men who would have retired as majors, 
lieutenant colonels, and colonels found that the CIA was the easy road to 
generals' stars. There are a great number of generals, even up to the full 
four-star rank, who would never have made that grade, and who never 
would have made general at any level had it not been for their CIA 
assignments and the role they played in the development of the Vietnam 
operations. There were a great many of these men; this force alone has had 
a considerable impact upon the nature of Vietnamese events and upon the 
escalation of activities in Vietnam back in the days when small but 
catalytic events propelled the early actions into a massive campaign. 

The same thing was happening in Washington. As men who served 
under Allen Dulles went out into other parts of the Government ~ into the 
Institute for Defense Analysis, the Rand corporation, certain key 
university jobs, into select businesses and major foundations — Dulles 
found that he had a massive instrument upon which he could orchestrate 
events as he wished. It was not his technique to lay deep plans and to use 
all of these resources in pursuit of these plans. Rather, it was his game to 
continually call upon the vast and continuing resource of secret 
intelligence to supply him with input data, with the raw events that he 
could then toss upon the keyboard to sound their own chords across the 
field of foreign relations. 

This may sound a bit weird at first telling; but how else can anyone 
explain the random series of events that has happened in the names of 
foreign affairs and anti-Communism since 1955? All personnel who had 
trained with the Agency had learned enough about its ways, its freedoms, 
and its ability to circumvent normal bureaucratic red tape, and were 
somewhat spoiled. Later, when they had gone out into other departments 
and agencies of the federal government, they would find themselves, at 
times, frustrated in their everyday activities. They tended to return to their 
Agency affiliations and found that they could still get things done through 
Agency channels. They also served as Agency conduits for things which 
the Agency wanted done where they now worked. This developed a loose 
but effective network, with tentacles that reached out in all directions. 

There was a group that was utilized as airline operators. They went 
into various countries such as Ethiopia, Iran, Jordan, Laos, Vietnam, and 
many others and worked to establish airlines, many of which ostensibly 
were national air carriers. These airlines were put together by common 
interests, part civilian business and part clandestine operations. In such 
cases secrecy was not really very deep; but it was used to shield the 



identity of the interests concerned from other parties in the U.S. The host 
government certainly knew who was behind the airlines, and they knew 
that there was more money being spent than was coming in through 
commercial revenues. 

These airlines and their supporting bases, which in many countries 
were relatively costly enterprises, became increasingly modern. They 
began with what were called World War II surplus aircraft, such as the old 
C-46 and the C-54. Then they began to get hand-me-down Constellations 
and DC-6 and DC-7 aircraft, which had been the backbone of the U.S. 
airline fleet before the advent of jet transports. Most of these countries did 
not have the pilots and other personnel essential to the operation of 
modern aircraft, so the Agency cover units filled these spaces. Soon, 
national pride dictated that these airlines have the finest modern 
equipment in order that their neighbors would not outshine them. It was 
not long before a number of these small and impecunious airlines began to 
flaunt their new jets before the public, from Manila to Tehran. 

These operations all began as modest havens for personnel who had 
been affiliated with the Agency or who were still with the Agency but 
gave the appearance of having left. By 1960 the CIA had grown very large 
in comparison with the figures that had been projected and with the figures 
that various controlling authorities thought the Agency had. By the time of 
the Congo problems and the uncertainties of other emerging African 
nations, the CIA had not less than forty stations scattered all through that 
continent, all of them very active and all of them manned with everything 
from U.S. military to non-attributable civilians of all kinds. The agency 
that Harry Truman thought would be his quiet intelligence arm had 
become a vast organization, which no one could control for the simple 
reason that the Agency was no longer the finite organization that had been 
created by law and then built with properly appropriated funds. It was now 
a tremendous force, using its own funds as an ante to open the big game, 
and then playing the big game with money belonging to most of the rest of 
the Government. 

In the Government, people (or as the bureaucratic euphemism goes, 
"bodies") are controlled by the appropriation and then authorization of 
funds. Thus, any Government organization is permitted to have precisely 
so many people; and to exactly control that number of people, the 
Congress appropriates only enough money to pay that number and no 
more. This is usually an effective method of control, provided measures to 
evade them are not cloaked in security. When the Air Force had the 
problem of manning the vast space center at Cape Canaveral, it found that 
it did not have sufficient people for the task but that it could get funds for 
the maintenance of that huge and fast-growing complex. So the Air Force 
obtained enough funds to contract the operation and maintenance of that 
base. Thus several companies bid for the job of operating the big space 
center, and Pan American Airlines was awarded the contract. By this 
device the Air Force could man a huge complex, with money and not with 
people. There are many obvious advantages of this method of performing 
a housekeeping task. 



The Agency witnessed the simplicity and effectiveness of this action 
and began to use it for its own ends. It would transfer funds to another 
department of the Government, and in return it would get people. Thus the 
Army, for example, could truthfully say that it had perhaps forty-two 
people in the Military Advisory and Assistance Group (MAAG) in 
Athens, and yet any visitor to the MAAG offices in Athens could easily 
see that there were more than one hundred people working throughout that 
big building. As a matter of fact, some visiting Senators noticed this and 
commented on it. They were told, with a straight face by the local MAAG 
officials, that the Army did have only forty-two people there and that they 
would be glad to have the Department of the Army in Washington furnish 
the Senators with an exact accounting of those people. This satisfied the 
visitors, and upon their return to Washington they were given audited 
figures from the U.S. Army, certifying to the fact that the Army had spent 
no more than "X" dollars on personnel in Athens and therefore could not 
have had more than forty-two people there. 

This is an old story. There are military bases that have been closed 
by the services. The records, based upon money audits, show that the 
bases are in fact closed, yet the base had been reopened by the service 
concerned with CIA funds and for CIA support purposes. There is a small 
but uniquely self-contained Army base near Washington that was closed 
in such a manner years ago. It is still open, and it is so active that it has a 
very lively housekeeping function, including a PX and commissary that 
services not only the special CIA elements on the base but a select group 
of senior retired military and naval personnel who live in baronial luxury 
in the adjacent horse country. 

There is also a massive Army post that has been closed many times. 
No news is ever published to show that it has been opened; but there is 
always a fanfare when it is closed. This huge, forested reservation is one 
of the best hunting preserves in the Washington vicinity, and it is 
frequented by noble parties of ranking military and other high government 
officials who travel to their shooting sites on an old Army railroad in 
quaint old cars — in real luxury attained by few people short of Hugh 
Hefner and the Onassis set. 

There was a time when the late Senator Harry Byrd, father of the 
present Senator, used to have to intervene on behalf of a few of his select 
clientele, because he kept receiving letters and telephone calls about 
bombs and other explosives bursting at a "closed" U.S. Navy station. The 
Senator had these messages sent to the Honorable Secretary of the Navy, 
who in turn would pass them to the Chief of Naval Operations and thence 
on to the proper authorities in the Norfolk area. Time after time the Navy 
would reply to the good Senator that there were no explosives being 
detonated in the area and that the base in question was closed and secured 
by a proper guard force. 

This exchange of correspondence went on for about three 
unpleasant cycles, until the Senator felt that he should bring it to the 
attention of the Secretary of Defense. Thus started an investigation that 



finally brought a harried naval officer to the Office of Special Operations 
at the Secretary of Defense level to ask if by some chance there might be 
some highly classified activity going on at that "closed" Navy base that the 
Navy did not know about. It was found that the Agency was in fact doing 
some demolitions and explosives training with a special group of foreign 
agents whom they did not want to expose at the Special Forces training 
site at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The Agency was taking these men, 
from time to time, from Fort Bragg to this abandoned Navy base where it 
had set up some special training for them. Then the Office of Special 
Operations asked the Agency to move its training to another site, the Navy 
was given a polite but obtuse answer, from this the Navy wrote apologies 
to the Senator, and eventually things were settled graciously with the 
Senator's constituents. 

These things, of course, are not earthshaking and are not too 
different from similar uncoordinated activities that can happen in any large 
operation. But the Agency had acquired the power to carry out such 
activities in spite of restrictions and in spite of other plans and policy. It 
was not just the one MAAG in Athens in which Agency people were 
hidden, but it was almost every MAAC all over the world. In fact, 
wherever the military might have some small out-of-the-way outpost in a 
foreign country where the Agency might wish to install one of its people, 
it would not take long before the position would be assigned to the 
Agency so that it could have its own man there. In many countries, the 
vast Military Air Transport Service network (now military Airlift 
Command, or MAC) would have only two or three men to handle landing 
and take-off requirements for a few planes a week. Such small pockets of 
men in remote places and with little apparent activity became havens for 
CIA personnel. And when activity grew in such locations, as it inevitably 
did, the Agency would make funds available to the parent service for more 
bodies, and the manning would be increased to provide for an invisible 
military expansion. Later auditing of the strength of the service involved 
would never show the increase. The Agency would never have to show the 
increase either, because all it had done was expend dollars and this would 
not be questioned. 

One of the things Allen Dulles achieved shortly after the submission 
of this report to President Truman was the approval of an amendment of 
the National Security Act of 1947. The amendment was passed in 1949. 
Among other things, it gave the CIA much more latitude in the 
expenditure of and accounting for its authorized funds. As a result, all the 
DCI had to do was to personally certify that the money had been spent 
properly, and there would be no further review. It was not thought at the 
time that money such as this would be used to make major changes in the 
personnel strengths of supporting Government departments. This device 
was used, however, and it permitted vast expansion of CIA manning- 
strength in the guise of other Government department jobs. All of this 
went without review and audit. 

By the time the Agency was ready to participate in an operation as 
large as the Indonesian campaign of 1958, it had the resources to open 



foreign bases, to create an entire supporting Tactical and Transport Air 
Force, and to demand the services of naval supporting forces. A former 
World War II air base on a remote Pacific island was reopened and put 
into commission, and a whole fleet of aircraft was put into major overhaul 
bases in the States to create an attack force of substantial capability. A 
rather considerable Air Transport force was able to deliver deep into 
Indonesia tens of thousands of weapons and the ammunition and other 
equipment necessary to support such a force, all by airdrop. The CIA had 
become a major power by 1958 and was ready to enter the world arena as 
the core of the greatest peacetime operational force ever assembled. 

By this time the Agency was not working alone. It was getting the 
willing and most active support of other elements of the Department of 
Defense and from the White House and parts of the Government. It was 
becoming a broad-gauge ST. The CIA was being diverted from its original 
role by the actions of men who took their motivation from the substance of 
secret intelligence inputs and turned them into response activities as large 
as many overt military campaigns. Yet, for all of this, they covered their 
work in deep security, which of course was a false security, and veiled 
their true intentions and actions from the rest of the Government, and 
especially from those whose normal task and responsibility it would have 
been to carry out such actions had they been so directed by proper policy 
and authority. 

In 1949 the Congress enacted what is called The Central 
Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which restated the powers and duties of 
the CIA as they had been in the National Security Act of 1947, and added 
some interesting paragraphs concerned primarily with money and 
personnel. By 1949 it had become apparent that a great number of the 
personnel assigned to the CIA would be military personnel and that this 
situation would continue. Thus the new Act spelled out the terms and 
conditions of such assignments and did this in a manner that would not 
appear to expose or compromise the system; yet the whole procedure 
appears in clear text within the law. The clear text is written as though it 
were a description of the duties of the DCI or of the DDCI only; however, 
it is actually applicable to all military personnel on duty with the Agency: 

(2) . . . the appointment to the office of Director, or 
Deputy Director, of a commissioned officer of the armed 
services, and his acceptance of and service in such office, 
shall in no way affect any status, office, rank, or grade he may 
occupy or hold in the armed services, or any emolument, 
perquisite, right, privilege, or benefit incident to or arising out 
of any such status, office, rank, or grade. Any such 
commissioned officer shall, while serving in the office of 
DCI, or DDCI, continue to hold rank and grade not lower than 
that in which serving at the time of his appointment and to 
receive the military pay and allowances (active or retired) as 
the case may be, including personal money allowance payable 
to a commissioned officer of his grade and length of service 
for which the appropriate department shall be reimbursed 



from any funds available to defray the expenses of the CIA. 
He also shall be paid by the CIA from such funds an annual 
compensation at the rate equal to the amount by which the 
compensation established for such position exceeds the 
amount of his annual military pay and allowances. 

(3) The rank and grade of any such commissioned 
officer shall, during the period in which such commissioned 
officer occupies the office of DCI or DDCI, be in addition to 
the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized and 
appropriated for the armed services of which he is a member. 

This is a most important feature of CIA personnel policy. Note that 
the law states that "the appropriate department shall be reimbursed from 
any funds available to defray the expenses of the CIA." The CIA is 
authorized to use money to buy people, and as long as they have the 
money, they can add people. This is one reason why few people really 
know how many personnel the Agency has; and why even these few may 
not know exactly, because so many of the cover people have been lost 
within the labyrinth of the total Government. 

Another key phrase is that in Paragraph 3, wherein it states, "The 
rank or grade of any such of commissioned officer shall ... be in addition 
to the numbers and percentages otherwise authorized ... for the armed 
service ..." The military services, as other departments and agencies of 
the Government, are bound precisely to certain total personnel strengths 
and to the percentage of rank and grade throughout those totals. This is an 
exact amount, and one that must be maintained and accounted for at all 
times. However, the CIA is not so bound. Thus the services are permitted 
to provide as many personnel as the CIA requests and can pay for, to the 
extent that the services simply deduct those totals by rank and grade from 
their own strict manpower ceilings. As a result, the services encourage 
certain personnel to join the CIA, and certainly do not discourage them 
from leaving the roles of the services for that purpose. In a sense, the more 
the better. Some five thousand or ten thousand military personnel in the 
CIA are just that many less for the military budget to account for and just 
that much more strength for the CIA, which it accounts for by 
"reimbursement". The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 further 
underscores this bookkeeping device in favor of the CIA in the following 
manner: 

Par 403j. CIA: appropriations; expenditures. 

(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of law, sums 
made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise 
may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its 
functions, including (1) personal services, including personal 
services without regard to limitations on types of persons to 
be employed ... (2) supplies, equipment, and personnel and 
contractual services otherwise authorized by law and 
regulations, when approved by the Director. 



(b) The sums made available to the Agency may be 
expended without regard to the provisions of law and 
regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; 
and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency 
nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the 
certificate of the Director . . . 

Not only, then, is the CIA not required to account for the number 
and grade of all of its people by virtue of the fact that it is authorized to 
use money to buy people, without regard to other law; but as we see in 
these latter phrases, the CIA is not required to account for the money it 
spends either. In 1949 this was a reasonable piece of legislation. The 
reader may judge for himself whether this same reasonableness applies 
today and tomorrow. 

There is another portion of this Act that touches upon another 
special facet of the personnel policies of the CIA. It states that "Whenever 
the Director, the Attorney General and the commissioner of Immigration 
shall determine that the entry of a particular alien into the United States 
for permanent residence is in the interest of the national intelligence 
mission, such alien and his immediate family shall be given entry into the 
United States for permanent residence without regard to their 
inadmissibility under the immigration or any other laws and regulations or 
to the failure to comply with such laws and regulations pertaining to 
admissibility: provided, that the number of aliens and members of their 
immediate families entering the United States under authority of this 
section shall in no case exceed one hundred persons in any one fiscal 
year." The common basis of understanding of the provisions of this 
paragraph is usually given as an allowance made for a valuable defector or 
official who might not otherwise be able to come into the country for such 
illegal reasons as that he was patently a Communist or at least a native and 
citizen of a Communist country. Certainly, in arranging for such 
defections the DCI and his agents must be able to guarantee to the defector 
that he and his family will be accepted permanently into the United States. 

This is the surface reason for this portion of the law. However, we 
discuss it here in this chapter on personnel because there are many more 
"illegal" aliens brought into the country who have been recruited as agents 
than there are defectors. In one sense of the words, "illegal alien" and 
"defector" may be about the same thing. However, there cannot be much 
confusing the roles of defector and agent. Most defectors would not 
submit to becoming active agents and to going back into the world of 
clandestine intrigue. However, many men serve the United States who are, 
in a sense, totally citizens of the world. These men are technically United 
States citizens by virtue of the application of the above cited law, but they 
also have been given "citizenship" in other countries as cover. These are 
extremely intricate ploys that require considerable time, money, and effort 
to maintain, as well as the dedicated daring of the men so occupied. Some 
of these men are pilots, navigators, and members of other highly 
specialized professions, and the least of them would titillate a true-life 
James Bond on most scores. 



They are, of course, but a nucleus of a greater segment of the 
Agency. There are a great number of non-U.S. citizens who work for the 
Agency in many capacities. Filipinos, for example, appear in the wake of 
so many CIA operations, including the Bay of Pigs and many Indochina 
projects, because there are a large number of skilled Philippines citizens in 
the regular or contract employ of the Agency. 

With such a variegated personnel congregation, the CIA has been 
given very special authority with respect to retirement. This, too, is spelled 
out in plain language in the CIA Act of 1949, some of which has the same 
double meaning as the bits which we have dissected above. Retirement is 
a special thing for the "deep" Agency employee. If by circumstance any 
such employee must retire for reasons of health or other infirmity, the 
Agency is burdened to assure that whatever attention and treatment he 
may get will at no time result in disclosures that might occur during 
anesthesia, treatment by drugs, or during other periods when the principal 
might not be in full control of his mental processes. Furthermore, the CIA 
must remain concerned about the locale in which such people choose to 
retire, to assure that they are not unduly exposed to dangerous influences. 
The not-too-infrequent problems with alcohol and even hard drugs place a 
special burden upon the Agency. All of these men have been involved in 
many highly classified matters. All of them have at one time or another 
been "on the black box(polygraph)", and all of them have been debriefed; 
but these are no more than the routine precautions that a large government 
agency can take. Much more remains that must be done. A thorough 
debriefing may underscore the zones of deep security; but it cannot erase 
memories, the activity of the brain, and the area of human weaknesses. As 
more and more men reach retirement age, these problems are increasing. 
One solution for a great percentage of this problem lies in the area of 
rapid, effective, and continuing declassification of those numberless 
episodes that certainly have no reason to be classified. As with so many 
other things, unnecessary security measures crop up as an artificial 
generator of problems, whereas many of the problems would go away if 
unnecessary classification could be ended. 

The remaining special characteristic of CIA personnel activity is 
that which is known in the trade as "cover". Except for the true and overt 
intelligence employee and other strictly administrative and service types, 
all Agency employees live under some form of cover. The great majority 
live out their days with the Agency as Department of Defense employees. 
Many others have other common cover, that cover which is essential for 
no more than their credit cards, driver's licenses, and other public 
documents, just so they will not have to say that they are employed by the 
CIA. 

From this base, the vast intricacies of cover become manifold as the 
nature of the individual's work increases in areas of high specialization 
and security. Sometimes, cover is changed, and the man must go through a 
transition period and develop a whole new character, as when he may have 
served as a Navy man at one station and then must become an Army man 
at another. Such situations are rare, because of the ease with which such 



cover is blown with the passage of time. 

Some of the deepest and most total cover exists right inside the U.S. 
Government itself. Some of the most buried of CIA men have been 
employed by other departments and agencies for years, and only a few 
know any longer that they are really CIA. This is a special use of cover, 
but the CIA gets more per capita benefit from these men than from any 
others of the profession. 

There are other deep cover personnel all over the world; but their 
existence and occupation is not the subject of this book. That they are 
there is enough. Some of them exist to assure that others in precarious 
positions can exist, and the rupture of the thin thread that supports them all 
is fraught with personal danger to them and their networks. These men are 
a part of the trade, and all countries know about the profession. 

Many people have tried to estimate the total personnel strength of 
the CIA. This is categorically a useless objective pursued by amateurs. 
First, there are the open, professional intelligence people. Next there is the 
vast army of support personnel, many of whom are buried as deeply as the 
"fun and games" types; upon them depends the success of the clandestine 
side of the house absolutely. This is a very large group, and it is certainly 
not all within the structure of the Agency. Then there is the DD/P (the 
Directorate of Plans) and all that it encompasses. In most respects, this 
operation is the largest by far, and in certain aspects the border between 
where DD/P begins and DD/S ends is seldom clear. 

Add to all of this the great supporting structure behind both DD/P 
and DD/S, such as that which exists in Air America and other corporate 
subsidiaries of the worldwide Agency, and this will include tens of 
thousands of non-U. S. personnel. For example, Air America alone has no 
less than four thousand employees in Thailand and not less than four 
thousand more in Taiwan as of 1972. 

Beyond these fringes, there are additional thousands of CIA camp 
followers. There are members of the business world who enroll 
themselves or who have become enrolled for various reasons in the lure of 
"fun and games"; there are people from the academic world, the 
publications field, and so on. And since the limits of the CIA personnel 
rosters are really only the limits of how much money that Agency can put 
its hands on, even the groupings herein set forth simply serve to give 
evidence of what surrounds us. Would anyone wish to conjecture whether 
the CIA has been on the moon? 



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Chapter 13 
Communications: The Web of the World 



Perhaps the greatest achievement of modern times is the 
communications revolution. Time and distance are all but obliterated by 
the speed and totality of worldwide communications networks — even 
outer space networks. We have witnessed a man stepping onto the moon 
in the full view of live and instant television. We have listened to the 
President as he placed a call to the men on the moon and talked with them, 
just as you and I would talk to other men. As this is being written, a 
satellite laboratory is speeding through uncharted space on its way to the 
planet Jupiter and beyond. All of these wonders of physical science and of 
man's ingenuity are in the hands of the ST. The intelligence community 
has absolutely unlimited communications power, and there is literally no 
place to hide from it. 

The Russians may wish to test fly a new bomber. To do this, they 
must arrange an intricate communications system between the crew, the 
instruments in the plane, monitoring airborne aircraft and other stations. 
The CIA and its sister agency, the NSA, will hear the communications 
support of the flight and will interpret all of the coded information almost 
as easily as the Russians themselves who are monitoring it. The Russians 
will orbit a satellite with intricate and complicated telemetering equipment 
aboard, designed only for their own ears. The long antenna of the 
CIA/NSA, among others — United States and foreign - will monitor this 
satellite and read it out with ease directly proportional to the skill, 
technology, and energy they have invested in such things. 

A small group of men will meet secretly in a room to discuss the 
overthrow of a government or to make plans to meet the agent of a foreign 
power. They will have with them an expert, trained in the high skill of 
electronic debugging. He will have checked their room and tested the 
telephone; yet every word they say will be recorded by a gang-monitor at 
a central switch belonging to the telephone company where all 
conversations, on any line, being made by anyone with any telephone in 
that huge network can be monitored with ease. 

Soviet messages transmitted by a special device that varies its 
transmission frequency often and unexpectedly and that has the ability to 
send a long message in the briefest "squirt" of time will be monitored and 



recorded accurately. Massive all-wave and all-frequency band receivers 
with high-speed scanning capability have the means to capture the "squirt 
messages" and then to draw them out until they are intelligible enough to 
be turned over to the computers for decoding. 

Even infrared signals, sound signals, and earth vibrations, such as 
are caused by railroad trains and mining operations, are recorded and 
translated into intelligence. The hum of high energy transmission lines 
carrying various loads gives indications of peak periods of line usage. 
There are no secrets. 

As Norbert Wiener said years ago, "... society can only be 
understood through a study of the messages and the communication 
facilities which belong to it"; and "... development of these messages 
and communication facilities, messages between man and machines, 
between machines and man, and between machine and machine, are 
destined to play an ever- increasing part." And he adds, "... the theory of 
control in engineering, whether human or animal or mechanical, is a 
chapter in the theory of messages. "[11 

In these modern times it may be added that the theory of control of 
governments is also another chapter in the theory of messages. That 
organization that controls the communication system will have in its 
power the ability to control the government. One of the greatest attributes 
of the communications system is its use in the development of feedback, 
the ability to generate future action — usually response — by the sensing of 
inputs from past performance. The total communications system makes it 
possible for the intelligence organization to collect and then to grade a 
great volume of information and to cull from this, those bits that will be 
made into the daily briefing and the essence of the current intelligence 
portfolio. 

More than anything else, it is this tremendous communications 
system that makes the Agency operational system what it is. From all over 
the world, messages of all kinds pour in from agents buried in all sorts of 
places and making all sorts of contacts. From all over the world, small bits 
of information gleaned from all kinds of instrumental communications 
equipment and advanced sensors feed information back into the centers of 
collection. Behind all of this, there are action officers who evaluate and 
process the bits that are culled and selected from the gross input from all 
sources. 

Whenever one of these action officers discovers something special, 
he will do his best to see that it is brought to the attention of his superiors. 
The system is so constructed that such data moves rapidly from the lower, 
gaining echelon, to the middle management areas where it is again 
weighed and evaluated. If the information survives this first sorting 
process, the action officer will be directed to go back to his source, 
whether it is mechanical or human, to seek further information to enhance 
the first bits. The occupational characteristic in this whole operation is that 
the action begins with the receipt of information. What happens afterwards 



is generally re-action. The message input becomes a control mechanism 
itself. The area of interest may build rapidly and require response in hours, 
or it may cover a period of months or even years. With each round of 
traffic the overall pattern begins to shape itself, and gradually the little 
projects become big ones. Then more and more people are put on the job, 
and responsibility for project development is moved higher and higher up 
the chain of command, until finally it will be considered for some sort of 
major action directly under the control of the DD/P and his senior staff. 

The fact that information is sought and pursued effectively must not 
be overlooked or ruled out. When certain events take place, experience 
teaches that others may follow, and the intelligence machinery will be set 
in motion to look for such things. This is particularly true in long-range 
projects. In modern manufacturing, it is impossible to assemble things like 
television sets or motorcycles without a system of marking and coding the 
parts so that they may be assembled properly in any plant having that 
know-how; and so that spare parts may be ordered that will fit the original 
set properly. Modern manufacturing requires that parts and major 
assemblies be marked for cost control and inventory purposes. In many 
instances the marking and coding systems used are very sophisticated. 
Thus, if a Japanese solid-state transistor radio is put together using "Ten 
Nines" germanium (the element of germanium pure to .9 to the tenth 
power), the tiny transistors will be marked with a code that proves they are 
the genuine product and that they are of that quality. 

This not only signifies that the transistors are a quality item; but it 
also indicates that the Japanese manufacturer has reached that level in the 
state-of-the-art that permits him to make and use such superior materials 
and techniques. The same is true for alloys, tolerances, and other things 
that are essential to quality work. Thus, if an agent buys several television 
sets in a foreign country and takes them apart to study them, he will find 
all of the subassemblies, down to tiny bits, coded and marked. If in the 
process he should find some novel, rare, or extremely precise technique, 
he will look further into the production methods of that factory and of that 
country to see what this means. 

In a country like the Soviet Union with a highly developed nuclear 
program and a superior missile and space manufacturing capability, it is to 
be expected that every so often new telltale discoveries will be made by 
finding some little item in an exported product that signifies a 
technological achievement, and perhaps even a new breakthrough. It is 
almost impossible for any sophisticated manufacturing system to conceal 
such developments once they have gone into mass production. 
Furthermore, serial numbers that usually accompany the marking program 
will show development serially, and one item acquired in an Asian 
country may carry one series of numbers that link with others found in a 
Latin American country. Reconstruction of the series which the codes, 
markings, and numbers reveal will give a quite accurate indication of rate 
of production, among other things. 

From such leads, the system then puts its agents to finding out 



whether these new metals, techniques, or ideas have developed from the 
space program, from weapons systems work, or what. The 
communications system feeds all of this back, and agents all over the 
world are coordinated in their development of this information speedily 
and accurately, as if they were assembling some massive jigsaw puzzle. 

So all communications bits are not just happenstance; but the 
distinction usually lies in the difference between intelligence collection 
and special operations. Since it is our objective to look more closely into 
the operational efforts of the ST, it is then more in character to see the 
communications network as a great machine that continually feeds bits of 
action information into a system that is prepared to respond whenever the 
"communist-inspired subversive insurgency" button is pushed. 

The ambassador to any foreign country is by Presidential 
appointment the senior official and representative of the Government of 
the United States. In peacetime, before World War II, his role was 
relatively uncomplicated, and most of the work done by the ambassador 
and his staff had to do with the processing of visas and taking care of 
traveling dignitaries and businessmen. Since World War II, the role of the 
ambassador has become much more complex. He is still the senior 
representative of his country, but now he may have with him in the 
country of his appointment a senior military officer and perhaps even a 
UN command with U.S. military components. He will have a senior CIA 
station chief, and he will have many other government officials, such as 
those from the Departments of Labor, Commerce, Agriculture, and other 
agencies. 

In spite of all of this, the Ambassador is still supposed to be the 
head of the country team, and all other Americans are supposed to be 
under his control. Special arrangements have been made where military 
units have active roles within that country as a part of larger organizations 
such as NATO. Troops move in and out of the country, and he is informed 
about such things but he rarely enters into any official contact with them. 
With the CIA, things are different, although they protest in public that 
they are always subservient to the ambassador. One of the areas this is 
most noticeable in is communications. The ambassador has 
communications channels directly from his post to the State Department. 
The ambassador has the authority to contact the Secretary of State directly, 
and some ambassadors, like Galbraith in India, find reason even to contact 
the President directly. These are exceptions and certainly not the rules of 
the game. 

When an ambassador communicates with State, his messages are 
received by the geographical-area desk responsible for his country. From 
there they are processed to the Secretary, Under Secretaries, and wherever 
else they need to go. Much of this routine is a protocol, which has 
developed over the years, and much of it is dictated by true security 
precautions, which demand that diplomatic matters be handled with 
secrecy and discretion. 



In accordance with these practices, the other members of the 
embassy, such as the labor attach and the agricultural experts, all utilize 
the embassy communications channels and then rely upon the Department 
of State to make distribution for them in Washington to their own 
departments. The same is true of military attach traffic. And in many cases 
embassy channels may carry certain CIA traffic. But this is not the limit of 
the CIA capability. In every country the Agency station chief has access in 
one way or other to direct communications contact with the CIA in 
Washington and when necessary he has direct contact to the DCI. 

The global U.S. military system is without question the most 
massive, the most powerful, and the most capable communications system 
in existence. However, the best and most efficacious system in the world 
belongs to the CIA. In making this statement, allowance should be made 
for the capability of the National Security Agency, but that is more or less 
a part of the military system and need not be explored here. The CIA is 
able to cover the entire world, not like a blanket, but like a rapier. There is 
no place it cannot reach out to get to an agent or to a busy station chief on 
its own secure facilities. In doing this, the Agency makes use of all kinds 
of communications; some are considered rather old and crude but 
effective, and others are highly sophisticated. 

Early in its buildup the CIA obtained the services of one of the 
military's top communications giants, General Harold McClelland. 
General McClelland began with a typical military base system and then let 
brains and technology run their course. He died in 1966 and left behind a 
superior system and the men to operate it. 

When a U-2 is thousands of miles away and all by itself over hostile 
lands, it is tracked silently by sensitive devices that provide assurance that 
it is still in operation and on course to a hidden destination. When an agent 
has made a contact in Istanbul or Koforidua he is able, if he so arranges, to 
be continually in contact with a back-up agent, either to record his 
conversation or to provide directions and advice for other activities that 
may arise. Agents may have effective radios built inconspicuously into a 
suit coat, antenna and all, and they have motoring pickups (bugs) of 
fantastic capability and design. But above all this, the most important 
communications are provided all the time between the station chief — the 
man who is the prime mover in any given area and his boss in 
Washington. 

One of the most radical things about the CIA network is that it does 
not have to go through any intermediate echelons. In State, the 
ambassador goes through the desk man, and woe befall the ambassador 
who tries to avoid that simple and red-tape structure. In the military the 
commanders overseas must go through their in-between military joint 
command chiefs in addition to the various levels of their own service 
echelons. Not so with the CIA station chief. When he wants to contact the 
DCI or the DD/P, he gets on the transmitter and he gets his man. 
Communications travel with the speed of light; yet many of the finest 
systems in existence are slowed down by the necessity of going through 



channels and then of decoding, review action, and encoding for 
retransmittal. The Agency avoids most of this on its essential traffic. The 
Agency may have a man who works day and night in a full-time military 
assignment in India; but when that man has something to send to the CIA, 
he gets it out through his station chief right to Washington, and none of 
the military channels will ever see it. The same applies to the ambassador. 

There are protests from time to time, and the Agency, for its own 
bureaucratic well-being, will retransmit a "clear" message by way of State 
channels or military channels to make it appear that a given wire of the 
same date and time group was transmitted properly. But when the chips 
are down, the "hot" message, the one that really got the action done, would 
have been transmitted by Agency circuits first. 

Of course, the reason given for all of this is to provide security over 
its sources and methods. The same old chestnut appears every time and is 
swallowed by most of official Washington year after year. There are cases 
when security for just that reason is essential, but for every one of those 
occasions that are true and fully justifiable, there are perhaps ten thousand 
or a hundred thousand times when such security has not been the case, and 
the CIA separate and direct channel has been used for Agency reasons 
alone. 

For example: There have been times when the Agency wanted to get 
something done in a certain country but the staff in Washington felt that is 
should be done on the basis of some agent input of one kind or other and 
its relationship to other information they had or wanted to use. However, 
the man in the field, not realizing that Washington wanted it done in a 
certain manner, did not come up with the exact language the Agency 
needed to present the idea to the Special Group for action. The Agency 
would find itself in a position not unlike a player in the parlor game of 
charades. It was making all the suggestive moves, but the unwitting 
partner was not getting the idea. On such an occasion the CIA is not 
averse to getting on its own secret system and canning a message to its 
contact in the distant country and saying explicitly, "Send us this message 
with information copies to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of 
State, the White House," and to anywhere else where they wish to make an 
impression. Then when they call the meeting, which they planned to do all 
along, they can say, for instance, "Gentlemen, we have a message which 
we understand you all have too, that leads us to believe there is grave 
trouble on the borders of India." All the other Government conferees 
especially gathered on the basis of top secret clearances and the need to 
know would agree that the situation looked grim. Perhaps the Army 
representative would say, "Yes, we have that message and we have several 
more from our attach, who says that trouble has been brewing for some 
time and that the Indian army may need help on the border." The White 
House might concur by pulling out its sheaf of copies of the attach traffic 
which also supported the idea that the Indian army was in trouble on the 
border. 

At such time the Agency would ask everyone to look at his copy of 



message Number 123 from New Delhi Embassy on such a date. That 
message would say that the trouble on the border was severe; however the 
group having the problem was the border police and not the army. Since 
border police assistance would fall under the jurisdiction of the Agency 
and not the U.S. Army, the Agency would propose that the assistance 
given to the Indians should be clandestine police support, under the cover 
of a Military Aid Program project accelerated because of the border 
problems. Everyone else would have his portfolio of messages and would 
be convinced that the CIA's view of the situation was correct. The Group 
would agree that the MAP project should be set up and that the aid 
delivered should be turned over to the CIA representatives and that the 
training program should be under CIA operation and direction. 

Superior and independent communications makes all the difference 
in the world at times like these. There are other times when an operator on 
a special project has the means to communicate with his headquarters in 
Washington independently of other channels. In such cases, this operator 
will at times bypass not only the ambassador and military hierarchy, but 
he may even bypass his own station chief. All of this is excused on the 
grounds of security and expediency. In some cases the station chief has 
become incensed over such actions; but, as in the case of the baseball 
player arguing with the umpire, his anger seldom got him very far. One of 
the most famous of these differences occurred in the Philippines when Ed 
Lansdale was operating with Magsaysay, and the station chief, who was 
on excellent terms with Magsaysay himself, was not aware of some of the 
operations that Lansdale and his Filipino cohorts had set in motion. 

Other instances have arisen where the ambassador and his CIA 
counterpart have come to grief over message traffic that the ambassador 
learned of somehow and then demanded from State and CIA in 
Washington an explanation of what was going on in his country. Such 
things were more important in the earlier days. As the CIA and the ST 
have become stronger there are not so many surface problems. Most 
ambassadors and most military commanders do as the Congress has been 
doing; they bury their heads in the sand and hope that the peacetime 
operation will go away so that they will not have to know a thing about it. 

When the question "what to do with Trujillo in the Dominican 
Republic" arose, a great proportion of military and of diplomats in the 
Department of State defended him. They maintained that Trujillo may not 
have been the ideal ruler of his country and that his strong one-man 
government was oppressive and diabolical; but at the same time, he was 
anti-Communist in the extreme when anti-Communism was supposed to 
be the epitome of good sense and good character regardless of all else. 
Why should anyone want to dispose of such a staunch anti-Communist? 
But several factions converged in the Trujillo case. It became known to 
those who would overthrow him that if they took action against this island 
strongman, the United States would not lift a finger. 

During this period, there were reports coming from military 
channels, from diplomatic channels, and from CIA channels. All of these 



reports came together in Washington in meetings of the highest order, and 
the fate of the Trujillo regime hung in the balance. It became evident that 
the United States would not do anything and that the policy would be that 
if such an overthrow took place, the United States would not support 
anyone and would not back anyone. However, it also became evident that 
the United States would not support Trujillo, nor would it warn him or 
move to protect him. It is this factor that makes a coup d'etat possible. It is 
not so much positive action; it is the understanding that there will be no 
support of that regime in power by the United States once the uprising 
begins. 

Although the Pentagon Papers do not provide all of the insight, it 
becomes clear that the Diem regime was toppled not so much by anything 
the United States did as by the fact that we did nothing. It is this exposure 
to his enemies that seals the fate of a government leader, as certainly as if 
the trigger were pulled from the embassy. 

One of the key elements in all of these situations is the ability of the 
Agency to have its own message traffic quickly and deftly in hand while 
the other major communicators are going through their channels. 

In the broad sense, communications involves much more than the 
means of transmitting messages. In this broad sense the ST has even 
greater weapons to employ. Even the fastest message system and the most 
direct routing and processing will not assure supremacy unless the men at 
both ends of the system are experts and unless they are able to act with the 
information they have. Here is where the ST excels and where it shows its 
superiority. An agent in a foreign country can send a message by a select 
channel with security coding that keeps the information from everyone 
who does not have the proper clearance and the need to know. This 
assures that very few people will get that message in the first stage of 
handling. The basic message will go to a control office in the CIA, and an 
information copy may go to cleared parties in the White House, State, and 
Defense. The men who receive these messages in those other departments 
may very well be CIA personnel who are in cover assignments. This 
means then that the State, White House, and Defense copies are still in the 
hands of Agency personnel, even though the record will show that they 
have been properly transmitted to the other addressees. Thus the control 
has not been lost, and delivery of these messages will be in strict 
compliance with and in timing with what the ST wants. 

This is why so many messages that have been made public in the 
Pentagon Papers appear to be part of Pentagon, or more specifically, JCS 
activity, when in reality this traffic was between Saigon and the Agency, 
with the information copy being delivered to the Special Assistant for 
Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA). This section in the 
office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was manned, for the most part, by 
military personnel. They did have some normal military functions but 
most of their work was involved with the support of the CIA. In this 
capacity they would control communications coming to the Joint Staff and 
in turn coordinate them with counterpart CIA- support offices in the office 



of the Secretary of Defense, or to a Focal Point office in each of the 
military services. During the period described, the OSD offices were those 
of Bill Bundy, General Lansdale, and others, in such places as the 
Directorate of Research and Engineering. 

To anyone not knowing the process, it would then appear that the 
Saigon message in question would have been properly staffed to the OSD, 
JCS, and all services, when in reality it had simply been to all of the CIA 
control points in those offices. The real military would not have seen it. In 
cases where action was to follow, it would be up to those persons who 
received such messages to call them to the attention of the Secretaries and 
Chiefs of Staff involved. This would be done with care, and yet these 
senior men seldom had all of the facts and all of the background to be able 
to see what really was under way since they would be seeing these 
messages piece by piece and rarely as a whole. Emboldened by knowledge 
of the fact that they had properly touched base with all parties and offices 
concerned, the ST would then go ahead with the project, on the 
assumption that no one had said not to go ahead with it after having been 
advised. 

This was one of the major steps forward taken by Allen Dulles as a 
result of his report. It looked like a small thing, and it was applied bit by 
bit; but once the NSC found itself in the position of doing no more than 
"authorizing" activities of the CIA rather than "directing" them, the roles 
began to turn 180 degrees, and the ST became the active party. When the 
NSC was established, it was realized that if such an eminent body of men 
made decisions and then directed that they be carried out, they would not 
necessarily be in a position to see that someone actually did carry them 
out. Therefore, provision was made for an Operations Coordinating Board, 
(OCB), which would see that the decisions of the President and his 
Council were carried out. This was effective only as long as the NSC was 
directing activity. The OCB would require that the NSC staff keep a 
record of decisions in duplicate, and the Board would ride herd on these 
decisions and see that they were done. It had trouble doing this when CIA 
was just getting its proposals "authorized". 

When the NSC was divided into a small and elite Special Group for 
the purpose of working with the CIA on matters that were from time to 
time clandestine, the task of the OCB became more difficult because of 
the cloak of security. Still, the OCB tried to keep up with such decisions, 
if by no other means than to require "blind" progress reports. But when the 
NSC, through the Special Group, simply sat and listened to outside 
proposals and then permitted or authorized actions that were highly 
classified and highly limited by need to know, the role of the OCB became 
impossible to perform. This was exactly what Allen Dulles wanted. His 
report had stated that he should be able to initiate operations and to take 
his proposals directly to the President, and that the President or an 
authorized representative would then approve what the DCI brought to 
him. He had not been given that authority by the law, and he could not 
have done it under Truman because Truman used the NSC and OCB 
differently from what Dulles visualized. But year by year during the 



Eisenhower Administration he worked to erode the NSC-OCB pattern 
until he was able to work through the Special Group 5412/2 almost 
without interference. Part of his success was due to his effective control of 
communications, which made it appear all the time that projects had been 
thoroughly staffed in all parts of the Government concerned and that the 
approval of the NSC (Special Group) was merely a formality. 

By the time Kennedy became President, he was led to believe that 
the NSC was unimportant, one of those Eisenhower idiosyncrasies, and 
that he could do without it. If he could do without the NSC, he certainly 
could do without the OCB. (Since it could be shown that the OCB was not 
able to perform its job properly because it was unable to find out what the 
Special Group had approved, there was no reason for OCB either.) 
Without either of these bodies in session, the DCI was able to move in as 
he desired, with very little effective control from any Council member. 
This was a major change brought about by a kind of evolution and 
erosion. It was certainly a downgrading process; but the trouble was that 
all too few people had any realization of what had taken place, and those 
who had were either with the CIA or the ST, and they were not about to 
tell anyone. 

In concluding our review of this function of the CIA 
communications system, it would be a mistake to overlook what is 
perhaps the heaviest source of volume. The CIA monitors electronic 
signals all over the world, and it gathers so much of this that it is 
practically swamped with taped information. However, it does a most 
excellent job in keeping its ear to the traffic of the world. There can be 
little question that an enlightened system of listening can pick up about all 
of the information any country would ever need, to keep itself well 
informed of what any other country is doing. In this day and age, almost 
all major parts of the Government and of industry must utilize and depend 
upon electronically transmitted messages and data transfer. All of this can 
be monitored, and even if it is in code it can be read sooner or later. This is 
one task of the Agency, and it is a major part of its role and responsibility 
to coordinate all national intelligence. 

Perhaps no other function of the Agency so clearly demonstrates the 
dual nature of the CIA more than does communications. In the intelligence 
business, communications is absolutely essential to make bits of 
information available to the collection center. However, by its very nature, 
the more capacity the communications system has and the more 
information bits it handles the more it tends to degrade the value of the 
information. The Agency receives so much information every day that the 
great proportion of it is never seen, never processed, and never analyzed . . 
. and most likely should not be. 

On the other hand, in this flood of information there is always the 
good chance that much is intentional deception and gibberish. Just having 
the information does not insure that it is worth anything. In this country in 
particular, information on almost anything is becoming something that has 
a price and can be bought and sold; yet even this does not ensure that it 



has value. 

From the other point of view, a high-caliber communications system 
makes it possible for the center to go out to all of its outposts and agents 
with instructions seeking certain information of value. This is certain to 
produce the best input, since the return product will be what is sought and 
not some random article. One of the greatest needs of an intelligence 
system is to know what it is looking for, along with all of the technical 
know-how in the organization. "Know what" is so much more valuable 
than know-how. 

But, as we said above, communications brings out the duality of the 
agency. While agents all over the world are seeking information, the 
operator is always looking for that choice morsel of data that can be used 
for another operation. In all of the material flashed over the 
communications network, there are those special bits and pieces — border 
trouble between two countries, a political slaying, an uprising in a remote 
village, a student riot on an urban campus — that provide fuel for 
clandestine operations. Such things provide the "fun and games" people 
with the fuel for their fires. 

When the Agency wishes to pursue one of these leads, it flashes the 
word back to get more information. It may activate a dormant agent 
network to see what further information can be acquired. If the situation 
warrants, agents may be flown in quickly to where the action is. A 
planeload of guns may be moved to a border area for early airdrop if 
called for; and so it goes. To the clandestine operators, communications is 
the lifeblood of the whole business. 

One thing is common to both sides. They always wish to keep their 
information secret. As we have seen, there are many reasons for secrecy, 
and many of them have little to do with real secrecy — which would keep 
the information, or the fact that we have it, from the enemy. But both 
parties should keep in mind that information is a continuing process. The 
dissemination of all information, all secrets, is only a matter of time. There 
is no "first line of defense" for the brain. Any idea conceived by one brain 
and known to a few more is bound to be general information in a short 
time. The purpose of secrecy is self-defeating. It is much more important 
for us to have adequate knowledge than it is for us to try to keep some 
other country from that knowledge. More harm is done every day by 
keeping essential information from those who should have it than ever is 
done by those whom we say we are trying to keep from getting it. If more 
experienced military men had known about the Bay of Pigs operation, it 
either would not have happened, or if it did, it would have had a better 
chance of success. On the other hand, the very people whom the cloak of 
secrecy was supposed to keep from knowing about the operation, 
ostensibly the Cubans and the Russians, knew all they needed to know 
about it. 

The best communications system in the world is certainly a 
tremendous asset for any intelligence organization; but in the hands of 



those who wish to use its information for the creation and promotion of 
clandestine operations it is another one of those facilities that lead to the 
type of problems described by President Truman and Arnold Toynbee. 



1. The Human Use of Human Beings, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1954. 



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Chapter 14 

Transportation: Anywhere in the World ~ Now 



In moonlight so clear that the high Himalayas could be seen one 
hundred miles away, an Air Force C-130 transport few over the 
multinational border region of Laos, Burma, and China. In the cargo 
compartment a small, highly skilled team of Tibetan Khamba tribesmen 
huddled quietly beside the heavy airdrop pallets that lined the center 
compartment. Under a dim light in the forward part of the huge cargo area, 
four Agency men played nickel-and-dime poker while they sipped hot 
coffee from the plane's airborne kitchen hotplate. The crew peered into the 
darkness at brilliant stars guiding them on into the vast remoteness of 
Western China. From time to time the navigator was busy taking star shots 
to verify the electronic navigation signals he was getting, but which were 
growing dimmer and less reliable as each hour passed. 

The Operations officials of the Agency had directed that the crew 
fly as low and as close to the horizon as they could with safety, so that that 
their radar profile would be obscured by ground clutter. This same low 
pattern played havoc with long-range navigational signals from remote 
sites. But this gave the experienced crew little concern. The C-130 was in 
fine shape, the four turboprop engines purred in their sleek nacelles, and 
fuel flow was well within the flight-plan parameters. Precise navigation at 
this point was essential only to verify wind conditions and to warn if 
major shifts in strength and direction might have an impact upon total 
effective range. They knew that this mission was going to demand all the 
range the C-130 had, and a little more. The target for the airdrop of the 
Khambas and the black cargo was in the vicinity of Koko Nor, deep in the 
outback of unknown China. 

A trainload of olive-drab Gl six-by-six U.S. Army trucks had been 
delivered to a siding in North Carolina. A crew of men had worked for 
days unloading the trucks and towing them to a small remote dockside 
facility for loading onto an old, World War II front-loading landing craft. 
Another old, but newly shipshape, vessel lay at anchor, ready to shove off 
for the south as soon as the last shipment of trucks had been hoisted 
aboard. Both ships, with skeleton crews, slipped out of the port quietly and 
ran southward to Puerto Rico, where they would await orders to join the 
small armada bound for an unknown beach in the Bay of Pigs region of 
western Cuba. 



The temperature sometimes reached 125 degrees, perhaps even 135 
degrees, in the scorching sunlight of northern Libya. The jet fighters lining 
the runways shimmered in the ever-present mirage that hung over the 
concrete runways. Men fueling these planes wore heavy gloves, in spite of 
the intense heat, to protect themselves from burns. Far across this huge 
base in the remote area reserved for rockets and other armament, a few 
low outbuildings were the only evidence of a below-ground ammunition 
and arms cache of a most unusual nature. A steady stream of trucks had 
been weaving back and forth all day from the huge C-124 transport planes 
to this dump area to unload heavy cases of guns. These were not the usual 
World War II leftovers. These were British Enfields, French guns, and 
most important, they were a good mix of guns from Iron Curtain 
countries, picked up from many sources, including war-captured booty 
from the Israeli campaign in the Sinai Desert. 

The common thread through all of these anecdotes is the fact that in 
every case the Agency was operating in its own interest with 
transportation provided by the military forces. The aircraft belonged to the 
U.S. Air Force. The trucks and the special flatbed rail carriers were 
provided by the U. S. Army. And the ships that made the run to Cuba had 
been U.S. Navy equipment, refitted for use in that operation. The Agency 
has ready access to all kinds of transportation all over the world in the 
global transportation system of the Department of Defense. This great 
network gives the Agency the opportunity to carry out its work behind the 
screen of regular military movements. This saves the CIA the problem of 
covering the bulk of its movements, and it saves a tremendous amount of 
money. Again, this is money that the Agency usually protests it will gladly 
reimburse to the prime agent of the DOD, provided it is billed for it. Most 
shipments made by the CIA through the military networks are made to and 
from Agency cover units using military designations. The cost therefore is 
not identifiable unless a knowledgeable person intercepts the shipment. 
This is not likely, because the Agency will protest and the top echelons of 
the service will support it that the high classification of the shipment 
precludes such identification. Thus the bulk airlift of tons of guns, which 
would mean nothing to military shipping clerks, travels without charge 
under the guise of secrecy. 

Much military shipment is made by contract airlift. During the peak 
Vietnam operation years, the total of military-purchased contract- airlift 
averaged three quarters of a billion dollars per year. With the CIA 
responsible for a $1 billion a year "pacification" program in Vietnam, it 
can be seen that the Agency's share of that airlift could have been 
appreciable; yet the chances are very good that no one ever knew just 
which shipments were Agency shipments and what to charge for them or 
how to collect reimbursement for them. When one reflects upon the early 
days of the CIA and upon the serious precautions taken to assure that the 
CIA would not grow beyond the size of a small, truly special operations 
capability, it is most significant to remember how all of this was done and 
how it has become such a normal and accepted practice today that at times 
even the U.S. Army has moved into certain operations under the cover of 
the CIA. 



When the CIA leaves the realm of the DOD and must strike out for 
itself into non-military areas and into areas where military relationships 
must be abandoned, it is able to use its own funds to provide its own first- 
class transportation to meet the situation. Most Agency personnel going 
overseas do so under one form of military cover or other, and as a result 
they travel on military aircraft or military contract shipping. This includes 
their household goods and other equipment as well. But there are times 
when CIA personnel cannot travel as military personnel, and then they 
travel as ordinary civilians and utilize all other means available. 

In foreign countries, the CIA procures fleets of indigenous vehicles 
to be able to pass more easily among the population among whom they 
will be working. It would be unwise for some man, attempting to be 
inconspicuous in Istanbul, to be seen driving around that crowded city in a 
new Buick or Chrysler. More than likely, the Agency will see that he has a 
Volkswagen or Renault, and perhaps one that is a few years old. In like 
manner, the Agency purchases civilian aircraft and boats of various types 
and sizes, to meet other special requirements. I have known of CIA 
personnel traveling in dog-sled parties and in sleek civilian business jets. 

The Agency does not want for transportation anytime, anywhere, 
and of any type, and they get so much of it free or for so little relative cost 
that what they need over and above the bulk military support, their own 
funds are more than adequate to provide. The Agency has a very large and 
special fleet of its own equipment, most of which is covered as 
commercial equipment. At the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA 
used landing ships of World War II origin, which it had purchased from 
surplus sources and then refitted for the occasion. In other water moves, 
the CIA has used special Norwegian-built high speed boats, and it has 
used small, light canoes. In such instances, the Agency mans these vessels 
with its own personnel, and augments the agent cadre with experienced 
men when necessary. Where the Agency excels in this business is with its 
many clandestine airlines, which are scattered throughout the United 
States and around the world. The most famous of these is Air America. 

Air America, the airline of the flying mercenaries, conjures up 
stories true and imagined, real and unreal, of the Dragon Lady and Terry 
and the Pirates and of deep, secret missions into rebel-held territory in 
countries from faraway Asia to Latin America. Air America, Incorporated, 
is a worldwide operation, chartered in Delaware and listed solidly in Dun 
and Bradstreet. Its main offices are within a few hundred yards of the 
White House, on Washington's posh Connecticut Avenue, and it numbers 
among its directors many famous names, including several former Navy 
admirals who have at one time or other been Commanders in Chief, 
Pacific (CINCPAC). Air America is a most important adjunct of the CIA. 

When the travel to Mecca is heaviest with the devout Moslems 
involved in the hadj, a nondescript old transport aircraft will shuttle 
pilgrims across the Arabian desert. When summer travel peaks in Europe 
and thousands of students hire charter planes to take them to an 
international peace festival in Munich, among these available planes will 



be aircraft belonging to Air America and flying under one of its countless 
cover, subordinate companies. If the Agency wishes to make a clandestine 
cargo drop in some out-of-the-way place like Burma, Pakistan, or 
Indonesia, a perfectly normal appearing commercial transport aircraft will 
find itself on business through and around that area for a while, until any 
suspicion that might be aroused has died down; then on one special flight 
it will open its rear cargo door and para-drop the supplies, equipment, and 
perhaps agents over the selected target zone. 

The men of Air America are legendary, from the incomparable 
"Earthquake" McCoon, who lost his life over Dien Bien Phu in an 
unarmed C-119, to nameless and faceless Chinese and Anzacs, who have 
flown for Air America on flights that would make fiction accounts tame 
by comparison. 

In the middle nineteen fifties, it became necessary to resupply 
Agency outposts deep in Laos. The usual DC-3 or C-46 from World War 
II surplus stockpiles required too much runway for some of these rugged 
areas. Helicopters lacked the range and load-carrying ability required. The 
CIA turned to light planes and worked with the native tribesmen to clear 
landing strips deep in the forested valleys of Laos. For a short time these 
strips were useful, until their adversaries found them and showered them 
with gunfire from the surrounding mountainsides. 

Air America came in and selected landing sites in the most 
precarious positions. It had become expert in the use of a small, special 
plane used by the Air Force Special Air Warfare squadrons and by the 
Army Special Forces troops. This plane was called the L-28, or 
commercially, the Helio Courier. It was as rugged as a Jeep and could land 
and take off in remarkably short distances. This ability to land and take off 
in short distances is not by itself sufficient to commend an aircraft to this 
special use. Almost any light plane can, with a big engine, take off or land 
from short distances. However, once that same plane is in the air, if it does 
not have superior control surfaces and other slow flying characteristics 
designed for really slow-speed control in the air, it will be lethal in regular 
service. The Agency learned this the hard way when it and the United 
States Information Agency (USIA) missions attempted to use other 
aircraft that seemed able to do the job and were a little cheaper. More than 
50 percent of those planes crashed in the first year of use. Meanwhile, the 
Air America planes and experienced crews actually operated from 
fantastically short and crude airstrips, which had been cleared by the 
natives on top of the ridge lines of the high, forested mountains of Laos. 
Even today, the flight handbook for pilots in Southeast Asia speaks of two 
categories of landing grounds in Laos — regular and Helio. Air America 
and the rugged Helio have made an unheralded and unequaled record all 
over Laos. 

Air America is not a small unseen company. At two bases alone, 
one in Thailand and one in Taiwan, it has more than four thousand 
employees at each. To live its cover as a commercial airline, it flies 
regular routes and is a major contract carrier airline competing with other 



airlines of the world for flying business and for aircraft maintenance work. 

Years ago, when pilots and ground-crew men of the old Chennault 
Flying Tiger groups decided to stay in China and to form an airline there, 
CAT Airlines, the forerunner of Air America and others of that time, 
operated all over the mainland. They bought a fleet of World War II 
surplus C-46 cargo aircraft and set up a big maintenance facility at a 
Chinese mainland airport. As the fortunes of war drove them from one 
base to another, someone decided to put the maintenance facility on board 
a big war surplus ship. Finally, with the defeat of the forces under Chiang 
Kai-shek, this shop with its facilities and stockpile of equipment sailed to 
Taiwan and anchored beside a dock in Tainan. There this most unusual 
aircraft maintenance facility performed maintenance for a fast-growing 
and very busy fleet of planes for many years. 

One could walk through that ship absolutely amazed at the beehive- 
like activity on board. Hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Chinese worked in 
that ship on stages, rather than floors or decks, joined by narrow catwalks. 
Many of those workers worked in small basket-like spaces, barely large 
enough for a small Chinese. Parts and materials were brought to them and 
poured into each work space as through a funnel. The worker would finish 
his special task and then drop the part through a short chute, where it 
would end up for the next worker to do his part. The whole operation 
worked on a sort of force-of-gravity basis, with the finished item falling 
out at the bottom, ready for an alert runner to carry it to the packaging 
room. Whole sets of aircraft engine spark plugs would be specially treated 
and then placed into a big slab of plank, drilled out specially to 
accommodate just enough plugs for a certain type of engine, e.g., twenty- 
eight plugs for a 14-cylinder engine. This was done so mechanics would 
not have to check plugs; they simply removed all of them and put in a 
whole set of new plugs, while the old ones would be returned complete to 
the shop. 

Even instruments were rebuilt, and as they were, the faces and 
decals were changed to have Chinese or English markings, as required. 
There were propeller shops and wheel shops. Planes could be completely 
rebuilt from this one facility. As a matter of fact, the CIA had obtained 
master transparent film slide sets of the aircraft manufacturers parts and 
supplies kits, and for such planes as the DC-6. Air America could make 
every part just about as well as Douglas Aircraft. The CIA justified this 
irregular and perhaps illegal operation on the basis that it was working 
with sanitized engines and aircraft and that it could not put such items 
back in the supply line of the services. As a result, instead of buying from 
Douglas, through the services, it simply made the parts in its Tainan 
facility. It is entirely possible that complete small aircraft were made in 
this manner and that Air America or its subsidiaries ended up with more 
aircraft in operation than it had had in the first place. 

This technique is "justified" by the nature of air registry, which 
precludes the availability and even the existence of "extra" aircraft. Every 
aircraft built and flown must be registered. Once it has been registered, 



that serial number stays with it for the rest of its existence. Therefore, if 
the Agency wishes to remove all traces of identity and ownership from an 
airplane in order to make it plausibly deniable, it must also arrange to 
cover that plane in the registry. This is done in many ways, one of which 
is to assemble an extra plane from the parts available. To begin with, the 
CIA may be able to salvage a destroyed aircraft and have it declared 
discarded. Then from the frame or some other essential part it will rebuild 
the plane from parts not having any serial numbers at all. This method 
must be used with larger aircraft; but the Tainan facility had the capability 
to build smaller aircraft from scratch, just by assembling spare parts, many 
of which it would have made itself right at the plant. 

With this splendid maintenance organization, the Agency faces the 
necessity to assure it sufficient business to be able to live its cover as a 
commercial establishment. At this date and time it is doubtful that the 
cover of Air America is of any real value. Certainly, anyone who needs to 
know by now knows all about Air America; but in any event, such a plant 
and all that equipment cannot be permitted to stand idle. As a result, Air 
America and its subsidiary maintenance components bid actively for 
commercial airline contracts and especially for U.S. military contracts. It 
is this military business that actually supports Air America. This is true 
also in the airline passenger and cargo business. 

Air America has a fine record, and on the basis of experience and 
service it is at least the equal of other contract carrier airlines that bid for 
U.S. military airlift. However, since the Agency has a proprietary interest 
in Air America, the CIA feels that the services should give the airline 
every opportunity to bid, and everything else being equal, the opportunity 
to be selected for contracts up to the minimum income level the Agency 
holds is essential to keep the airline in business and give it the added 
capacity to support ST activities when called upon. 

There was a time when contract carrier bidding was very 
competitive because the Pacific airlift had been cut back and there was 
very little to go around. After a few cycles of bidding, other airlines noted 
that Air America was getting business steadily, even if not in large 
volume. One new and most enterprising contract airline president flew 
into Washington and presented his views to the proper authorities in the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense and in the Air Force. At every turn he 
was assured that the bidding had been perfectly legal and correct, and that 
Air America was getting no more than its share and that Air America had 
made valid low bids. This man had heard some stories about Air 
America's pedigree, stories that were very easy to come by in any bar in 
Hong Kong where Air America pilots were very popular; so he went into 
town and hired a lawyer. As his good fortune and, no doubt, his good 
sense would have it, the lawyer he retained was a knowledgeable 
individual who among other things had served as Secretary of the Air 
Force. 

Accompanied by this gentleman, the airline president returned to the 
Pentagon and held a brief meeting with certain aware officials there. By 



the time they left the Pentagon, this airline had the promise of a contract in 
the Pacific. The contract saved that airline from lean years, and it would 
be nice to be able to leave the story there with a happy ending. 

Actually, once that airline president had learned the trick, it was 
only inevitable that he would resort to that game again and again. Middle- 
level executives and appointive officers in the Pentagon rotate and move 
on after brief terms. With each generation of new faces someone sooner or 
later would be confronted by the same "pirate" airline president with the 
same story. Each time, the heavy cloak of security had kept the new man 
from knowing the antecedents of the case; so he would have to seek help 
and advice from the staff. Inevitably he would be told, "Do anything you 
can to placate the man. That subject is highly classified, and we can't let 
legal action compromise the real facts in the case." As a result, the 
president would get his contract again and again. Because he knew that, he 
had all the high cards in the deck. Today that contract carrier advertises as 
one of the largest and most successful in the business, and its very 
successful leader has done very well with his secret formula. 

What was involved here was not such a lot of money; but it is 
indicative of a great weakness in this sort of a system. What works in one 
case works in countless others. It is a sort of blackmail predicated on not 
breaking security, and no real consideration is given to whether the 
security is worth the price or not. This same type of "security blackmail" 
exists in many forms. If a government does not get the Military Aid 
Program material it thinks it should get, it will put pressure on the CIA 
liaison people, telling them it will have to stop supporting a 
reconnaissance unit or some radar installations, or some similar threat. 
Then CIA puts pressure on the MAP staff and gets the additional material 
for them, or may even get it out of its own resources of stockpiled military 
material. Or, as in the case of the Bay of Pigs operation, the governments 
that assisted Guatemala and Nicaragua either kept what they "found on 
base" or bargained for more. This upset other assistance plans because 
other countries claimed the right to more equipment based upon a 
balanced formula, security or not. 

We see other applications of such blackmail, as in the case of the 
ransom paid to Castro for the Cuban invaders. This figure in money and 
heavy equipment as well as in medicine has been quoted as being $53 
million or more. It seems pertinent to note that so much money and 
equipment was paid willingly for captured Cubans and as far as we know, 
not one cent has been offered, except by certain private citizens, for the 
release of our own prisoners of war in Indochina. 

After the adventure in Indonesia, considerable amounts of 
equipment and preferential purchasing rights were paid to the Government 
of Indonesia as a sort of compensation for that misadventure. 

In the case of the airline president above, he has made a success of 
this technique, which has been exceeded only by the success of Air 
America itself. This is now a very large and honorable company directed 



and managed by some very able men. It is the excellence and superiority 
of the men on the logistics side of CIA who have made the Agency look 
good year after year in spite of some of the problems created by the more 
adventuresome operators. As Air America has become quite overt, 
respectable, and above-board, it in turn has had to be the cover unit for 
much really deep operational work. It has the capacity and the know-how, 
and it certainly has the people, to perform aircraft support for almost any 
operation that can be conceived. 

In fact, it is organizations such as Air America that show how the 
Agency could have done things from the beginning, if it had not turned so 
quickly to the soft touch in the Department of Defense. If the early 
opportunists had been content to perform truly clandestine missions of a 
size and expectation that would have had the chance to remain clandestine, 
then the CIA might have managed to live within its charter and to have 
limited its operational efforts to those actually in support of intelligence, 
instead of becoming a vast international operational force. It was the 
broad-gauge goals set by the Dulles-Jackson-Correa report and the 
exploitation of the war-planning largesse of the military that launched the 
Agency upon a runaway operational activity, which resulted finally in the 
Indochina venture. 



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Chapter 15 
Logistics by Miracle 



Historians attribute to Napoleon the statement that armies move on 
their stomachs. In actual practice, it may have worked the other way 
around. The army's stomach may have been what made the General move. 
When the great Genghis Khan captured and pillaged a city, his army ate 
well for a while. However, when the food began to run low Genghis Khan 
was already looking for the next city to capture. Historians may attribute 
his conquests to a vast imperial effort; but objective analysis may reveal 
his sweeping across the cold and hostile land-mass of Asia was due more 
to the need to feed the growing horde of men behind him than to any other 
one incontestable factor. 

It is logistics that permits armies to move. When the British Army 
sat at El Alamein holding the Rommel advance at bay, their failure to 
attack was more a function of logistics than it was of tactics. Montgomery 
and his great assistant, Alexander, knew all too well that once the army 
moved, it would be absolutely dependent upon a flow of supplies that 
must remain unbroken all the way to Tunis. They were not about to give 
the order to move until that flow of supplies was assured. 

When Patton broke out across the fields of France in his dash for the 
Rhine and the destruction of the German armies, his fate lay in the hands 
of General J. C. H. Lee, Eisenhower's logistics chief, more than it did in 
his tactical wizardry. 

And so it has been with the CIA. The important thing about the 
logistics system of the Agency is not that it has so much and that it can do 
almost anything it wants with its horn of plenty; but that it has achieved 
this position without specific authorization and quite generally without the 
knowledge and approval of the rest of the Government, especially 
Congress. The ultimate control over any agency of the Government lies in 
the purse-strings that are held by Congress. Yet the Agency grows and 
grows, and Congress seems to have little to do with it and to know little of 
what it has created. Of course, everyone knows that the CIA has a fleet of 
aircraft, tens of thousands of people, ships and trucks, overseas facilities, 
weapons of all types in vast quantities, and almost limitless funds. Almost 
anyone, especially any member of Congress can say, "I certainly am aware 
of the fact that the CIA has secret overseas facilities." And another can 



say, "I know that the CIA is mixed up with Air America, the contract 
carrier airline, in some manner or other." Another might add, "I have 
visited overseas capitals and I have found that the CIA had a number of 
people there under cover assignments." And some other Congressman 
might even say that he has heard that the Agency gets plenty of money 
through various secret channels from other Government sources. 

The Agency likes to conceal the fact that it has so much under 
heavy security wraps. Whether these facts are concealed for real security 
reasons, or whether they are concealed simply to keep them from the eyes 
and ears of Congress and of the American public is the big question. 
Actually, the CIA prefers to keep its wealth under security so that all 
Americans, including the members of Congress, do not know how much it 
has and how it got it. There is a very good chance that the other nations of 
this world have a much better idea of what the CIA has in their countries 
than we do in this country. They make it their business to know, and we 
do not. We have just let it happen before our eyes without ever making a 
real investigation of the facts. If everyone else in the world knows, why 
shouldn't we? If Greece is the locale of one stockpile and they know what 
is in it; and if Turkey, Iran, and Jordan all have stockpiles in their 
countries and know what they contain and where they are, what makes 
someone here think that they do not talk to each other and compare notes? 
As a matter of fact, they not only compare notes, they use each other's 
knowledge to improve their own game. The only ones who don't know 
what the CIA has in Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Jordan are the American 
people and their representatives in Congress. 

And for all those Congressmen who know about the Agency, there 
are none who can say that they know all of the things the Agency has of 
all kinds. Each Congressman may have a smattering of knowledge of 
some of the things that the Agency has. But the CIA has achieved this vast 
wealth in manpower, money, and materials, as well as facilities all over 
the world, without the knowledge of the rest of the Government. This 
means that the rest of the Government does not know about it in total — all 
in one place, as in Congress. 

Undoubtedly, someone from the CIA and perhaps from the 
executive branch of the Government may say, "That is not exactly right. 
We are fully aware of the total inventory of the Agency. We are aware of 
its manpower resources and of its goods all over the world, and we have 
an inventory of its facilities and installations, including those in foreign 
countries." Certainly, there is no need to doubt or to question such a 
blanket statement of faith. Somewhere there must be a fairly accurate total 
of what the CIA is supposed to have; but at that point one will be 
confronted with the tautology, "This inventory of the Agency lists 
everything the Agency has; therefore, everything that the Agency has is 
listed in this inventory." 

For the CIA, the idea of property takes on a new meaning. Any 
other agency of the Government that wanted to use one hundred trucks 
would have to buy one hundred trucks or make some arrangement with 



another agency of the Government, or with a private organization, to 
acquire the trucks. And that agency would have to show in its budget the 
expenditure of a certain amount of its funds for the purchase or lease of 
the hundred trucks. In other words, its utilization or ownership of property 
could be verified and accounted for by reviewing or auditing its 
appropriated funds. The CIA can use and the CIA can acquire and "own" 
one hundred trucks without any budgeted fund transaction at all. 

The CIA has the authority, or at least it is given the authority by 
other Government agencies, to create cover organization within other parts 
of the Government. This is one of the key tasks that the old Dulles- 
Jackson-Correa report set out for the Agency. Having once created such 
units, the CIA is then able to use those units as though they were real 
elements of the covering organization and to do with them pretty much 
what it pleases. So if the CIA wants to use one hundred Army trucks, it 
may have one of its Air Force cover units (it could use an Army unit; but 
it is easier to use cross-service channels to conceal such a transaction) duly 
and properly requisition the trucks. In response to this order, the Army 
will furnish, and write off, the trucks to the Air Force. However, the Air 
Force won't really know that one of its units, a cover unit, has acquired 
these trucks; so the Air Force will not pick them up on its inventory. The 
trucks are then in a sort of never-never land. They are "owned" by an Air 
Force cover unit that the CIA has the authority to direct, and those trucks 
will be used as the CIA wishes and for as long as the CIA wishes. There 
have been cases where the CIA turned around and transferred such 
property to another country in a sort of a CIA-MAP project all of its own. 

In this manner, only one of numerous variations, the Agency has 
acquired countless mountains of material, which it stockpiles, uses, loses, 
gives away, and just plain warehouses all over the world. Even the Agency 
doesn't know what it all is and where it all is. No one in the Government 
really knows how much the Agency has. A corollary of this statement is 
that the Agency has been able to stockpile money in a somewhat similar 
manner, because if it had money to buy trucks and then was never billed 
for them, it still has those funds to spend elsewhere. 

With these funds that the CIA has stockpiled for its own use, it 
develops areas beyond those in the realm of the military and other regular 
branches of the Government. The Agency has a wonderful little shop 
called "TSS". Few know what TSS really means; but it probably means 
something like "Top Secret Stuff". This shop makes all kinds of James 
Bond trinkets. It is the place where they design briefcases that will not 
burn, that will blow up if someone attempts to open them the wrong way, 
and that will put out long spidery legs if they are released by the agent 
who is carrying them. And it is the shop that puts a full-blown tape 
recorder into a Zippo lighter case or a ladys lip-rouge container. 

The TSS shop works on all kinds of unusual and very special 
weapons, and it works with chemicals that can perform all manner of 
special tasks. It has the finest bugging devices available and the very best 
debugging facilities. TSS goes out into industry and has things made 



without telling the people who have made them what their uses will be. At 
one time for photographic purposes the Agency wanted to develop a 
brilliant floodlight that could be carried on the wing-tip of an airplane in a 
pod. This light required so much energy to operate it that the normal 
electrical supply of the aircraft could not ignite it properly. The Agency 
then developed, with the help of a private corporation, a generator driven 
by a propeller attached to the pod. This small propeller was so efficient 
that it could drive a generator for the floodlight to illuminate an entire area 
below the plane. 

Although this was a splendid development, it was found that in a 
tactical situation the worst thing you could do was to send a plane into a 
hostile situation lit up like the sun. This would be an easy target for 
ground gunners. The next step was to synchronize the light and the camera 
shutter to the point that the flash would be so brilliant and so brief that an 
unwitting ground party would not realize it had blinked. 

This created new problems; a whole new automated photographic 
and lighting system had to be developed. This was done, and Agency 
aircraft can now approach targets in the dark, even at times in an engine- 
out or engine-idling glide for silence, and take high-speed pictures without 
anyone on the ground knowing that they have been photographed. TSS 
was also able to make another advance in aerial photography. The U-2 had 
proved that it could fly across denied or unwitting territory without notice 
or without danger from attack because of its speed, altitude, and range. It 
was also a relatively small radar target. However, at the flight altitude at 
which the U-2 operated, any normal aerial camera was being pushed to its 
limits. The camera lens had to focus on the target area and put what it saw 
on film as precisely as possible. At some point the lens became better than 
the film paper. This meant that the image that the lens put on the paper 
was finer than the grade and grain of the paper. Therefore the process of 
enlarging such pictures and then enlarging them again and again became 
limited, not because the lens could not accurately transmit the image but 
because the paper itself had a grain structure that began to break down the 
detail after a certain amount of enlargement. By working on this problem, 
TSS and its corporate research associates were able to create a means by 
which enlargement could be carried so far, for example, that it could 
distinguish between an oval table or a roundtable of about four feet in 
diameter from the operational altitude of the U-2, or even higher. 

This became a most useful facility in the days of the U-2; but it had 
not reached the zenith of its utility until the Agency went into space. Now 
the Spy-in-the-Sky orbital laboratories park out in space at about 110 
miles mean altitude and take very valuable pictures of the earth's surface 
on predetermined schedules or on signals. For example, such pictures of 
the Chinese atomic energy facilities clearly delineate between dry drying 
flats and moist drying flats. The continuing variations give a fairly 
accurate estimate of the rate of activity at the facility. 

These developments have led to policy problems that this country 
has not faced up to primarily because so few people really know about 



them. They are hardly secret from our enemies, and for that matter they 
are not secrets from our friends. They are the kind of secrets we keep from 
ourselves in order that secret operations may be continued in the hands of 
the ST. For example, Secretary of Defense Laird has made a strong case 
before the Congress on behalf of the development of the B-l supersonic 
bomber, which the U.S. Air Force states it will need for the defense of the 
country in the decade of the eighties. As a function of his presentation to 
Congress, Mr. Laird gave information about a Soviet supersonic bomber, 
which he said had already been built and flown. As a result of the impact 
of this information, he drew the conclusion that the United States must get 
on with a project to build a bomber that would be equal to or even better 
than the Soviet bomber. In support of what he had been saying about the 
Soviet bomber he gave sufficient details of that new plane to artists to 
permit them to arrive at a suitable pictorial representation of it. A copy of 
this artists' conception of the Soviet bomber appeared in an issue of Time 
magazine and was used in that periodical as the basis for a strong article in 
support of a crash program to build an American supersonic bomber 
without delay. This whole process, which most Americans will recognize 
as a familiar pattern used for submarines, super-carriers, and for missiles, 
is intended to make everyone believe that we are behind the Russians and 
that we must catch up; we must close the bomber gap. 

To the tune of an opening request for $11 billion, Congress is 
supposed to vote for production of this bomber based on the information 
given in limited fashion and upon a poor picture of an alleged flying 
aircraft. When the stakes are so high and so costly, it is time that the 
intelligence community and the DOD give up this facade of secrecy. 
Everyone knows that the intelligence community uses cameras of great 
ability and that they use orbiting laboratories from which photographic 
canisters are dropped for recovery and development. And everyone knows 
that these orbiting laboratories take pictures of Soviet territory and of any 
other territory desired. None of these things would be done if the pictures 
were not excellent and if they were not getting an excellent product. 
Therefore, if the intelligence community has hard information about a 
bomber, which includes photographs of that bomber, why should it not 
show the actual pictures of that bomber to Mr. Laird, to the President, to 
the Congress, and most of all to the American public and to the whole 
world? What possible case can be made for keeping such things secret, 
especially when they are asking for $11 billion? Is the reason they do not 
show these pictures to Congress the fact that they do not have these 
pictures? And if they do not have the pictures, why not? Is it because they 
have been unable to find the bomber and to get a picture of it outside its 
hangar? Or perhaps their conjecture about the bomber is a bit premature, 
and the bomber is perhaps only on the Soviet drawing-boards, like too 
many American bombers? 

Of course, there are technical problems. An orbiting photographic 
laboratory can only take a useful picture of such a bomber at certain 
optimum times in its orbiting periodic cycles. And an orbiting lab can be 
tracked by the Soviets, and they can hide the bomber whenever they know 
a satellite, suspected of being a photographic type, is due to fly by. But, by 



the same token, there are tactical things the intelligence community can 
and should be doing to get such pictures anyhow. They are not established 
to get second-best pictures or none at all. If the long ears of electronic 
intelligence and of other sensors tell us that the Russians are flying a new 
supersonic bomber, then there are other ways of getting its picture and of 
getting so much concrete information about it that we do not have to 
depend upon incomplete data. This is what an intelligence agency should 
be for, instead of a lot of other things that it would rather be for. 

Such frankness openly discussed and openly aired would give up 
nothing to our enemies and would in the long run improve the total 
program. It would be most helpful and it would save billions of dollars. 
However, so many of these things that the wonders of U.S. industrial 
capability have developed for the CIA and for its TSS, have been kept 
under wraps — not so much because some form of security has been 
established that makes this reasonable and correct, but because the 
security shield leaves room for maneuvering when the ST needs to create a 
story that intelligence, for the time being perhaps, cannot actually support. 
Furthermore, if the huge spy satellite program were to be brought out in 
the open as a routine technical achievement, which it is, it might better be 
operated by NASA or one of the services than by an element of the 
intelligence community. 

Much could be said for the merits of the TSS side of the Agency. 
The ability of the intelligence community to develop truly remarkable 
equipment and to extend the reach of surveillance and knowledge has been 
really magnificent. However, just as one would like to commend the 
community for having done something well, one realizes that the human 
factor has crept back in and beclouded the issue again by throwing up 
artificial barriers about these developments and by keeping them under 
wraps so that the controlling members of the "big game" may be able at 
one time or another to spring facts as surprises and at other times to spring 
surprises with or without the facts; and no one anywhere will be in a 
position to know otherwise, including, as President Truman has said, the 
very President and Commander in Chief. 

What is so miraculous about the Agency's logistics system is that it 
has grown to such tremendous proportions in spite of the fact that the NSC 
directives specifically stated that the CIA should not have the men, 
money, or materials to pursue operations unless and until the CIA had 
been directed to carry them out by the NSC in the first place. During the 
early nineteen fifties, the Council was in the process of issuing a directive 
revision and an updating of the old NSCID 10/2 - which would authorize 
the CIA to carry out special operations when directed by the NSC. A copy 
of the original draft of this directive used to be in the files of the Office of 
the Secretary of Defense, and the paragraph that pertained to what might 
be called the "logistics plan" of this directive had been carefully and 
elaborately annotated in plain handwriting. The handwriting was that of 
the President, Dwight D. Eisenhower. He wanted to make it so certain that 
the Agency could not acquire the logistics base for regular operations that 
he wrote into this directive his own stipulations. 



When the final draft was published, these stringent stipulations were 
still there, and they required that whenever the Agency was directed to 
carry out a special operation, it would be instructed as a function of the 
same decision of the NSC, to request assistance from one Government 
agency or another, and that this assistance would be granted from "time to 
time" and would not be kept by the Agency for use from one operation to 
another. In other words, Eisenhower prohibited the CIA from stockpiling 
material for clandestine operations. 

This philosophy ran at cross-purposes to the course laid down for 
himself and for his agency by Allen Dulles. Even though his brother was 
Secretary of State and his friend Ike was in the White House, he found 
ways to erode and to get around these stipulations. His report had said that 
a central intelligence agency should have the power to combine the secret 
intelligence function and the secret operation function under one official — 
the DCI. He was getting closer and closer to having the authority to carry 
out special operations; but to go all the way he must have the logistics. 
This is why the early war planning role of the Agency had been so 
important and then later why the Army Special Forces and Air Force Air 
Resupply and Communications Wing concepts had proved so opportune. 
With ready resources such as these all over the world, Dulles never lacked 
for equipment, facilities, and personnel. On top of this, he was greatly 
aided toward his goal by the zeal and initiative of the services themselves. 
They practically fought with each other to see who could provide the 
Agency with the most at the lowest cost, or for nothing at all. 

It was this latter phase of developments that moved the CIA into a 
position of sufficiency. By the time of the mid-fifties, so many military 
men had been rotated through the Agency and had been retained as ardent 
disciples of Allen Dulles that the military services were shot through with 
men who were even more zealous for the CIA than some of its own people 
were able to be. When the Agency had not figured out some way to get 
something it wanted, or when in its own straight-laced manner — and there 
were some straight-laced people in the Agency — it could not bring itself 
to suggest that one of the services should do this or that, it frequently 
happened that a general or other ranking individual, still carried away by 
the "fun and games" fervor of his Agency tour, would set up procedures 
whereby the agency would get exactly what it wanted. In a sense, the 
whole U-2 program was an outgrowth of such zeal. 

Gradually and with security-concealed movement, the Agency 
advanced toward its goals, and the glacier-like progress was reinforced by 
the assurance that in its relationship with the DOD the CIA would never 
lack for logistics support. During the later part of the fifties, the Agency 
began to set up storage facilities of its own in many foreign countries. 
Most this equipment was labeled for war-plan-directed utilization and was 
otherwise concealed as 'military' property. By 1955 the Agency was ready 
to try for the big game, and by 1955 knew that it had the equipment to 
move out. Although the directives had not been changed in that respect, no 
one noticed the movement of the glacier as it slid along toward Dulles- 
inspired goals. And by 1955 the Agency was more than the CIA — by that 



year the quiet intelligence arm of the President had been diverted into a 
vast operational organization and its direction had passed from the limited 
control by the DCI to the ST. 



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PART IV 
The CIA: Some Examples 
Throughout the World 

Chapter 16 
Cold War: The Pyrrhic Gambit 

BY THE SUMMER OF 1955 THE CIA had grown to the point 
where it was ready to flex its wings in areas in which it had never before 
been able to operate and in ways that would test its intragovernmental 
potential. The first wave of Army Special Forces support of CIA war- 
planning initiatives and of U.S. Air Force Air Resupply and 
Communications activity had waned following the Korean War; yet the 
major overseas base structure that the CIA had been able to establish 
under the cover of those units remained. Border flights, leaflet drops, and 
other Iron Curtain sensing operations were under way both in Europe and 
Asia; but the CIA had no major projects that it could call its own. 

The Agency believed that it had the means and the requirement for 
advanced operations, which it would support on its own initiatives. One of 
the first of these would be a worldwide airborne capability for electronic 
intelligence, radio transmission surveillance, photographic and radar 
intelligence, and other related activity. TSS had developed many things 
that could be put to work, and the overseas base structure that the DD/S 
had created under the "war planning" cover was more than adequate to 
support operations. 

A small team of Air Force officers, some real Air Force officers 
who were on Agency assignment, and other CIA career personnel who 
operated under Air Force cover, met with U.S. Navy personnel to make 
arrangements for the purchase of seven new navy aircraft, known as the 



P2V-7. The P2V was not a new plane. It had been developed shortly after 
World War II, and the original model at one time held the world record for 
straight-line unrefueled long-distance flight. The "Dash Seven" model had, 
in addition to its two large reciprocating engines, two small T-34 
Westinghouse jet engines. These small jet engines gave the plane a 
powerful jet-assisted take-off capability and a burst-of- speed capability, if 
such should be needed in any hostile situation. The airframe was rugged 
and proven, and Navy support facilities were available all over the world. 
Also, adequate cover for this plane was possible because it was slated to 
be given to many foreign countries as part of the Military Assistance 
Program. This meant that if one should happen to be lost on a clandestine 
mission, the United States could disclaim any connection with the flight 
on the hopeful assumption that whatever country found the wreckage in its 
backyard would be unable categorically to say whether it came from the 
United States or from one of several other countries. 

The gross weakness of this type of cover is readily apparent. Any 
target country, such as China, eastern European satellites, or the Soviet 
Union, would scarcely even consider that these specially equipped aircraft 
had been launched on such a mission by Greece, Taiwan, or Japan, even if 
they did have some P2V-7s as part of their MAP. Furthermore, the 
appearance of any aircraft of this type in the inventory of any country 
would be made the subject of an attach report, and any worthwhile 
military intelligence system would have reported within days the existence 
of the exact number of such aircraft. Therefore, if one did show up as 
wreckage in a denied area, all that country would have to do to verify any 
cover story release would be to check its records against what it knew to 
be there and determine if a plane had in fact been lost. The loss would be 
readily apparent. 

Such rather simple abuses of cover would usually lead one to 
conclude that the exploitation of cover was no more sincere than most 
other security devices, and that it had been designed just to play the 
secrecy game in this country, whether it had any merit vis— vis the world 
of Communism or not. But in any case, this is the way it all was done. 

This latter point, about cover itself, was always made a subject of 
prime importance by the Agency. Wherever the planes would be operated, 
they would have to have insignia and special serial numbers; nothing 
stands out more than an unmarked plane. And they would have to operate 
as part of some parent, or cover, organization. To be effective cover, these 
numbers and insignia could not be picked out of thin air. The CIA cannot 
operate aircraft of its own with a CIA insignia on them. This was one of 
the prime considerations during the first meetings with the Navy. 

Discussions went well up to the point of getting the Navy to agree to 
provide the worldwide support and cover this operation would require. 
The Navy could see that if anything ever went wrong with the program, if 
any one of these planes ever crashed or was shot down over denied 
territory, it would be the Navy that would have to bear the brunt of the 
exposure. The Army and Air Force already had a history of going along 



with the CIA; but the Navy, a service that has created a much stronger 
sense of tradition, was willing to help; however, it was never willing to 
"become involved". For a while this impasse brought the P2V-7 
negotiations to a standstill. 

Finally, the "Air Force" people in the CIA decided that they could 
find no other suitable aircraft and that they would have to find some other 
way to get this project going, utilizing their original choice, the P2V-7. 
They asked for a meeting with the Air Force. It took place sometime in 
August or September of 1955. It was finally agreed that the CIA would 
make arrangements with the Navy for the production and purchase of the 
planes and that they would be delivered to the U.S. Air Force. The Air 
Force had agreed, at the insistence of the CIA, to try to establish an 
adequate support program for these Navy aircraft. 

Such a support project is not easy. The Air Force had aircraft with 
similar engines; but everything else about them was different. The Navy 
maintenance and supply manuals were completely different, and the Air 
Force might just as well have been supporting a completely new type of 
aircraft. Parts procurement, which would have to be done with Lockheed, 
the manufacturer, would require that either the Air Force requisition all 
parts from the Navy and then have the Navy go to Lockheed, or the Air 
Force would have to set up a separate supply channel itself to Lockheed. 
In either case it would be complicated. It is as difficult to support seven 
aircraft of a new and distinct type as it is to establish procedures to support 
seven hundred. It would have been easier for the Air Force to have set up a 
line for seven hundred. 

All of these things were worked out, and the CIA "Air Force" 
officers became the project officers at the Lockheed plant. The seven 
planes were given production numbers along with the regular Navy 
production orders, and the project was well under way. Air Force pilots 
were selected for training in these planes, and Air Force maintenance and 
supporting men were sent to Navy schools to learn how to maintain these 
planes. All of these men were eventually informed of the special nature of 
the project and that the CIA was involved. This meant that all of these 
men had to be assigned to the CIA and that they were all volunteers for the 
project. 

It was necessary to designate one Air Force base as the prime station 
for these new planes, for their maintenance and for the basic supply 
stockpile. At the same time the CIA Air Operations staff and the DDS Air 
Support staff had come to the conclusion that CIA air activity had reached 
the point where it should be consolidated on one major base rather than 
spread out all over the world as it had been. Also, the operational missions 
of the Agency had reached a level that required worldwide capability 
instead of local European or Asian capability. The Air Force and the CIA 
agreed to bring all of this together at Eglin Air Force Base in Florida. In 
terms of real estate, this was the largest base in the Air Force, and all kinds 
of special operations could be set up at Eglin without becoming apparent 
to others. 



Also this was the Air Force proving ground, and it was customary to 
find there aircraft of all types from all services, undergoing operational 
training exercises. That base was an ideal location for such an organization 
as the CIA would have once it had been assembled. Agreement upon the 
CIA base at Eglin facilitated the support of the P2V-7s. They would go to 
Eglin also. However, there were differences, and there were problems. 

One of the things the project officer on a regular Air Force 
procurement program is responsible for is to see that new aircraft stays 
within the limits of design specifications and that it does not "grow" in the 
process. If the design weight was to be eighty thousand pounds, then the 
project officer must see that it does not begin to exceed that weight as it is 
developed. This problem of growth usually arises as the result of the 
addition to the airframe of other components that are to be part of the 
plane's armament and electronic (avionics) packages. This was not quite 
the problem with the CIA plane because it would not have armament; but 
because this project had been shrouded in security classification, the usual 
specialists who would have been monitoring the work on these planes 
were not permitted to work on the P2V-7s, and the Agency had its own 
men on the job. Later in the development of the CIA version of the P2V-7, 
it was found that the plane had taken on a lot of weight and that if all of 
the extra gadgets and other components that TSS and other "users" had 
been adding to the plane were to be put on board, these planes would 
never be able to get off the ground. 

As a result, many of these parts had to be redesigned, and all sorts 
of compromises and Rube Goldberg schemes were devised to package 
these additional items. For example, one group of the Air Operations shop 
wanted the plane to have a very modern leaflet drop capability. A huge 
device, which took up all of the space in the bomb-bay compartment, was 
designed. It looked something like an oversized honeycomb. Tens of 
thousands of leaflets could be stacked in small compartments, and then 
when the bomb-bay doors were opened and special motors activated, 
leaflets would be peeled off each honeycomb section and distributed like a 
computer-programmed snow storm. This was an excellent idea, and the 
leaflet spreader worked like magic; but it could not possibly be 
permanently attached to the plane. It was too heavy and it was too 
cumbersome. It would have meant that many of the other gadgets that 
were being planned would have to be left off. 

This started some internal hostilities in the Agency. To pay for this 
P2V-7 project, the CIA Air Operations staff had put together the 
requirements of several offices of the Agency and had pooled their funds. 
This was all right for the purchase of the plane; but it was not a reasonable 
solution for a working arrangement. Every shop that had contributed to the 
purchase of the P2V-7 felt that it had a proportionate right to put 
equipment aboard the plane. However, all equipment requirements do not 
divide themselves into equal packages by weight, and some of these minor 
"piggyback" accessories began to overload the plane. There was no one in 
a clear position of authority and know-how sufficient to overrule each 
claimant. As a result, a number of non-operational concessions were 



made, and each P2V-7 grew like Topsy. 

This is not an uncommon problem, and as we shall see later, this 
overgrowth of technology and the lack of restraint placed upon highly 
classified projects — because the normal "restrainers", the men whom on 
normal projects would have known how to deal with such problems, were 
precluded by security measures from knowing what was going on — 
caused many projects to go wrong and many others to grow and expand 
far beyond the original idea. 

To accommodate this problem with the P2V-7, the manufacturer 
and the augmenting-equipment manufacturers reached the conclusion that 
most of the extra equipment would have to be modularized and made 
detachable. In this way, the plane could be configured for one set of 
targets on one flight and for another set the next time. Even with this 
compromise, certain elements of every system had to be permanently 
installed, and by the time the planes became operational, they were always 
overweight. 

(At this very same time the CIA bad won approval for the U-2 
project, and the Agency was hard at work with its Air Force supporting 
elements, getting that major program under way. This meant another large 
Lockheed project on top of the P2V-7 package. The CIA and the 
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation have always been especially close. At one 
time, the CIA was working closely with one group of Navy specialists and 
with two groups of Air Force personnel, all of them aided by highly 
skilled technical representatives from the Lockheed Corporation. As Allen 
Dulles had planned, the CIA would be able to grow operationally by 
spreading itself into other parts of the Government and into industry and 
by making itself the catalyst for each project, which to the uninitiated 
would seem to be a project of the host service and not of the CIA.) 

Meanwhile, special crews were being trained at Navy bases from 
Whidby Island in Washington to Jacksonville, Florida, and support 
personnel were being made familiar with Navy supply catalogues and 
procedures. Finally the day came when these special planes could be 
flown to Europe. Some operated out of Weisbaden, Germany, for several 
years, and others went to Taiwan. Eglin Air Force Base became the 
logistics support base for their worldwide operational mission. 

These unusual aircraft served many purposes and many masters. 
They possessed an advanced low-level photographic capability. They were 
an operational test bed for highly specialized electronic intelligence border 
surveillance work. They were perhaps the first operationally successful 
carriers of the new side-looking radar system, and they had that novel and 
most effective leaflet scattering system. On top of all that, someone had 
insisted that they have the capability to drop supplies or personnel, so a 
hatch had been cut in the underside of the plane, which could be opened in 
flight for that specialized purpose. 

It was not so much the success or failure of the P2V-7 project that is 



important. The real issue is that after 1955 the CIA had reached the point 
in its development at which it was prepared to take on major global 
operational missions on its own using ~ not just requesting support of — 
the vast resources of the DOD for its own ends. This was a major turning 
point in the process that had begun with the passage of the National 
Security Act of 1947 and that had been moved forward by such other 
events as the Dulles Report of 1949. By 1955 the CIA had progressed from 
its assigned role as the "quiet intelligence arm of the President" to become 
the major operational center of power within the military and foreign 
policy infrastructure of the Government of the United States. The P2V-7 
project was another step on the way and was positive evidence of that 
stage of development. 

The important thing was not the size of the project itself or of the 
CIA operation relative to the gross size of the DOD. Rather, it was the fact 
that the CIA project was an active operation. It was in a sense a major part 
of the battle of the Cold War. 

Thus the fact that only seven P2V-7s or a few squadrons of U-2s 
were involved was not the real measure of the impact of the ST. It was the 
fact that the ST was operational anywhere in the world, fully supported by 
any element or elements of the DOD and its supporting industrial complex 
that the CIA needed for its "fun and games". Thus the Western World 
versus the Communist World Cold War was made increasingly more real 
because the ST was actively, though clandestinely, engaged. 

There was a French colonel in the nineteenth century named DuPicq 
who wrote that battles - the great early battles of history — were not quite 
the massive, total confrontations that historians have portrayed them to be. 
On the contrary, they were the close-up hand-to-hand clashes of the few 
men who were on the contiguous perimeter of opposing forces. Although 
sixty thousand men may have been arrayed on one side confronted by 
eighty thousand of the advancing enemy, the only men actually engaged at 
any one time were those in the front line, and then only those that formed 
part of the front line who actually came into physical contact with their 
counterparts and adversaries. Thus it was the task of the general, the man 
on the white horse, to see that more of his men were in position to engage 
- face to face, hand to hand — the enemy that were on the other side. Yet, 
the shoulder-to-shoulder mass combat of that time meant only so many 
men could effectively be crammed into a given area at the same time, and 
this would roughly be equal for both sides. It was at this juncture that 
tactics and training began to decide the course of the battle. As men in the 
front fell others directly behind them had to move into the fray. As the 
course of battle ebbed and flowed the well-trained, disciplined army 
would seize the initiative at every turn, not so much demonstrating 
superior power as superior training, equipment, and morale. Thus the fates 
of nations and empires rested not so much on huge armies as upon the 
shoulders of a few men engaged on the perimeter of the battle zone. 

In that type of combat, before weapons with longer range — spears, 
bow and arrows, and then guns - the battle was won on the perimeter by 



small circles of men face to face, locked in deadly combat, with no choice 
but to go forward or die, until each adversary fell before the physical 
onslaught. This was essentially a battle of total attrition, with the victory 
going always to that force that outlasted the foe. Victory was total. It was 
won by annihilating the vanquished. 

In a certain sense this is how the Cold War is being fought. It is all 
too inevitable that the two greatest powers on earth should oppose each 
other. General Motors has its Ford; Macy's has Gimbel's, and in nature, 
positive has negative. Major forces always oppose each other. This is 
normal. Even without the incessant reminder of real or imagined, actual or 
potential Cold War, a massive contest would inevitably exist between the 
United States and the USSR in all areas of contact. We should not lose all 
sense of proportion as a result of this realization, any more than they 
should. This confrontation is a fact of life. Thus the battles, large and 
small, of the "war" are the local face-to-face skirmishes between small, 
often unnoticed, elements on both sides. These battles may be social, 
economic, athletic, political, religious, and military. And no matter how 
large or small, how deadly or insignificant, there is only one way to tally 
up the score in the won-and-lost column. It is the same way one scores in 
chess. The game is won by not losing. As in chess, luck plays no part; the 
loser loses his own game. The winner is simply the man who is there at 
the end. 

Thus the Cold War is a massive, totally grim game of attrition. The 
loser will be the one who has dissipated all of his resources; the winner 
will be the one who remains with his force relatively intact. The great and 
terrible truth is that in this type of warfare the loser may be the victim of 
deadly attrition brought about as a result of his own futile actions, as much 
as or even more than by actions of an enemy. Consider the battles of the 
Cold War all waged against the enemy, Communism. In the Berlin airlift, 
for example, there may have been a sort of local victory; but in the true 
measure of victory in the war between the great powers it was the United 
States that paid very heavily and the USSR that made little more than 
verbal onslaughts. On the scale of relative total attrition the United States 
went down and the USSR went up. In this type of scoring, the "up" is 
relative. 

Or look at the score of the massive special operation into the 
rebellion in Indonesia. Again the battle was waged against Communism. 
The cost to the United States was very great, much greater than most 
people realize because so much of what actually took place was concealed 
quite effectively from the American people, although it was not unknown 
to the Indonesians, the Chinese, and the Russians, and for that matter, to 
any other country that chose to know. As a result of that costly Cold War 
battle, again the attrition of the United States was considerable and that of 
the USSR was negligible. 

The Bay of Pigs was another such major battle. We made a great 
investment in resources and in our world prestige. Russia's contribution 
was again little more than words, and they were more the words of Castro 



than of the men in the Kremlin. Even after the gross failure of this battle, 
the United States lost further in the tribute it paid in the sum of more than 
$53 million for the release of the Cuban patriots who had been captured by 
Castro. It might be pointed out here that it is not so much monetary and 
other costs of such a secret operation that are important as it is the fact that 
like the battles of old, it is the ratio — in the Cuban operation, $53 million 
to zero ~ which is so deadly. 

This has been the scoring for the Cold War almost all the way 
along. When Krushchev no more than threatened western Europe with 
medium-range rockets after the outbreak of the Suez attack in 1956, he set 
off a flurry in this country to create a weapon that up to that time had 
never been considered essential. This led to the hasty and fruitless 
development of the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. Hundreds of 
millions of dollars were spent on those rockets, and except for their bonus 
payoff as power systems for certain space projects, the Jupiter, Thor, and 
Polaris (original model) programs were all hasty tributes to the Cold War 
threat. Again United States attrition was in the billions of dollars and the 
USSR loss was little more than the bluster of an angry Krushchev. 

The Cold War has been fought along the perimeter of the zones of 
Communism and of the Free World, along what is called the Iron Curtain, 
the Northern Tier, and the Bamboo Curtain. In a very special sense, it has 
been fought, like ancient wars, by those few who actually brush against 
the hot spots. If anything was ever a better example of the futility of this 
type of conflict than the operation in Indochina, which has taken place 
during the past two decades, it would be hard to find. Here again the 
contribution of the United States, the terrible attrition of our national 
wealth, prestige, manpower, and money has been stupendous. It is really 
unparalleled in the history of warfare. One nation has lost so much and its 
stated adversary has lost and contributed so little. The United States has 
lost more than fifty-five thousand men and the USSR has lost none. The 
United States has lost more than $200 billion and perhaps much more if 
the gross cost is included in this total, and the Soviet Union has lost a few 
billions at the most — only enough to assure that we would not lose heart 
and leave. Unless there is an early realization of these significant facts and 
with it a major change in the course of events in this country, this massive 
conflict may well be the last one of this stage of civilization. By all 
indications now, it is moving on relentlessly to a conclusion of doom for 
the United States. As in a terrible human chess game, the loser is giving 
up all of his men as a result of his own errors, and the winner is doing 
little more than waiting out the game and keeping up the relentless 
pressures. 

This is why it is so important to see how the early small-scale 
contests between the operational forces under the direction of the ST 
began to stir the sleeping giant of the Defense Department into an ever- 
ascending crescendo of Cold War activity. With such minor events as the 
worldwide program of the P2V-7 and all that it involved, with the much 
more significant U-2 program escalating from its first tenuous border 
excursions to that final flight by Gary Powers in May of 1960, the ST was 



preparing itself for other operations, each one larger and grander than the 
one that came before. And each time, as the ST prepared a new operation, 
it was the catalytic force that spurred the passive, counter-punching 
military establishment further into the quagmire of massive attrition. 

By 1958 things had gone so far along these lines that the CIA was 
able to get itself involved in its most ambitious foreign operation. Contact 
had been made with an attach from Indonesia in Washington. This is not 
an unusual thing, and the CIA, the Department of State, and the Defense 
Department are frequently in contact with foreign individuals and groups 
who believe, selfishly in most instances, that with the help of the United 
States they can take over their own Communist oriented government. In 
the case of the Indonesian attach, the CIA was willing and ready to sound 
him out further, because it believed the removal of Sukarno from power in 
Indonesia would return that major Asian nation to the non-Communist 
family of nations. The "anti-Communist" war cry looked especially good 
there. 

Rebel leaders from one end of the Indonesian island chain to the 
other were encouraged to organize and to plan a major rebellion against 
Sukarno. 

Meanwhile, the CIA prepared for its most ambitious peacetime 
operation. A headquarters was established in Singapore, and training bases 
were set up in the Philippines. An old World War II airfield on a deserted 
island in the southwest Pacific was reactivated, and other airstrips on 
remote Philippine territory were prepared for bomber and transport 
operations. Vast stores of arms and equipment were assembled in 
Okinawa and in the Philippines. 

Indonesians, Filipinos, Chinese, Americans, and other soldiers of 
fortune were assembled in Okinawa and in the Philippines also, to support 
the cause. The U.S. Army took part in training the rebels, and the Navy 
furnished over-the -beach submarine back-up support. The Air Force 
provided transport aircraft and prepared the fleet of modified B-26 
bombers. The B-26 is a light bomber in modern terms, but it had been 
fitted with a nose assembly for eight 50-caliber machine guns. This is a 
power-packed punch for this type of warfare. A small fleet of Korean War 
B-26s was prepared, and a number of covert crews were assembled to fly 
them. 

In the beginning, rebellion broke out in various parts of the island 
chain, and loyalist forces were forced to deal with them one at a time. 
While the Indonesian army, under the command of General Nasution, 
began an attack upon the rebels on the main island of Sumatra it seemed 
that the rebel cause would be victorious on the other islands. 

However, the inability of the rebels to win decisive victories and to 
enlist the aid of neutrals or of the regular forces of the Government turned 
the war back gradually in favor of the loyalist army. The struggle was 
protracted, and the CIA threw everything it had into the attack. Tens of 



thousands of rebels were armed and equipped from the air and over the 
beach, but at no time were the rebels ever able to take the offensive. 

Meanwhile, the U.S. ambassador in Jakarta had the difficult task of 
maintaining the semblance that the rebels were acting on their own, and 
that the United States was not involved. As if to strengthen his hand, the 
Chief of Naval Operations, then Admiral Arleigh Burke, sent his chief of 
intelligence to Jakarta right at that time, as much as if to say that certainly 
there was no U.S. military involvement in these attacks. It was an unusual 
rebellion, with the CIA doing all it could to help the rebels and with the 
overt U.S. Government officials doing all they could to maintain normal 
relations. Then, during an air attack on an Indonesian supply vessel, one of 
the B-26 bombers was shot down. The pilot and crew were rescued. The 
pilot turned out to be an American, and his crew was mixed from other 
nations. This American, Allen Pope, had in his possession all kinds of 
routine identification documents, including a set of U.S. Air Force orders 
that proved beyond any doubt that he was an active U.S. Air Force pilot. 
The only choice left for the Indonesians was to assume that he was either a 
U.S. Air Force pilot flying for the USAF, or that he was a U.S. Air Force 
pilot flying in support of the rebels clandestinely at the direction of the 
CIA. 

Things had not been going well, and other CIA assistance had been 
compromised. It was not long before rebel activity was limited to remote 
areas where government control had never been strong in the first place. 
General Nasution continued a mop-up campaign, and the rebellion came 
to an end. 

There were many who asked, when Allen Pope came up for trial in 
Jakarta, how it happened that a man who was flying clandestine missions 
could have been carrying so much and such complete identification with 
him. Why had he not been subjected to a search and other controls that 
would have assured that he would have been stateless and plausibly 
deniable if captured? These same questions were asked after Gary Powers 
had been captured in the Soviet Union after his U-2 had landed there in 
1960. 

The usual procedure requires that the aircraft, and all records that 
might ordinarily have been aboard the plane, and all other airborne 
materials be sanitized before the plane is used on any clandestine mission. 
A considerable amount of money had been spent by the Air Force to 
assure that these B-26 aircraft had been sanitized and that all airborne 
equipment was deniable. 

At the forward base where Allen Pope and the other pilots were 
operating, the CIA was supposed to assure that all crew members were 
sanitized. This required that they enter a crew room, strip naked, and then 
be examined by proper authority. From that room they would enter 
another bare room, where nothing but the flight clothes they would wear 
would be available. All personal effects and other identification would be 
removed and left in the first room. From this second room the crew would 



be driven directly to their aircraft. 

However, all crew members, as all other members of the human 
race, have a strong sense of survival, and they know very well that if they 
are captured and declared to be stateless, they will then have no legal 
means to appeal to the United States or to any other nation and they will 
be shot as spies in accordance with custom. On the other hand, if they are 
captured and can prove beyond doubt that they are American, then they 
become valuable pawns in the hands of their captors. The nation that has 
captured them can deal privately with the U.S. Government in a form of 
top-level international blackmail. The lives of the men involved becomes 
of minor importance by that time to both countries compared to the 
advantages that the capturing country can wring out of the loser with the 
threat of exposure of the facts of the case. This is the key factor in the 
present prisoner-of-war problem with Hanoi. Those prisoners, many of 
whom were captured under unusual circumstances in accordance with the 
compacts signed in Geneva, have become a much more valuable asset to 
the Government of Hanoi than what might be called the usual prisoner of 
war, as in World War II. 

With this in mind, it can be said that every agent takes precautionary 
measures on his own to see that he has some identifying material with him 
if he can possibly get away with it. It is entirely possible that the crew of 
the captured B-26 had their identification hidden in the plane and that they 
retrieved it once they were in the air. This must have been the case 
because the official reports from the base where they had departed on that 
mission stated that they had gone through the inspection process outlined 
above. In spite of all this, the Indonesian Government was able to produce 
at Allen Pope's trial copies of his recently-dated Air Force orders, which 
had transferred him to the Philippines. They had his Air Force 
identification card and a current post exchange card for Clark Air Force 
Base Manila, and such other documents. There could be no doubt in their 
minds that Allen Pope was a current Air Force pilot and that he was flying 
in support of the rebels and for the CIA. Such evidence is all that is 
needed to expose the hand of the United States and to lay this Government 
open to pressures. 

Students and researchers of subsequent action in Indonesia may 
have noted that the Pope case and all that it exposed has cost this 
Government heavily in the years that followed. Although Pope had been 
captured in 1958, it remained for Bobby Kennedy, during the 
Administration of President John F Kennedy, to complete some of the 
remaining "payoff". 

The Indonesian campaign was no small matter. It marked the entry 
of the CIA into the big time. Its failure also marked the beginning of a 
most unusual career for the CIA. It seemed that the more the CIA failed, 
the more it grew and prospered. As a direct and immediate result of this 
failure, the Eisenhower Administration made a searching review of what 
had happened. Unlike the Bay of Pigs investigation three years later, this 
review was not made in public and it was not as gentle on the main 



participants. The leader of all CIA activity in Southeast Asia at the time of 
the Indonesian action was Frank Wisner. He was then the Deputy Director 
of Plans for the CIA. He had gone to Singapore himself to head the 
operation rather than delegate this important task to someone else. Wisner 
was relieved of duty with the Agency, along with several other top 
officials, and the whole team that had worked on that program was broken 
up and scattered to the four winds of Agency assignments. 

This brusque action by Eisenhower, although properly justified, led 
to certain events that have left their record upon history. The activist in the 
Eisenhower Administration who had gone along with Allen Dulles and 
Frank Wisner on this campaign was the Vice President, Richard M. 
Nixon. Also the man who wielded the cudgel when it came time to clean 
house was the same Richard Nixon. In the government civil service 'safe 
haven', it is one thing to censure and to wring hands; but it is an entirely 
different matter actually to fire someone and release him from the 
protective cocoon of government service. Since the Indonesian campaign 
was, technically anyway, highly classified, most other government 
workers did not know why all of these 'nice people' had been fired, and 
since they were cool to Nixon anyhow, they arose in unison to damn him 
when he ran for President in 1960. 

This in turn led to other events of some magnitude. When 
Eisenhower directed Allen Dulles to brief Kennedy and Nixon equally 
during the campaign, Dulles had briefed each of them according to his 
idea of what each needed to know. He knew that Nixon was up to date on 
such things as the anti-Castro campaign, so he did not have to go into 
detail on that with him. And when he briefed Kennedy, he gave the same 
briefing, being strictly fair and equal. This meant that Kennedy had not 
been briefed as fully on the anti-Castro plans as Eisenhower might have 
thought desirable. Allen Dulles was able to report, when challenged, that 
he had briefed them both equally and that he had not gone into the detail 
of the covert Cuban campaign (later Bay of Pigs - this will be discussed in 
detail later). However, other CIA officials at a level well below Allen 
Dulles did see to it that Kennedy knew all there was to know about the 
anti-Castro campaign and everything else that might help him in his bitter 
and strenuous campaign against Nixon. 

Thus Nixon, who carefully observed the limits of security, was at a 
considerable disadvantage, and Kennedy, who could take the stance that 
he was not "officially" aware of classified things of that nature, could use 
anything he chose against Nixon. The assistance that he got across the 
board from the multi-million-civil-servant reservoir of good will easily 
proved sufficient to tip the scales of that very close election in favor of 
John F. Kennedy. It is interesting to see how proper action at the time of 
the Indonesian debacle backlashed against the man who carried it out as a 
member of the NSC. 

With one Deputy Director of Plans gone and with the Agency 
scrambling to find something to do after it had withdrawn from the area in 
Indonesia, Allen Dulles turned his attention to the U-2, which had become 



operational on a grand scale. He made the director of the U-2 program the 
new Deputy Director of Plans for the Agency, thus promoting Richard 
Bissell to the highest clandestine operations spot in the U.S. Government. 

Meanwhile, the P2V-7 project continued to grow and to operate on 
a worldwide scale, as did the U-2 project. The Agency also got itself 
involved in lesser activities all over the world. It was active in Iran and in 
Ethiopia. It stepped up its work in Laos and Thailand, and it was actively 
supporting the Chinese Nationalists in their penetration operations into the 
mainland. Then, in May of 1959, the Agency found itself again involved 
in one of those totally unexpected catastrophes that seem to occur when 
least expected and least desired. 



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Chapter 17 
Mission Astray, Soviet Gamesmanship 



HIGH OVER EASTERN TURKEY, THE BIG PLANE tossed 
fitfully in the turbulent air. Scattered snow-white cloud formations 
billowed above to thirty-five and forty thousand feet. In the brilliant 
sunlight and clear air between the clouds the crew could see the distant 
shores of Lake Van. At Lake Van they would turn to the southeast to cross 
near Lake Urmia and then on to Tehran. All was going well, and they 
expected to be in Tehran on schedule or perhaps a little early. The 
navigator was new in this remote area of the world, but he had noted that 
the winds were picking up, and he had alerted the pilot to watch for the 
turn at Lake Van: "You know, if you miss it we'll be in Russia." 

Five men were up front in the pilot's compartment, and the others 
were in the empty cabin, relaxing. One young crew member, enjoying his 
first visit to the Near East, was taking pictures out of the right side of the 
plane. He noted one particularly high peak rising all by itself from the 
knot of mountains around it. The plane was cruising at about nineteen 
thousand feet, yet this lone majestic peak seemed almost to reach that 
altitude. Then it was lost from sight because of a cloud and he waited for 
his next chance to take another picture. 

In front of them the pilot saw that they were getting quite close to 
the big lake, and he was preparing to turn as soon as he reached its near 
corner. On this highly classified mission, none of them wanted to take any 
chances of being too close to the Soviet Union. If what was in the heavy 
briefcases in a tail compartment of the plane ever fell into the hands of the 
Soviets, the work of many years with the U-2 in the Near East would be 
exposed, and the participation of those friendly Northern Tier countries 
would be compromised. 

As Lake Van dipped under the nose of the big transport the pilot 
took the plane off of autopilot, gently banked it to the right, and set a 
course along the international airway for Tehran, which should have 
brought him just to the east of Lake Urmia. As he was busy realigning the 
autopilot he noticed far ahead, under the base of the cumulus clouds, what 
looked to be the shore of Lake Urmia just about where it should be, 
slightly to his left. Still thinking of the Soviet Union, he gave the knobs 
that controlled the autopilot an extra twist to bring the big bird that much 



more onto the safe side. 

The young airman in the rear of the plane was able to get another 
good view of the big mountain now, off to the right rear, and was 
preparing to shoot another picture when he saw the first MIG coming up 
fast on their wing tip. When he saw another MIG and that undeniable Red 
Star on the big, high slab tail which is the distinguishing feature of the 
MIG, he dashed up to the cockpit and called to the pilot. At about that 
time they all could hear the "thutt-thutt-thutt" rapid fire of the MIGs 
cannon. With MIGs riding just off the right wing tip, the pilot had no 
choice but to detach the autopilot and veer slightly to the left. Then his co- 
pilot noticed the Russian pilot motioning them downward. He told the 
pilot, who cut the power a little and continued to bank left. In this 
maneuver they began to come full circle, and just as they thought they 
might be able to slip into a nearby cloud the whole plane shuddered and 
the men in the cabin saw the left inboard engine burst into flames. Another 
MIG flying just under their belly had given them a convincing burst of fire 
in the left engine nacelle. 

Without waiting, five of the nine men on board donned parachutes, 
jettisoned the big main door as soon as the pilot decompressed the cabin 
air pressure, and bailed out. All of these men landed safely but were 
burned by flying droplets of molten metal coming from the burning 
engine. The other four men had no choice but to stay with the plane. With 
the MIGs flying only a few feet off their wing tips, they gently let the 
burning plane settle toward the fields below. It was then that the pilot 
noted a small unfinished airstrip in the farm land. He leveled off and eased 
the plane toward the only safe haven he could see. As he approached this 
small landing strip, he noticed that the grass was leaning toward his line of 
flight and that wind in the few small trees indicated that he would be 
landing downwind. This meant a fast landing on a small strip; but he did 
not dare to pull the plane up and try again. He could see the flames in the 
white-hot inboard engine, and he knew that the wing would fold up and 
drop off in a few more minutes. He cut his power, dropped the gear, and 
dropped full flaps, all as fast as he could, and drove the big plane into the 
ground, planning to bring it to a halt with brakes and luck. 

The plane stopped skidding, far out into the field, beyond the end of 
the unfinished runway. It had been a rough landing, but they were on the 
ground. Now they had to get out of the plane right away. Because of the 
tail wind, the fire around the engine was blowing forward and had begun 
to engulf the entire wing and cockpit area in billowing smoke. The fuel 
tanks in the outer wing would be the next to go ~ and that would be some 
explosion. The four men on the plane didn't wait to put the ladder down 
from the cabin doorway which was about nine feet in the air. They swung 
from the emergency rope and slid to the ground, then ran away from the 
plane as fast as they could. As they ran they saw smoke billowing above 
the plane. The MIGs swirled above them as much as to say, "Stand where 
you are. We're watching." Just as they stopped running they saw where the 
five parachutes had settled to the earth a few miles away. All nine men 
had landed. All nine wondered where they were. 



In Washington I had just been home for about an hour and had 
started a charcoal fire in the backyard. The steaks were ready, and my wife 
and I were finishing a drink on the patio when the telephone rang. My 
young daughter answered the phone and then called to me, "Mr. White 
wants to speak to you, Daddy." I picked up the phone, and Mr. White 
turned out to be General Thomas D. White, then the Chief of Staff of the 
U.S. Air Force. He did not want to discuss the subject on the telephone, 
but suggested that I go directly to Allen Dulles house and do whatever I 
could to help him with a grave problem that had arisen. 

In a few minutes I was on the way to Mr. Dulles' home. I pulled into 
his driveway just before dark, and as I walked through the house to his 
study I noted four men finishing a tennis match on the court in the rear of 
the house. Allen Dulles had on a vee-necked tennis sweater with white 
tennis shorts and peaked hat. He quickly introduced me to Dick Bissell 
and some of the others who were there and then began to tell me about 
their problem. 

American newsmen in Moscow had been saying that a USAF 
aircraft was down somewhere in the Soviet Union. This report had been 
coming in from Moscow for more than eighteen hours. No one had been 
able to confirm or deny it. The President wanted an answer one way or the 
other without fail. A check of all Air Force aircraft showed that none were 
missing and that none were known to be anywhere near the Soviet Union. 
The other services and all other operators of large transport aircraft that 
might have been in that area were checked. No aircraft were missing. 
Quiet requests had been made to the CIA station chiefs in other countries 
to see if there might have been a foreign plane of a U.S. made type that 
could have gone down in the Soviet Union. For eighteen hours all of these 
checks had proved to be fruitless; yet the story from Moscow persisted. It 
was apparent that the Russians knew more than they had released, and that 
they were letting someone stew over the problem. A picture of a four- 
engined aircraft was given to the press and had been radio-photographed 
to the States. It showed a large plane burning in the last stages of 
destruction. About all that was left was the towering tail section. (Since 
the wind had blown from the rear, the fire had burned the front and the 
wings where the fuel cells were located and had left no more than the high 
tail section.) This gave little to work on; yet it was quite obviously the tail 
of a DC-6 or military C-l 18. 

After I talked with them for a while and listened to all of the news 
they had, I excused myself and went to the Pentagon. In my office there 
was a top secret safe with a special card file on a great number of the 
seven-thousand-odd men who worked with me all over the world in 
special activities that were generally related to the support of the CIA. It 
consisted of a code of names, numbers, and other information that was 
indispensable. I took this box of cards and went down into the basement of 
the Pentagon, to the Air Force Command Post. This is one of the finest 
communications centers in the world. The duty officer authorized me to 
enter and to take over one of the telephone positions there on a matter of 
urgency. 



In a few minutes I had reached the home, in Germany, of an Air 
Force officer who might be able to tell me about a C-118 aircraft that was 
not in the Air Force inventory and which might be the one that was 
missing. The plane I was looking for was one that belonged to the CIA 
itself and one of two considered to be Mr. Dulles' personal planes. I had 
called this officers' home in Germany by private commercial lines to 
bypass the military center in Frankfurt. There would be time for them 
later. 

It was about four in the morning then in Weisbaden when the phone 
was answered by the housekeeper. The officer was not home. I asked 
where he was and learned simply that he had gone on a flight. This was 
part of the answer I needed. I called another Air Force officer, one who 
was a cover type. He told me that the plane was away on a trip. I stopped 
him there and asked him to go immediately to headquarters and to call me 
from there on the secure scrambler telephone. 

About twenty minutes later the security phone rang, and he told me 
that General Cabell, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, had 
arrived in Germany a few days earlier in the special C-118. He had 
authorized a CIA/ Air Force crew to take the plane on a very highly 
classified and important flight to Tehran and Pakistan. Cabell had gone on 
to England in a smaller plane, and the nine Agency men had taken the big 
plane to Cyprus, then to Adana, Turkey and thence to Tehran. He was 
advised to get the names of the nine men involved while I called Adana. 

The next call was to the duty officer at Adana. He was asked to 
check the records there for the C-118. After a few moments he said that no 
C-118 had come through Adana on the day in question. He was asked to 
check again and to query the operations office people even if he had to 
wake them up one at a time. The plane must have gone through there. 
Fortunately, he started his search by talking with the weatherman on duty. 
He had been on duty when the C-118 had left Adana. The meteorologist 
remembered the crew and the plane. Still they could find no record of the 
flight. Finally, the duty officer checked the on-duty operations officer to 
see if perhaps he had held out the clearance papers for that flight. This did 
the trick. A few minutes after I had gotten the complete crew list from my 
contact in Germany, a call from Adana came in, stating that the pilot of the 
C-118 had told the operations officer not to file the clearance he had made 
but to hold it. This was done frequently on such black flights, and it 
accounted for why no one had missed the plane. Ordinarily, any overdue 
Air Force aircraft would be the subject of an alarm and search within one 
hour after its last report of position. The people at Adana did not know 
where the plane was going and the people at Tehran did not know that it 
was expected; so once the plane — this plane of all planes ~ had taken off, 
no one had monitored the flight at all. Its singular disappearance had gone 
completely unnoticed, even to the extent that it was not included on the 
Air Force master inventory or on the DOD master list of all military 
aircraft. 

Having pieced this much together, I called Allen Dulles on the 



direct line to his home and told him that the plane we were looking for 
was General Cabell's plane, but that Cabell was not aboard. Within 
minutes, even at that hour, he was on the phone to his brother, who in turn 
passed the word on to the White House. 

After a few hours rest, I drove back into town and stopped at Allen 
Dulles' house, picked him up and went to Foster Dulles' house, where we 
met the Secretary of Defense, at that time Neil McElroy, and the Chief of 
Staff of the Air Force, General Thomas D. White. The CIA had confirmed 
that nine men were on the plane, that it had left Adana for Tehran, and that 
the men had with them aboard the plane some most highly classified 
material in heavy briefcases. There was nothing to do but announce that a 
military transport aircraft on a routine trip had been blown off course on 
its way from Adana, Turkey, en route to Tehran and that it had landed in 
the Soviet Union south of Baku. At that time we knew no more than that, 
and we did not know that the plane had been shot down. The Secretary of 
State picked up the direct telephone to the White House and spoke with 
the President. The 'official' version of the story was released with the hope 
that there would be no necessity to elaborate further. However, this would 
depend upon the identification carried by the crew members and on 
whether or not the classified materials and other items that might have 
identified the CIA would be uncovered. 

It was not long before the Russians released the story that the big 
plane had violated its airspace and that MIG fighters had forced it down as 
it attempted an escape maneuver, by firing a warning burst into the left 
wing. What we did not know at the time was that the pilot and other crew 
members had mistaken Lake Sevan for Lake Van. This meant that a 
greater than expected tail wind had blown them off course to the left and 
at the same time had put them ahead of schedule. Because of the clouds 
they missed Lake Van, and with Lake Sevan in sight they felt no concern. 
They were sure they were on the right course. The CIA had utilized a crew 
for this flight who did not know the area well, and confusion is not 
uncommon for a new crew in a strange place. Then, with Lake Sevan as 
their mistaken turning point they did see water ahead, which looked like 
Lake Urmia. Not being familiar with Lake Urmia, a larger lake, they 
mistook the distant shoreline of the Caspian Sea for Lake Urmia and 
thought all was well. Actually, on this windblown course, they were well 
inside the Soviet border, somewhat south of Baku, 

The key to their mistake was discovered later, when all of the 
crewmen were questioned and the young airman in the cabin who had 
been taking pictures told us about the huge mountain off to their right. 
That was Mount Ararat, over sixteen thousand feet in altitude and the 
highest peak in the area. Mount Ararat should have been far on their left, 
and they should have turned to the southeast before they ever got near 
Ararat. When the airman revealed that he had photographed Mount Ararat 
through the right window — looking to the south — before the turn, and 
then had seen it again through the same right window after the turn — thus 
to the east — it became indisputably clear that the plane had passed north 
and then well to the east of Mount Ararat. This was far off course and over 



Soviet territory. 

Another thing we did not know was that as the men in their 
parachutes were descending they all realized that they were carrying 
considerable identification, including reference to their USAF "cover" unit 
that might have compromised them; so they began to clean out their 
pockets and tear up all they could while going down. Later, they learned 
that Russian farmers noticed this hail of bits and pieces and that the local 
police had rounded up scores of people, located most of this evidence, and 
reassembled it during their captivity in Baku. 

Another thing that became evident from the selected pictures the 
Russians chose to release was the fact that the C-118 did not burn 
completely; the part that remained after the tail-wind landing was the 
entire rear of the plane — where the classified briefcases were. Tests on 
such briefcases had shown that they could sustain considerable heat and 
some flame without appreciably damaging the documents inside. The 
chances were very good that the entire classified cargo had been recovered 
intact. 

This may have saved the men from lengthy captivity. Knowing that 
they were doing nothing more than transporting briefcases, and that most 
likely they were little more than a crew and not true agents, the Soviets 
may have reasoned that it was better to release the men early. That would 
imply they really believed the men were simply transport crewmen, and it 
would lead us to attempt to find out how much the Russians might have 
gained through the unscheduled gratuity of the briefcases. The men were 
held for nine days, and during this time they were questioned continually. 
The Russians learned all they needed to know and then let the crew go 
without too much delay. 

One episode stands out clearly and supports the idea that they knew 
quite well exactly what they had captured. Aboard was an Air Force 
colonel and the senior officer of the USAF cover unit in Weisbaden, 
Germany. He was a real Air Force officer and his cover assignment was 
deep; but not so deep that he would have had great value to the Russians. 
However, they did not wish to miss any chances. After a few days in Baku 
the Russians approached the colonel and told him that since he was the 
senior officer and since it had become obvious to them that he was simply 
the commander of a transport unit — his cover story — they saw no need to 
have him attend the strenuous interrogations in which the other men were 
involved. In fact, they suggested that he might enjoy a few days fishing on 
the Caspian. They also told him that they had located a teacher who 
happened to be there on his vacation and that this teacher could speak 
English. 

The colonel accepted this offer, and for several days he joined this 
male teacher on hiking and fishing trips. During this time they talked alot 
about the United States. It seemed that the teacher had been in Washington 
during World War II and that he had been a member of the Russian Lend 
Lease staff. The teacher was able to lead the conversation into many 



fields, and the colonel thought it best to speak unrestrainedly in order to 
establish a comfortable relationship that might help all of them to gain 
their release. However, upon retrospection the colonel did realize that the 
teacher seemed to have a most excellent insight into current American 
policies and practices; but in his zeal to win his cooperation the colonel 
tried to answer what seemed to be simple questions, even when they led at 
times into some areas that put a little pressure on secrecy. 

When the men were released nine days after they had been shot 
down, a special team had been sent to the Iranian-Soviet border to provide 
transportation to get them back to Germany without delay. In Germany the 
men went through lengthy interrogations designed to be somewhat 
superficial so that they might let their guard down. Then when they were 
flown to the United States they were put through a program of intense and 
highly professional interrogation by teams of well-trained FBI, CIA, and 
military men. It was the Washington debriefing that uncovered the Mount 
Ararat fix, the location of the briefcases, and the fact that they most 
probably were not destroyed; this debriefing also developed the "school 
teacher" angle further. By about the fifth day of debriefing, the combined 
FBI and CIA team[ll was able to lay a set of pictures on the table before 
the colonel and with apparent ease show him several very good pictures of 
the "school teacher". This "vacationing school teacher" was none other 
than one of the top intelligence men of the Soviet Union. He had been 
with the Russian staff in Washington during the Lend Lease period in 
World War II. The very fact that this man himself participated in this mild 
interrogation on the shores of the Caspian made it quite clear that the 
Russians had found out that they had made a big catch in the capture of 
this one plane. 

This whole incident in some ways presaged the U-2 affair and in 
some ways offered clues to other events that followed. The CIA was 
getting to the point where it took operational matters into its own hands. 
There was no reason whatsoever why the highly specialized and sanitized 
C-118 should have been used on a mission close to the Soviet border. Any 
Air Force aircraft could have been used. Certainly the Russians combed 
the remains of the plane and found a number of odd features, among them 
totally unsanitized and "unmarked" 121 component parts. 

There was no reason whatsoever to utilize an inexperienced CIA 
crew on this flight, when the Air Force had a number of crews that were 
very familiar with the Gordian Knot area of remote Turkey. Actually, 
there is an effective radio beacon homer at the southern tip of Lake Van, 
and an experienced crew would have used it properly. For example, the 
navigator on this CIA crew had not been in this area before and another 
navigator who was with him had not been there for a very long time. 

Perhaps the most damaging oversight, which must have confirmed 
for the Russians that they had caught a pretty special breed of fish, was 
that the CIA used unnecessary secrecy with respect to fight clearances of 
the plane. There was no good reason why the plane, which looked just like 
a regular Air Force plane, should not have used the customary landing and 



take-off clearances that all Air Force aircraft use the world over. This 
would have assured that the flight would have been monitored. Under 
such regulations the Air Force would have noted the silence of that plane 
within thirty minutes, and in any case within one hour after its last contact 
with a ground station. This is standard procedure. Had this been done, a 
search would have been started right away. Then the Secretary of State 
and the President would not have had to deny that a plane was missing for 
a full eighteen hours, while the Russians knew all that time exactly what 
had taken place. They had the men, the plane and the briefcases. It might 
be added that a normal part of an Air Force clearance requires 
confirmation that the crew is competent and has been over the route 
recently. 

Failure of the entire U.S. Government to respond to the reported 
loss of this aircraft certainly signaled to the Russians that this plane must 
have been on a special mission, if nothing else did. One year later this 
same thing happened when the U-2 was lost. At first the United States did 
not know just where the U-2 had been lost. Then, when it was realized that 
it was down in Russia, it was assumed that the pilot was dead; so a cover 
story was used, only to have Krushchev blow it up when he surfaced a live 
pilot and a nearly whole aircraft, both in Soviet hands. 

It goes without saying that the CIA compounded the problems of 
this incident by permitting a most highly secret cargo to be entrusted to 
this plane and crew, when it could have set up a more secure and less 
casual means of transportation even if it had used a normal commercial air 
carrier. Such disregard for real professionalism, in favor of a growing 
dependence upon its new-found strength, independence, and size, became 
more marked as the years passed. 



1. Headed by the same James McCord later to gain notoriety in the 1972 "Watergate" affair. 



2. Industrial components are marked with special numbers, codes and other identifying inscriptions. A thorough 
intelligence system classifies these things and can gain considerable information from such data. (More later.) 



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Chapter 18 

Defense, Containment, and Anti- Communism 



A DECADE HAD PASSED SINCE JACKSON, DULLES, AND 
Correa had submitted their report to President Truman. Allen Dulles, a 
lawyer trained in the ways and traditions of the law, may well have been 
familiar with the famous concept of Dicey on "Law and Opinion". "The 
opinion," according to Dicey, "which changes the law is in one sense the 
opinion of the time when the law is actually altered; in another sense it has 
often been in England the opinion prevalent some twenty or thirty years 
before that time; it has been as often as not in reality the opinion not of 
today but of yesterday." 

With a simple twist that quotation can be made to apply to the 
eventual outcome of the Dulles report. What he wanted and what he 
planned to do as a result of his work and his study in 1948 — fully 
expecting that Thomas E. Dewey would be elected President and that he 
would then become the DCI — had all come about anyhow by 1959. The 
opinion and hopes of yesterday had all but become the law of the day. If 
this was not entirely true as early as 1959, it was under way in the glacier- 
like movement of covert events, as we shall see in the next chapter, and by 
the winter of 1961 the new Kennedy Administration thought that the 
methods being used and exploited by Allen Dulles and the ST were, in 
fact and in practice, the law. 

Dulles was the DCI, and his agency had grown to great strength and 
great power and influence in the Government. As a result of the 
intelligence oversight at the start of the Korean War, we have seen how his 
immediate predecessor had been able to turn that gross mistake into an 
advantage and to establish the concept of the Current Intelligence 
Estimate, and following that success, to develop the practice of the daily 
report to the President. Exploited as it was during the following seven 
years, this device became a most effective tool in the hands of Allen 
Dulles. By playing on what he called "security", he had been able to limit 
the National Security Council's working control of the CIA to a small, 
friendly, and hand-picked Special Group, which instead of "directing" the 
CIA from "time to time", had easily fallen into the practice of convening 
its meetings simply to put the stamp of approval on proposals made by the 
CIA for almost any Secret Intelligence-generated Peace-time Clandestine 
Operation. By 1959 there were almost no restraints. This permitted the 



CIA to avoid entirely the scrutiny of the OCB and to work outside the 
continuing monitorship of that board. In effect, by 1959 the Agency was 
able to run operations itself as it saw fit. 

During this same decade Allen Dulles had been able to accomplish 
his goal to join within one organization the two power-packed elements of 
Secret Intelligence and Secret Operations. Dulles knew that when he could 
combine Secret Intelligence and Secret Operations, he could bring them 
together under conditions of his own choosing to create a force of 
unequaled power. By the time he had created an agency, which by 
bypassing all of the barriers of the law and of the NSC, and with the men, 
the money, and materials sufficient to carry out any operation anywhere in 
the world, he knew that he had succeeded in turning the tables completely. 
He was, for all intents and purposes, in control of the foreign policy and 
clandestine military operational power of the United States for combat in 
the Cold War. In this sense the vast military establishment, including 
much of its industrial supporting complex, had become his orchestra. By 
1960, after Eisenhower had seen his hopes and dreams of peace crushed 
by the untimely disaster of the U-2 flight, he warned of this power and of 
its abuse. 

During this formative decade Dulles had positioned CIA personnel 
and Agency-oriented disciples inconspicuously through out the 
Government and in many instances had positioned the CIA throughout the 
business world and the academic community as well. It will be recalled 
that many of the new Kennedy team came from some of these founts of 
power, such as The Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology. In fact, there were few places where the CIA had 
not taken advantage of covert positions, at home and abroad, for the 
ostensible purpose of gathering intelligence, and for the undercover 
purpose of making it possible for the CIA to mount any operation it chose 
to direct. 

As in the case of the wayward C-118, the support of the rebellion in 
Indonesia, the paramilitary activities in Laos, and other such activities in 
Tibet, by the time the Agency had reached this position of power it had 
become somewhat insensitive to the usual and ordinary restraints that 
normally apply to covert operations. The Agency lost a plane, 
compromised a crew and the U-2 operations, and exposed its hand in 
Indonesia. But instead of halting such risky and fruitless operations, it 
ordered more planes and looked for more "subversive insurgents to 
counter". It was this attitude and this type of activity that led to many 
controversial events that have plagued this Government during the second 
decade of the CIA. 

To understand why the CIA has become so controversial, one must 
understand its motivations and one must understand what happens when 
things are done clandestinely — and by this we mean clandestinely within 
the Government of the United States. Recall that we pointed out how 
World War II ended with Truman's abolishing the OSS and demobilizing 
the military as fast as possible. Recall what is more important, that the 



great war against Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo had been won with the help 
of the Russians. No matter how anyone may feel about the ideological 
distinction between the Soviet Government and the United States, the 
incontrovertible fact is that the Russian people fought the might of 
Germany on their doorstep, and those people, with our material help as a 
factor, utterly destroyed the great German war machine. Those of us who 
have seen the destruction and havoc caused in Russia by that war can 
vouch for the fact that no conflict in history has ever been so massive and 
so total. 

Then, with victory it was only realistic to have some feeling still for 
the people of Russia who had given so much to the common cause during 
that war. And from this feeling there arose in our Government the official 
view, stated on many occasions by the Secretary of State, among others, 
that we must establish peace in this world with the Russians and with all 
people, and that we must not do anything that would divide the world into 
armed camps and divisive forces. While the official spokesmen of this 
Government were pledging their faith in the United Nations and in the 
"one world" of 1946, only one short week passed until the aging Lion of 
Britain stood up on that platform in Missouri with President Truman 
beside him and uttered the great cry of the weak, "Beware!" Here in the 
greatest country on earth, with the greatest victory ever achieved in a 
major war, with armed forces equipped with the most advanced 
technology and production know-how, and with all of this increased by an 
unbelievable order of magnitude because of the possession of the atomic 
bomb and the proven means to deliver and detonate it, we were being told 
to beware of that other ally whose ideology we did not like, but certainly 
whose strength and even whose intentions could scarcely have been 
dangerous in that era. 

But with that cry others were given heart. General Donovan, the 
Dulles brothers, and many others, including Clark Clifford, preached the 
doctrine of containment. Even in those days they saw the Soviet danger as 
a military threat against the United States. How could they support that 
openly? Even George F. Kennan, then in Moscow, warned of the Soviet 
danger; but the great distinction was that he saw Russia as a political 
threat; and the threat that he saw was, more correctly, that the Marxists 
expected that the United States would crumble in spite of itself. Their 
threat was not so much what Communism would do to us as what they 
expected we would do to ourselves. In other words, the Marxists felt that 
all they had to do was maintain the political pressure, and we would 
crumble under the weight of our own weaknesses. 

Then, behind the curtain of secrecy, the Donovan, Dulles, and 
Clifford element began to win the day. No longer did the President stand 
behind his Secretary of State on that declaration that "we shall do nothing 
to divide the world into blocs." But now he listened to the counsels of the 
frightened and the weak as they rigged first the Iron Curtain, then the 
Truman Doctrine, with its shield over NATO, Greece and Turkey, on to 
the Northern Tier, and then to the Bamboo Curtain. By the end of 1947 the 
entire military establishment of this great country was technically, 



semantically, and philosophically reduced to an uncertain and cowering 
defensive posture. From this position it became dependent upon the eyes 
and ears and mentality of the intelligence community to tell it what was 
going on in the rest of the world and where the next threat was coming 
from. From that day to this, this country has been engaged in the most 
massive war of attrition ever fought. 

By now, the terrifying truth of the matter is that in this last great 
total war we have been wiped out in every battle. There is no sense in 
trying to rate the intangibles such as, "We have made friends in Greece" or 
"We did pretty well in the Congo." The facts are that even though we say 
that we are engaged in a war with Communism, which at some point 
inevitably must mean Russia, we have paid all the losses in tens of 
thousands of men, hundreds of billions of dollars, and prestige beyond 
measure. On the other side, the Russians have done exactly what Kennan 
said they would do — preside over our own demise and demoralization. In 
a war of attrition, the winner is he who holds his own position while his 
adversary wastes away. Whether the loser wastes away as a result of 
strategic moves on the part of the winner, or as a result of his own miscues 
is of no concern to the historian. All the historian will note is that like the 
dinosaur, the loser will become extinct in spite of the fact that he seems at 
the time to rule the world. 

The shocking fact is the growth of the power of secret and 
clandestine actions. The legislators and the Administration that passed into 
law the National Security Act of 1947, and with it created the CIA, were 
the same men who most staunchly protested against and denied to the 
Agency the right to become involved in clandestine operations. Yet it was 
patently inevitable that the creation of such an agency would lead to its 
exploitation for just such purposes. 

As the National Security Act visualized, the NSC might "from time 
to time direct" the Agency to carry out a clandestine operation and no 
more. Congress expected that there would be clandestine operations; but 
they saw them only as those operations which the highest echelon of the 
Government would plan and direct. On the other hand, as General 
Donovan and Allen Dulles had proposed, the very success of Secret 
Intelligence would from time to time create its own requirements for 
subsequent clandestine operations for no more reason than that the 
intelligence input had detected something somewhere. The legislators 
knew that clandestine operations would grow out of the findings of Secret 
Intelligence whether or not there was any national plan or policy to carry 
out in the first place. This is why the Donovan-Dulles-Clifford school of 
thought requires the existence, real or imagined, of a constant enemy — 
Communism. With the constant enemy, every bit of Secret Intelligence 
that reveals the existence of Communism is its own reason for the 
development of an operation. Then the counterpunch becomes the action 
of a machine, not of minds. 

Recall the area covered with sprung and set mousetraps we have 
mentioned before. The traps are there, covering every inch of the floor and 



every avenue of entree. All the master of the house has to do is wait until a 
trap has snapped. Then when one trap snaps it most likely activates others, 
which in turn activate others until all the traps go off. While all of this is 
going on, the master of the house comes to one preordained conclusion — 
there are mice in the house and at least one of those mice has just entered 
his domain. His "machine" is ready to do the rest. 

Throughout this period these were two opposing views. The 1st saw 
requirements for clandestine operations arising only after and as a result of 
planning and policy — in other words, from a position of confidence and 
strength; the second saw such requirements as an inevitable result of and 
response to the product of Secret Intelligence — or from a position of 
weakness uncertainty, and re-action. In either case, the resort to the use of 
clandestine operations would be an extremely serious business. 

By 1959 there had taken place a rather sinister refocusing of such 
operations themselves. As we have said earlier, the impetus behind the 
creation of the CIA came from concern over the gross failures of 
intelligence during World War II and worry over the possibility that the 
Soviet Union might acquire the atomic bomb. When the CIA first started, 
it concentrated its limited efforts in those primary areas of interest in the 
heartland and contiguous periphery of the Soviet Union. The CIA in those 
days worked right along with the military as the military establishment 
developed its "new generation" war plans. As a result, all early targeting 
of the CIA was directed upon the Soviet Union as a military adversary and 
on the Iron Curtain countries as part of the primary target area. In other 
words, the CIA and the military were deeply committed to the 
"containment" philosophy and dedicated to the encirclement of the Soviet 
Union and the Communist world. 

This action on a continuing basis taxes the counterpuncher severely. 
He must be always on the alert, always geared for maximum action, and 
unhesitatingly diligent lest the enemy make a move. The war of attrition 
was already beginning to take its toll, even in those early years. It would 
be impossible to maintain a posture of massive retaliation day after day, 
forever, and then to maintain an alert air defense force, as well as a total 
intelligence effort supporting both. The whole "defensive-posture system" 
needed to find some way to maintain its apparent vigilance, but in such a 
manner that would permit it to relax now and then. 

By the end of the decade of the fifties the CIA had found a way to 
do this and at the same time to make it appear that it was as much in the 
center of the fray as ever. It began to find Communism in other areas. 
Rather than devoting all of its time and energies to the Soviet Union and 
its neighbors, the CIA began to see "problems" in the territories of our 
friends. By that time the CIA had spread itself all over Africa, Europe 
(that part that is in the Free World sector), Latin America, and Asia (again 
the part that is Free World). The CIA spent less and less time 
concentrating on Russia and its zone of influence and more and more time 
looking for the influence of Russia and the influence of Communism in 
our own back yard. As the host nations, among them most of our friends, 



became increasingly aware of this intrusion, often an unwitting one, they 
became more and more concerned over the foreign policy and activity of 
the United States because it was clothed almost everywhere in the black 
cloak of espionage and clandestine operations. This had become a serious 
problem. In time this intrusion looked as ominous and sinister as the 
possibility of Communist intrusion itself. 

The change in the very character and traditional nature of this 
country bothered our friends. Historically, the United States has always 
professed to be an open society. This government is of the people, and 
since the power was in the hands of the people, there has always been a 
majority who believe there is no need for limiting that power. Even as 
Franklin D. Roosevelt had assumed more and more power, first to fight a 
terrible depression and then to fight the greatest war in history, few people 
believed that this usurpation of power by the President was anything more 
than evidence of the fact that this power was after all being used for the 
good of the public. Certainly, the American Dream in the minds of most 
foreigners, at least until 1960, seemed to mean that we lived in an open 
society and that the power in the hands of the Government was limited to 
that which could best be used for the good of all citizens. 

But with the advent of the Truman Doctrine we heard the new voice 
of those who had taken the defensive. "The language of military power is 
the only language," it said in part, and "the main deterrent to Soviet attack 
on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world . . . vital to our 
security, will be the military power of this country." This was something 
Americans had always believed, whether they had in mind Russians, the 
Red Coats of the British, or the Blitzkrieg forces of Hitler. But then this 
traditional policy changed: "In addition to maintaining our own strength 
the United States should support and assist all democratic countries which 
are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR." And then, "as long 
as the Soviet Government adheres to its present policy the United States 
should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet 
Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area." 

In 1947, as a part of the Truman Doctrine, this was the way the idea 
of containment was planted as a seed in the minds of the American people. 
This was followed by such things as the Marshall Plan and then the 
worldwide Military Assistance Programs of various kinds. What had 
begun as a plan to contain Russia and Communism with strong military 
force became not a barrier against Russia itself, but a creeping 
encroachment upon the sovereignty and territory of our own friends. 
Whether they wanted them or not, we have kept military forces on the soil 
of our friends for more than thirty years, and there is no end in sight. But 
even more important, we have developed in more than forty countries 
strong clandestine and paramilitary forces far more dangerous to the 
internal welfare of those countries than encroachment of Communism, 
which is supposed to be the reason for the existence of such action. And 
these covert forces exist. The "Communism" they are there to guard 
against is for the most part no more than an interpretation of intent. 



Whether one believes in the inviolability of national sovereignty as 
the supreme power among nations — unlimited, inalienable, indivisible, 
absolute, and the very essence of a state ~ or whether one believes that 
sovereignty is an antiquated idea, its great importance in the community of 
nations cannot be disregarded. If the whole concept of sovereignty were to 
be abandoned, we would of necessity have to fill the void. We would then 
face the fact that we are dealing with raw power, and what is important in 
the nature of power is the end it seeks to serve and the way it serves that 
end. Whether we accept the concept of absolute sovereignty or whether we 
see a complex world riddled throughout with power centers and other 
binding, uncontrollable forms of human relationships, we must realize that 
these rights, in no matter what form, imply certain duties, such as the duty 
of non-intervention in the affairs of other nations and the duty to respect 
the rules and customs of international law. Forcible intervention, which 
was in less civilized times rather common in the relations of states, is now 
no longer either condoned or justified and is almost always met with 
violent condemnation, except where crimes have been committed or where 
international interests of great importance are endangered. 

As this nation turned to a broad though quiet and generally covert 
campaign of worldwide anti-Communism, it pressed its military forces, 
economic forces, and its intelligence arm upon this group of more than 
forty countries. At the same time, it turned from the real Communist states 
such as Poland, Hungary, and others on the periphery, not to mention the 
heartlands of Russia and China. Thus the struggle took place in remote 
areas of the rim-land along the traces of the Iron Curtain. The struggle was 
hidden from the view of most Americans and from those countries where 
there was no activity at that time; but not from the countries that were 
active, such as the Philippines, Thailand, Pakistan, or Iran — and certainly 
these actions were not hidden from the awareness of the Soviet Union. 
Although we may have cloaked an activity on the border of India in 
deepest secrecy, who in India and who in Russia would believe that such 
activity was being supported and directed by anyone else than the covert 
peacetime operational forces of the United States? 

If the Dalai Lama is spirited out of Tibet in the face of an 
overwhelming Chinese army of conquerors, are the Chinese going to think 
he found his support in heaven? If the disorganized rebels on the scattered 
islands of vast Indonesia are suddenly armed with great quantities of 
modern and effective weapons, including transport aircraft to airdrop such 
weapons and the bombers to support their attacks, are the Indonesians and 
the Soviets going to be fooled for even one day by "secrecy" that is 
supposed to keep them from knowing where this all came from? 

The entire position and policy of the United States Government 
turned to the defensive. It abandoned its position of real leadership in 
favor of creating a vast intelligence organization and the mightiest 
peacetime armed force of all time to react to and respond to the activity, 
real and imagined, of the men in the Kremlin. And we became totally 
dependent upon the inputs of intelligence from any and all sources, 
generally quite random, to activate this great force in what, by the time the 



Kennedy Administration came upon the scene, had come to be called 
"counterinsurgency " . 

By this time the entire might of the U.S. military had become a 
reservoir and magazine operating in support of the operational 
machinations of the ST and its paramount force, the CIA. Even though at 
first impact this may appear to be a totally unrealistic picture in terms of 
the disproportionate ratio of strength of the two organizations, it comes 
into focus when we consider the analysis by Colonel DuPicq. That is, the 
only forces that are in combat are those actually on the perimeter — even 
on the three-dimensional perimeter as was Gary Powers in his U-2 and 
these forces not only bear the brunt of the action, but they make the 
victory or the defeat. 

Now a small CIA operation in Laos, for example, involving only a 
few hundred CIA personnel, real and contract, and a few hundred more or 
a few thousand U.S. military in support, may seem too small an effort to 
support the statement that the entire might of the U.S. military existed in 
support of the ST. But if the ST activity becomes a runaway action, such 
as it did in Indochina, it is inevitable that the few hundred, and then a few 
thousand, all too easily became five hundred thousand. 

Thus, in those crucial ten years, the clandestine activities of the CIA 
were redirected from those originally aimed at the Soviet Union and its 
neighboring states to the many nations of our friends, in which we saw the 
"rampant", dangerous forces of "subversive insurgency". And today they 
have been even further directed, along with other powerful arms of secret 
power, to seek the sources of subversive insurgency within this country 
itself. All during this refocusing of direction, the ST has increased its 
utilization of secrecy in order to keep the host nation from knowing what 
was gong on. Throughout this complex series of operations the Agency 
went out of its way to keep this information from the Congress and from 
the people of the United States. There is no doubt that the people of 
Taiwan, of the Philippines, of France, and of many other countries know 
more about what the CIA has been doing during the past twenty years than 
we do here in the United States. 

Even as Congress debates whether or not it should be given more 
intelligence information by the CIA it can be seen that those august men 
are again being misled by the turn of events. Should Congress rule that the 
CIA must brief it on current intelligence matters, it will find itself more 
and more enslaved by the system, just as the President has been by the 
current intelligence briefings which are his frequent diet. Not only will the 
CIA then take over the daily indoctrination of key members of Congress, 
but it will also place them under the "magic" of its security wraps. Every 
day it briefs the Congress, in whole or in part, it will warn that what they 
are hearing is Super Red-Hot, Top Secret and that now that they have 
heard it, they must not mention it to anyone. Then, to provide them with a 
reasonable alibi, since most of those men have an occupational proclivity 
for free and easy speech, the CIA will provide them with suitable cover 
stories. Day after day they will hear about happenings around the world, as 



the ST wants them to hear about them, and day after day they will have 
less and less time to hear about real world events from any other source. 
Thus their own ideas and knowledge of the outside world will decrease 
from day to day. Then to finish what this process does not accomplish, 
consider what the day-by-day pabulum of cover story after cover story can 
do to otherwise intelligent and wholly rational men. 

The record is full of the names of men appointed to high office who 
have come under the influence of the daily dosage of current intelligence. 
Look what it has done to them. At whose doorstep did men like Robert 
McNamara, John McCone, Earle Wheeler, Maxwell Taylor, and countless 
others learn about Vietnam. Their briefings came directly, or at the most 
once removed, from CIA sources, whether they were "in house" CIA men 
like Tracy Barnes and Desmond Fitzgerald, or "across the river" CIA men 
like Bill Bundy, Ed Lansdale, and Bill Rosson. 

The course of these events did not just happen as a random or 
natural development. It was guided, sometimes quite deliberately, by the 
early work of Clark Clifford, or later by such relatively chance events as 
those that took place during the latter part of the fifties. It may be 
worthwhile to trace a course of events that played quite a role in this 
period just before the election of John F. Kennedy to the office of 
President. 

In 1956, just before the Arab-Israeli War, the British, with Selwyn 
Lloyd in the Foreign Office, and the French, with Guy Mollet, had made 
covert plans to help the Israelis against Nasser for their own interests. 
Naturally, General Dayan wanted to defeat and roll back the Egyptians, 
and the British and French were more than willing to help re-establish 
some form of control over the Suez and to relieve Arab pressures on 
Algeria. These three interested partners planned in secret to strike at 
Egypt, defeat the Egyptian army, and depose Nasser. A French undercover 
unit of navy commandos disguised as Arabs was in Cairo for the express 
purpose of killing Nasser. All of this hinged upon careful timing and 
secrecy. Neither Britain nor France informed John Foster Dulles, the 
American Secretary of State, of their plans. As events progressed, Dulles 
played on this lack of formal coordination heavily, assuming the role of an 
unwitting and appalled outsider. However, Allen Dulles was providing 
Foster with all the information he needed in the form of regular and most 
revealing high-altitude U-2 pictures and other ferret-type intelligence. 
These revealed the arrival and off-loading of the French and British 
shipping in Haifa and the subsequent removal of these ships to pick up 
allied forces in Cyprus for the next phase of the operation. 

As is frequently the case in such pressure situations, the partners got 
concerned about one another's sincerity and reliability, and they all knew 
that the CIA has long eyes and ears. Or perhaps Dayan had been tipped off 
that Dulles knew what was going on. For whatever reasons, Dayan jumped 
off against the Egyptians with crushing air attacks about forty-eight hours 
ahead of the joint plans. This locked the British and French into the action 
and called their hands. Dayan swept across the desert. Since the Egyptian 



air force had been utterly destroyed on the ground, he received little 
opposition from the unprotected Egyptian ground forces. The French navy 
commando elements operating under the skillful direction of the youngest 
admiral in France, Admiral Ponchardier, moved in swiftly to do away with 
Nasser. French and British forces steamed across the Mediterranean at top 
speed to join the action. It was certain that Nasser would be knocked out 
in a short time. 

At this point several strange things happened. John Foster Dulles, 
seeing all this before him and knowing, despite his technical protestations, 
exactly what was taking place, demanded that the British and French stop 
where they were and ordered Dayan to a halt. Over the other horizon, 
Krushchev thundered that if the attack did not stop he would hurl missiles 
at all hostile targets in Europe. With pressure from Dulles, from 
Krushchev, and with the vociferous opposition of the Labor Party in 
England to contend with also, Selwyn Lloyd and Guy Mollet submitted. 
They called their troops to a halt. The magnificent plan, which might have 
done much to change the course of history during the past fifteen years, 
was shattered. This Suez affair has perhaps been one of the most 
unfortunate episodes of the past twenty-five years. It prevented the British 
from re-establishing an enlightened control over the Canal, and it created a 
situation that made further French action in North Africa untenable. And it 
has led to fifteen years of unrest on the Arab-Israeli border, not to mention 
what the weight of its failure had upon events in the Far East. One other 
thing that came out of this odd situation had a tremendous impact upon the 
United States. 

The United States Army at that time had been going downhill since 
its glorious days in World War II and its slight though unsatisfactory 
resurgence in Korea. Then, in the pre-Sputnik era the Army had assembled 
a team around Werner von Braun in an attempt to regain some of its lost 
glory in space. Just at this time, Maxwell Taylor, the Army Chief of Staff, 
heard Krushchev's threat to hurl rockets across Europe, loud and clear. He 
and his staff sat down without delay and computed that this meant that the 
Russians must have in operational weapons delivery system that could 
deliver a warhead effectively about 1,750 miles. This was derived from 
the computation of the average distance from Russian launching sites to 
all European capitals. Using this as their battle cry, they set up a great 
clamor for an Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile with about 1,800 miles 
range. The IRBM battle was under way to win supremacy for the Army 
over the Air Force and the Navy in the new missile and space era. 

In the clamor of this battle the Suez crisis was nearly forgotten 
while the U.S. Army and the Air Force fought it out in the halls of 
Congress and before the eyes of the unwary public. The Army came up 
suddenly with an IRBM called the Jupiter and the Air Force with its own 
Thor. Actually there was very little difference between the two. In fact, 
they both utilized the same rocket motor and many other common 
components. However, the battle was on not only for the Jupiter or the 
Thor; but to determine which service would have the primary 
responsibility for IRBM warfare. Behind the scenes those who were in the 



know were aware that the Army and the Air Force were puppets for much 
more serious contenders. 

All of the services were joined in a struggle that really involved the 
most powerful segments of the vast military-industrial combine. The war 
was not so much about which service would be supreme in the missile 
business; but it was about whether the great American automobile industry 
would get the majority of missile contracts or whether the powerful 
aviation industry would get these contracts. The Navy joined in the fray 
later and quietly, on the coattails of the steel industry and the conventional 
munitions makers, with its Polaris system. (The prime contract was 
through Lockheed for the missile structure; but the whole system was 
dependent upon submarines and submarine base support and with a solid 
propellant system that would utilize vast quantities of explosives, which 
would mean huge contracts for the munitions industries.) Forces were 
joined, and Maxwell Taylor was at the forefront, leading his Army 
contenders and fronting for the automobile industry. At that time the 
Secretary of Defense was the former president of General Motors, Charles 
Wilson. The ensuing decision from which there could be no escape was 
not for him to avoid or to make. How could a pre-eminent auto maker rule 
against his industry? On the other hand, how could he rule against aviation 
and its powerful industry? With every practice missile shot, the tensions 
mounted, and Maxwell Taylor was demanding a decision. He saw this as 
essential to the automobile industry, which had always bee